Yes, perhaps, in terms of chronology, when talking about cruisers, I ran a little ahead, but all these armored deck and armored cruisers puffing on the angle will not go anywhere. Precisely because they are unhurried. And to start with the "Washington" cruisers, although a few readers quite rightly blamed me for this - this, you know, is like a kind of tribute to what has gone.
An armored and armored cruiser - well, such a cute vintage, yes, you can admire how such puffs traveled at an angle such distances as they could even get with such imperfect sighting systems, and in general, the era before the 30s of the last century is a complete admiration.
But after … After the cruiser became not just a support ship, it could become the quintessence of sea death. But two things that happened to this class of ships, alas, deprived us of (almost) this deadly but very beautiful type of ship.
More precisely, two people. Charles Evans Hughes and Werner von Braun.
Werner von Braun
With this character, everything is clear and understandable, it was von Braun who invented the missile (cruise and ballistic) in the form in which it is used to this day. And such classes as battleships and cruisers are simply not needed, since missiles can be carried in a sufficient number of ships of smaller classes.
One can argue for a long time how many chances Missouri or Yamato would have (actually a lot) against MKR with Caliber, but nevertheless.
But with the first name, everything is not so simple. And I am sure that without the help of Yandex and Google, few people will be able to say at all what kind of bird it is, more precisely, a fish.
Charles Evans Hughes was a very remarkable person in the history of the United States. In addition to his fierce hatred of Soviet Russia in general and the Bolsheviks in particular (in 1925 he prepared a 100-page report with arguments against establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet regime), he is also known for being the initiator and signer of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.
In general, the document is a masterpiece.
It seems to be signed by the leading maritime powers, that is, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. It happened in Washington on February 6, 1922.
In fact, there were three participating countries. USA, Japan and UK. It seems that France and Italy, which had won the war, were rapidly slipping to the level of regional powers and did not take much part in the treaty, since they were simply unable to build such fleets as the first three.
But the first three had something to fight for.
Especially the real winners - the USA. Real, because it was after the First World War that the United States came to the fore in the world, entangling all its former allies in the Entente with debts, except for Russia, which became Soviet Russia.
And in the States there was a very strong position of the "hawks", a party of industrial gunsmiths who dreamed that the United States would build a navy that could withstand the fleets of Great Britain and Japan. A minimum separately, ideally combined.
By the way, it is logical, since no country has Japan had such close relations as with the British Empire. Fact.
In general, the United States even then wanted them to have everything and nothing for it.
Great Britain was openly against such a situation, since, on the one hand, an impressive number of battleships, battlecruisers and conventional cruisers had already been laid in the US shipyards, we are not talking about a trifle such as destroyers, on the other hand: Britain after the war was due to the USA 4 s more than a billion dollars. Gold.
An interesting situation turned out: Great Britain had an advantage in the seas and oceans, since it ALREADY had a huge fleet. Only the British had more cruisers than all the countries of the Treaty combined. And given the number of British bases in the colonies …
In general, "Rule Britain, the seas …"
And the United States had the potential in the shipyards and the ability to take Britain by the throat. Gently so …
And here is the main thing that the Washington Treaty contained: the ratio of the tonnage of battleships was established: USA - 5, Great Britain - 5, Japan - 3, France - 1, 75, Italy - 1, 75.
That is, by hook or by crook, the United States stood on the same step with Britain, which was unattainable until then.
Why? Because 4 billion in gold.
It seemed that the contract was outwardly good. He limited the ability of the participating countries to build as much as they want. It was possible to build ships, but with restrictions.
For example, battleships could be built within the allotted tonnage. And nothing more.
Moreover, it was possible to replace the tonnage allocated for battleships with ANY class of ships, without going beyond the scope of the contract. If we are talking about numbers, then it looked like this:
- for the USA and Great Britain - 525 thousand tons;
- for Japan - 315 thousand tons;
- for Italy and France - 175 thousand tons each.
Moreover, for battleships, restrictions were introduced on displacement (no more than 35 thousand tons) and on the main caliber (no more than 406 mm).
Move on. Aircraft carriers.
The class for 1922 is strange and dubious. Aircrafts, seaplane transports, and the first aircraft carriers, shall we say, were in a state of transition from nursery to kindergarten. Nevertheless, many could already see a certain potential in the classroom, and this is what it resulted in. A limit was also set for aircraft carriers:
- for the USA and Great Britain - 135 thousand tons;
- for Japan - 81 thousand tons;
- for Italy and France - 60 thousand tons.
Again, there were very interesting restrictions for aircraft carriers. In terms of tonnage (no more than 27 thousand tons) and main caliber (no more than 203 mm), so that there is no temptation to make a battleship and disguise it as an aircraft carrier, placing a couple of squadrons of aircraft on it.
At the very beginning, I said that the Treaty knocked the cornerstone out of the cruising dock - this is it, by the way.
For cruisers, a limit of 10 thousand tons was adopted, and the main caliber was limited to 203-mm guns.
Since the number of cruisers was not limited, a very peculiar situation turned out: build as many aircraft carriers as you like, as many battleships as you like, but do not go beyond the tonnage limits. That is, there was still a limitation. And cruisers could be built as much as you wanted, or as many shipyards and the budget would pull.
In fact, the Washington Treaty set a very noble goal: limiting the arms race at sea. Limiting the number of battleships, limiting the number of aircraft carriers (albeit through tonnage), limiting the tonnage of cruisers.
