In the articles published by "Military Review" by Alexander Timokhin “Yak-41 is against further development of Yak-38. Lesson from the past " and "Aircraft-carrying cruisers and Yak-38: retrospective analysis and lessons" far from all theses can be agreed. This in no way means that their author should be "obstructed" and "brought to the end of the pier", because when discussing complex technical issues (and even more tactical and operational) "full consensus" is possible only in one place - in the cemetery. And military-technical discussions are undoubtedly a necessary and extremely useful thing (provided they are of a decent level).
If the thesis about the complexity and duration of the creation and development of "verticals" is absolutely correct:
25 years have passed since the creation of the project of the first "vertical" design bureau of the Yakovlev Design Bureau until the adoption of the Yak-38M. Since the first flight of the Yak-36M / 38 - 15 years. Since the adoption of the Yak-38 into service - 8 years. This is the time frame for such aircraft being created and brought to a combat-ready state. In a normally operating aviation industry, with practically no "effective managers" … with the simplest radio-electronic equipment … A reason to think for all fans of "vertical".
One cannot agree with the opinion about the need for a "transitional vertical" Yak-39:
“The work on the future Yak-41 was going on with a serious lag behind the schedule. It was supposed to take off back in 1982, but it didn't. Everything indicated that a more high-tech and complex supersonic VTOL aircraft would be created in no way less than a simple Yak-38. In this case, insurance is required in the form of a Yak-39. But, the main thing is that while there are "dances" with VTOL aircraft, there will be no decent number of new carriers for it."
In terms of carriers, the situation is more complicated. On the one hand, the best thing that could be done with the Project 1143 "Kievs" was their modernization (during the middle repair) in the "Vikromaditya" (that is, the "maximum normal" aircraft carrier with the MiG-29K), the design of which was made even under the USSR.
On the other hand, the question arose of the possibilities of the shipbuilding and ship repair industry of the USSR. A huge bias towards shipbuilding by the beginning of the 80s. it was already clear that it was planned to build powerful shipbuilding and ship repair facilities (with the advanced development of the latter).
However, plans in the USSR too often and significantly differed from reality. In these conditions, it is far from the fact that all 1143 would have received a deep "aircraft carrier" modernization. In this case, the Yak-41 was unambiguously necessary (despite the fact that this plane received meaning only as an interspecies one, and for the Air Force it had a meaning).
However, all these theorizing make sense only when taking into account military-political factors and the real situation with military R&D in the USSR. And these were very difficult and problematic situations.
The arrival of President Reagan at the White House sparked a sharp escalation in the Cold War confrontation. The third world war began to be considered as "quite probable" (and in the "near future"). For those who did not catch this time, there is an opportunity to "feel" the events of that era, such as "the bombing will begin in 5 minutes." This was a typical Reagan joke on August 11, 1984, before Saturday's radio address to Americans:
“My compatriots are Americans, I am glad to inform you today, that he signed a decree declaring Russia outlawed for eternity.
The bombing will begin in five minutes."
And it was like that at the time
"Almost in the order of things."
And in this acute military-political situation, the key factor was the urgent bringing of the available forces and means to real combat-ready levels, their modernization as soon as possible, which ensured a real increase in efficiency and the ability to solve tasks as intended. The issue of eliminating the most acute problems of the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces and the Navy was extremely acute.
For the fleet, problem No. 1 was air cover from air attack and a special case of this threat - the "Harpoon factor" (a new stealthy anti-ship missile system of the US and NATO Navy, capable of flying to a target at a height of several meters above the water).
Special exercises conducted in the late 1970s showed that the Soviet Navy did not actually have any effective means against such a threat. The measures taken raise a number of questions (on which, in an amicable way, it would be worth writing a separate article with an analysis of what was happening), and most importantly, they were fully implemented only for new air defense systems and new ships. The "Harpoon problem" for most of the naval personnel remained extremely acute throughout the 1980s.
This was superimposed on a more long-term and large-scale problem - the provision of air defense of naval formations from enemy air raids. Coastal aviation, in any way effectively, was not capable of solving this problem (not to mention "divided control", since it belonged not to the Navy, but to "another department" - the air defense forces).
In this situation, the Navy in the early 80s had three TAVKRs of the "Kiev" type.
