Reading the article "The most absurd ships in the history of the Navy", published by the respected Oleg Kaptsov, I was surprised to find that the list of nominees for "naval absurdism" included Soviet heavy aircraft carrying cruisers of Project 1143. This article is an attempt figure out how appropriate the stay of our aircraft carriers in this rating.
Oleg Kaptsov writes:
The Americans were afraid of Soviet submarines, and mocked TAKRs, calling them surrogate children of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. And there was something to laugh about. A hybrid of a missile cruiser and an aircraft carrier turned out to be completely ineffective as a cruiser and completely unfit for action as an aircraft carrier.
It is difficult to disagree with this. Indeed, the ships of the "Kiev" type are clearly untenable in the role of cruisers, for this they were excessively large, but under-equipped. And even more so, aircraft carriers were not suitable for aircraft carriers - due to the inability to receive horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, they did not receive an adequate air wing capable of performing all the variety of tasks of fighter, assault and reconnaissance deck aviation. But is this enough to recognize them as useless or even absurd? In order to answer this question, let's consider the circumstances of the emergence of project 1143 into the world.
The first-borns of the aircraft carrier of the Soviet fleet were the ships of Project 1123: "Moscow" and "Leningrad", which were a kind of anti-submarine helicopter carrier with good defensive armament.
They emerged as "our answer to Chamberlain" to US nuclear-powered submarines equipped with Polaris A1 ballistic missiles. For that time, it was a very formidable weapon, but in order to use it, US submarines had to approach the coastline of the USSR closer, because the launch range of such missiles at that time did not exceed 2200 km, and not all of their targets were located on the coast. For example: in the north, the launch of the Polaris was expected directly from the Barents Sea.
At the same time, Soviet acoustics were still not very good, and it was only possible to organize an effective search for enemy SSBNs if, in addition to the existing anti-submarine ships, search equipment was placed on airplanes and helicopters. So the construction of a specialized anti-submarine helicopter carrier seemed to suggest itself - and, contrary to popular belief, the helicopter carrier was to operate not in the world's oceans, but in the immediate vicinity of its native coast. As a matter of fact, this is directly indicated by the OTZ, in which the Russians are told in white that the main task of the Project 1123 anti-submarine cruiser is: “the search and destruction of high-speed nuclear submarines-missile carriers in the distant zones of anti-submarine defense as part of a group of ships in cooperation with PLO aviation” … In other words, the “far zone of ASW” did not mean the ocean, but the distance from the coast at which ships could operate in conjunction with land-based PLO aircraft (there were no other PLO aircraft at that time in the USSR). Interestingly, it was originally planned to fit the anti-submarine helicopter carrier in a displacement of only 4000-4500 tons, while the air group was supposed to be 8 helicopters, and the speed was to reach 35 knots. But it soon became clear that it would not be possible to create a helicopter carrier in such dimensions, moreover, calculations showed that at least 14 machines should be based on the ship to ensure round-the-clock search. With great difficulty, it was possible to obtain permission to increase the displacement, first to 8 thousand tons, then to 9, 6 thousand and, finally, to the final 11 920 tons. from above”, as a radical reduction in the crew, a refusal to duplicate technical means and combat posts, a decrease in living space up to the submarine standards, and so on. (fortunately, most of them managed to get out).
But where did this craving for minimalism come from? And why, in general, the creation of aircraft-carrying ships in the USSR began with helicopter carriers, vulnerable to attack by US and NATO carrier-based aircraft, if (at least theoretically) at that time the Soviet industry could well create full-fledged aircraft carriers?
A multipurpose aircraft carrier as a means of war at sea is much preferable to an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. It has much greater functionality, and in terms of anti-submarine warfare, the aircraft carrier noticeably wins over the helicopter carrier due to the ability to ensure the combat stability of the formations, since it can not only search for enemy submarines with ballistic missiles, but also cover anti-submarine ships, deck helicopters, and PLO aircraft with power based on mute fighter aircraft.
