This article is, in fact, a continuation of a series of articles on the history and prospects of the Russian Navy, on one of the key issues - "the problem of the Russian aircraft carrier."
For the first time, the question of the possibility of implementing an aircraft carrier based on the corps of the project of a heavy missile cruiser (TARKR) of project 1144 was raised by the author publicly in 2007 in the article “Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will?"
… 7. Construction of a new light training aircraft carrier (landing helicopter ship) or re-equipment of the project 1144 missile cruiser as an aircraft carrier (for example, repair with modernization of the TARKR "Ushakov" or "Lazarev" as an aircraft carrier). The presence of the second "deck" will allow to supply Kuznetsov for proper repair (or to provide the Pacific Fleet's "ship deck").
However, the idea itself arose much earlier, in 1994. During the period of cadet practice in the Northern Fleet. On the TARKR "Kirov", with the clarification of the issue in the development of documents on the possible promising appearance of the Navy in the 2000s (including taking into account financial and other restrictions).
Indeed, the hulls and power plants of the Project 1144 cruisers that remained at the disposal of the Navy at that time were quite possible to rebuild them into light aircraft carriers. One would definitely be able to
Once again, I emphasize that the issue of efficiency (including the criterion "efficiency - cost") of an aircraft carrier is not worth it (its effectiveness has been studied and confirmed by a number of studies). The question can only be in its (air group) appearance and models of application.
Of course, a small aircraft carrier is theoretically inferior to a large one not only in terms of combat effectiveness, but also in terms of "efficiency - cost" … Here I quite agree rated by A. Timokhin (and specialists from the US Navy and the RAND corporation, who investigated the issues of "various dimensions of aircraft carriers").
For example, the labor intensity of the construction of American atomic "Nimitz" is about 40 million man-hours. At the same time, the labor intensity of the four times smaller British light aircraft carriers of the Invincible class is only half as much - about 22 million man-hours.
However, this approach does not fully assess a number of practically significant factors.
First. No matter how good a "large aircraft carrier" is, if it actually does not exist, there is no subject of the conversation itself. Here it is necessary to note the operational requirements with which one aircraft carrier is "almost none".
Second. Naval battles are not "sports competitions", where the comparison is made in roughly equal conditions and according to strict rules. It is clear that the overall potential of the Nimitz is many times greater than the Charles de Gaulle-sized aircraft carrier. However, for the case of the Soviet Navy (and the Russian Federation), no one was going to bring the aircraft carriers to the "lists" "one-on-one". The main strike tool of the Navy was long-range operational anti-ship missiles (anti-ship missiles ON) from ship and aircraft carriers. At the same time, the optimal task of our aircraft carrier was to provide (reconnaissance, air defense) our strike forces.
In fact, an aircraft carrier in this capacity is a means of obtaining data about the enemy, which can be used for precise target designation to ship missile systems. Moreover, the effectiveness of this, even for a grouping with a single ship of Project 11345, could be almost an order of magnitude (!) Higher than the effectiveness of strike forces (including enemy losses) operating without a TAVKR. If our TAVKR began to participate in joint delivery of strikes, then its effectiveness "sagged" to 1, 1–1, 5 (coefficient of efficiency gain). There were more than enough missiles in the USSR Navy, but there was a very big problem with the feasibility of the fleet's strike potential.
On the scale of the "great confrontation of the cold war", a number of aspects of this were considered in the article “Once again about the myths of the post-war shipbuilding. Integration of long-range missile weapons and air defense aircraft carriers will be a good solution for the Russian Navy. "
Write-off of "Lazarev" was determined by "Nakhimov"
At the end of April this year, the aircraft carrier "Admiral Lazarev" in tow set off on its last trip from the Fokino base for disposal.
In fact, this put an end not only in the fate of this ship, it became a symbolic turning point in the part of the naval reserve left to us from the USSR.
The modernization of the 3rd generation ships turned out to be a complete failure, and the extremely rare cases of this (TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov" and BOD "Marshal Shaposhnikov"), in fact, confirm this.