The episode is little-known, but scandalous enough. When in 1981, at an organizational and mobilization meeting in Leningrad, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral E. N. "Effectively solved the problem", "what to do" 1143 (so that the enemy would not sink them immediately), placing them "to strengthen the air defense" of naval bases (in fact, he refused to put into the sea, leaving under the cover of coastal air defense systems and interceptors).
Yes, the project 1143 itself is very controversial. This is to put it mildly. However, its main problem was the carrier-based aircraft - Yak-38 (M), with extremely weak armament and range and very limited maneuverability.
Was it possible to do "something"? With the Yak-38 and TAVKR 1143 in those specific conditions, what would give the possibility of real, and most importantly effective participation of the TAKR and Yak-38 in a possible war?
And there were such opportunities.
Mastering the TAVKR and its air group
Historian of naval aviation of the Navy, Colonel A. M. Artemiev:
“Before the march, the aircraft carrier“Kiev”prepared and approved a private instruction for the production of flights. When it was drawn up, they proceeded from the position developed by the Naval Aviation Headquarters, which (after a long, tedious and humiliating procedure of coordination with the departments and directorates of the Main Staff of the Navy, which took more than a year) was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
The regulation introduced the concept of "ship aviation complex", which included: airplanes and helicopters with their equipment and weapons; naval aviation technical equipment (flight deck, hangar, deck technical equipment for LAC takeoff and landing and their transportation on the ship).
On the aircraft carrier, the post of deputy ship commander for aviation was envisaged. He was subordinate to the commander of the ship and was the direct superior for the personnel of the aviation combat unit, the flight control group and the combat control of aviation at the command post. He coordinated the activities of the personnel of the warhead and specialists of the leadership and combat control groups.
The commander of the aviation group (the commander of the aviation regiment) supervised the preparation of aircraft crews for flights and personally checked their readiness. He was the direct superior of all personnel and was responsible for flight safety.
The launch command post, control tower or flagship was intended to control flights on the ship."
During the first combat service of the TAVKR "Kiev" (to the Mediterranean Sea and back) in the period from December 15, 1978 to March 28, 1979, 355 Yak-38 flights were performed.
The International Defense Review magazine analyzed the takeoff technique of the Yak-38:
“During the campaign of“Kiev”from the Black Sea to Murmansk, no more than two planes flew at the same time. Takeoff technique is common, but execution is rather cautious …
Often for this, the speed of the ship was reduced to 4 knots (7 km / h). Before vertical takeoff, three engines were started and a low thrust test was performed. The takeoff was carried out vertically and very steadily up to a height of 18-24 m above the deck, after which the transition to horizontal flight was made. The acceleration was small, and the entire transition to aerodynamic flight took about 1.5 minutes after the vertical takeoff itself.
The usual stable landing on the deck was also preceded by a long transient regime.
The Kiev also strikes a complete lack of experience in deck operation, discipline and safety equipment.
In terms of discipline, it appears that factory personnel were still on board and that the crew were not aware of the dangers involved in operating aircraft from the deck of an aircraft carrier.
In terms of security, there was a lack of conventional Western equipment such as fire pumps, asbestos coveralls, bulldozers and even headphones.
There is no doubt that these shortcomings will be eliminated during the next campaigns "Kiev".
However, during the transition to the Pacific Fleet in 1979, the TAVKR "Minsk" number of flights significantly decreased - to 253 (with only 50 flight hours flying!) Due to the revealed problems of the Yak-38 in high temperatures.
The resolution of the Council of Ministers Commission on Military-Industrial Issues on the deep modernization of the Yak-38 aircraft was issued on March 27, 1981, but only the next year the OKB began to develop the Yak-38M aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Navy (and the Naval Aviation) made great efforts to master the aircraft (including takeoff with a short takeoff run for the Yak-38M). Colonel A. M. Artemiev:
“At the beginning of 1983, at a meeting of the Military Council of the Navy, the Commander of Naval Aviation, Colonel-General of Aviation G. A. Kuznetsov reported that since October 6, 1976, Yak-38 aircraft have performed 32,000 flights.
But he paid the main attention to the shortcomings of the aircraft:
low thrust-to-weight ratio, no radar;
unsatisfactory longitudinal balancing in case of engine thrust mismatch and violation of their stable operation due to exhaust gases entering the inlet;
high specific fuel consumption and low aerodynamic quality of the supersonic wing, which does not allow increasing the tactical radius;
short range of missiles with a radio command guidance system;
small power reserves of reactive control and directional stability in the modes of vertical takeoff and landing;
inability to perform flights during icing;
high level of vibrations, thermal and acoustic loads, as well as insufficient operational adaptability.
