Today, there are a number of postulates regarding the conduct of war at sea, from which the secondary role of surface ships in the destruction of other surface ships follows. So, in Western countries, the basic point of view is adopted that submarines and aircraft should destroy surface ships. In countries whose main naval theaters are located immediately beyond the territorial waters, certain importance is also attached to missile boats and small corvettes, which are considered as means of strikes against surface ships.
The main players in the world (except for Russia, and, apparently, China) consider battles between large surface ships, in principle, possible, but secondary in comparison with their other tasks (providing anti-submarine defense and air defense of ship formations).
In Russia, the ability of surface ships to fight with their own kind is given much more importance.
Who is right?
At first glance, the West.
First, indeed, nothing can compare in destructive power to a massive airstrike. And modern nuclear submarines pose a huge danger to surface ships.
But at the same time, history speaks against these arguments.
So, in the entire history of mankind after 1945, only two diesel-electric and one nuclear submarine destroyed one ship each in a real war.
In 1971, the Pakistani diesel-electric submarine "Hangor" sank the Indian frigate "Kukri". And in 1982 - the famous attack by the Concaror nuclear submarine of the British Navy against the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano took place. In 2010, an alleged North Korean submarine sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan.
Everything.
But the battles between surface ships and the destruction of surface forces by surface forces were much greater - at times.
Since the destruction of the Israeli Navy destroyer Eilat by Egyptian Navy missile boats in 1967. And then 1971 - the Indo-Pakistani war. 1973 - Arab-Israeli. 1974 - battles for the Paracel Islands. 80s - tanker war in the Persian Gulf. And at the end of the Cold War - Operation Praying Mantis, in which one of the Iranian ships ("Joshan") was destroyed by a missile attack by American ships. Another ship ("Sahand") - a joint attack by a rocket ship and a carrier-based attack aircraft. And also the Chinese operation on the Spratly Islands in 1988.
The number of warships and boats (together) killed in these battles is in the tens.
In 2008, the first combat use of the Russian Navy against a foreign state was also, in a sense, a sea battle - a missile strike on Georgian boats. None of them were destroyed. But at least their attack on the Russian convoy was thwarted, the boats were driven into the base, where they were destroyed by the paratroopers.
Thus, the historical experience of recent decades suggests that naval combat between surface forces not only has not lost its relevance, but remains the main task of surface ships.
Even in conditions when it is possible to use strike aircraft, the role of surface ships remains critical.
You can read about how the basic strike aircraft and surface forces interact with each other, and what role surface ships play in this interaction, you can read in the article “Naval Warfare for Beginners. Interaction between ships and strike aircraft .
But today we are talking about a "clean" naval battle, without aviation.
Is it real?
Historical experience suggests that yes.
Moreover, the almost complete absence of aircraft carriers in our fleet simply dooms the Russian Navy to the prospect of dealing with the enemy with the help of missile ships, at least in some cases.
And this is not some kind of fantasy.
The events of 1973 in the Mediterranean show that sometimes this is even possible against an aircraft carrier fleet. In addition, successful training attacks by missile ships against aircraft carriers took place in the west.
On the other hand, only the United States has significant aircraft carrier forces in the world. All our other potential adversaries are either just like us (that is, they cannot count on serious air power far from their shores), or even weaker.
This means that outside the combat radius of the base aircraft, we will be in the same position with them. And our (and their) main force will be the ships.
Today, the Navy is present in the Mediterranean Sea, ensuring the security of our group in Syria and communications with this country. Preparing for the deployment of PMTO in Sudan, relying on which our ships will be able to be present in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
With any aggravation of relations with many countries in these regions, the battle with their ships will easily become a reality. The same can easily happen in the Baltic (see article “Is the Baltic Fleet a former fleet? No! ).
And in the case of the Persian Gulf, Arabian and Red Seas, ships are guaranteed to have to fight on their own. In the Mediterranean, too, to a large extent.
Starting position
Let us analyze the situation in which detachments of warships or single ships find themselves in isolation from the "coast" and the opportunities that it gives. Or they are simply forced to act on their own for a while.
Around conditionally (we remember about the curvature of the planet's surface, right?) A flat surface without shelters, relief, etc. The detection range of anything that does not emit is equal to the visual range. You can turn on the radar, and then it will increase to the direct radio line of sight. But this automatically means that the ship is unmasking itself. And the enemy's radio-technical reconnaissance, in the best case, will establish the fact of the presence of a ship (or ships), and in the worst case, it will reveal the coordinates and parameters of the target's movement within a certain period of time with an accuracy sufficient for a missile strike.
At the same time, it is impossible to establish precisely whether a ship or a detachment of ships has been detected by the enemy or not yet.
The situation will be further complicated by the fact that the enemy has satellite reconnaissance (if any). Of course, the bands in which satellites can detect something, and the time of their flight is approximately known. And this makes it possible to evade detection. How such things are specifically done, using the example of a real satellite constellation, is shown in the article “Naval Warfare for Beginners. We bring the aircraft carrier to strike .
Any ship (or squad of ships) can act in the same way. But one must understand that this is in any case a limiting factor - there is always a zone that cannot be entered at one time or another. And this narrows the freedom of maneuver.
In this situation, it is necessary, first, to quickly find the enemy. Secondly, do not get caught on the way "in the eye" of any merchant ship, otherwise the "merchant" can "light up" the ship. Third, do it without radiating.