Project 1144 ships had a service life of more than 50 years, and it was the thoughtless and extremely costly modernization of "Nakhimov".
In fact, what is being completed today at Nakhimov is a senseless sawing off of a huge amount of resources. For two key reasons: the ship does not have a sane concept and application model, being in fact the Yamato of the XXI century (despite the fact that the battleship Yamato itself was sunk by aviation with minimal losses back in 1945), with a colossal level of financial costs on him (absolutely disproportionate to his capabilities). “Nakhimov” became the “golden log” of our defense industry complex (which was “sawed off” with great pleasure). Against the background of this main thing, the constant failure to meet the deadlines for it is already perceived as "commonplace".
Taking into account the fact that the Nakhimov scam raises a number of very bad questions (including to the persons personally responsible for all this and actively participating in this “assimilation of budgetary funds”), an information campaign “in justification” has begun:
Doves of peace. The Eagles also have another secret. Of the four built ships - "Kirov", "Admiral Lazarev", "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Peter the Great" - by the end of the 90s, only the last was fully operational. The first-borns of the series, because of the "subcontractors", surrendered to the fleet literally unarmed.
In short, this is an absolute and shameless lie. And below this will be in more detail, with details and facts.
However, in the course of publication, the "degree of lies" simply "takes off":
In 1996, the cruiser "Peter the Great" saved from such a case, one might say. The visit of the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin was planned to St. Petersburg. As usual, in order to resolve stagnant problems, the command of the Navy included a visit to the Baltic Shipyard in the program of the head of state. The stake was very clear - he would see the giant and give money for its completion. They say that at this moment another miracle happened - the unfinished "drowned" literally at the quay wall.
That is, in "sober mind and good health" it is declared about the drowning of a ship with a nuclear power plant in the middle of the 90s in the center of St. Petersburg! Sorry, but this is not even a fake, this is not a duck. This is just an outrageous lie from start to finish, indecency, and it was published (by an "expert" with a "well-known name") not in some kind of "yellow sheet", but in … the TASS agency (link)!
Actually, all this is done by "pseudo-experts" in order to justify the next delays in the terms of "Nakhimov":
A similar story is observed with the new anti-aircraft missile system. It seems that instead of the S-300 or S-400 "Triumph" on the "Admiral Nakhimov" they can install the newest S-500 "Prometheus" … However, with all this, none of the first persons ever spoke about the existence of a naval version of such a complex. And the naval version is always different. At least by the fact that the ship's radar stations operate in different conditions and modes than their coastal counterparts, they have to be built practically from scratch. It means that if the fleet really insists on the best, then the delivery time of the cruiser will increase even more.
And now the facts.
The first atomic heavy missile
The most difficult component of the new TARKR weapons was the S-300F "Fort" air defense system.
From "Historical sketches of Captain 1st Rank V. K. Pechatnikov" on State tests of the air defense missile system "Fort":
Admiral Bondarenko, said that from now on the ship and its crew will work as in battle. Subsequently, no one, except for the admiral and the commander of the ship, knew from which direction and which target would be launched. A combat alert was simply played and a simple task was solved - to shoot down everything that appeared in the air. After some fuss at the first shooting, the personnel gained confidence, and it was the regime proposed by the admiral that led to the fact that almost the entire volume of shooting at the final stage of testing was completed in 12 days …
On August 25, 1983, having already completed the last firing according to the test program, the ship returned to Severomorsk. Admiral Bondarenko played a combat alert, the personnel fled to combat posts. It turned out that Zam. The commander-in-chief for combat training decided to give another RM-15M target from his reserve. The boat fired from under the coast of the Kola Peninsula, and in the sea along which the ship was sailing, it was at least 5 points. I was on the bridge and I felt uncomfortable when the hatch covers of the launcher opened, and a wave at that time covered the fire deck. The rocket went off without comment, and then everything went on as usual. People grumbled: "Well, who else needs to be shot down?" There was no more shooting.
