The battle of January 27, 1904 is of interest not only as the first battle of armored squadrons in the Russo-Japanese War, but also as the only clash of the main forces of the opponents in which the Russians were not defeated.
On the evening of January 26, 1904, Heihachiro Togo, commander of the Japanese United Fleet, withdrew his main forces to about. Road, located 45 miles from Port Arthur. At 17.05 he told the destroyers “According to the pre-planned plan, go to the attack. I wish you complete success. On the night of January 27, 1904, Japanese destroyers attacked the ships of the Russian Pacific Squadron stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur: this night strike was supposed to, if not crush, then greatly weaken the Russians, then the next morning the main forces of the Japanese fleet could destroy the remnants of the Russian squadron with one blow. Therefore, on the morning of January 27, H. Togo brought to Port Arthur a powerful squadron of 6 battleships, 5 armored and 4 armored cruisers, including:
1st combat detachment - battleships Mikasa (flag of Vice Admiral Togo), Asahi, Fuji, Yashima, Sikishima, Hatsuse;
2nd combat detachment - armored cruisers Izumo (flag of Rear Admiral Kamimura), Azuma, Yakumo, Tokiwa, Iwate;
3rd combat detachment - armored cruisers "Chitose" (flag of Rear Admiral Deva), "Takasago", "Kasagi", "Iosino".
The Pacific squadron was significantly inferior to the Japanese in strength. Since the squadron battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan", as well as the armored cruiser "Pallada" were damaged by torpedoes, at the disposal of the governor E. I. Alekseev and Vice Admiral O. V. Stark, only 5 squadron battleships remained ("Petropavlovsk", "Sevastopol", "Poltava", "Pobeda" and "Peresvet"), the armored cruiser "Bayan" and 4 armored cruisers ("Askold", "Diana", "Boyarin", "Novik").
The situation was also worsened by the fact that Pobeda and Peresvet, in terms of their firepower, occupied an intermediate position between Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. The other three Russian battleships could not be considered modern ships, each of them in its combat qualities approximately corresponded to the oldest and weakest Japanese battleships of the 1st combat detachment "Fuji" and "Yashima", but was inferior to four others. The only advantages of the Russians were the ability to fight with the support of the coastal batteries of the Port Arthur fortress and the presence of quite a few destroyers.
At 07.00, the 3rd combat detachment, which had previously followed along with the main forces of the Japanese, increased its speed and moved towards Port Arthur for reconnaissance. Rear Admiral Dewa had to assess the damage from the night mine attack, in the same case, if a large Russian force tried to intercept the fast Japanese cruisers, the latter would have to retreat and lure the enemy south of Encounter Rock.
At 07.05, Vice Admiral Oskar Viktorovich Stark, who was holding his flag on the battleship Petropavlovsk, raised the signal: “The Pacific Ocean squadron to load the guns with high-explosive shells. The Pallas signal is canceled. On the ships, standing in the outer roadstead under the topmast flags, a combat alarm was sounded.
At 08.00, the cruisers of the Devas were spotted on the Russian ships. "Askold" raised the signal "I see the enemy at S", similarly reported "Bayan" and "Pallada", and with the "Novik" signal they asked for permission from "Petropavlovsk" to attack the enemy. According to the officer of "Askold", the signal "Cruisers to attack the enemy" was raised at the "Petropavlovsk", but there are no records of such a signal in the logbooks.
Be that as it may, "Askold" and "Bayan" attacked the Japanese, but at 08.15 the admiral ordered them to return, and instead sent the 1st destroyer detachment into the attack, but almost immediately withdrew it, because he decided to go the whole squadron.
At 08.25 at the "Petropavlovsk" they raised the signal "All of a sudden to weaken the anchor." A semaphore would be received from the Golden Mountain, first: "The governor asks the head of the squadron at 9 o'clock," and almost immediately: "Where is the squadron going?" In response to this, O. V. Stark reported 4 Japanese cruisers, to which at 08.35 he received a reply: "The Governor submits to the Squadron Leader to act at his discretion, keep in mind that there is a stronger Japanese squadron somewhere nearby."