Then you need to successfully attack first. And all this time to remain invisible to the enemy.
Moreover, ideally, even after an enemy attack, it is necessary not to show him your location.
Thus, initially the commander of a ship (or a detachment of ships), who began an operation to search for and destroy the enemy at sea, must resolve the issue of covert detection of the enemy and covert access to the missile launch line.
At this moment, he will do what the Soviet commanders demanded from the forces entrusted to them from the very moment the anti-ship missiles appeared in service with the Navy - he will win the fight for the first salvo.
Then he needs to keep stealth right after the volley. And at the same time evaluate the results of the blow. Then - a quick retreat so that the enemy's reinforcements would not find him.
Evading detection
When looking for an enemy, all factors must be taken into account.
Thus, the orbits of enemy reconnaissance satellites are known. Knowing this, you can use them and evade detection, without going into those places that will soon come under observation from space.
Although the ship operates autonomously, it can receive intelligence reports in any case. In this regard, it is very important to include ships in the network of mutual information exchange (IZOI) in the theater of operations.
But even without this very important step, some important information can be transmitted to the ships. So, it is possible to give the ship commander notifications about takeoffs of enemy base patrol or reconnaissance aircraft from airfields. This information allows, knowing the flight technical characteristics of enemy aircraft, to predict the time at which a reconnaissance aircraft may be in the same area as the ship.
What to do in this case?
In some situations, you just need to be ready to jam the aircraft. And bring him down as quickly as possible, if he were discovered.
In others, be ready to "pretend to be a tanker." Sail like a merchant ship on their usual courses and at their usual speed.
For example, the commander of a ship is planning a dash through an area in which, in his opinion, the danger of enemy air reconnaissance is high. In this case, we are talking about an area with intensive fishing. Suppose it is known that the enemy does not have optoelectronic surveillance systems that allow visual identification of the target at night on aircraft used for reconnaissance over the sea.
Then it is logical to cross the area at night, using the fishermen who are fishing, as a cover - at the time of fishing, they usually have AIS terminals turned off (so as not to show the "fishing" places to competitors). Their navigation radars will not be able to identify the ship. Accordingly, if in the dark the ship is somewhere near the fishermen, then air reconnaissance will not be able to distinguish it from a fishing vessel.
It also helps to hide from observation traffic in the stream of merchant ships. True, more serious precautions are already needed here. If only because the AIS from the "traders" is basically turned on. And a radio contrast target without signals from this system can attract unnecessary attention.
During the day, you need to keep a distance that excludes visual identification from merchant ships. But, despite all the difficulties, such a way of hiding is nevertheless possible.
Checking civil "traffic" is a chore. Air reconnaissance will have to visually identify each target. First of all, this is long. Secondly, this can be neglected due to the lack of air forces. Thirdly, it makes it possible to suddenly shoot down the scouts and restore stealth.
Submarines are a problem - the submarine sonar system can easily distinguish a warship from a merchant ship at a fairly large distance.
But, first of all, not always. Secondly, sometimes it is possible to neutralize the enemy's submarine forces in advance, at the very beginning of the conflict. Thirdly, the boat will not always be able to attack the ship itself. In this case, it will give "to the shore" only the coordinates, course and speed of the target, so that it can be re-detected from the shore (for example, by aircraft) and struck. Fourth, this data may be so inaccurate that it cannot be used. And fifthly, there may simply not be boats in the theater of operations.
That is, the ship commander has time.
He can, for example, knowing that the enemy takes two hours from the moment the ship is discovered to the rise of large aviation forces, and having data on the flight time from each airbase in the region, try to periodically change course so that the aircraft that took off to the calculated target location (for terminology - see article “Naval Warfare for Beginners. The problem of targeting ), found nothing there. Then there will be a search operation. And this is time again.
And, in general, there are chances to leave. And then come back if necessary.
Let's give a real example of the withdrawal of a ship's compound from under a conventional airstrike. American aircraft carrier formation from under the blow of the Soviet naval missile-carrying aviation:
It was a shock.
The results of radio direction showed that the newly formed aircraft carrier strike force (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts carrier-based aircraft flights at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the Main Headquarters of the Navy.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov makes a decision immediately. Urgently send the Patrol escort ship, three Project 671 RTM multipurpose nuclear submarines to monitor the AUS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, bring all the Pacific Fleet's naval missile aircraft to full readiness, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, bring into full combat readiness of all parts and ships of the Pacific Fleet reconnaissance.
In response to such aggressive actions of the Americans, prepare the air division of naval missile-carrying aviation for departure in readiness, on Monday to designate an air-missile strike on the aircraft carrier formation.
At the same time, multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
September 13, Monday. The Pacific Fleet reconnaissance will have to find the location of the AUS and direct the air division of the naval missile-carrying aviation.
But at this time, a radio silence mode was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off.
We are carefully studying the data of the optoelectronic space reconnaissance. There is no reliable data on the whereabouts of aircraft carriers.
Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA aviation from Kamchatka took place. To an empty space.
Only a day later, on Tuesday September 14, we learn from data from air defense posts on the Kuril Islands that the carrier strike force is maneuvering east of Paramushir Island (Kuril Islands), conducting carrier-based aircraft flights. Rear Admiral V. A. Karev "Unknown Soviet Pearl Harbor"
As you can see, if you know how the enemy is acting, then you can evade detection.
