One of the issues that consistently causes misunderstanding among the general public is the issue of target designation when firing anti-ship guided missiles (ASM). And it is precisely the lack of understanding of this issue that leads to the fact that our people actively believe in superweapons. Still, a rocket can hit a ship from a thousand kilometers!
Maybe. Or maybe not. To hit, the rocket must, having flown this very thousand kilometers, reach the target with the required accuracy. And if the current target location at the time of launch is known with a significant error? At this moment, the curious begin to divide into those who are able to think rationally, and those who immediately need some kind of fairy tale to repair the shaken foundations. Satellites, for example, which see a target and "transmit" something somewhere, after which an unbreakable rocket arrives from this "somewhere" exactly at the target. Or the gigantic sector for capturing the missile's seeker, for many tens of kilometers, together with its supposedly super-maneuverability, which will allow it to turn behind the target and not miss.
In a real complex and dangerous world, everything is different. And, in order not to be fooled, all those involved should deal with this very target designation.
Before we go any further, let's clarify a few important points. This text is a popularization text, it is not a quotation of rudocs or the "Rocket Fire Rules". It explains basic concepts in simple spoken language and using elementary examples. Moreover, even with this in mind, much is simply left behind the scenes, and on purpose. Some methods of obtaining data for this very control center are simply deliberately not mentioned. And, as a result, indications of gross mistakes from comrades who wore a black uniform will be accepted with gratitude, but nothing needs to be detailed and further clarified, this is not the case, the topic is too serious. But let's start with a frivolous story.
Targeting Pink Pony
Once upon a time there was a Pink Pony. He was a patriot and loved his country. But, alas, he did not like to think - at all. And it seemed to him that everything in the world is very simple.
For example, you need to put a rocket into an enemy aircraft carrier.
Well, what are the problems, they saw the aircraft carrier from the satellite and sent a rocket to it. "But what about the Central Administration?" - people asked the Pink Pony. “Don't you see? - Pink Pony pointed with his hoof at the photograph of the aircraft carrier from the satellite. - What else do you want? The goal is visible!"
And people were perplexed and told him: "So you understand that this is" Charles de Gaulle "in Cyprus, how can you explain this to a rocket?" And the Pony started raving, laughing loudly and shouting at people: "Yes, everything has been decided for a long time, any normal satellite can transmit the coordinates of the detected target to the right place!" People did not calm down and asked further: “Coordinates? Will they be enough? What is target designation, you know? What is the meaning of this word?"
Then Pony was furious. He began to call people Solzhenitsyn and Rezuns, accused them of being for America and selling themselves to the State Department: Russophobes, pour mud on their country and do not understand anything at all! He wrote them various nonsense on the Internet and put emoticons with protruding tongues at the end of these nonsense, thinking that this is how his nonsense looks very convincing.
But in reality, the pony just didn't want to think. He never found out what target designation was, although he was told. He didn't hear. He thought that everyone who is not like him is not patriots and enemies.
So what is this, target designation?
Let's talk about this briefly.
Shooting data
Before moving on, it is worth understanding what basic data is used in rocket firing at a target that is not directly observed from the rocket carrier.
Let's imagine a picture. There is a war going on somewhere, and we, like some Houthi, are sitting on the shore with a makeshift launcher, on which stands an anti-ship missile system pulled from a wrecked naval warehouse. We have found a way to make it start and we can even program some commands for it, for example, make it fall on the course set by us, turn on the GOS "by timer" or immediately, it does not matter. Now, in order to launch it, we need to find a target somehow beyond the horizon.
We do not have a radar station, but we have a small boat with observers and a radio station. He walks around the designated area "snake" and searches for targets visually. And now his crew saw a warship on the horizon. A look through powerful binoculars, the silhouette seems to be identified (“like” is the key word, here we begin the theory of probability, but more about it below). Now we need to somehow inform the shore about where the target is, and so that they immediately understand where it is and understand exactly. The sea is empty, there are no landmarks in it. Therefore, in order to transfer the data about the target "where it is necessary", it is necessary to agree on how to explain the location of the target. And this requires a coordinate system. There is no control center without a coordinate system.
The systems can be different. The first is polar, or relative.
In polar coordinate systems, there is a central reference point from which the positions of other objects are set. As a rule, this is the object itself, oriented in these coordinates, for example, a ship. It stands at the center of the coordinate system. The position of other objects is specified in terms of angle and range. The direction from the central point to the object whose coordinates you need to know (the target in our case) is called the word "bearing". The range is given for this bearing.
The second system is rectangular, or geographic. These are the usual geographic coordinates: latitude and longitude. You can recalculate target position data from one coordinate system to another.
How to transfer coordinates to our boat? If we had an automated system for generating data for rocket firing, it would give us a bearing from itself to a target and a range to it, and automation would have already converted these two numbers into a bearing from a launcher and a distance from a launcher to a target in this bearing.
But we do not have any automated system, so on the boat, knowing their coordinates, they calculated the approximate coordinates of the target in normal geographic coordinates and reported on the radio to the command post of the launcher. Nothing, we'll count it if necessary, right? So.
And now we have the coordinates of the target, and, therefore, the bearing to it and the range.
The data on the exact location of the target at the present moment in time is called the "Present location of the target" - NMC
Let's say we received this data without delays, quickly recalculated it into relative coordinates, got the bearing to the target and the range along it, then calculated the angle of rotation of the rocket after the launch so that its course would coincide with this bearing, programmed it all into the rocket … still five minutes.
Is it possible to send a rocket to the NMC exactly?
The ship does not stand still, it moves. In five minutes to prepare for launch, which we carried out with the help of a laptop with "broken" software taken from the enemy, the ship covered some distance. Moreover, while our rocket is flying towards him, he will continue to go and cover an even greater distance.