At 08.38 a column of Russian cruisers, having the head "Bayan", followed the Dev's cruisers, followed by a column of Russian battleships. But already at 09.10, contact with the Japanese was lost and the Russians turned back. Then Deva led the 3rd combat detachment to join the main forces and gave a radiogram as follows: "Most of the enemy is in the outer roadstead. We approached 7000 m, but did not open fire on it. Apparently, several ships were damaged by ours. min. I think it is advantageous to attack them."
At 09.20 a.m. "Petropavlovsk" raised the signal "Battleships to anchor sequentially in the order of the wake formation", but then changed their order, ordering "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" to stand to the S-at the seaward, which caused the formation of Russian battleships to form a wedge with the flagship battleship in its top. “The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Book I "indicates that" Petropavlovsk anchored at 10.45, but the description of the events allows one to suspect a banal typo - it probably happened at 09.45.
At 09.58 from Zolotoy Gora to "Petropavlovsk" it was transmitted: "The governor asks if the squadron chief has the opportunity to be with him and at what time", to which the answer followed: "The squadron chief will be at 11 o'clock."
At 09.59 "Boyarin" received the admiral's instructions "To go for reconnaissance from Liaoteshan to O for 15 miles." The cruiser immediately went to sea, immediately after that O. V. Stark ordered to move the boat to the gangway. The exact time of departure of the vice admiral is unknown, but this apparently happened at eleven o'clock.
The desire of the governor E. I. Alekseev to arrange a meeting at such a time, especially considering that earlier he himself had warned O. V. Stark's statement about the presence of a powerful Japanese detachment nearby has no excuse. Of course, E. I. Alekseev could not know anything for sure, because the main forces of H. Togo had not yet been discovered. His warning was only speculation. But the road from "Petropavlovsk" to the governor's house took at least an hour, and it was obvious that if Kh. Togo's battleships appeared, the head of the Russian squadron might not have time to return to his flagship. If this meeting was so important to the governor, it would be much more reasonable to hold it on board the Petropavlovsk. But, apparently, the idea of going to a meeting with a subordinate himself, E. I. Alekseev could not even think of it. Such actions of the viceroy put the Pacific Squadron in extreme danger.
At this time, the 3rd combat detachment of Rear Admiral Dev joined up with the main forces of H. Togo, the Japanese squadron was separated from Port Arthur by no more than 20 miles. The Japanese lined up in a wake column - the 1st, 2nd and 3rd combat detachments in succession. Immediately after rebuilding, Mikasa raised the signal "Now I will attack the main forces of the enemy," and soon after that the Japanese discovered the cruiser Boyarin (they themselves believed they were seeing Diana).
The latter, of course, immediately turned back and went to Port Arthur, firing 3 shots from the stern 120-mm cannon. Just before the start of the battle, H. Togo ordered the top flags to be raised and raised the signal: “In this battle lies a decisive victory or defeat; let everyone try his best."
But even before the Japanese battleships approached within firing range, a signal was raised on the Boyar: "I see the enemy in great forces." The same was reported to "Petropavlovsk" from battery # 7.
All this put the Russians in an extremely unpleasant position. According to the charter, in the absence of the admiral, his flag-captain took over command of the squadron, in this case, the captain of the 1st rank A. A. Eberhard. But the problem was that this provision of the charter extended only to peacetime service, while in battle the flag captain was forbidden to control the squadron. The junior flagship was supposed to take command in battle, but … only in the event of the death of the squadron leader! Here are just O. V. Stark was alive, and therefore the junior flagship of the Pacific Squadron P. P. Ukhtomsky had no reason to assume command … The squadron was beheaded, but one can hardly blame the drafters of the charter: a situation in which the commander is unharmed, but absent from the fighting squadron, obviously, simply could not have occurred to anyone.