The fact that it was the aircraft carrier formation that was "dodged" by the Americans from the strike should not be confusing - during such "breaks" they do not fly. And in the same way, the missile ships could leave, without aircraft carriers.
An analysis of how aviation evasion from detection was carried out during exercises in the western fleets can be found in the article “How can a missile ship sink an aircraft carrier? A few examples.
One way or another, the possibility of a covert passage of a ship (or ships) to the designated area is real.
Naturally, the "coast" must provide all the necessary information support, conduct an operation somewhere to misinform the enemy, push him to transfer aviation to other directions, distract by other forces, and so on.
On the ship itself, a specially assigned group of officers or even a headquarters specially formed for this task should deal with issues of evading detection. It also implies how well sailors should know aviation, its capabilities and tactics.
In such operations, Western ships have one important advantage - they are now equipped with a civilian navigation radar. Its radiation is indistinguishable from that of civilian ships - commercial or fishing. But at the same time, the same Thales even worked out target designation for anti-aircraft missile systems according to the NGRLS.
For Russia, it is technically possible to equip naval ships with such non-radar systems that can be adjusted to the radiation of civilian stations. This is vital.
There is one more side to the question.
Even if the enemy received "contact", then it is possible to confuse his reconnaissance, being in the range of his missile weapons, in conditions when the enemy has information about the position of our ship (or ships).
Let's give an example.
In 1972, the Pacific Fleet held an electronic countermeasures exercise according to the plan of the Navy's REP service - a sea battle between a brigade of missile ships and a brigade of artillery ships using Crab jamming stations, and artillery ships - only passive jamming projectiles.
As a result, the firing of artillery ships created such a complex jamming situation with only passive interference that the sides could understand it only half an hour after reaching the range of using weapons against each other.
This must be taken into account and used - even if you are discovered, it is not the end.
But we must act quickly.
All of the above should by no means be understood as a recommendation to climb under the shore on surface ships. For example, Norway. During the ongoing military conflict in which she participates against us together with NATO allies.
This is for situations where the enemy's forces are as limited as ours. For example, the military operations of our ships against the Japanese somewhere in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca or the Persian Gulf. Or against the Turkish - in the Red Sea. That is, where both sides are in relatively equal position. And they cannot "throw on the scales" all the power of their Armed Forces in general and aviation in particular. They fight with what they have with them.
Covert detection of the enemy
Except for the occasional exits of the ships of the warring parties at a distance of mutual detection, the enemy will have to be looked for. And to seek in such a way as to remain unnoticed.
The intelligence information that will be sent to the ship may contain some information about the enemy, sometimes inaccurate, sometimes outdated, sometimes accurate and up-to-date, but insufficient for the use of weapons. Any such information will narrow down your search areas. But in any case, the ship (or ships) will have to search for the enemy by their own means.
It will narrow the search areas and the radio reconnaissance (radio interception) post on the ship. But, again, only narrows it down. Ideally, it will indicate some kind of landmark (narrowness, island, etc.), next to which the enemy is now located. But you still can't do without searching.
The most important of the search tools is electronic intelligence. RTR means on board ships allow detecting the operation of enemy ships' radar stations hundreds of kilometers away. Naturally, if the enemy turns them on. They also detect the work of "civilian" navigation radars. And this gives the commander a chance not to "collide" suddenly with a ship carrying such a radar too.
Let's give an example of such work from the book cap. 1st rank reserve Yuri Nikolaevich Romanov “Combat miles. Chronicle of the life of the destroyer "Battle":
“Found at the Sword station the operation of the radio equipment of an American destroyer. In order to maintain combat readiness and practice the ship's combat crew, the first mate announced a training alert for a simulated missile strike by the main complex.
After performing a series of maneuvers, creating a "base" for determining the distance and determining that the target was within reach, while continuing to observe secrecy, not including additional radio equipment for radiation, they inflicted a conditional missile strike with two P-100 missiles.
When carrying out a missile attack, a complex of all measures was fully worked out according to the classical scheme of a missile strike schedule. And the overheated crew was shaken from the nap caused by the heat.
Visually, the adversary was not detected or identified, and they did not strive for this, following strictly according to the transition plan.
Radio-technical search station MP-401S repeatedly found behind the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, at the exit to the Indian Ocean, the operation of the radar station of the American carrier-based aircraft AWACS "Hawkeye".
Obviously, from the AVM "Constellation", which, according to intelligence reports from the 8th OPESK, regularly arriving at the "Boevoy", is on combat training in the Arabian Sea.
Passive means of search and reconnaissance help out a lot. This is our trump card. Allowing to remain invisible, they "highlight" the surrounding situation, warn about the approach of air attack means, about missile danger, about the presence of enemy ships, eliminating civilian targets.
The cassettes of the memory blocks of the stations contain the data of all existing radio-technical equipment of the ships and aircraft of the potential enemy.
And when the operator of the Mech station reports that he is observing the operation of an air detection station of an English frigate or a navigation radar of a civil ship, reporting its parameters, then this is so …"
The operation of enemy radars is also detected by radars in passive radar mode, without radiation.
This is what draws attention to itself.
After performing a series of maneuvers, creating a "base" for determining the distance.