What will it be like? It's simple, it will be equal to the time from the moment of detection and receipt of the NMC and until the moment the rocket arrives, multiplied by the target speed. And in which direction will he go this distance? If after the discovery of the ship we no longer observe it, then in any unobservable one. For example, if a ship has gone beyond the horizon from our boat, then it can go either along the horizon in any direction, or at an angle to it. As a result, the zone in which the ship may find itself will form a semicircle for some time. And if our boat was forced to run from the ship in panic at 45 knots? And at the same time his connection was crushed by the ship's means of the REP? Then it turns out that the ship from the NMC could leave in any direction, and the zone in which it can be now is a circle.
This figure, inside which the target can be at a given moment in time, is called the "Area of the likely target location" - OVMC. By the time when the OVMC circle on the map grew around our NMC, it was no longer real, but the initial one
Here it is necessary to make a reservation. If we had any other information about where the target can go, then we would turn a circle or semicircle into a sector. If there were many options for where the target would go, and we had the time and the appropriate software, then we could get within this OVMC the probability distribution of finding the target in one or another part of the OVMC. In reality, this is exactly what they strive for, it makes shooting easier. But we will continue as if we do not know anything else.
If we cannot obtain such a probability distribution, then it is critical for us how much this circle is larger or smaller than the swath width of the target seeker of our missile. What if the OVMC is twice as wide as the GOS swath width of our RCC? The chances that the last missile will go nowhere are becoming very high. And if the OVMC did not have time to "grow" and almost all of it is covered by the GOS search bar? Then it is more or less possible to shoot, although this is still a risk: the missile can capture the target somewhere on the edge of the field of view, but because of the speed it will not have time to turn on it. The faster our rocket is, the more accurately we must bring it to the target. Or you need to set it to a high flight altitude, with a large radio horizon, so that it detects a target from a long distance and relies on it without problems, but then it will be easier to shoot down. Ideally, be in time when the OVMC is still small.
Thus, we have a dependence on the time factor.
The time from the moment the target is detected until the missile approaches it at the range of the seeker is called the total data aging time
This time can be calculated in advance, since it consists of such known quantities as the time from the moment the target is detected until the end of the transmission of a message about it to the “firing” unit (coastal launcher in our case), the time for prelaunch preparation, flight time, etc. etc. For a ship, it may even include time for some maneuver necessary for launching a rocket.
Our task is to hit the target, thus, it boils down to this: the total aging time of the target data should be such that during this time the target does not have time to go too far and that the size of the OVMC does not grow to exceed the width of the GOS swath width
Let's consider a specific example.
Let's say we have a ship armed with a long-range anti-ship missile, and we have just been told the coordinates of the target to be hit, also the ship. The range to the target is 500 kilometers. The speed of the rocket on the course is 2000 km / h, the width of the capture swath of the seeker is 12 kilometers. The time from the moment the target coordinates arrive at the attacking ship until the missile is launched is 5 minutes. The flight time is obviously 15 minutes, the total data aging time is 20 minutes, or 1/3 hour. The rocket course is laid directly in the NMC. So that, when the missile approaches the target, the GOS can capture it, it is necessary that the target does not leave the NMC further than 6 kilometers perpendicular to the missile's course in any direction. That is, the target should not go faster than 18 kilometers per hour, or 9.7 knots.
But the warships don't move at that speed. Modern warships have an economical speed of 14 knots and a maximum speed of 27-29. Old ships sailed at an economical speed of 16-18 knots and had a maximum speed of 30-35.
Of course, the ship can go not across the course of the incoming rocket, but lag (at an angle) to it. Then he can be in the detection zone of the seeker, even walking at high speed. But it may not be, and the greater the distance to the target (and hence the total data aging time), the less chances of hitting the target if we have only the NMC, that is, the coordinates of the target received once.
Here we need to distract ourselves from simple things and say this. In fact, the situation is even more complicated.
In the examples described above, what is in reality is missing. So, for example, in relation to the coordinates of the target, the calculation of errors must be performed, and in reality we know the NMC inaccurately - this is always the case. The second point is probabilities. The results of such problems are estimated using the apparatus of the theory of probability. Basic things can be seen in the "primer" known to any lieutenant - in the book Elena Sergeevna Wentzel "Introduction to Operations Research" … Why do we need a theorver? Then, for example, sooner or later the rocket does not start from the TPK when the command passes. Or her seeker will break. Or there will be a cruise ship next to the target. The enemy can tow a decoy target nearby and the missile will be directed towards it. Or … and the required high probability of hitting the target must be ensured precisely in such conditions when the outcome of each step in preparation for launch, the launch itself, the flight of the missile and the destruction of the target upon a successful exit to it is of a probabilistic nature. Moreover (remember that the target was identified from the boat), even the detection itself can be erroneous, that is, it also has a probabilistic nature. With the target coordinates determined with errors. Moreover, in reality, even wind corrections must be taken into account, and when launched at a long range, their effect is directly proportional to the range.
In such conditions, the probability of successfully hitting a target when firing at the NMC becomes too low, and it is undesirable to shoot so.
Actually, this is where our Pink Pony stumbles. He cannot understand how it is: a satellite photo is not a control center, even in principle. And he cannot understand why it is simply impossible to send a rocket by coordinates. But fervently argues with those who understand and know.