Alas, in those years, with the light hand of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, everything in the navy that was not a missile or a submarine was subject to universal censure and prompt extermination: in accordance with the general line of the party, large surface ships were considered relics of the past, targets for anti-ship missiles. As for the largest of them - aircraft carriers - they were generally branded with weapons of aggression, which had no place in the Soviet fleet and could not have been.
But the Soviet sailors have long since realized the need for aircraft carriers! For the first time, ships of this class "surfaced" in the perspective programs of building the Soviet naval forces even before the war. After its completion, in 1945, Kuznetsov created a commission to select the required types of ships, and she also substantiated the creation of aircraft carriers. The main naval headquarters included nine large aircraft carriers (six for the Tikhiy and three for the Northern Fleet) and six small ones for the Northern Fleet in the long-term plan for the construction of the USSR Navy. True, all of them, in the end, were deleted from there by I. V. Stalin.
But the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Kuznetsov did not give up. In August 1953, he presented a report to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Bulganin, in which it was emphasized that "in post-war conditions, without the presence of aircraft carriers in the Navy, the solution of the main tasks of the fleet cannot be ensured." Kuznetsov fought to the end for the aircraft carriers, but his removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in 1956 put an end to his ideas, because the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov did not talk about aircraft carriers for a long time.
It's hard to say why this happened. Perhaps the new commander-in-chief initially underestimated the role of carrier-based aviation in the Navy, but rather, he simply understood that you could not beat the butt with a whip, because in the late 50s - early 60s the political situation was developing in such a way that one could only dream of aircraft carriers (but not out loud). However, the Soviet fleet needed some aircraft-carrying ships - at least to gain experience, and the industry was strong enough to create them. And, apparently, the project 1123 anti-submarine cruisers just became a compromise between the desired and the politically possible. Having substantiated the need to build helicopter carriers with an understandable and therefore acceptable for the country's leadership concept of “fighting enemy missile submarines,” the fleet at the end of the 60s received its first aircraft-carrying ships. The absence of fighter aircraft on them was to some extent compensated for by the presence of decent air defense and by the fact that these ships were supposed to be used in the near sea zone, within the range of land-based aviation.
However, by the time the "Moscow" and "Leningrad" became part of the Soviet fleet, a number of events had taken place that greatly influenced the further development of aircraft-carrying ships of the USSR Navy:
First. In the United States, the next generation of ballistic missiles for submarines was developed, the range of their use increased to 4,600 km. Now the American SSBN no longer needed to approach the shores of the USSR - operating in the same Mediterranean Sea, the US atomarines kept at gunpoint many of the most important targets on the territory of our country. Therefore, by the end of the 60s, American SSBNs were no longer in the areas of Soviet aviation's ground-based aviation, and where they were now, NATO surface forces and carrier-based aircraft dominated. Of course, the dispatch of a few and not covered from the air of Soviet search groups to the deployment areas of US SSBNs at that time could not end well. Nevertheless, the fleet had no choice but to charge the newly built ships of Project 1123 with the suicidal task of finding and destroying SSBNs in remote areas, including in the Mediterranean Sea.
Second. Yakovlev Design Bureau demonstrated an experimental vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft Yak-36.
Third. The powerful D. F. Ustinov, at that time the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for defense industries, believed in the great future of VTOL. He assumed that after the development of transonic VTOL aircraft, Yakovlev would get supersonic fighters and thus VTOL aircraft could become an "asymmetric" response to the power of the US carrier-based aircraft wings. For the sake of fairness, I note that I have no idea how much to the formation of such an opinion in D. F. Yakovlev himself had a hand in Ustinov.
Fourth. On December 28, 1967, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the creation of the Yak-36 light carrier-based attack aircraft and the more advanced Yak-36MF on the basis of the experienced Yak-36 VTOL aircraft, which was supposed to become a fleet interceptor fighter and an Air Force front-line fighter.