That is, having “caught” the radiation of the enemy's radar, the ship took measurements from several points in order to accurately determine the area of the probable target location (OVMC) and “narrow” it to a size smaller than the target capture sector of the anti-ship missile seeker.
With these methods, RTR really makes it possible to detect an emitting target.
But what if the adversary is smart and also walks exactly without emitting?
Then there is no choice but to use naval aviation.
In this case, it is necessary to resolve the following issues.
When using a UAV, it is necessary to ensure the secrecy of its control over the radio channel - complete. Otherwise, instead of information about the enemy, his missile salvo will arrive "from somewhere from there." Such stealth, for example, is provided by highly directional satellite dishes on ships and "drones". Other methods are less reliable.
For the helicopter, it is necessary to take off and fly in radio silence mode.
And in the case of a helicopter, and in the case of a UAV, it is necessary to withdraw the aircraft or a group of them from the carrier ship at an extremely low altitude for a long distance, guaranteed to be greater than the width of the capture swath of the enemy's anti-ship missiles. Ideally, much more.
Target ships may not be very far away. And the ascent of the helicopter with a climb near the ship can immediately detect the carrier ship when the radar for detecting air targets is turned on. The helicopter needs to fly a long distance. Then make the lift, simulating take-off from a false position. So that the enemy, who was able to detect an aerial target or the radiation of a helicopter radar, would send a volley to the wrong place. Moreover, it is so wrong that even an LRASM-type missile, without hitting any target and going on a secondary search, would not find anything. But such a volley already unmasks the enemy.
The search performance of a helicopter is many times higher than that of a ship. This means that the pair "helicopter-ship" is also higher than that of the ship.
A helicopter is an essential element of a ship's combat power. Moreover, it should be a universal naval helicopter, combining an anti-submarine vehicle, a reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-ship cruise missile carrier. And ideally, it is also capable of working with its own radar when the ship repels a missile or air strike, ensuring the firing of the ship's air defense system at targets outside the target designation radius. And also capable of using air-to-air missiles to destroy enemy helicopters, UAVs and other air targets. It must also carry an electronic warfare system capable of protecting both itself and the ship.
There is nothing supernatural about such a helicopter. Moreover, the presence of such a machine is vital if we are really preparing to fight, and not just go to parades. The importance of helicopters in naval warfare - article “Air fighters over ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea … There are also very vivid examples of the combat use of helicopters against ships, already as a strike weapon.
All this implies a requirement for the ship - the number of helicopters on it should be as large as possible. Naturally, not to the detriment of the main function. Examples of ships carrying an increased number of helicopters in comparison with the generally accepted number are the Japanese "helicopter destroyers" of the "Haruna" types and their further development - "Shirane". These ships not only carried three helicopters, but also ensured the simultaneous takeoff of two of them.
Thus, the second means of searching for targets and reconnaissance, along with RTR, is naval aviation, both manned and unmanned.
In the special case, when ships are fighting in the coastal zone, within the beat. the radius of base aircraft (aircraft or helicopters, it does not matter), base aircraft can and should also be involved in reconnaissance in the interests of surface forces. Especially if small ships operate without their own aircraft.
In the future, it is possible to create disposable reconnaissance aircraft launched from vertical launch facilities. The use of such means can unmask the ship. But, nevertheless, they can be indispensable in some cases.
But now the goal has been achieved - the enemy is detected, his movement parameters are determined, the current target location is established and calculated in advance, starting from the movement parameters. The fight for the first salvo is de facto won, you need to attack.
But there are a lot of nuances here too.
Helicopter strike
Whenever possible, you must try to give the target to aviation.
Aviation is the dominant force in naval warfare. And this fully applies to specialized sea helicopters. Modern ships are equipped with vertical launch rocket launchers, we have 3C-14 of various modifications, and the Americans have Mk.41.
Their specificity is that they cannot be recharged at sea.
Launchers of the Uranus missile complex can be reloaded at sea, but only if there is a floating crane and a stock of missiles in transport and launch containers. In their absence - nothing.
In contrast to shipboard launchers, a helicopter can consume missiles from the vault of aircraft weapons (AAS), which can be freely delivered to the deck for suspension.
It should be borne in mind that sooner or later such a situation may develop when it will be impossible to use a helicopter (for example, it has just landed). And the ship will have to fire its missiles. They should not be spent for this emergency.
The second reason is that the helicopter can strike farther than the ship. This does not apply to all ships. But, for example, to the corvettes of the project 20380 - applies.
The corvettes have the Uranus missile system as an offensive weapon. With missiles, basically identical to the aircraft anti-ship missile X-35, which theoretically can be carried by a helicopter. In such conditions, when striking at a long range, the combat radius of the helicopter is added to the range of the anti-ship missile system.
Most importantly, a helicopter strike has much less chance of unmasking the ship.
There is one more factor - the problem of the “rocket slide”.
Rocket slide
Most anti-ship missiles, starting from a ship, even with a completely low-altitude flight profile, first make a "slide". This applies to both the 3M54 Caliber anti-ship missile and the Uran anti-ship missile (to a lesser extent, true). For the Americans, this also applies to the "Harpoon", and to any anti-ship missiles launched from vertical launchers.
Hypersonic missiles stand apart, which rise to a height of tens of kilometers and from there go to the target with a decrease. For the latest Zircon launches, for example, this altitude was 28 kilometers. If someday the Americans have the same missiles, they will also have the same flight profile.