Is it possible to give the rocket such a speed that the total data aging time becomes very small? In fact yes. For example, if, in the above example of firing from a rocket ship at a target at a distance of 500 kilometers, the target speed were not 2000 km / h, but 6000 km / h, then the target ship would not leave the 12-kilometer strip at any realistic speed would, but there would be another problem: such a speed is a hypersound with various funny effects such as plasma on the GOS fairing. This means that we would not have 12 kilometers …
Or imagine firing a Dagger missile at a distance of 2000 kilometers, as promised on TV, at a ship. In order to play along with the "Dagger", the MiG-31K is not at the airfield, but in the air - the enemy aircraft carrier is waiting for 24 hours a day. Let's assume that 5 minutes passed from the moment of control (we didn’t understand what it was, but it didn’t matter) and before the MiG-31K headed for the target and gained the speed necessary to detach the rocket. Then the rocket goes to the target. We neglect its acceleration time; for simplicity, we assume that it is instantaneous. Next, we have a flight of 2000 km at a speed of about 7000 km / h, which gives us an approach time of 17 minutes, and the total data aging time is 23 minutes. The "Dagger" has a radio-transparent fairing on the nose, but it is small, which means that the radar is very small, given that the operating conditions of this small antenna are very difficult (plasma), we get a rather small target detection area, a small detection range and strict requirements to its conclusion on the target. How long will the ship travel in 23 minutes in a straight line? At 24 knots, for example, it will cover 17 kilometers. In any direction from the NMC. That is, the diameter of the OVMC will be 34 kilometers and there will be a 300-meter ship in this zone.
“Dagger” doesn’t work just like that and get where it is necessary … And “Zircon” will have similar problems.
Moreover, our examples do not take into account the EW factor. The problem is that the electronic warfare, even in the case when the anti-missile missile seeker can detune from part of the interference, greatly narrows the field of view, that is, the "tabular" data on its width dramatically lose relevance, in addition, the missile's target detection range suffers, it also decreases up to a few kilometers (without electronic warfare - tens of kilometers). In such conditions, it is necessary to bring the missile literally to the ship itself, and not somewhere to the side, with the detection of the target "on the edge" of the seeker's line of sight.
Of course, a number of missiles implement the "jamming guidance" mode, but a potential enemy has Nulka-type systems, in which the jamming emitter flies away from the ship, and there are also electronic warfare stations on helicopters, and he will be able to deflect the missile. It would save the inclusion of the seeker directly in front of the target, but the rocket must go exactly to this target.
So it turns out that you can't shoot at the NMC? It is possible, but for short distances, when the target is guaranteed not to leave the missile's line of sight in any direction. For tens of kilometers of range
But for accurate shooting at medium and long ranges, that is, hundreds of kilometers, some more data are needed.
What if we know the course the target is on? Or what kind of maneuver is she performing? Then our situation changes, now the OVMC becomes incommensurably smaller, it actually comes down to the error with which the course is determined.
And if we also know the target's speed? Then it's even better. Now the huge uncertainty in the target's position becomes negligible.
The course and speed of the target are called its motion parameters - MPC
With regard to submarine war, they say "elements of target movement" (EDT), and they still include depth, but we will not touch this issue.
If we determine the MPC, then we can predict the place in which the target will be by the time the rocket arrives. We will simply extrapolate the course taking into account the known speed and corny send the rocket to where the target will be in the same 20 minutes from the previous example.
Schematically, it can be defined like this:
The predicted target site indicated on the diagram is called the "Pre-emptive target site" - UMTs
This diagram does not indicate an error, and it does not explicitly follow from it that the course is of a probabilistic nature: the target can simply turn around at the moment of launch, but we cannot influence this. But this is much better.
What if we only know the target's course (roughly, like everything else in war), but not the speed, but we need to shoot? Then you can try to launch the missile at such an angle to the intended course that the missile with the maximum probability "meets" the target in some place.
This place is called the calculated target site - RMC
Shooting at the OVMC is an exceptional case, the "Rocket shooting rules" require shooting at the NMC, UMC or RMC, and providing a high probability of hitting the target. At the same time, as we saw earlier, shooting at the NMC (without knowing the MPC) is possible with a given probability of hitting only short distances, and shooting at the RMT and RMC requires knowing a much larger amount of information about the target than its coordinates at some point in time. …
These two types of long-range missile firing require knowing the MPC - course and speed (for the UMC), and it is also desirable to know what the target is doing (how it maneuvers). And all this with errors and probabilities. And adjusted for the wind, of course.
And then it becomes possible to send missiles to where the target will be at the right time. This does not guarantee the destruction of the target - it will eventually shoot back. But at least the missiles will get where they need to go.
But how do you know the course and speed of the target?
Sufficient information
Let's go back to the situation with anti-ship missiles on a homemade coastal launcher and a reconnaissance boat. Suppose the range to the target is such that our old subsonic missile with a "dead" ancient seeker has very small chances of reaching the target by firing at the bearing received at the NMC (in fact, we are talking about shooting at the OVMC). Then we need to know the UMC. And for this you need to know the course and speed of the ship.
Let's make an assumption: our reconnaissance boat has an optical rangefinder, but it itself is under a neutral flag and is not classified as a dangerous target by the enemy. Then, having a rangefinder, our boat will make a series of measurements of the range to the target ship for, for example, 15 minutes, and at the same time, by the angle of rotation of the rangefinder on the boat, it will calculate the target speed.
We put the data transmitted by the radio to the shore on the tablet, and here it is - the UMC.
But for this, it turned out to be necessary to observe the target ship from the boat for 15 minutes and transmit data by radio to the shore without frightening the enemy away. It is easy to imagine how difficult it will be in the course of a real war, when a ship or aircraft detected by the enemy is immediately attacked, and the enemy himself is doing everything possible so that no one can see it.
And yes, the satellite with its speed will not be able to measure the MPC for 5-15 minutes either.
Let's make an intermediate conclusion: in order to obtain all the necessary data for rocket firing at a long distance, the target should be regularly and at short intervals (or even better continuously) tracked until the missiles are fired at it with the transfer of target data to the missile weapon carrier. Only then does it become possible to obtain all the necessary data for firing a rocket. If this condition is not met, then the probability of hitting the target drops sharply, including to negligible values (depending on the situation). And one more important conclusion: no matter what range the anti-ship missiles have, the closer their carrier is to the target, the higher the probability of its destruction
Just because the data in a real war will always be incomplete, there will always be a lack of information, electronic warfare will "shoot down" guidance, and a short flight time can somehow help to ensure that the OVMC does not grow beyond the swath of the anti-ship missile's seeker, especially in a strip "cut" by enemy interference.