I would like to especially note that in 1967 there was a fundamental change in priorities in the field of naval aviation: not only the leadership of the Navy, but also the leaders of the country (Ustinov, and after him the Council of Ministers) fully realized the need of the fleet for deck aircraft. From now on, the dispute between the sailors and their land leaders was not about whether or not to be an aircraft carrier: both of them recognized the need for aircraft carriers, but the "ground" believed that the VTOL aircraft would cope with the tasks of deck aircraft, while the sailors dreamed of aircraft horizontal takeoff and landing. According to eyewitnesses, the idea of a deck VTOL aircraft did not come from the fleet, but from D. F. Ustinov - while the Navy wanted to develop and build classic aircraft carriers with aerofinishers and catapults, he was urged to create all the same helicopter carriers adapted for basing VTOL aircraft.
And here the commander-in-chief of the Navy makes a rather strange, at first glance, decision. He does not argue with Ustinov about the creation of new heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers-carriers of VTOL aircraft and, moreover, "rolling up his sleeves", gets down to business - this is how the history of the creation of ships of Project 1143 begins. But at the same time S. G. Gorshkov continues to insist on the creation of full-fledged aircraft carriers, and initially it even seemed to be a success: the Council of Ministers already in 1969 adopted a resolution on the development of preliminary designs for an aircraft carrier (Project 1160 "Eagle") and carrier-based aircraft. In 1969-1972. Nevsky PKB is carrying out "Order" - research work on the military-economic substantiation of the creation and operation of an aircraft carrier. In total, 8 variants were designed with various power plants and displacement from 40 to 100 thousand tonnes.tons., and the most developed was the nuclear aircraft carrier in 80 thousand tons. The preliminary projects of air arrestors, steam catapults, emergency barriers were carried out, but, alas, by the decision of D. F. Ustinov, the development of Project 1160 was discontinued in favor of the development of Project 1143 with VTOL aircraft.
S. G. Gorshkov did not give up, and in 1977, based on the results of a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, the Nevsky PKB was instructed to develop a technical proposal, and the Navy and Air Force Research Institute - a technical assignment for an aircraft carrier ship with catapults, aerofinishers and aircraft with horizontal takeoff and landing. This time S. G. Gorshkov tried to "grow" the aircraft carrier from Project 1143, since frontal attacks did not lead to anything … Subsequently, it was his undertaking that was crowned, albeit half-hearted, but still successful - the construction of the only aircraft carrier in the Russian Navy "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".
Based on the foregoing, we can safely say that S. G. Gorshkov did not agree with D. F. Ustinov in the assessment of VTOL aircraft and did not believe that VTOL carriers would be able to replace the catapult aircraft carrier. However, as mentioned above, promoting the idea of a full-fledged aircraft carrier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy did not at all protest against VTOL aircraft and, moreover, made every effort to create heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of Project 1143.
Because of this, today many reproach S. G. Gorshkov, seeing in such his actions conciliation, or even outright careerism and unwillingness to quarrel with the higher leadership. But, pondering the current situation, you come to the conclusion that the commander-in-chief simply had no other choice. How could S. G. Gorshkov to abandon the VTOL aircraft imposed on him? To do this, he had to either prove the complete futility of VTOL aircraft as the main aircraft of carrier-based aircraft, or declare that the fleet does not need deck-based aircraft at all. But if D. F. Ustinov was confident in the bright future of vertical takeoff aircraft, how could S. G. Gorshkov? And to declare the uselessness of carrier-based aircraft to the fleet AT ALL, the commander-in-chief could not, all the more so - after all, then he would have to give up the catapult aircraft carriers too!
Most likely, the commander-in-chief reasoned as follows - the chances that it will be possible to "push through" the construction of classic aircraft carriers are now small, and the fleet needs carrier-based aircraft. Therefore, even if there will be aircraft carrier VTOL aircraft for now, especially since the construction of these ships, which Ustinov favors so much, will go without a hitch, and there will be work for them.