On October 17, 1983, a new aircraft carrier "Novorossiysk" with an escort left the Kola Bay. And on February 27, 1984 he arrived in Vladivostok. During the cruise, the Yak-38 and Yak-38U made about 600 flights (that is, twice as many crossings of the "Minsk") with a total flight time of about 300 hours (six times more than that of the "Minsk"), including 120 takeoffs from a short take-off run.
However, all this intensive training focused on the use of the Yak-38 (M) primarily as a carrier-based attack aircraft.
After the Yak-38M, the design of the next modification of the VTOL aircraft began - the Yak-39 (increased wing, new engines and radar).
However, the development was stopped at the stage of a technical proposal, in the comments of the commission it was indicated:
"The combat capabilities of the Yak-39 as a fighter are limited and provide a solution to the problem of hitting only single subsonic air targets not covered by fighter aircraft."
Taking into account the fact that full-scale work on normal deck interceptors was already underway, and with the obvious duration of work on the Yak-39 project (especially taking into account more powerful engines and the installation of an armament complex with a radar), the apparent reluctance of the Yak-39 Naval Aviation becomes understandable.
“In the meantime, the patience of the rather compliant flight crew was running out.
On December 23, 1987, pilots of the Pacific Fleet Air Force sent a letter to the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU.
It was a document with a [very low - MK] rating for the Yak-38.
Proposals of about the same content were repeatedly sent to the Minaviaprom back in 1983."
It seems to be "everything is clear and understandable."
Apart from missed opportunities.
Effective application model
On January 1, 1988, there were about 150 Yak-38s in the aviation of the Navy (of which 25 Yak-38U). That is, all 4 TAVKRs could be equipped with Yak-38 (M) air groups with a strength close to the maximum possible, in terms of basing conditions and restrictions on training for flights and use.
At the same time, the Navy did not have any other carrier-based aircraft.
Taking into account the real conditions of application, issue No. 1 of the TAVRK air group was to give the ability to realistically solve air defense problems of the ship's formation (including repelling the strikes of anti-ship missile carriers). Of course, this raised the issue of air battles with enemy aircraft (including such highly maneuverable fighters as the F-15 and F-16). Definitely, for all-weather performance, a radar and such weapons and tactics were needed that could compensate for the shortcomings of the Yak-38's maneuverability.
The placement of a powerful radar station (which was planned for the Yak-39) did not solve the problem, since the lack of the aircraft's payload "cut" the ammunition to an unacceptably low level. With a pair of "long-range" missiles you can't "fight" much.
However, the solution here was the interaction of deck interceptors with the ship and helicopters, ensuring their guidance to high-altitude targets according to the powerful radars of the ship, and to low-flying targets - the radars of helicopters.
And such experiments were carried out - at the Pacific Fleet under Emil Spiridonov. The effectiveness of the carriers of the "Success" radar system (Tu-95RTs and Ka-25Ts) when working on low-flying air targets turned out to be very high.
However, the initiator of these works died together with Spiridonov in the Tu-104 of the Comflot in 1981, and no one else returned to this topic in the Navy and Naval Aviation.
The presence of external target designation and guidance made it possible to sharply reduce the requirements for the radar (practically to the level of a "radio sight") and reduce its mass (to the real one according to the permissible conditions of placement on the Yak-38).
For example, the mass of the smallest "fighter radar" in the USSR - "Sapphire-21M" (RP-22SMA) was just over 200 kg. Theoretically, its placement on the Yak-38 during the modernization was possible, but "at the limit" and with a significant limitation of the combat load and radius.
In the situation with military R&D, no one would specifically develop a "small radar" for the Yak-38 (because it just took years to go through the cumbersome chain of coordination and planning just to start development work), there were no "small firms" then.
However, the necessary technical groundwork was available, and the serial one.
We are talking about the seeker (GOS) anti-ship missiles, some of which had technical parameters close to the necessary (especially the high-frequency channel GOS "Moskit" should be noted).
Yes, the requirements for the airborne radar and the seeker of the anti-ship missile system are different, including the resource and a number of other parameters.