It's a shame Pink Pony didn't finish reading this far.
Having figured out what data is needed, now let's figure out what, after all, this control center is.
Target designation
If you open definition of the Ministry of Defense, which is made available to wide circles of society, then the word "target designation" refers to the following:
Communication of data about the location, movement elements and actions of the target from the source of detection (reconnaissance) to the carrier of the means of destruction. Ts. Can be produced from landmarks (local objects), aiming a device or weapon at the target, in polar or rectangular coordinates, on a map, aerial photograph, tracer. bullets (shells), signal cartridges, reference-signal aviation. bombs, explosions art. shells, using radar, air defense nets and specials. tech. funds.
This is "in general". This definition even includes "tracers" fire on a window with a firing point, led by a 24-year-old motorized rifle platoon commander to show the platoon the target. We are interested in the marine component, so we will remove from the definition everything that does not apply to it.
Communication of data on the location, movement elements and actions of the target from the source of detection (reconnaissance) to the carrier of the means of destruction. Ts. Can be produced … in polar or rectangular coordinates … with the help of radar … and special. tech. funds.
What conclusion follows even from this "vague" definition? Target designation is actually the PROCESS OF TRANSMISSION AND PRODUCTION OF DATA with the parameters necessary for the effective use of weapons. How is the data transmitted? "In general," - even with flag signals, but in the domestic fleet and naval aviation it has long been accepted as the main option that the control center is transmitted from the "reconnaissance" to the "carrier" in the form of machine data of special target designation complexes.
For the effective use of weapons, not only do we need to detect the target and get the NMC, not only do we need to determine its MPC (for which the goal needs to be monitored for some time), it is not enough to calculate all the errors, we also need to convert all this into a machine format and transfer it to carriers in a ready-to-use form
Moreover, given that a "scout" is, as a rule (though not always), an aircraft with a limited crew and high vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire, then the data generation process should be fully or partially automated.
If we are talking about data transmission in a different way, then this is possible only through some kind of ground control panel with the corresponding data aging time.
Of course, data can be transmitted to the ship even by voice, and if they are accurate, then the personnel of the BCh-2 will prepare all the data for firing, starting from the real position of their ship, will enter them into the missile weapon control system, where they will be converted into the same machine control unit and loaded into a rocket or rockets.
But this is on the ship. In aviation, pilots launch an aircraft into an attack at a speed much higher than the speed of sound, under fire both from surface ships and from enemy interceptors, with losses in the strike group and the corresponding situation on the radio, in the most difficult jamming environment, and sit there. with rulers and calculators and there is simply no time to load something somewhere. Having superimposed on this imperfection of the devices for displaying information about the target and oxygen starvation (sometimes), we get an environment in which people act at the limit of human capabilities, on the edge. Accordingly, a "machine format" is needed.
For a long time, the control center for aviation meant not transmitting and receiving data for launching a rocket, but transmitting and receiving data necessary for an aircraft to reach the line of its launch - the rocket performed target capture directly on the carrier.
With the advent of such missiles as the Kh-35 on airplanes, it became possible to attack targets in a ship-like manner - with the target of the missile's seeker on a course, after being detached from the carrier. But this does not reduce the rigidity of the requirements for the control center, but, on the contrary, increases it. The error after detaching the missile can no longer be corrected, but the pilots of the "old" aviation had the opportunity to "show" the target to the missile before launch, correcting the consequences of reaching the target according to inaccurate data from the control center by targeting the missile at the target selected for destruction directly from the aircraft radar. Modern pilots can launch missiles without observing the target with their own radar, and this is one of the standard ways of using them. This means that the control center data should be more accurate.
And now, understanding the complexity of the problem, let us ask ourselves the question: how can you get all the data? Naturally, in a real war, where the enemy shoots out aerial reconnaissance and crushes communications with interference?
Let us examine this question for a start using the example of the "Dagger" complex.
Realities of the "Dagger"
Let's imagine what it would take for us to hit a sea target with this missile. So, the antenna, half-blind from the plasma, under the small radio-transparent fairing of the "Dagger" should be very close to the ship, so that neither the problems with guidance due to speed, nor the electronic warfare would simply have time to interfere with the rocket. What is needed for this? It is necessary to transmit with extreme precision to the carrier the control center with the anticipated target location, almost without errors, so accurately that the "Dagger" could hit the target even without aiming at all.
Will it work then? Quite. If the target moves without maneuvering, then by measuring its speed and determining the course accurately enough, knowing the weather on the missile's route and choosing the time of its launch (the carrier should already pick up speed by this moment), it will turn out to "drop" the missile exactly on the target. And the presence on the rocket of a primitive radar and gas-dynamic rudders will make it possible to carry out minimal corrections of the missile's course, so as not to miss a point target.
The question is: what conditions must be met in order for this trick did it work out? First, as mentioned earlier, the goal must be discovered, about how difficult it is sometimes, it was said in the last article. “Naval Warfare for Beginners. We take out the aircraft carrier "to strike" … Secondly, as already mentioned above, the goal should go straight and not maneuver under any circumstances. And, thirdly, somewhere near the target there should be a target designator, for example, a ship or an airplane. Taking into account the fact that the accuracy of determining the coordinates and MPC should be the highest, this can only be a very perfect scout.
Yes?
Yes. News from July 30, 2020 from the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:
THE DAGGER ROCKET COMPLEX WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE AIMS FROM THE MODERNIZED IL-20M BOARD.