It is also possible that S. G. Gorshkov also considered such a "Machiavellian" idea: based on the results of the operation of the aircraft carrier of the project 1143, substantiate the discrepancy between the tasks of the aircraft-carrying cruiser and the capabilities of its air wing. In any case, it should be taken into account that the tasks that were formulated in 1968 for the aircraft carrier of project 1143 could not be solved by the air group with VTOL and S. G. Gorshkov could not have been unaware of this. List of these tasks:
- covering naval formations from air strikes, their anti-submarine and anti-boat support;
- ensuring the combat stability of strategic missile submarine cruisers in combat patrol areas;
- ensuring the deployment of submarines;
- cover for naval missile-carrying, anti-submarine and reconnaissance aircraft in the reach of naval fighter aircraft;
- search and destruction of enemy missile submarines as part of groups of heterogeneous anti-submarine forces;
- defeat of enemy surface ship groupings;
- ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces.
Exhaustively describes the functionality of a full-fledged aircraft carrier and, of course, their solution required a powerful air group of horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. It should also be noted that the next "assault on aircraft carrier heights" - the creation of the terms of reference for the catapult aircraft carrier, was undertaken by S. G. Gorshkov a year after the entry into service of the Northern Fleet of the first-born of Project 1143 - the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev.
It was in such very difficult conditions that the project 1143 heavy aircraft-carrying VTOL carrier cruiser was designed and created. Its tactical and technical characteristics look at least strange, and moreover, they cast doubt on the sanity of those who designed this ship. But if we give up Zadornov's "Well, stupid!" and take as a hypothesis that:
1) The fleet wanted full-fledged aircraft carriers, but could not insist on their construction.
2) VTOL aircraft were imposed on the fleet as carrier-based aircraft, which he did not want and in the combat capabilities of which he did not believe.
3) The fleet did not have a plausible excuse to abandon the carriers of VTOL aircraft, without discrediting the very idea of carrier-based aircraft, which the fleet categorically did not want to do.
4) Under the conditions specified above, the fleet tried to create a large and useful ship for the USSR Navy, capable of performing important combat missions.
Then we will look at project 1143 with completely different eyes and many decisions that seem illogical and ill-considered, will appear before us in a completely different light.
After all, what was the aircraft carrier of project 1143?
This is the ideal anti-submarine helicopter carrier, which they wanted, but which, due to their small displacement, were not received in Project 1123 ("Moscow"). The ship, capable of carrying 22 helicopters (of which 20 anti-submarine ones), was able to provide round-the-clock presence of two or three such machines in the air, and even a little more. The island superstructure of "Kiev" did not interfere with the takeoff and landing operations of helicopters, as it was on the anti-submarine cruisers of Project 1123, in which the superstructure created significant air turbulence.
But why did the USSR Navy need this "ideal" helicopter carrier? As mentioned above, after increasing the range of American sea-based ballistic missiles, their "city killers" no longer had a reason to deploy in the near sea zone of the USSR. And to follow them into the ocean, where our anti-submarine groups could not cover land fighters, would become a sophisticated form of suicide.
And, nevertheless, the tasks for the Soviet helicopter carriers could well be found, and even what! The thing is that at the end of the 60s the USSR was on the verge of a small military-technical naval revolution, and in 1969 it happened - the tests of a sea-based intercontinental ballistic missile began (and quite successfully), which later received the P-29 index. Already the first modifications of this "ballista" had a range of 7,800 km, so that from now on the newest Soviet strategic submarines - carriers of the R-29 did not need to go to the world ocean. They could make their contribution to the nuclear Armageddon, being located in the seas adjacent to the territory of the USSR - the Barents, White, Kara, Norwegian, Okhotsk, Japanese.
Accordingly, one of the most important tasks of the fleet in a full-scale nuclear missile conflict was the organization of "protected combat areas" in the adjacent seas, in which the secrecy of our strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) was guaranteed by a whole range of measures, such as: minefields, deployed multipurpose submarines boats, land-based naval aviation and, of course, surface ships. And the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of Project 1143 could well become the backbone of the defense of such areas - operating in the near sea zone, they perfectly complemented the actions of ground anti-submarine aviation. And the absence of fighters on them was compensated to a certain extent by the presence of the most powerful land-based aviation in the USSR, capable, if not of covering detachments of surface ships in the adjacent seas, then at least of inflicting powerful blows on the AUG deployed near our shores.