However, the question in the situation is "a war on the doorstep." And it is precisely the emergency measures that are needed to quickly and realistically increase the combat effectiveness of “what is” (and especially the urgent elimination of the most serious shortcomings).
Here it is appropriate to recall a completely different historical example from the times of the Korean War about the creation of our first radiation warning stations:
“Having addressed on command, Lieutenant Matskevich did not meet with understanding from the leadership of the research institute (well, what kind of device is this the size of a pack of cigarettes, besides, the Americans do not have such a thing).
After which he talked about this with G. T. Beregov, at that time a tester of MiGs at the Air Force Research Institute.
Georgy Timofeevich, through his colleague, S. A. Mikoyan, nephew of the chief designer of MIGs A. I. Mikoyan, arranged a meeting with him. The chief designer, assessed the lieutenant's proposal and mentioned it at the next report of I. V. Stalin, and he ordered to test the device in a combat situation.
At that time, V. Matskevich had developed only a schematic diagram. With the help of employees of the Research Institute-108 A. G. Rapoport (later Chief Designer of space-based electronic surveillance equipment) and military representative A. I. Strelkova the necessary documentation was issued and an installation batch of 10 products was manufactured.
The dimensions of the receiver are smaller than the telephone set, which made it possible to mount it on the MIG-15 fighter plane without any problems.
The receiver was named "Siren".
Lieutenant Matskevich was sent to China to conduct military tests.
The receiver received the most positive feedback from the pilots
Matskevich was awarded the title of captain (through the title).
Stalin ordered the production of 500 receivers within 3 months. At a meeting with Bulganin, Stalin's assignment was brought to the attention of the directors of the enterprises.
However, they considered its implementation impossible, since, in their opinion, only the preparation of production required at least two years. However, the director NII-108 (now TsNIRTI) A. Berg took up this task, subject to a shift to the right of the timing of the current work. Link.
I would like to note that Axel Berg was not just a prominent Russian scientist, but also a very strong practitioner, a former commander of a submarine.
Given the extremely bureaucratic nature of conventional R&D, technically, in a short time, work on equipping deck "vertical units" with small radars could only be carried out "informally." For example, by ordering a series of GOS for research work (R&D), under the "pretext", for example, "research of GOS issues in the group use of anti-ship missiles in electronic warfare conditions", after which the resulting materiel should be finalized "for an aircraft" in agreement with its developer.
It should be noted that in the same Air Force, the approach to the modernization and implementation of a new one was much more adequate than in the Navy, an example of which is the massive MiG-23, modified at repair plants according to the "thousandth bulletin" to a completely modern MLD level, with a sharp increase in their combat capability against new fighters of the US Air Force.
A "bunch" powerful radar for long-range target designation (from a ship or a helicopter) and a "small" radar of the interceptor itself (in fact, a "radio sight") ensured quite effective use of "verticals" in difficult hydrometeorological conditions (within the relevant restrictions) and at night.
However, the problem was no less acute:
"How to shoot down enemy planes?"
Given the severe payload restrictions, the use of missiles such as the R-24 and R-27 was out of the question. However, we had a very effective technical and tactical solution - the R-73 missiles with a thermal seeker and a helmet-mounted target designation system, which made it possible to drastically reduce the requirements for the aircraft's maneuverable characteristics.
Four R-73s with launching devices are about 600 kg on aircraft suspensions, which is a bit too much for the Yak-38 (when working at full radius), but quite realistic.
Nominally, the R-73 was not considered at all for the "verikalka" as its armament, for use against air targets were the R-60 (M) with half the mass. However, the R-60M had an extremely small (and often insufficient for reliable target destruction) warhead, short range and insufficient capture range (especially in the front hemisphere of the target). That is, for real combat conditions, the effectiveness is an order of magnitude lower than the P-73.
The R-73 went into mass production in the second half of the 1980s, but before that it was quite possible to use the R-60M, the main thing was the installation of a helmet-mounted target designation system (NTSU) on the aircraft.
Again, only the NCU could compensate for the extremely inadequate maneuverability of the Yak-38 in battle against normal fighters, providing it with very real chances of winning (including through the use of R-73 missiles in the front hemisphere of the target).
The enemy had no analogues in the 80s, and this was a very real and very effective trump card in air battles.
Provided that it will be possible to survive after the attack by "radar" long-range missiles AIM-7M Sparrow. And there was only one means for the Yak-38 - modern and effective electronic warfare.