The modernized Il-20M electronic reconnaissance aircraft was put into operation in the Southern Military District (YuVO). The aircraft commissioning ceremony took place at one of the airfields in the Rostov region. Experts believe that the main feature of the aircraft modernization is the possibility of issuing target designations via a secure communication channel directly to the Kinzhal hypersonic aviation missile system.
Earlier it was reported that the "Dagger" complex took over on experimental combat duty in the area of responsibility of the Southern Military District.
Fully: here.
Here it is, the missing piece of the mosaic. What was lacking in the picture of the all-crushing "Dagger" to make it whole. But, fortunately, the Ministry of Defense explained everything: in order for the hypersonic "Dagger" to hit an aircraft carrier from 1000 kilometers, a low-speed turboprop Il-20M must be hung next to the aircraft carrier, the PDTs must be removed, transferred to the control unit, and the aircraft carrier must be asked not to maneuver and not to shoot down Ilyushin. ". And it's in the bag.
The accuracy of the Il-20M electronic reconnaissance systems is very high. This aircraft can indeed ensure that the Dagger hits a naval target, but under the conditions indicated above. It will not be surprising if soon the Ministry of Defense will show us some kind of demonstration launch of the "Dagger" with a hit in the BKSH, just not mentioning the turboprop "pterodactyl" flying next to the target for half an hour.
The fireworks made of bonnets, thrown into the sky in a patriotic frenzy, will be noble, and the nuances - well, who is interested in them? If only then you don't really have to fight, otherwise everything will pop up, but it seems that they do not believe in the possibility of war in our country because of the word “at all”.
Well, we are returning to the real world.
Is it correct in principle to use a guidance plane, target designation, etc.? In fact, this is often the only way out. Especially when the enemy has powerful air defense and you need to attack him suddenly, from different courses and low altitudes. Then some external "gunner" is simply uncontested. In the USSR, Tu-95RTs aircraft were used in this capacity, below is one of the schemes of their interaction with attack missile-carrying aircraft.
I must say that this was not at all an ideal scheme: there were much more cases when the Americans intercepted scouts than when they did not intercept. But nevertheless, these were some chances, and besides, the Tu-95 in terms of its characteristics, such as, for example, speed, is not an Il-20 at all, it is a much more difficult target in reality.
Examples of obtaining information for the control center
Let's analyze the options for obtaining data for the development of the control center.
The simplest option: the ship detects the target of its radar and inflicts a missile strike on it. Such battles took place after the Second World War more than once, in fact, this is the main option. But it works only within the radio horizon, that is, at a distance of tens of kilometers. Naturally, the enemy can fire missiles at our ship before our missiles reach him. Both the missile attacks of the Americans during Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf and our "episode" with Georgian boats in the Black Sea in 2008 were just such battles. But if the risk is too great? How do you get all the data you need without exposing your fragile, valuable, and expensive ship to damage?
Answer: using electronic reconnaissance means without emitting radiation, to detect the operation of the enemy's radio technical means, to determine the NMC by them and to use weapons. The accuracy of determining the NMC in this way is low, but the firing range is also small - the same tens of kilometers, only from outside the enemy's radio horizon.
An example is from the book cap. 1 rank of reserve Romanov Yuri Nikolaevich "Combat miles. Chronicle of the life of the destroyer" Battle ", concerning the development of the control center according to RTR (RTR station" Mech "):
"We discovered at the Mech station the operation of the radio equipment of an American destroyer. In order to maintain combat readiness and practice the naval combat crew, the first mate announced a training alert for a simulated missile strike with the main complex. After performing a series of maneuvers, creating a" base "for determining the distance and determining, that the target is within reach, while continuing to maintain stealth, not including additional radio equipment on the radiation, a conditional missile strike was inflicted with two P-100 missiles. the crew was shaken from the drowsiness caused by the heat. Visually, the foe was not found and did not identify, nor did they strive for this, following strictly according to the transition plan. The station of radio technical search MP-401S was repeatedly found behind the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, at the exit to the Indian Ocean radar operation American carrier-based AWACS aircraft "Hawkeye". Obviously, from the AVM "Constellation", which, according to intelligence reports from the 8th OPESK, regularly arriving at the "Boevoy", is on combat training in the Arabian Sea. Passive means of search and reconnaissance help out a lot. This is our trump card. Allowing to remain invisible, they "highlight" the environment, warn about the approach of air attack means, missile danger, the presence of enemy ships, eliminating civilian targets. The cassettes of the memory blocks of the stations contain the data of all existing radio-technical equipment of the ships and aircraft of the potential enemy. And when the operator of the Mech station reports that he is observing the operation of an air detection station of an English frigate or a navigation radar of a civil ship, reporting its parameters, then this is so …"
That is, there is a simple case: the ship turned out to be hidden from the enemy at such a distance, with which the RTR was able to detect the operation of radio equipment on the enemy ship by maneuvering and making repeated measurements, and, since the distance was small, “inflicted »Missile strike at the NMC.
Of course, it was peacetime, and no one was looking for our destroyer, but even from the last article (“Naval Warfare for Beginners. We take out the aircraft carrier "to strike") it is clear that the ship in the ocean can be "hidden", and combat experience confirms this: there have been sudden skirmishes of ships and will be in the future.
Let's complicate the situation: our destroyer has no missiles, it has been used up, but the target must be hit. To do this, you need another ship to strike, for example, a missile cruiser, and the destroyer would receive the necessary data and transmit to the control center. Is it possible? In principle, yes, but here the question arises of what kind of goal it is. Maneuvering around an unwary ship using emitting means and determining its NMC so many times to reveal the course and speed, and then transfer everything to the cruiser, the "Combat" could technically, and the cruiser, according to the control center formed and transmitted by the destroyer, could shoot back, and with good accuracy.