The value of the aircraft carrier project 1143 in a full-scale nuclear missile conflict could turn out to be very high - during the period of escalation of tension (when the whole world expects war, but there is no war yet), aircraft carrier-helicopter carriers were able to reveal the location of enemy submarines (whatever one may say, a helicopter - a terrible enemy of the submariner) and squeeze them out of the "protected areas", or quickly destroy them with the beginning of the conflict. Of course, enemy aircraft carrier strike groups could crush our aircraft carrier and the ships attached to them (if they themselves were not destroyed by naval missile-carrying aircraft before that), but so what? Victory was hardly expected from the Soviet surface fleet in the "protected areas", its task was to hold out long enough not to give offense to SSBNs while they were delivering a nuclear missile strike. And our ships of Project 1143 were quite capable of fulfilling this task - it was not for nothing that our anti-submarine helicopter carriers were equipped with a very powerful air defense for that time.
By the way, it will be said that, in my opinion, the statement that the Kiev air defense systems quickly became outdated in connection with the appearance of the S-300 is not entirely true. Firstly, the official adoption of the S-300F naval modification took place only in 1984, so if the "storms" are outdated, then not quickly. And secondly, the undoubted advantages of the S-300F did not at all make the "Storm-M" worse than it was, but it was a very formidable air defense system. In other words, the Kalashnikov assault rifle is great, but from its appearance the three-line did not kill worse.
But let us return to the use of helicopter carrier aircraft carriers as support ships of "protected combat areas". What could the US and NATO navies oppose to this tactic? Not too much. The advance deployment of nuclear submarines as numerous as low-noise submarines in the Soviet seas could no longer be considered a panacea, but what else? In a period of tension to enter into the Soviet "protected areas" aircraft carrier strike groups? But to drive the AUG to the Barents or Okhotsk Seas even before the start of the war meant to doom them to an almost inevitable death. Aircraft carriers discovered and tracked back in peacetime in our inland seas would inevitably become difficult, but still legitimate prey for Soviet surface, submarine and air forces.
Of course, it was possible to try to conduct an anti-submarine search by carrier-based aircraft and helicopters from aircraft carriers maneuvering at a certain distance about the "protected area", since the combat radius of the carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft quite allowed to do this, but … Many unflattering words were said about the presence on our aircraft carriers. ah heavy missile weapons - Basalt anti-ship missiles.
They say that the floating airfield does not need missiles, its function is to ensure the operation of its air group, and it is for this task that the structure of the ship should be "sharpened". All of this is true - for an aircraft carrier. But for our aircraft carriers, the presence of "Basalts" to a certain extent guaranteed the absence of enemy aircraft carrier groups within a radius of 550 kilometers from the ship. Whatever today's analysts say there, the Americans, even in peacetime, tried to keep their AUG out of the reach of Soviet long-range anti-ship missiles.
Of course, one can argue like this - why put an anti-ship missile on a helicopter carrier, it is better to make it smaller and cheaper, and let the missiles be carried by specially designed missile cruisers, both surface and submarine. But there is a nuance - in the USSR, neither in the 70s, nor later was there an abundance of heavy ships capable of carrying long-range anti-ship missiles "Basalt" / "Granit". And the idea to make a high-quality airfield for 22 helicopters, and then enlarge it a little bit more and install Basalts is not bad at all - it's easier and cheaper than building a separate ship for 8 anti-ship missile launchers installed on Project 1143 TAKRs. Therefore, it turns out quite interesting - the author, of course, agrees that anti-ship missiles are not needed on aircraft carriers, but regrets that Project 1143 aircraft carriers carried only 8, and not, say, 16 launching Basalts - unlike aircraft carriers, they carry Basalts were quite appropriate.
As a result, during the pre-war deployment of the aircraft carrier project 1143, it was still a "surprise" - its helicopters were able to control the underwater situation for hundreds of kilometers, not giving our submarines offense, but at the same time, no enemy ship, which turned out to be closer than in 550 km did not feel safe. The AUG, of course, could strike with carrier-based aircraft from a distance of 600 and 800 km and destroy the aircraft carrier, but the time it would take for the aircraft carrier to deliver such a strike, and then to enter the "protected area" and search for our SSBNs was too long to hope to destroy our "strategists" before they launch ballistic missiles.