To the credit of Captain 1st Rank A. A. Eberhard, if he hesitated, it did not last long. He had a choice - to abide by the regulations, risking the defeat of the main forces of the squadron, or, waving his hand at the law, to take command.
At 10.50, Petropavlovsk gives a signal: "The cruisers of the 1st rank should go to reinforce the Boyarin, and the Novik was told by a semaphore:" Go for reinforcements to the Boyarin, do not leave the fortress's area of operations."
Then, between 10.50 and 10.55 - "Battleships to anchor all of a sudden"
At 10.55 - "Angara" to anchor"
At 11.00 "Destroyers to anchor". By this time, all 15 Japanese ships were already clearly visible.
At 11.05 am "The battleships will line up in the wake of the" Sevastopol ", not observing the order of numbers."
On this, alas, the period of command of the energetic captain of the 1st rank came to an end. Of course, neither O. V. Stark, nor E. I. Alekseev could not let the squadron go into battle under the command of A. A. Eberhard. No explanation for such an incident could be taken into account, and the most disappointing conclusions for them would have been drawn in relation to both commanders. Therefore, at 11.05 a.m. a semaphore was adopted at "Petropavlovsk": "Wait for the squadron chief: do not remove the anchor." Accordingly, at 11.10 am "Petropavlovsk" gave a new signal: "The battleships are suddenly canceled to unanchor everyone" and after another 2 minutes: "Stay in place."
The exact time of the beginning of the battle, alas, is unknown. According to Japanese sources, Mikasa, having approached the Russian squadron at 8500 m, turned to W, opened fire from the 12-inch bow turret, while the first shot was fired at exactly 11 o'clock (11.55 Japan time). At the same time, Russian sources indicate the beginning of the battle at very different times in the interval from 11.07 (the magazine on the Golden Mountain) and until 11.20 (the magazine "Askold"). Be that as it may, one can state with all certainty only one thing - the beginning of the battle found the Russian battleships anchored.
What's next? It must be said that the Russian and Japanese descriptions of the battle on January 27, 1904 at Port Arthur are very different. According to the "Description of military operations at sea 37-38 years. Meiji "the Japanese wake column went from O to W, along the Russian squadron and fighting on the starboard side. Approaching Liaoteshan, "Mikasa" turned 8 points to the left sequentially, since the distance to the Russian battleships was already too great for firing. At this moment (11.25) the Russian coastal artillery entered the battle. As for the 2nd combat detachment of the Japanese, it went on a combat course (that is, passed the turning point on the W "Mikasa") only at 11.12 and fought until 11.31, after which it turned sequentially after the battleships X. Togo. For the 3rd combat detachment, the battle began at 11.20, but already at 11.42 H. Togo ordered the Dev's cruisers to turn "all of a sudden" to the left - the Japanese commander noticed that they came under the concentrated fire of the Russian squadron, which the armored cruisers could not withstand. Nevertheless, the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment fired for some time (3-7 minutes), so for them the battle ended at 11.45-11.50. At 11.50 the top flags were lowered on the Japanese ships, and the battle ended there. At the same time, according to the Japanese, the Russian battleships never removed from the anchors - but still the ships of H. Togo retreated without resuming the battle.
The Russian description differs significantly from the Japanese one.
By the time the battle began (11.00-11.07), the Russian battleships remained at anchors, but, being motionless, they responded to the Japanese with fire, and the cruisers were between the squadrons, moving in the direction of the battleships H. Togo. It is not known exactly what time O. V. returned. Stark to Petropavlovsk. According to the flagship magazine, the Russian commander's boat appeared at 11.14 and approached the Petropavlovsk "among the enemy shells that were already falling on the roadstead" and the admiral boarded at 11.20, but the Petropavlovsk commander claimed that he weighed anchor at the admiral's instructions at 11.08. In any case, "Petropavlovsk" weighed anchor first, and went to the enemy, raising the signal "Follow me."