Hypersonic missiles have obvious advantages. But the fact that they unmask the place from which the carrier launches them is their big minus. However, this is a topic for a separate analysis.
How serious is the “rocket slide problem”?
We count.
Let's say our ship is carrying out a missile strike with 3M54 missiles on an enemy ship 60 kilometers away. A little later we will return to why such a small distance. For now, let's just count.
Let's say the ships have the same antenna height - 35 meters above sea level. Then the range of direct radio visibility, at which one ship could detect another - 48, 8 km. And between them - 100. Let's say the attacked ship comes with the included radar for detecting air targets. And so we found it, by its radiation.
Let's say our rocket makes a "slide" 100 meters above deck level or 120 meters above sea level. Then, the range of direct radio visibility of the target ship on our launching rocket is just 60 kilometers. That is, the enemy can establish both the fact of the attack and the place from which it is being conducted. And, accordingly, he will have time to send his own to us before our salvo approaches him - and we want to avoid this!
Of course, when hitting a long range (for the same 100 kilometers, for example), nothing like this will happen - the distance is too great. But you should never underestimate your opponent. It is quite possible that he has another ship in his group, which we did not find and which is much closer to us.
Another example.
Let's say that the enemy is also looking for us with the help of a helicopter, and he is 10 km from his ship, in the direction opposite to that in which our attacking ship is located at an altitude of 300 meters. Then this helicopter will notice the launch of missiles, although our ship will be out of its direct radio line of sight.
Are there any missiles for which the “roller coaster” problem is not so acute?
There is. This is Onyx.
We look at how this rocket is launched (from ships - the same thing).
Photo (launch from submarine "Severodvinsk").
As you can see, her "slide" is minimized. And it’s not just that. Onyxes are preferable from the point of view of a stealthy salvo at the enemy.
Apparently, there are no powerful missiles in the world that are better suited for combat, in terms of launch stealth, than Onyx.
Naturally, we are talking about launching along a completely low-altitude trajectory. Their "slide" is much lower than that of the 3M54 Caliber. And it remains only to regret that the same Project 11356 frigates do not have these missiles in the ammunition load.
Thus, due to the "slide" in some cases, the enemy can receive a warning about the attack, and data about the location of the attacking ship.
And this is also a reason to use anti-ship missile helicopters in an attack whenever possible.
But sometimes it won't work. And then you have to attack yourself.
Ship missile strike
If the commander of the attacking ship properly ensured the secrecy of the missile strike and won the fight for the first salvo, then his second most important task is not to cause a missile strike on himself already in the course of the battle.
Another challenge is the need to send missiles exactly to the targets that need to be hit. Theoretically, if the composition of the detachment of enemy warships and their structure is revealed, if the ships in the order are identified, if there is a technical possibility to program the anti-ship missiles to attack specific targets in the order, then the missiles will hit the designated targets.
In practice, such an idyll is almost unattainable. Something is always known inaccurately, there are no real radar "portraits" of at least some of the targets. Yes, and some types of missiles simply do not provide for target selection, capturing either the very first one that hits the seeker, or the most radio-contrast one.
When attacking targets with helicopters, this problem also exists.
But at least there it is possible to launch from such a course that, at least in theory, will lead the rocket to the desired target. For example, a "star" raid by a troika of helicopters armed with anti-ship missiles will most likely lead to the fact that even primitive seeker missiles will capture exactly three different targets. And if the air defense of enemy ships is not something significant, then you can act that way. In addition, against some ships, helicopters can simply launch their missiles, observing the target using the radar.
The ship does not have such an opportunity. Therefore, it is necessary to approach strike planning with the following criteria.
1. The angles of rotation of anti-ship missiles after launch are set in such a way that the salvo on the target does not come from the side of the attacking ship. If the range to the attacked target is too short, and the enemy sees a "slide", then this requirement is not essential. But if not, then the volley should come to the target not from those courses that "lead" to the attacking ship.
2. If the missiles used cannot recognize targets or the target data is not accurate enough (for example, it is known that this is a detachment of warships, the number is clear, but not all are classified), then it is necessary to "spread" the salvo in several directions in order to capture the GOS RCC hit different parts of the enemy's order. Otherwise, all the missiles will simply aim at one or two targets, and the rest will remain unfired.
A salvo of missiles must be "bred" in such a way that the missiles approach the target more or less simultaneously, with a small salvo range, and not sequentially, as they are launched. However, this is widely known, as well as the fact that the overlap of the radar fields of the seeker missiles along the front of the salvo should be ensured, then the probability of hitting the target is higher.
The most important conclusion follows from this - it will be possible to shoot at extreme distances very rarely or impossible at all. The missile, which is "taken" to the target "bypassing", will fly a much greater distance than the distance between the attacking ship and the attacked one. So, if you shoot the Onyx anti-ship missile system at a target at a distance of about 100 km, then when the salvo is launched at the target from different directions, the Onyxes will fly a distance that is very close to their maximum flight range.
3. An estimate of the number of a salvo is determined based on what capabilities the enemy has to repel a strike. What principles are applied in assessing the required number of missiles in a salvo is described in the article “The reality of missile salvos. A little about military superiority … There are also simplified (in its original version) salvo equations (without taking into account the probabilities of the occurrence of each event - a successful launch of the anti-ship missile system, its technical serviceability and the risks of under-reaching the target, the probability of intercepting anti-aircraft missiles by enemy anti-aircraft missiles, etc.) and their meaning is explained.