Be that as it may, the draft of all documents was sent to the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union DF Ustinov for submission to the country's leadership. But he did not believe the successful completion of the tests and ordered the entire live-fire program to be repeated.
Nobody began to challenge the minister's order, but only repelling the attack of six RM-6 targets was repeated. DF Ustinov did not believe the successful results and ordered the transfer of the Slava RRC (project 1164), which had already entered service, to the Northern Fleet and a series of joint firing. As a result, 96 missiles were used for all additional firing.
Observers from all control bodies made sure that only personnel were working. The result of each shooting was reported personally to the Minister of Defense, while the rest of the ministers watched the events in the north with bated breath. Our department did not go to these shooting, the URAV Navy represented the combat training department. All shooting gave 100% success. Only having received such brilliant results, the minister signed the documents and presented them at the instance.
It is worth noting here that the issue of delivering really combat-ready ships was so acute that the head TARKR "Kirov" received modifications of a number of key complexes from old ships, for example, the anti-submarine missile system "Metel" and BIUS "Alley-2M" (with their replacement with complexes 3rd generation "already on the next ship of the series - aircraft carrier" Frunze ").
And here it is necessary to note the exceptional role in ensuring the development of new ships of their first commanders - the lead (TARKR of the Northern Fleet "Kirov") A. S. Kovalchuk and E. G. Zdesenko (TAKR Pacific Fleet "Frunze").
When Kirov's officers write that they had photographs of their Commander (with a capital letter) in their cabins, they do not exaggerate at all. A. S. Kovalchuk had great respect and love from his men. And this is, among other things, a personal assessment of the author, who already found Rear Admiral Kovalchuk as the head of the VVMU named after V. I. Frunze at the beginning of the very difficult 90s.
About Commander Zdesenko I have heard similar assessments already at the Pacific Fleet. Those interested can familiarize themselves, for example, with memoirs of N. Kurinus.
Yes, it’s impossible to say that “everything worked 100%”. And this applies, for example, to a number of CIUS tasks. But the "combat systems" and tasks on the new TARKR worked completely in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements for development.
And here the main question arises about Project 1144 - did they make sense, or did they represent, according to some authors, "a victory of common sense over technology"?
And the answer to this question is "His Majesty the Aircraft Carrier."
System-forming factor of the operational connection
Preliminary work on the future aircraft carrier of project 1144 began in the early 60s. However, full-scale work unfolded almost simultaneously with the deployment of work on our full-fledged aircraft carriers (Project 1160 "Eagle").
And in this version of the TARKR project 1144 acquired their deep meaning and very high efficiency: with long-range air defense systems, they not only provided the middle air defense line of the operational connection with the aircraft carrier, but also, due to a powerful strike complex, fettered the activity of enemy aircraft (forcing always to have a reserve of interceptors for parrying this threat). At the same time, the nuclear power plant on cruisers and aircraft carriers provided a huge range and high operational mobility of such a compound.
Actually, the example of the US Navy was before my eyes:
As a result, the history of our aircraft carriers turned out to be very complex and winding. However, at the end of the 80s, the construction of nuclear aircraft carriers in the USSR was started (moreover, with large-block construction technologies that were ahead of the United States). And if it had not been for the collapse of the USSR, by the mid-2000s, the USSR Navy would have only nuclear-powered - 3 aircraft carriers.
That is, the well-known phrase about the 1144 project "victory of technology over common sense" had grounds only in relation to the TARKR project 1144 without an aircraft carrier.
At the turn - "status ship"
In 1987, a symbolic meeting at sea of the Frunze TARKR and the Chinese destroyer Chongqing (a missile destroyer based on our Project 41) took place.
The newest powerful ship of the USSR Navy at the peak of scientific and technological progress and an obsolete PLA ship for twenty years, a meeting on the "threshold" of the death of a great power …
In the future, the PLA Navy showed the whole world what stubborn and purposeful work on construction and improvement is - with claims that have already emerged today to become the No. 1 fleet in the world.