Following this, O. V. Stark ordered to give another signal: "Do not interfere with shooting, follow me." It can be assumed that this order concerned cruisers, and on "Askold" it was seen and carried out - the armored cruiser quickly passed along the column of Russian battleships, and then turned into their wake. But "Bayan" and "Novik", which went further than "Askold", either did not see the signal or ignored it. The first minutes of the battle, the Russian battleships went perpendicular to the course of the Japanese and could only fire from their bow guns, but somewhere between 11.23 and 11.30 they turned 8 points to the left and lay down on the Japanese countercourse, diverging from them on their right sides. At this time, the distance between opponents was reduced to 26 kbt or less.
At 11.30 the coastal batteries of Port Arthur opened fire. In addition to them, Russian ships blown up by mines also took part in the battle, although the latter could fire for a very short time and fired only a few 6 "shells. "Diana" and "Boyarin" during the battle held on to the battleships, but then entered the wake of "Askold"
At 11.40 the Russian commander sent destroyers into the attack, but after some 5 minutes he canceled the attack.
At 11.45 the Japanese fire weakened and their ships turned into the sea, a signal was raised on the "Petropavlovsk": "The admiral is pleased."
At 11.50 O. V. Stark turned onto W and ordered a ceasefire.
The actions of "Novik" and "Bayan" deserve a separate description. Both of these cruisers went to meet the Japanese fleet, but neither of them wanted to retreat, as Askold did, after the flagship's signal "Do not interfere with shooting." Novik, having developed 22 knots, moved closer to Mikas by 17 kbt, and then turned back. Breaking the distance to 25-27 kbt, he turned again and went to the Japanese, approaching them up to 15 kbt, intending to then retreat again, but at the moment of the turn the cruiser received an underwater hole that impeded steering, which forced the Novik to retreat. The Japanese believed that the Novik launched a mine and nearly torpedoed the armored cruiser Iwate, but in reality this was not the case.
"Bayan" opened fire on "Mikasa" from 29 kbt, but seeing the signal "Do not interfere", simply lay down on a course parallel to the Japanese. The brave cruiser went to W, while the Russian battleships turned in the opposite direction, and continued to fire at Mikas until it turned left. Then "Bayan" transferred fire to the battleship following it, then to the next one, and so on. Finally, seeing the order "Line up in a wake column", "Bayan" followed the Russian battleships.
It may seem that such "recklessness" did not make any sense, but it is not - the cruisers distracted the attention of heavy Japanese ships, creating a certain nervousness, thereby alleviating the situation of the few battleships of the Pacific Squadron. For example, it is known that as many as two Japanese battleships fired at the Bayan.
In the battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese demonstrated better shooting than the Russians. The battle took place at distances of 46-26 kbt, the statistics of the consumption of projectiles and hits are given below.
The percentage of hits for the Japanese as a whole is twice as high as for the Russians (2.19% versus 1.08%), but if you look closely at the table, then everything becomes not so simple. So, for example, the percentage of hits of Japanese 12 "guns is 10, 12%, while for the Russians it cannot be lower than 7, 31% (if the Japanese ships were hit by 3 12" shells). And if we assume that out of two hits by shells of unknown caliber (10 "-12") one or two could have been 12 ", then it turns out that the accuracy of Russian 12" could be 9, 75% or 12, 19%. The same is true for shells of 6 "-8" caliber - unfortunately, the presence of 9 hits of an unknown caliber (either 6 ", or 8") does not allow analyzing their accuracy separately, but the total percentage of hits of artillery of these calibers was 1, 19%, for the Japanese - 1.93, which gives a difference of 1.62 times (still not double). The overall results of the firing were affected by the extremely low firing accuracy of the Russians 3 ", but these guns were completely useless in a squadron battle.
Of all the guns of the coastal batteries that took part in the battle, only 5 10 "modern guns and 10 6" Kane cannons, mounted on batteries No. 2, 9 and 15, could possibly have sent their shells to the Japanese. The fact is that these guns were fired at very long distances for the Russian gunners, and the projectile consumption was extremely low - it is hardly possible to count on hits in such conditions. the ships were reached by the naval artillery of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.