But, for example, to get in this way data about an aircraft carrier with security, or about a detachment of ships in which only one is sailing with the radar on, or about an enemy destroyer, which goes, as Vice Admiral Hank Masteen said, "in electromagnetic silence", "Combat" would no longer be able to and would not provide any control center for a missile cruiser in wartime. He would be able to maximize time to find some kind of extreme ship in security, and then it would be covered by aviation. Even information about the composition of the aircraft carrier group, the depth of its defensive order and its formation could not have been obtained, only to establish the very fact of the presence of the naval (presumably aircraft carrier) group.
And how to get the control center so that the ship with its missiles worked for hundreds of kilometers and hit? In the West, ship helicopters can be used for this. Almost any helicopter has a radar and a terminal for the system of mutual information exchange with the ship, which allow the ship to "look beyond the horizon" and receive the necessary data about the enemy. The helicopter has powerful electronic warfare equipment, it can go a few meters above the water, remaining unnoticed by the enemy and "jumping" only to control the situation, detect the enemy and determine the MPC. At the same time, it can also be used as a means of disinformation, reaching the target from a direction that does not coincide with the bearing from the enemy to its ships.
Thus, it is possible to obtain a control center at a distance of hundreds of kilometers, comparable to the maximum ranges of such missiles as the last "blocks" of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system, the former anti-ship Tomahawk, and others. In general, helicopters are of great importance in naval warfare, you can read about this in detail in the article “Air fighters over ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea " … The topic of reconnaissance is also raised there, and it is also well shown that modern naval helicopters themselves can destroy ships.
And for a long range? And for a long range, the same USA has aviation. There is a possibility of reconnaissance with the help of carrier-based aircraft, there is with the help of AWACS E-3 aircraft assigned to the Air Force. Thanks to the well-functioning interaction between the aircraft types and the well-organized interspecies communication, this is quite possible.
But even in this case, the same Americans took the problem of data obsolescence so seriously that their only "distant" LRASM anti-ship missile system received very serious "brains". The Americans are not even trying to grasp the immensity and learn how to shoot at large, hundreds of kilometers, distances at a moving target with "blunt" missiles. They need not only to launch a rocket, but also to hit.
However, brains also need guidance. The Swedish rocket SAAB RBS-15 with "brains" is also more than good, but it also needs to be directed from the air to achieve maximum efficiency.
Our situation is different: our AWACS aircraft are very much inferior to foreign ones, and there are very few of them, they are of little use for detecting surface targets, the aircraft carrier is always under repair and its aircraft cannot be used for reconnaissance, the basic reconnaissance aircraft is almost destroyed. But we have brainless long-range missiles.
In the USSR, a "bundle" of Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designators and missile-carrying aircraft was widely used, but now the Tu-95RTs is no longer there, and attempts to use low-speed aircraft based on the Il-18 as such are simply beyond good and evil. For the surface and submarine forces, the Tupolevs were also transferred to the control center. The USSR got out with long-range shooting as best it could, but now we simply do not have an "eye" like the Tu-95RTs.
At the same time, we will not be able in the foreseeable future to get away from the missile weapons of ships as one of the main striking means, we do not hold "brains" in high esteem, therefore we do not have "smart" missiles, although it is not the most difficult task to put the target search algorithm into the missile., there would be a desire.
This means that long-range control issues will remain relevant for us for a very long time. It makes sense to familiarize yourself with how such things have been done in the past.
Let us consider the experience of obtaining a control center for an attack on an aircraft carrier multipurpose group using a real example from the USSR.
From the book of Admiral of the Fleet I. M. Kapitanets "Battle for the World Ocean in the Cold and Future Wars":
In June 1986, the US Navy and NATO conducted a strike fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea.
Taking into account the situation, it was decided to conduct a tactical exercise of nuclear submarines of the anti-aircraft division against real aircraft carriers. To detect and track the AVU, a reconnaissance and shock curtain of two submarines, pr. 671RTM and SKR, pr. 1135, were deployed, and long-range aerial reconnaissance was conducted by Tu-95RTs aircraft.
The transition to the exercise area of AVU "America" was made secretly, observing camouflage measures.
At the command post of the fleet, the air force and the flotilla of nuclear submarines, posts were deployed to ensure the control of forces. It was possible to reveal the deceitful actions of carrier-based aircraft. All this confirmed that it is not so easy to fight with AVU.
At the entrance of AVU "America" into the Norwegian Sea, the aircraft carrier was directly tracked by the TFR pr. 1135 and tracked by missile weapons of the tactical group of nuclear submarines. Air reconnaissance was constantly conducted by Tu-95RTs and Tu-16R aircraft.
To break away from tracking, the AVU developed a maximum speed of up to 30 knots and entered the Westfjord Bay. The use of the Norwegian fjords by aircraft carriers to lift carrier-based aircraft was already known from the actions of the US 6th Fleet in the Ionian Islands, it made it difficult to select long-range missiles. Therefore, we deployed two Project 670 nuclear submarines (Amethyst missiles), which were capable of striking missiles at short distances in the fjords.
In the course of the tactical exercise, control was transferred to the command post of the tactical group to organize an independent strike, and from the command post of the fleet, a joint strike by submarines and naval missile-carrying aviation was organized.
For five days, the tactical exercise on the aircraft carrier America continued, which made it possible to assess our capabilities, strengths and weaknesses and improve the use of naval forces in the naval operation to destroy the AUG. Now aircraft carriers could no longer operate with impunity in the Norwegian Sea and sought protection from the forces of the Northern Fleet in the Norwegian fjords.
The admiral forgot to add that all these forces of the Northern Fleet acted against one American aircraft carrier group, and there were fifteen of them and more allies. Anyway…
For the rest, even in peacetime, in order to obtain the control center, it was necessary to conduct a complex reconnaissance operation of very large forces, including aerial reconnaissance, and all this in order to establish the impossibility of striking from a long distance, which required bringing the submarine into action from a short range.. 670.