The Russian Navy in the early 2000s was left with the only TARKR "Peter the Great", which became the most "status" ship of the Navy.
The political influence and effect of "Peter the Great" became one of the key justifications for the repair and modernization of the aircraft carrier "Admiral Nakhimov". Alas, like a missile cruiser - Yamato of the XXI century.
The problem is that Yamato would be good at politics (if the Japanese hadn't kept him so secret). But the realities of hostilities showed that for the Japanese Navy it would be much more useful instead of one more (several - instead of the entire series of super-battleships) heavy aircraft carrier. And the final assessment for him is the restructuring of the last hull of the battleship "Shinano" into a heavy aircraft carrier.
Returning to the Aircraft Carriers
The question arises, which aircraft carrier could have turned out on the basis of the TARKR project 1144?
And as a qualitative example of an aircraft carrier of this "dimension", one can recall the English R12 Germes (and further Indian), whose air group even included heavy attack aircraft Blackburn Buccaneer (that is, heavier than our MiG-29KUB). And from which, for experimental purposes, even the F-4B Phantom multipurpose fighters flew.
The dimension of such an aircraft carrier provided even the basing of our most promising carrier-based aircraft - the Su-33 KUB … Alas, but to the question of the author of the article on this aircraft to its chief designer K. Kh. Marbashev a little over a year ago, the answer was:
I was left alone …
And now the chief designer is gone …
Official obituary of OKB "Sukhoi"
On April 13, 2021, after a serious long illness, the chief designer - director of the naval aviation program Konstantin Khristoforovich Marbashev … passed away. In 1983 K. H. Marbashev was appointed deputy chief designer, and in 1989 - chief designer of the Su-27K (Su-33) ship fighter … In the period from 1992 to 1999, K. Kh. Marbashev was deputy general designer for naval issues.
In 1996 he took a direct part in a three-month military campaign in the Mediterranean on the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR as part of a squadron of ships of the Northern Fleet. From 1999 to the present, K. Kh. Marbashev held the post of chief designer for the Su-27 KUB aircraft.
An amazing photo, full of hope, and feelings of victory, and great success after hard work! In the photo there are emotions, but the emotions of persons whose official position (test pilot, chief designer and general director) said better than any words that the task of creating effective aircraft carrier forces of the USSR Navy was absolutely solvable.
Marbashev is no longer with us, the entire ship direction of the "dry" "hung in the air."
However, we have a shipborne MiG, the development potential of which is far from being exhausted.
From the article "The Second Life of the MiG-29 Shipborne Fighter" by its Chief Designer I. G. Kristinov in the magazine "Wings of the Motherland" No. 9-10, 2019:
… On January 20, 2004, two contracts were signed in Delhi at the same time:
- for the repair and re-equipment of the ship "Admiral Gorshkov";
- delivery to the Indian Navy of a batch of 16 MiG-29K / KUB aircraft (12 combat MiG-29K and 4 combat training MiG-29KUB).
… The signed contract was of a purely delivery nature, and there was no provision for an R&D project to create an aircraft that would meet the requirements of the Joint Staff of the Indian Ministry of Defense (Osh MO (Indian Navy)) for a carrier-based fighter.
De facto, the RAC had to be carried out by the RAC "MiG" itself. At the same time, its cost turned out to be very, very modest. According to unofficial information on special forums - about $ 140 million (for comparison, the development work on the Su-30MKI in the early 2000s cost about $ 300 million). This is for questions like "where is AFAR on the MiG-29KUB?"
For this little money, the following was done:
In connection with the requirements of the (OSH MO (Navy) of India) to equip the MiG-29K / KUB aircraft with a number of foreign-made equipment (9 items), obligations were taken in the contract and funds were allocated for the integration of this equipment into the avionics of aircraft. At the same time, in accordance with the "Regulations on the creation of military aviation equipment" and other regulatory documents FSUE "RSK" MiG "was obliged to carry out R&D work, conduct a complex of ground and flight tests and obtain the corresponding Conclusion of the NIO of the Ministry of Defense of the RF on production of a batch of serial aircraft and their operation in combat units.