The worst quality of shooting by Russian gunners has the following reasons:
1) The artillery exercises of 1903 were not carried out in full.
2) Shortly before the start of the war, more than 1,500 old-timers were in the reserve, including about 500 specialists, including the squadron gunners. So, on the cruiser "Varyag" almost half of the gunners went to the reserve.
3) From November 1, 1903, the ships of the Pacific Ocean Squadron entered the armed reserve and did not conduct combat training. Accordingly, it was not possible to train the newly arrived gunners in artillery and, of course, to maintain the level of training achieved in the fall of 1903. The ships were withdrawn from the reserve only on January 19, 1904, and there was no way to seriously train the crews a few days before the start of the war.
4) The beginning of the battle found the Russian battleships at anchor and the stationary ships represented a much better target than the moving battleships of H. Togo.
5) During the battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese wake line was located between the Russian ships and the sun, i.e. the sun's rays blinded the Russians.
On the whole, it can be argued that the Russian description of the battle is much closer to the truth than the Japanese - at least two important theses of Japanese historiography: that the Russian squadron spent the entire battle at anchor, and that almost all hits into the Japanese were achieved by the Russian coastal artillery are erroneous.
Based on the results of the battle, the following can be stated:
1) The commander of the 3rd combat detachment, Rear Admiral Deva, acted very unprofessionally. He could neither understand the state of the Russian squadron, nor drag it into the sea, so that the main forces of H. Togo could defeat it without entering the zone of operation of the Russian coastal batteries.
2) H. Togo did not organize fire control of his ships. According to the official description of the battle: "Asahi" concentrated fire on br. "Peresvet", "Fuji" and "Yashima" fired at the "Bayan", "Sikishima" fired at the very middle of the crowded enemy ships, and the rear ship "Hatsuse" fired at the ship nearest to it"
3) The extremely stretched wake column of the Japanese endangered the 3rd combat detachment, since it was by the time of its passage that the Russians (at least in theory) could achieve maximum fire efficiency.
4) The decision of H. Togo to withdraw from the battle has no reasonable explanation.
5) Actions of the governor E. I. Alekseev, who summoned the head of the Russian squadron, could lead to a heavy defeat for the Russian naval forces.
6) Actions of Vice Admiral O. V. Stark were mostly correct (such as sending the cruiser Boyarin to reconnaissance exactly where the Japanese fleet came from), but pretty hectic, since the admiral constantly canceled his own orders. Nevertheless, the main decision of the battle - the formation of a wake column and the divergence with the Japanese on the countercourse - should be considered correct.
7) The unwillingness of O. V. Stark to pursue the retreating enemy and continue the battle after 11.50 is quite understandable: it is difficult to fight 6 armored ships (counting the Bayan) against 11 enemy armored ships, especially outside the zone of coastal artillery fire. Nevertheless, the refusal to attempt to attack the "tail" of the Japanese column should be viewed as a mistake by the Russian commander.
On the whole, the battle of January 27, 1904 can be seen as a battle of missed opportunities. H. Togo failed to take advantage of the chance to defeat the weakened Russian squadron. At the same time, O. V. Stark failed to take advantage of the advantages that he had. As S. I. Lutonin, who fought in that battle as a senior officer of the battleship "Poltava":
“The Japanese came to the first battle without destroyers, and so we could successfully use the often practiced maneuver in the squadron of Admiral Skrydlov, when the destroyers, hiding behind the opposite sides of their battleships, suddenly jumped out into the intervals at a 14-knot speed and went on the attack. Four minutes later they were on a sure mine shot from the enemy, and during the battle, when all attention is focused on a large enemy and small guns have no servants, there is every chance that the attack would have been successful."
As a result of the battle, the Japanese fleet, possessing a significant advantage in forces, was unable to neutralize the main forces of the Pacific Squadron and was forced to retreat.