Again, in peacetime, it was possible to "track with weapons", during hostilities no patrolmen could have acted like that, at best there would have been work to detect "contacts" without revealing themselves, as the "Combat" did, to transfer the "contact" to other forces, mainly air reconnaissance, and the latter would have to fight to the fullest in order to simply determine the area in which the enemy is located - no one would have let them to the aircraft carrier.
Someone will ask: what about the Legend satellite system? I. M. Kapitanets gave the answer a page earlier:
Under the leadership of the commander of the 1st Fleet, Vice-Admiral E. Chernov, in the Barents Sea, an experimental exercise of a tactical group on a detachment of warships was conducted, after which rocket firing at a target field was carried out. Target designation was planned from the Legend space system.
During a four-day exercise in the Barents Sea, it was possible to work out a joint navigation of a tactical group, to acquire skills in the management and organization of a missile strike.
Of course, two SSGNs of pr. 949, having 48 missiles, even in conventional equipment, are capable of independently incapacitating an aircraft carrier. This was a new direction in the fight against aircraft carriers - the use of plarks pr. 949. In fact, a total of 12 SSGNs of this project were built, of which eight for the Northern Fleet and four for the Pacific Fleet.
The pilot exercise showed a low probability of target designation from the Legend spacecraft, therefore, to ensure the actions of the tactical group, it was necessary to form a reconnaissance and shock curtain as part of three nuclear submarines of the project 705 or 671 RTM. Based on the results of the experimental exercise, it was planned to deploy an anti-aircraft division to the Norwegian Sea during the command and control of the fleet in July. Now the Northern Fleet has the opportunity to effectively operate submarines, independently or in conjunction with naval missile-carrying aviation, on the US aircraft carrier-strike formation in the North-East Atlantic.
In both examples, the situation is obvious: an incredibly expensive tool, the ICRC "Legend" system, did not provide a solution to the control center problem, which "took out of the brackets" the main striking force of the Northern Fleet - the Project 949A submarine.
And in all cases, in order to find and classify a target, as well as to be able to strike at it (including obtaining a control center), it was necessary to conduct a comprehensive reconnaissance operation of heterogeneous forces, and in the second case, it also required a reduction in the launch range by launching carriers to the launch line located close to the goal.
And this is really the only solution that can have practical application. In peacetime and in a threatened period, you can act like this:
At the entrance of AVU "America" into the Norwegian Sea, the aircraft carrier was directly tracked by the TFR pr. 1135 and tracked by missile weapons of the tactical group of nuclear submarines. Air reconnaissance was constantly conducted by Tu-95RTs and Tu-16R aircraft.
The TFR transfers the control center to the submarines, the submarines keep the aircraft carrier at gunpoint, the Tupolevs track the position of the target to ensure the possibility of an aircraft strike at it. But this will not work in war. Submarines and ships - for sure, aviation may have options.
If you did not know why the Americans did not even try to create ultra-long-range anti-ship missiles before, now you know this, as well as why LRASM "brains" are much more needed than flight speed.
Integrated reconnaissance operation and strike on the AUG
Let's try to still determine what a successful operation to obtain a control center for striking with anti-ship cruise missiles at a long range and this strike itself should look like.
The first stage is to establish the very fact of having a goal. The difficulties of such are known and are described in more or less detail in the last article, but it will not be possible to get away from this: the target must first of all be found and quickly, until it can strike at which it is being advanced.
At this point, all types of intelligence and analytics are included in the work. There are two tasks to solve: to identify areas where the probability of finding a target in which is high enough to start looking for it there, and those, the probability of finding targets in which is so small that it makes no sense to try to find it there.
Let the enemy try to bring an aircraft carrier group to strike with cruise missiles and aircraft, as described in the last article. Thus, our target is an aircraft carrier multipurpose group.
Suppose reconnaissance surveyed a certain area from aircraft. Inside this area, it is possible to delimit those zones into which the target will not have time to pass before the next search, you can immediately mark the bands that will be checked by optical reconnaissance satellites, tie the need for a lurking target at one time or another not to enter these or other areas. Even at the beginning of the preparatory measures, reconnaissance detachments of surface ships may be created, the task of which will include not so much the search for the target, but the control of various lines and informing the command that the target is not there.
So the search areas begin to narrow, surface ships enter the areas surveyed by aviation and remain there, on the path of the target's possible movement there are curtains of submarines, covered from enemy submarines by surface ships and aircraft, in those narrows through which the target can pass into the protected area (which - some fjord) minefields are placed from the air, which reduces the field for maneuver for the target.
If the target is an aircraft carrier, then AWACS aircraft capable of detecting air targets from a long distance are involved in reconnaissance, and sooner or later the areas of probable location of a target evading detection will be reduced to several zones that reconnaissance aircraft can check in a couple of days.
And now the goal has been found.
Now the second stage of the operation begins: obtaining the NMC and the PDC, without which the use of weapons is impossible.
Periodic flights of aerial reconnaissance, the work of RTR, sonar stations of submarines will give different OVMC with different errors in determination. By superimposing them on each other and identifying common areas in the results of all types of reconnaissance, noting their displacement over time, you can get an idea of the target's course and where it is going.
Further, using the mathematical apparatus of the theory of probability, based on the received intelligence, the area is calculated where the location of the target is most likely. And the target is searched again.
After completing several reconnaissance missions in succession and detecting a target from a long distance (without being exposed to fire and interceptors; if substituted, then there will not be enough forces for the war), the OVMC is minimized and reduced to very small areas.
Then comes the most difficult stage. Knowing the outdated NMC with an error, having an acceptable size OVMC, roughly knowing the course and having received the RMC, it is necessary to bring the carriers (for example, SSGNs and missile cruisers of pr. 1164) to the launch line, prepare for them to receive the control center in such a way as to get it right away after the final stage of the reconnaissance operation before the first strike.