To carry out the design work, it was planned to build:
- two experimental aircraft (1 - MiG-29K (single combat) and 1 - MiG-29KUB (double combat training) for flight tests;
- two airframes for static and life tests;
- 28 stands for practicing and ground testing of various aircraft systems and assemblies.
And the "preliminary result" for the Indian Navy:
Today MiG-29K / KUB aircraft are intensively operated in the Indian Navy, including from the ship. As of January 1, 2019, Indian Navy pilots performed more than 16,500 flights on MiG-29K / KUB aircraft, including more than 2,800 flights from the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier and 900 flights from NITKi.
The article also contains about us (the Russian Navy), but completely different assessments and emotions.
According to the situation today, the MiG-29KUB continues to be an effective machine. The main question of its prospects is the possibility of effective confrontation with aircraft of the F-35B (C) type. And there are solutions in this direction (provided that the MiG is considered not abstractly "one-on-one" with "Lighting", but as an element of the operational formation system of the Navy).
The conclusion from all this - the creation of an aircraft carrier based on Project 1144 and the formation of an effective air group for it was technically absolutely real. Moreover, the relatively low cost of operating such an aircraft carrier made it possible to ensure a high intensity of its use (including the development of issues of using aviation with high intensity). The necessary supply of aviation fuel for this could well have been provided by the installation of onboard boules (at the cost of losing a couple of full speed knots).
AWACS question
Here the question of AWACS arises.
On R12 Germes, AWACS tasks were solved by a Gannet AEW.3 turboprop aircraft with AN / APS-20 S-band radar and AWACS data transmission equipment to the AN / ART-28 ship (that is, the fighters were controlled in the main version from an aircraft carrier).
The Gannet AEW.3 was operated in the British Navy until December 1978 (the withdrawal of the last "classic" aircraft carrier Ark Royal) … And "tomorrow there was a war" (Falklands), where the "royal navy" was on the verge of defeat. Largely due to the lack of AWACS for low-flying targets.
After the Falklands, the British Navy urgently adopted AWACS helicopters.
The creation of the domestic Ka-31 AWACS helicopter was envisaged simultaneously with the Yak-44 carrier-based AWACS aircraft. However, it was significantly ahead of schedule. In fact, at the end of the USSR, they managed to make the Ka-31. And already in the 90s, after a relatively small and inexpensive revision, it went for export.
Speaking about comparing AWACS aircraft and helicopters, it is worth citing opinion of a domestic specialist (at one time directly related to the subject of the Su-33KUB):
We were supposed to have both airplanes and RLD helicopters. At the same time, the aircraft conducted long-range observation in a likely threatened direction, and helicopters over the TAVKR (while sharply increasing the radio horizon) in less likely directions.
The capabilities of an airplane and a helicopter are different, but their combined use leads to more safety for less money. For example, an RLD aircraft searches at the turn of 350 km, with a view range on the target of a fighter of less than 400 km, in "less probable" directions, in fact, it will not help the ships in any way. Since he sees in the same way as the ships themselves with their radars. A helicopter RLD, flying just over the TAVKR, sees fighters 100-150 km around.
At the moment, the domestic aircraft carrier will operate where there is no pronounced threatened direction, the threat is rather circular. In these conditions, the helicopter is simpler, cheaper, has a variety of bases and, finally, it is. The need for an RLD aircraft may arise with an increase in the number of its carriers, if it is not replaced by space vehicles, UAVs.
Finally, in place of 1 Yak-44, about 5 Ka-31s can be accommodated in the hangar. The Yak-44 can stay in the air for 6 hours and make 2 flights a day, the Ka-31 can stay in the air for 3 hours and make up to 4 flights a day. In total, 2 Yak-44 or 2 Ka-31 are enough for round-the-clock patrolling around the ship, only they have a different viewing area. At the same time, both significantly increase the radio horizon of the connection.