Currently, a more complex mathematical apparatus is used to assess the success of a salvo, which takes into account both the salvo nature of missile combat and all these probabilities.
One caveat must be made here.
The guidance documents of the Navy require that a salvo be carried out when the probability of successful destruction of targets is high enough.
At the same time, American assessments of real clashes with the use of anti-ship missiles indicate the following - the re-modeling of missile attacks that actually took place during the tanker war in the Persian Gulf suggests that missile attacks against targets with weak air defense were successful in conditions when the probability of hitting a target (calculated for the situation immediately before the attack, which later turned out to be successful), on average, turned out to be equal to 0.68.
We will not draw any special conclusions from this. We will limit ourselves only to the assumption that, perhaps, something in the domestic approaches needs to be revised.
As a result, if everything worked out, then the enemy, who had previously just suspected that he was not alone here, discovers the approach of several missile salvos from different courses. And he will have to wage a difficult struggle for survival, the outcome of which will be unpredictable even for ships with the AEGIS system. For what, for example, the Turkish Navy is armed with, on the contrary, it is quite predictable.
However, one must understand that the enemy can do all the same. Moreover, unlike the Russian Navy, our "opponents" already have helicopters with anti-ship missiles. There is also combat experience, the analysis of which is available to all countries friendly to Great Britain.
There are some special cases of naval combat, which need to be discussed separately.
Praying Mantis Lessons or Elevator Stabbing
On April 18, 1988, the US Navy conducted an operation in the Persian Gulf, codenamed Mantis.
We will not give its details, they are easily found on the Internet.
We are interested in the battle between the Iranian corvette Joshan and a detachment of American ships consisting of the missile cruiser USS Wainwright, the frigate USS Simpson and the frigate USS Bagley.
It is clear that the corvette was doomed, although it was he who launched the first missile. However, this is not the question. And how this ship was destroyed.
The frigate Simpson hit the corvette with two SM-1 anti-aircraft missiles, and the cruiser with one SM-1ER. At the same time, the third ship, the frigate Bagley, fired the Harpoon anti-ship missile system at the corvette. But due to the destruction of the superstructure of the GOS corvette, the anti-ship missile system was unable to capture the target and passed by.
Note that the Persian Gulf is a zone of intensive shipping, with a huge number of merchant ships and, more importantly, warships from different countries. Going past the goal of the RPC in such conditions could have done things. But nothing happened.
What is important for us is the fact that an anti-ship missile attacking a target in horizontal flight can miss a target with a low height of the hull and superstructure above the water.
Let's remember this.
This is very important because there are things that are much worse than an "alien" anti-ship missile on board - it is its own anti-ship missile into neutral, with heavy losses, for example, on a cruise liner.
In another battle, the destroyer USS Joseph Strauss, together with the A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft, struck and destroyed the Iranian frigate Sahand, which was the first success of the Harpoon launched from a surface ship in this operation.
The conclusions that the Americans made from this operation are as follows (what is listed is what relates to the conduct of a naval battle):
1. In conditions with intensive civil shipping, it is extremely important, if not necessary, visual (!) Identification of the target before the attack.
2. The presence of any aircraft (even helicopters, even aircraft) is vital for reconnaissance and target designation.
3. In combat at a distance of visibility, it is preferable to use anti-aircraft missiles. The statistics of SM-1 missiles in that operation are 100% hits on the target. The statistics of the launched Harpoons is only 50%, although the effect of the Harpoon hit is many times more powerful.
These are important details.
Everything described above about the battle of surface ships or their units refers to the situation of battle at relatively long distances, when the opponents do not see each other at all. And I must say that such a scenario is basic.
But in the case when the battle takes place in a water area with a small area, when there are a lot of neutral targets (including military ones) around, the distances are reduced
If the enemy uses small ships and boats with a low silhouette, then it is much more preferable to use anti-aircraft missiles against them, rather than anti-ship missiles. In addition, there are serious reasons to believe that anti-aircraft missiles are preferable when attacking large surface ships of the enemy - their destructive power when hitting unarmored ships is very high, and the flight time is several times shorter. In addition, anti-aircraft missiles are much more difficult to shoot down, even if the enemy was preparing to repel a strike.
The combination of the difficulties in identifying and classifying targets and how serious the damage inflicted by NK anti-aircraft missiles led the Americans to abandon the placement of the Harpoon anti-ship missiles on the new destroyers.
We certainly shouldn't do that.
But it is necessary to remember that it is SAM that are more effective in a number of conditions.
Analysis of a naval battle off the coast of Abkhazia on August 10, 2008
Let us analyze (taking into account all of the above) a sea battle between Georgian boats and Russian ships guarding the Caesar Kunnikov large landing craft and the Saratov large landing craft on the way to the Abkhazian coast.
The official version is available on the Internet. As well as descriptions of the oddities of this event.
So, it is known for sure that not one of the Georgian missile boats was sunk during the battle - they were all destroyed by the paratroopers of the legendary 45th special forces regiment of the Airborne Forces. When it became clear, a version arose that the patrol ship "Gantiadi", armed with a 23-mm anti-aircraft gun and several machine guns, a former fishing seiner, was sunk in the battle.