There was one more place where the aircraft carrier of project 1143 could bring tangible benefits - the Mediterranean Sea, the fiefdom of the US 6th Fleet. It is well known that our 5th OPESK, which is constantly present in this region, had a completely suicidal task in the best traditions of the Japanese "divine wind" - kamikaze. Under no circumstances could the ships of 5 OPESK survive in the war - in the absence of bases and the superiority of the Mediterranean NATO fleets, they could only perish in an unequal battle. But before they died, they had to inflict the hardest, unacceptable damage to the opposing forces and the NATO SSBN deployed in the Mediterranean, exchanging their lives for the US 6th Fleet, which was of great strategic importance. In the open ocean, the combination led by the TAKR with the VTOL aircraft certainly lost the battle of the AUG, but the peculiarity of the Mediterranean theater is that it is relatively small and in many places, located in the middle of the sea, the TAKR blocked it with Basalts from the European to the African coast. Here, 5 OPESK really had the opportunity to follow the AUG of the 6th fleet and, in the case of Armageddon, deliver its first and last blow. Here, TAKR helicopters could, on the eve of the war, "lead" enemy submarines or control the actions of naval formations, and with the start of the war, heavy anti-ship missiles would be very useful. Even the use of VTOL aircraft had some chance of success if the enemy forces were tracked from a distance of 80-120 kilometers or closer.
Interestingly, for the tasks of escorting the AUG in the Mediterranean, our aircraft carrier of project 1143, perhaps, were even better suited than the classic aircraft carriers. They could monitor the enemy on the eve of a nuclear apocalypse a little worse, because in order to carry out round-the-clock observation from relatively small distances, it is not necessary to have AWACS aircraft, helicopters will also descend if there are enough of them (and there were just as many as needed). In the conditions of overwhelming NATO air superiority, our air groups in any case would not have been able to protect the ships of the 5th OPESK, and would have been destroyed, here the qualitative advantage of aircraft with horizontal take-off from a catapult aircraft carrier could hardly help anything. At the same time, the aircraft carrier of project 1143 was much cheaper than an aircraft carrier - with a standard displacement of 30, 5-32 thousand tons, three of our aircraft carriers weighed about the same as one American "Nimitz" and hardly exceeded it in price.
Of course, the logic is dreadful: "He doesn't care to die, so let it be at least at a cheaper price!" Only that the valor of our crews, who took up combat duty, being doomed to death in the event of a conflict, is worthy of all respect and memory of grateful descendants.
Summarizing the above, we can state: of course, much of what a multipurpose aircraft carrier with horizontal take-off aircraft “can do” remained inaccessible for our heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, but still Project 1143 aircraft carrier did not become useless ships and, moreover, significantly increased the power of the Soviet navy in the event of a full-scale nuclear missile conflict. The aircraft carrier of project 1143 were not useless even in peacetime - the fleet finally received some kind of carrier-based aircraft and began to master new weapons for itself, thereby gaining invaluable experience.
Instead of a postscript, I would like to note that the stake on VTOL aircraft, which was made by D. F. Ustinov, unfortunately, did not justify itself at all, and the Yakovlev Design Bureau miserably failed the task entrusted to him by the Party and the Government. The decision to create a vertical take-off and landing interceptor fighter was made in 1967, but even 24 years later, the Yak-141, which survived three general designers, was still not ready for the series. And this despite the fact that in terms of its performance characteristics, it was much inferior not only to the Su-33 carrier-based interceptor, but even to the MiG-29. Of course, a lot of time could have been spent on fine-tuning it, but at the time when the Su-30 was being created and work was underway on fifth-generation machines, such a decision could hardly be considered at least somewhat reasonable.
The article used materials:
1. V. P. Zabolotsk "heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser" Kiev"
2. S. A. Balakin "Anti-submarine cruiser" Moscow ""
3. A. Grek "Russian Aircraft Carriers: 6 Forgotten Projects"
4. V. P. Zabolotsky "Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser" Admiral Kuznetsov"