And if you provide a similar viewing area as the Yak-44 (above the compound), then it is necessary to keep 4 Ka-31s in the air.
Total: to perform the same mission, you need 2 Yak-44 or 8 Ka-31. Taking into account the coefficient of combat readiness: 3 Yak-44 or 10 Ka-31. In this narrow (but important) task, the advantage is for the Ka-31.
And data on the radar AWACS (from him):
E-700 (Yak-44) target detection range EPR = 3 sq. m - 250 km (for 1, 8 sq. m will be 220 km), "Harpoon" will see at a distance of 165 km.
E-801 (Ka-31) target detection range EPR = 1, 8 sq. m - 110-115 km. "Harpoon" will see at a distance of 85 km.
Author's note
In addition, there are "alternative ways" AWACS. For example, using the ZG radar. And these are not "theories." From the memoirs of a veteran of the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, retired colonel G. Ya. Kolpakov (monograph "History of domestic radar" 2011):
In 1987, at the Reflection-87 exercise, the Korona-2 over-the-horizon radar (ZG radar) (Nikolaev), two MiG-31 fighters (the basing airfield was 2,100 km away from the ZG radar) participated in the experiment. intercepted targets - one Tu-16 and one MiG-23P aircraft each (the base airfield was removed from the ZG radar by 3100 km) … During two flight days, four guidance and interceptions were provided (respectively, two bombers and two fighters) … voice guidance, by issuing target coordinates according to the "legend", the mode of operation of the onboard systems of fighters - "onboard search".
In 1988, the Zrachok-M radar station (Komsomolsk-on-Amur), two MiG-31 interceptors and two MiG-31 interceptors (the airfield was removed from the radar station by 3000 km) took part in the experiment.) … Automatic guidance of fighters (on board the fighters was installed special equipment for interfacing with the ZG radar).
Note
The tasks of the operational connection with the aircraft carrier based on the project 1144 and the model of its application
Speaking about the real ability of a light aircraft carrier to really solve the tasks of the Navy, the question of seaworthiness when working with aviation immediately arises. After the article was published “Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will? the author received a number of very critical remarks from shipbuilding specialists from the 1st Central Research Institute of the Navy, which can be briefly characterized by the phrase:
A light aircraft carrier of the Navy is not needed, since in most cases it will not be able to use its air group due to excitement.
In fact, their argumentation repeated the already expressed and widely known theses of the specialists of the 1st Central Research Institute Kuzin and Nikolsky.
The problem is that in our country the effectiveness of ships is usually judged by "mechanics" who too often have a very vague idea of the fleet's combat assets, tactics and operational art. The indicated authors themselves are a good example of this (the devastating criticism of which is given, for example, in "Once again about the myths of post-war shipbuilding"). Moreover, such a "mechanical approach to tactical issues" received neat but harsh criticism in the GosNII AS monograph on naval aviation.
In general, the issue of the evolution of the concept of a domestic aircraft carrier is worthy of a separate article, especially since such a very authoritative source as the specified work of the GosNII AS (with all its advantages and disadvantages) has not yet been introduced into wide public discussions on aircraft carrier topics.
However, within the framework of this article, two points are fundamental.
First. The seaworthiness of the use of aviation by light aircraft carriers can be significantly increased. It can be either a special system of pitching control, for example, on the "Charles de Gaulle", which made it possible to increase seaworthiness for aviation, from the aircraft carrier "Clemenceau" of a larger displacement, by as much as two points (!), And "a number of other methods."
Second. With an increase in the sea level, not only light aircraft carriers receive significant restrictions, but also other ships (and even "nimtsy" - despite the formal ability to fly, for example, at 6 points, its air group under these conditions has serious restrictions). Without going into details, in short - the decrease in the effectiveness of a light aircraft carrier in such conditions as part of an operational formation is quite possible to compensate by increasing the effectiveness of the use of other means against enemy targets (in conditions of high sea waves).