It is known for sure that the Mirage missile launcher actually used the P-120 Malakhit anti-ship missile system. This is evidenced by the state of the starboard launcher upon returning to the base.
This statement is fully consistent with the fact that fragments of the P-120 anti-ship missiles hit the board of the "Lotos-1" dry cargo ship. The P-120 is equipped with self-destruction equipment (ASL), which detonates a missile when a target is missed. According to the description, what the crew of the dry-cargo ship says is fully consistent with how the ASL works.
Thus, we can safely say that the RCC "slipped over the target", whatever this target was.
Since everything that the Georgian Navy could put out to sea was distinguished by a low height above the waterline, it is logical to assume that at least one P-120 repeated the "Harpoon's feat" during an American attempt to attack an Iranian corvette with this missile (in fact, also a boat with a displacement of 265 tons).
This again makes us think about the damage to third parties.
In that war, part of the American leadership actively sought to bomb the Roki tunnel, and, consequently, on the Russian troops. An attack on a neutral ship with fatalities could lead to the fact that the point of view of the American "hawks" would prevail. Anyone can imagine the political consequences.
What else do we see in this battle?
Faced with the fact that the anti-ship missile system did not hit the target (and it did not hit, it was impossible not to understand), the crews of the ships used anti-aircraft missiles of the Osa air defense system. The success of this application is still controversial among the public.
Another important point is that our ships were sailing with the included radars. In principle, this cannot be considered a mistake in this particular case - the situational awareness of the Georgian Navy was provided by coastal radars, it was pointless to hide.
At the same time, if these radars were destroyed in advance (for example, by the aviation of the Russian Air Force) and if the crews of Georgian boats had the opportunity to detect the radars of Russian ships, then the issue of maintaining secrecy during the transition could become very acute. Some of the Georgian units could well send their anti-ship missiles from a long enough distance to go unnoticed.
In a sense, ours were lucky. And not only the fleet.
The non-use of aviation for reconnaissance in the interests of the convoy is also noteworthy. This is a traditional vice of the Russian fleet, which has not been eliminated to this day. Which no one is going to get rid of. And which can be very expensive in the end.
What could be the worst case scenario?
Georgian boats, having joined the civilian traffic (he was there), would have moved at a slow speed to the connection at the point from which the Russian detachment could have been attacked. By detecting the radar radiation of Russian ships and not standing out from the civil flow of ships until the very last moment, they could undertake a synchronous rapid exit to the missile launch line. Launch on converging courses from different points outside the direct radio line of sight of our ships and retreat at maximum speed.
What should have happened?
Generally speaking, they should have been destroyed by the Air Force at the base. But if this had not happened, then the detachment of warships would have had at least aerial reconnaissance. In this case, at least, the risk of an impact on the BDK would be removed - the ships could turn away, along with the minesweepers. And the battle with boats would be accepted by the IPC and MRK, not connected with the need to protect the landing ships and having superiority in situational awareness over the Georgians. The attack could have been better planned. Perhaps they could have destroyed someone.
Questions also arise about our approaches to weapons.
In the past, the P-120 normally hit small target vessels and shields. There was no reason to believe that she would miss the target. But after this war, it would be necessary to draw some conclusions in terms of strikes against small targets with a low height above the waterline. It is better to attack such targets with the help of rockets coming in on the target from above. This is evidenced by both our experience and the American one. Moreover, the experience of real military operations.
To what extent this problem has been resolved today is an open question.
Most likely, it could be solved at the level of modernization of the seeker, even of old missiles. Perhaps someday some commentary from the side of the Navy will be given on this topic.
Well, the actions of the Russian Navy in the war with Georgia clearly indicate that the foreign (American) experience in the combat training of our forces was not taken into account even when there was someone to study and analyze it. And that was deeply wrong.
Now (after the Serdyukov-Makarov reform) there is no structure in the Navy responsible for the analysis of foreign combat experience. There is simply no one to draw conclusions from it.
Reflecting an enemy volley
What happens if the enemy is still able to fire a return salvo before the destruction of his ship (s)?
This cannot be ruled out in any way.
People are fighting. And, as experience shows, some of them fight better than others. In addition, there is a very important, but absolutely not predictable factor of luck.
Taking into account the realistic distances for a ship that searches for a target on its own, this means that it is impossible to escape "from under a salvo" by moving and maneuvering. The ship (or ships) will have to repulse this blow using their air defense systems and jamming stations.
There are, however, several possibilities that can dramatically increase the chances of repelling such a blow.
Firstly, as already mentioned, a modern naval helicopter must provide its radar with target designation for a shipborne air defense system at a distance greater than that of a shipborne radar. This allows you to push back the line of interception of the enemy anti-ship missiles.
Secondly, helicopters must have their own jamming station and air-to-air missiles. Of course, UR explosives still need to get into a small-sized stealth missile such as NSM or LRASM. And it will not be easy to get into "Harpoon". But when you have nothing to lose, why not give it a try? Moreover, it is possible to work out the defeat of anti-ship missiles on our "harpoon-like" target missiles RM-24.
But even in the worst case, when the explosive missiles are not guided, and the interference does not work (for NSM this will be so), there is guidance for the air defense system.
There is one more thing.
Missiles with radar seeker, the same "Harpoons" and many others can be confused by false targets.