For example, we plan that aerial reconnaissance will be in the RMC, determined by the results of the ongoing reconnaissance operation and will find a target there at 16.00 and that, according to its data, the control center for ships and submarines can be transferred to them no later than 16.20 and at 16.20-16.25 a time-synchronized salvo will be fired. … The carriers are at different ranges from the target, and they will have to launch missiles at such intervals that they still arrive at the target at the same time. In case of earlier detection of the target, the carriers are ready to receive the control center and fire in advance. Since the SSGN "under the periscope" are vulnerable, the areas where they are located are covered by other forces: aviation, multipurpose submarines, etc.
The total data aging time, therefore, should be equal to 20 minutes + the flight time of the missiles. Suppose we are talking about a range of 500 kilometers, and the speed of the rocket is 2000 km / h, then the total data aging time will be 35 minutes.
At 15.40, aerial reconnaissance begins a search. At 15.55 he finds the target, enters into battle with the cover aviation. Only this time we have an Avrug, an aviation reconnaissance and strike group, which must not only find a target, but also attack it, simply without unnecessary risk, without breaking through to the main goal, etc.
At 15.55, the target was attacked, RTR noted the intensive work of the radar and radio facilities, the joint results of aerial reconnaissance and RTR showed sufficiently accurate for a salvo of the NMC, the rise of deck aircraft (if the target was an aircraft carrier) was recorded, which means that now the target would have to periodically use radio equipment or, when work "in silence", do not change course, so that the planes themselves can then find their aircraft carrier.
At 16.10, regarding the results of RTR, reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force, the UMC or RMC of targets are calculated, generated and transmitted to the Central Control Center for SSGNs and RRC. At the same moment, starting from the same control center, the task is set to strike the aircraft.
It was at this moment that we, albeit not for long, but solved the problem of control center. That's what it costs to get this very CU, that's where it comes from. This is what it looks like - the solution to the target designation problem
At 16.15-16.20, the missile defense carriers fire a massive salvo, calculated not only by the launch time, but also by the front (the front width of the approaching group of missiles between the outermost missiles in the group) and span (without going into details, the estimated time between the defeat of the target of the first and last missiles in volley).
A volley from a variety of missiles ensures that, with insufficient accuracy in determining the NMC, RMC, etc. a significant part of the missiles will still hit their targets, and if there is an exchange of data between the missiles in the group, then some of the missiles will have time to maneuver and turn over to those targets that their GOS did not detect. But part, of course, will not be in time and will fly by. Since the obsolescence of data is still measured in tens of minutes, we will not reach the target with one missile or a small number of them - we need an attack on a wide front, beyond which the target would definitely not go. The percentage of missiles that will have to reach the target is calculated with the help of the probability theory matapparat in advance, and taking these calculations into account, a volley is planned.
At 4:45 pm, the missiles reach the target, and at about the same time, the main aviation forces, with additional reconnaissance of the target at the same control center, inflict a massive air strike with the subsequent recording of the results of all strikes delivered to the target.
Then, the results of strikes are assessed according to data from other types of reconnaissance, and, if necessary, either new missile strikes (if there is anything) and air strikes (if there is anyone), and / or an offensive of surface forces and submarines is carried out to destroy the enemy from shorter distances, up to the use of torpedoes by submarines (it is clear that such an offensive will also have its own price).
Of course, in fact, there can be many different attack options. There can be a mainly air offensive operation with different options for the order in which enemy ships should be destroyed: either it will be a rush to the main goal, or the successive destruction of all ships in a battle. Perhaps, first there will be an air offensive, under the cover of which ships and submarines will launch an attack from a closer range. There are many options, but they are all very complex, primarily from the point of view of command and control of forces.
And obtaining reconnaissance information, searching for the enemy, receiving precision and command control by strike forces to strike or strike at the enemy is a separate and very complex operation with large losses
This is how a strike on an aircraft carrier group and target designation for it looks very roughly.
Some moments were left in a distorted form for "regime reasons". The goal was not to tell how it really is there, but simply to give an idea of the scale of the problem of issuing target designation for long-range firing
It is easy to understand that there is no question at all about some kind of magic tool that can simply be fired “somewhere there” and also get there. With the "Dagger" of the Ministry of Defense it seems like it was "revealed", but any other combat science fiction such as Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles and the like has the same problems and limitations.
Based on what you have read, it is also easy to understand why skeptics from among the retirees simply do not believe in the ability of the Russian Armed Forces as a whole (this is not about the fleet) to conduct such operations: Russia simply does not have the forces necessary for this, and the headquarters do not have the training for that. to carry out such operations. Just the rise to strike of several different air regiments from different airfields and their output to the target together at a given time is a whole story. There is no guarantee that this can be done without dozens of prior exercise attempts.
The level of control that should be in order to organize such an operation is simply unattainable for today's Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and such things have not been practiced for many years even in exercises. Yes, and there is nothing to work them out with, there are no forces that can be controlled and work out such operations.
And why the Americans sincerely believe that their aircraft carriers are invulnerable in general, in principle, is also clear: they believe in this precisely because of their understanding of the complexity of the task of finding and destroying an aircraft carrier group and understanding what numerous and well-trained forces are for this. are needed. They simply know that no one has such powers today.
In fact, Russia today has the resources to acquire forces capable of such operations in a short time, and it will not be very expensive. But this issue must be dealt with. This needs to be done, it is necessary to form parts and formations, purchase equipment for them, mainly aviation, create guidelines and instructions and train, train, train
Tales about the "Dagger", which will sweep away everyone "in one fell swoop", will remain fairy tales, the idea that, having seen an enemy ship on a satellite photo, it can be immediately attacked is the level of Pink Pony's thinking. This is a simulacrum, suitable only for propaganda among schoolchildren, and nothing more.
But at the same time, the problem, with all its difficulty, is solvable. If it is, of course, solved.