All this our "shipbuilders-mechanics" simply refused to perceive, understanding only one thing - the "mechanical" length of the ship's hull. Which (the building), based on their requirements, turns out to be simply unrealistic for construction and extremely problematic in (theoretical) operation.
The main idea of the model for the use of a light aircraft carrier of the Navy can be to ensure combat stability and support its forces in the near zone as part of an interspecific grouping of forces in a theater of operations against a "strong enemy" the oceanic zone against the "weak enemy".
The question arises - what about the missiles? All these "Calibers", "Onyxes", "Zircons"? And they could very well be placed on the modernized APRK of project 949AM, with their inclusion in the operational connection with an aircraft carrier based on the project 1144. Alas, the modernization of these submarines was disrupted.
Here it will be very appropriate to recall the experience of the USSR Navy with the inclusion of formally completely outdated and very noisy nuclear submarines of the 675MKV project with long-range and effective anti-ship missiles "Vulcan" as part of a surface task force, where the use of formally completely outdated nuclear submarines was very effective.
Some financial aspects
We will not recall the epic with the repair of "Admiral Nakhimov" here. Everything could have been done much cheaper. On the ship, they simply "mastered the funds."
It is interesting to compare prices for various types of weapons and military equipment, while solving similar problems. Without going into details, here are some comparative values.
For example, the "Soviet" cost of the TARKR project 1144 was equal to about 4 destroyers of the project 956 or 27 interceptors Su-27. The cost of the TAVKR project 1143 (with the Yak-38) was one and a half times higher than the cost of the TARKR project 1144, while the cost of operating the TAVKR was twice as high. The difference in the cost of the Project 949A APRK and the TARKR was less than the cost of the destroyer (while the cost of the Project 949A APRK slightly exceeded the cost of the Project 971 cruising nuclear submarine).
Comparison with the Marine Missile Aviation (MRA) is very interesting, here the "equivalent" to one TARKR will be 16 Tu-22M3. Only the "devil", as you know, is "in the details." And if you start to deal with them, then "it suddenly turns out" that the cost of an hourly operation of a huge TARKR and a small (albeit heavy) bomber differs by less than 3 times.
That is, the active use of aviation is very expensive. Unlike ships.
Unfortunately, the works in which these (and other) issues were deeply worked out, for example, the articles of Rear Admiral Matveychuk (then the head of the department of surface ships tactics of the Naval Academy), still remain closed (although today they do not carry there is no state secret in itself).
However, on the basis of some permitted publications, it is possible to reach the approximate modern cost of operating ships and aircraft (and taking into account the operational stress factor). However, it is advisable to consider this issue in a separate article.
A brief conclusion from all this is that a light aircraft carrier in the "dimension of 1144 project" is not just financially feasible, but quite real within the framework of a series of ships, with their active operation.
Common sense in a minimal version
When carrying out the current modernization of the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR (as a missile cruiser), alas, the possibility of “minimal aviationization” due to the deployment of a reinforced group of helicopters was completely missed. Nominally, 3 Ka-27 helicopters are based on the TARKR project 1144. However, the very large modernization capabilities of the 1144 project made it possible to multiply this number.
And that would be very important and effective.
PLO helicopters could (provided the required number and the installation of an effective anti-submarine complex) provide the necessary "safety radius" from torpedo attacks by submarines during independent active maneuvering of a nuclear cruiser at high speeds.
AWACS helicopters - to provide the necessary detection range for low-flying targets and the possibility of over-the-horizon guidance of long-range missiles at them.
The deployment of Ka-29 landing helicopters and Ka-52 attack helicopters provided the possibility of at least minimal "force projection" from the sea to the shore.
Alas, but the "mechanical replacement" of old complexes with new ones, in the complete absence of any sane concept of such a ship, preserved the situation of "victory of technology over common sense." The helicopter group on the Admiral Nakhimov did not receive any reinforcement.