In a simple version, a ship that has received a warning about an attack (for example, because of the enemy's “missile slide”) can throw inflatable corner reflectors into the water and retreat with a maximum speed in such a way that the inflatable LC would remain on the estimated combat path of incoming enemy missiles between ship and missiles. Then, if the enemy has anti-ship missiles without the possibility of target selection, then the volley will hit false targets.
An even more interesting feature is the quick release of an unmanned boat with automatically inflating corner reflectors into the water.
Such a boat can be controlled by exposing it to the attack of enemy missiles. The combination of such a boat and the means of electronic warfare can give good chances to divert the salvo from the ship, even without using the air defense system. But in reality, of course, there will be a combination between the use of decoys, helicopters, electronic warfare systems and shipborne air defense systems.
This requires a high combat capability of these systems, the training of personnel in the tasks of repelling a missile strike against real targets. And the availability of all the necessary means (BEC, decoys, helicopters) with the appropriate performance characteristics.
Battle to destroy
What if an exchange of volleys occurred, the sides inflicted losses on each other in ships and helicopters, used up their anti-ship missiles, but did not achieve complete destruction of the opposing side?
In theory, there could be different options here.
The commanders of both detachments will make decisions in accordance with the orders and conditions given to them earlier. And it cannot be ruled out that it will be necessary to go to the end - both in accordance with orders and in accordance with the situation.
Then the opponents will have no choice but to draw closer to the range of using first anti-aircraft missiles, then artillery.
At this point, the skill of the commanders and the training of crews will be the decisive factor. So, in order to gain an advantage in conditions when the parties find themselves at the range of using missiles almost simultaneously, it will be necessary to very competently use electronic warfare means, so that, when actually "face to face" with the enemy, does not allow him to use weapons. And most of this opportunity to realize.
It will be even more difficult to reach the artillery fire distance. And here it is important to achieve an advantage in ammunition - NATO has at its disposal various types of guided and homing projectiles with a caliber of 127 mm, which allow them to shoot at a distance of 60 kilometers or more, if there is data on the target.
On the other hand, such calibers are generally not used on frigate-class ships. This is done only by us and the Japanese.
The rapprochement must be planned extremely carefully. Considering everything: from possible assessments of the situation by the enemy, which one must try to predict, to the time of day.
The return fire of enemy artillery can be ten times more accurate and deadly.
Also, finding yourself in a disadvantageous situation, you need to be able to break away from the enemy, going for rapprochement.
For this, it is extremely important that the ships that may find themselves in such a situation, the speed allows them to make a separation from the enemy. Today, the global trend is to reduce the maximum speed of ships. The only country that consistently fights for every node and tries to secure superiority in the speed of its new ships over any enemy is Japan.
The rest of the countries have clearly lost their understanding of the importance of speed. And they may have to pay dearly for it.
In general, it should be noted that in order to take a position that is advantageous for a volley and to break away from the enemy, speed is critical.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that the most destructive means of warfare at sea is aviation, and nuclear submarines are called the second most important in the leading fleets, the risks of surface ships having to fight each other have not diminished.
At the same time, the combat experience of the second half of the twentieth century suggests that the probability of surface forces entering into battle with each other is significantly higher than the probability of a battle between a submarine and surface ships. Given these facts, it is necessary to consider the possibility of a battle between surface ships - real.
Fundamental to success in battle for a surface ship (or a detachment of warships) is, firstly, winning the fight for the first salvo. Second, the execution of this volley secretly for the enemy, with a minimum "slide" in height or launching missiles from a distance at which it cannot be detected, and launching missiles to the target from such courses that will not show the enemy a real bearing to the attacking ship.
This requires careful reconnaissance of the target, for which, in addition to means of electronic intelligence, combat helicopters and UAVs become fundamentally important. Therefore, the ships of the future must have a stronger air group compared to what is happening today. Even two helicopters is not enough, it is desirable to have at least 3-4. It is apparently impossible to place a larger number on a rocket ship without prejudice to its other characteristics. At the same time, helicopters should not be anti-submarine, but multi-purpose (including anti-submarine), with the possibility of using, inter alia, for hitting air targets.
It is necessary to ensure the movement of the ship with zero electromagnetic radiation.
It is also necessary to equip ships with a civilian navigation radar, which could be used for camouflage purposes. Or an alternative - you need a radar with the ability to adjust for civilians.
In all cases, if it is possible to attack the enemy with aircraft (helicopters), you need to attack him with aircraft.
In the coastal zone, using ships and boats that do not carry aircraft on board, it is necessary to ensure the use of aircraft from the coast, at least for reconnaissance.
In the future, it is necessary to create disposable reconnaissance and target designation means launched from the ship's standard missile launchers.
To repel an enemy missile strike, it is necessary to expand the possibilities for the use of false targets, including those towed by unmanned boats, for which it should be possible to quickly launch (or even drop) boats into the water with corner reflectors ready for immediate use.
Warships must have at least a slight superiority in full speed over any potential enemy. As a last resort, do not give in.
All these actions should be practiced in exercises in a situation as close as possible to a combat one.
It is necessary to take all measures to prevent damage to third parties, up to the use of other tactical schemes, with a reduction in firing distances and accurate identification of each target.
Something like this may look like a sea battle in the XXI century.
And our Navy needs to be ready for such actions.