And then the devil appears. A small detail: the limitation of the cruising class tonnage, but the absence of a limit for this tonnage. Do you understand what is the difference? You can build as many cruisers as you like, as long as no more than 10 thousand tons and guns no more than 203 mm.
Small digression. As soon as the parties signaled the agreement, the results were very interesting.
The United States sent for scrap 15 old battleships with a total displacement of 227,740 tons and 11 battleships under construction with a displacement of 465,800 tons. This is a lot. One side.
The American battlecruisers all went under the knife, except for two, the Saratoga and Lexington, which were completed as aircraft carriers.
The Japanese did the same, converting the battleship Kaga and the battle cruiser Akagi into aircraft carriers.
Great Britain sent for scrap 20 old dreadnoughts with a total displacement of 408,000 tons and 4 battleships under construction with a total tonnage of 180,000 tons.
And so all the countries were faced with the question: what to build next?
It is clear that the battlecruiser class that flourished during the First World War is dead. Higher speed and less heavy armor compared to battleships did their job: battlecruisers simply merged with battleships, taking a step up. The concept of ships to neutralize enemy heavy and light cruisers has died. There was no point in building these ships, and their further evolution was impossible.
There was no point in spending precious battleship tonnage to build a battlecruiser, a ship more specialized than a battleship.
As for the heavy cruisers, constrained by the Treaty, they also began to lose something. What resulted in attempts to shove it into the unstoppable, namely 10 thousand tons of everything that was needed, the Germans turned into "Deutschlands", practically the most controversial ships of the Second World War.
And the Americans got "Alaska" and "Guam", with a displacement of more than 30 thousand tons with the main caliber of 305 mm, that is, in fact, classic battle cruisers.
However, they did not show themselves in any way, since they appeared at the very end of the war, when their rivals, the Japanese heavy cruisers, no longer posed a danger. And in the end, even the plans to convert them into carriers of rocket weapons did not materialize due to the high cost of converting the ships.
As a result, the Treaty (especially the closer to the Second World War) began to frankly spit. And slowly go beyond it. Not 10 thousand, but 11, 13 and so on. And now, they have grown to 30+.
The same Japanese were cunning and dodged as best they could. And they could. The standard displacement according to the Treaty was defined as the displacement of a ship ready to go to sea and having on board a full supply of fuel, ammunition, fresh water, etc.
The parties that signed the Washington Treaty determined the displacement of ships in British tons (1,016 kg). In Japanese naval terminology, the concept of standard displacement was also there, but the Japanese put it in a slightly different, very strange meaning: the displacement of a ship ready to go to sea and having on board 25% of the fuel supply, 75% of ammunition, 33% of lubricating oil and 66 % of drinking water.
This, of course, gave rise to some opportunities for maneuvering, but nevertheless, the provisions of the Treaty firmly constrained the development of ships in the pre-war period.
The Washington Naval Treaty led not to the limitation of naval weapons, but to a redistribution of influence among the states parties to the treaty.
The main task for the cunning Hughes was that now the United States achieved the right to have a fleet no weaker than the British and superior to the naval forces of Japan. It is clear that back in 1922 it was an Achievement with a capital letter.
The fate of the cruiser class was sealed.
Despite the fact that, as I said, the "cruising race" began, this race was quantitative, not qualitative.
Before the conclusion of the Washington Treaty, 25 cruisers were built at the shipyards of the leading naval powers (10 American, 9 Japanese, 6 British). After the conclusion of the Treaty, at least 49 new cruisers were laid down or planned for construction (15 in Great Britain, 12 in Japan, 9 in France, 8 in the USA and 5 in Italy) and 36 of them were heavy cruisers, with a displacement of 10 000 t.
But in fact, heavy cruisers simply could not develop in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty. 10 thousand tons - if this is the limit, then the limit in everything. That is, something will be infringed in comparison with other parameters, either armor or weapons. Agree, it is unrealistic to create a ship with 10 thousand tons of displacement with 9 guns over 203 mm (for example, 283 mm), stuffed with air defense systems, carrying mines and torpedoes, and having a good speed and range.
It's just unrealistic. Even the Germans did not succeed, for which they were inventors, but "Deutschland" became, though a compromise, but such itself. As a result, whatever one may say, the Deutschlands did not show themselves in any way, although the ships had an impressive main caliber, everything else was more than mediocre.
Here are the results of the Washington Treaty.
Battlecruisers became extinct as a class.
Heavy cruisers stopped in development, and when everyone began to spit on the Washington Agreement, the time for artillery ships passed completely and irrevocably.
Light cruisers have come a long way of mutation in air defense, PLO, and URO cruisers, until they finally dried up to the size of a destroyer. In a sense, the role of a cruiser in the navy of almost any country is assigned today to a destroyer.
Anyway, the cruisers are in service only in one country. IN THE USA. The Ticonderogs, with a displacement of 9800 tons, are today the only mass type of cruisers.
And there was only one heavy cruiser in Russia. But this is a completely endangered dinosaur, therefore we will not talk about it in detail.
In general, in 1922, an agreement was concluded that simply made it impossible to develop ships of the cruising class. That is why today we have only what we have.
Good or bad, but it is a fait accompli. You can, of course, fantasize about how the development of the ships would have gone, if not for the two characters at the beginning of the article. But history does not know the subjunctive mood. Alas.