Unique hull and unexplored survivability protection issues
One of the "bugs" that allegedly "modernization of ships is not needed" is the thesis that the cost of the hull is supposedly "less than 20%" of the cost of the entire ship, and, accordingly, it is supposedly "easier to weld a new hull."
However, in the case of the TARKR project 1144, this is absolutely not the case. To the extent that there are compelling reasons to doubt that in today's conditions it will be possible to repeat such corps for a reasonable time and cost.
The hulls of the ships of Project 1144 are not just "thick metal plating" (with the expectation of half a century of service), it is a material of steel, created in due time on the basis of tank armor, among other things. This is a special design of the case and an original system of constructive protection, only small "echoes" of which were announced publicly. For example:
In the end, if the ships have gone to decommissioning, there remains the possibility of actually shooting them with various means of destruction. It is worth recalling here that the results of such tests on large warships, even old ones, are classified by the US Navy because of their importance.
Just one example. We have adopted a new generation of anti-ship missiles with significantly weakened (in comparison with anti-ship missiles of the times of the USSR) combat units (CU). And not a single official in the Navy all this time bothered to check them against real warships - targets. Meanwhile, experts know, for example, such an unpleasant property of "small warheads" as the ability of large ships (for example, aircraft carriers) to "absorb" them in large numbers with a relatively small effect on combat effectiveness (roughly: the effectiveness of one warhead of 400 kg on an aircraft carrier in most cases will be higher than two warheads of 200 kg).
Of course, no one will shoot at a ship with a nuclear power plant and sink it with it. But the possibility of cutting out part of the hull structures with the formation of a separate target from them (to test the real effectiveness of the design protection scheme of the TARKR project 1144) deserves the most careful assessment.
Alas, today the opportunity to obtain a series of quite effective light nuclear aircraft carriers based on the TARKR project 1144 is practically missed (although theoretically such an opportunity remains for "Peter the Great").
The "manilovism" continues according to the "domestic Nimites":
The estimated cost of building a new aircraft-carrying cruiser for the Russian Navy has become known. A full cycle will cost 300-400 billion rubles. RIA Novosti was informed about this by a source …
Only one solution remains out of this impasse: redesigning the UDCs laid down in Kerch as light aircraft carriers.
This is the only worthy way out and an effective solution to the scam (for today) with these "white elephants of the Navy". In the absence of air cover (aircraft carrier) and a powerful floating rear, UDC makes no sense. Their cost will deliberately and many times exceed the declared "100 million", and the displacement has already grown to quite "aircraft carrier" 40 thousand tons.
But getting decent and effective light aircraft carriers, with the existing groundwork, is quite realistic.
In fact, we have (had) the following. Further, "just quotes" about the work of our carrier-based aircraft on "Kuznetsov" naval blog author, expatriate with US Navy experience, and on the UDC, "on deck":
Well, in order not to get up twice, here are two old posts and an interesting textbook on Kuznetsov and ropes … 300+ comments. I didn't write about the cables there, because I don't know anything about it, but if the general carelessness shown in everything else applies to the cables, then there is nothing strange about the cliffs. (link).
My comments about the organization of the deck personnel in this video are just quiet horror. It looks like nothing has been improved since the 90s. God forbid, "Kuznetsov" will have to deal with intensive combat flights - it will incapacitate itself.
The problems in the video are as follows: … all this guarantees frequent accidents on deck with varying degrees of severity during intensive flights. It is completely unclear why the American rules for working on the deck have not yet been translated and implemented at least partially - they have the most experience in this matter. After all, all NATOPS on this topic can be downloaded from the Internet for a long time …
At the same time, it is necessary to objectively understand that the problems in question are not “the exclusive illness of Kuznetsov”. This is evidence of the "ceremonial illness" of our entire fleet (the main thing is "to look cheerful and dashing in the parade," and the war "maybe it will wait or it will cost"). And the same can be said about our submarine forces, mine-sweeping ships, etc.