Formally, the electronic warfare on the Yak-38 was "there" ("Lilac-I" or "Carnation"), but the question was not "availability", but real efficiency. First of all, the possibility of a sharp decrease in the likelihood of hitting an AIM-7M Sparrow UR aircraft.
It would be appropriate to recall the small-sized electronic warfare stations that were installed on some of our anti-ship missiles. Alas, a significant part of the Navy's aviation did not have electronic warfare equipment at all, and first of all, this must be said about extremely valuable helicopters (including the Ka-25Ts target designators). Conventional electronic warfare aviation stations did not rise in mass. But the fact that there are nearby (and "in the series") very interesting stations "at the missilemen", we, alas, did not "see" it.
Alas, the fleet did not see all this. Life went according to the principle "eat what they give." Even with the use of standard air-to-air missile systems, the Yak-38 was initially very “careful”:
“The headquarters of the naval aviation quite often showed petty tutelage and, with its innumerable instructions, slowed down the development of technology.
The already mentioned Edush cites such a case. According to the plan, during the expedition of the aircraft carrier "Kiev" in 1980, it was supposed to make two launches of R-60 missiles (a short-range air combat missile with a thermal guidance head). On the appointed day, one aircraft was lifted from the hangar onto the deck of the TAKR and its pre-flight training began. The rocket launch was ordered to produce Food …
Described by the performer himself.
“On assignment, I made the first launch from a distance of 8 km. When the rocket derailed from the guide, the aircraft developed a slight roll, a large plume formed, and the rocket went to the target. The target was hit. The second missile was launched from a range of 10 km.
During the launch of the missiles, the entire crew of the ship, free from watch, poured onto the deck."
After the missiles were launched, a report was sent to the aviation headquarters. The result was unexpected, but in the style of naval aviation leadership.
Together with congratulations, reprimands were issued to the deputy aviation commander of the Northern Fleet for naval aviation N. F. Logachev and Edush for the untimely report on the preparation for the launch of the missiles."
The first interception of the Yak-38 with R-60M missiles (aircraft from the Eisenhower aircraft carrier) took place in 1983.
In the memoirs of naval officers, the active use of the Yak-38 to intercept potential anti-ship missile carriers in the second half of the 80s at the Pacific Fleet is cited.
However, the extremely small number (literally a single one) of Yak-38 photos with R-60M missiles clearly indicates that the attitude towards this both from the Navy and from the Naval Aviation was, to put it mildly, restrained. The warhead of the R-60M was weak against large aircraft. And with enemy fighter-bombers (even with suspensions), our low-maneuverable "vertical" with weak missiles and a primitive sight (only with the "fi-zero" R-60M) did not shine, in general, nothing.
The demoralizing factor is also of great importance. It's one thing to practice strikes against sea and ground targets, where flying skills can achieve something in terms of combat effectiveness, and quite another thing when the flight crew knew that no matter how hard they tried, they had practically no chances against enemy fighters.
Alas, the likelihood of a sharp increase in the aircraft's capabilities due to new missiles and the NCU was not seen by “who should” (and those who flew “were not supposed to know about it”).
And what about the range of an interceptor with 4 R-73 missiles?
According to A. M. Artemyev (article "Taking off from the ship"), during the state tests of the Yak-36M (Yak-38) aircraft, a practical flight range at an altitude of 200 m with two UR X-23 was obtained - 430 km. The mass of the UR-X-23 suspension was at least 800 kg (two missiles, their launchers and Delta equipment), that is, 4 R-73s (with their own APUs) and a light radar more than stood up. At the same time, the radius fully ensured the interception of the "Harpoon" carriers before their launch, which was extremely valuable and important for the USSR Navy in the situation of the 1980s.
Once again, I emphasize that this is true if the "bundle" is working - the Ka-25Ts helicopters with a powerful detection radar and the Yak-38 with R-73 missiles.
Short run question
The factor that significantly increased the capabilities of the Yak-38M was the short takeoff run.
A. M. Artemiev:
“By combining WRC and short-range landing, it was possible to achieve a significant improvement in aircraft performance, especially in tropical conditions.
So, at a temperature of +30 ° C, starting with a takeoff run of 110 m, it turned out to be possible to increase the takeoff weight of the aircraft by 1400 kg.
An important achievement was the significant fuel savings (280 kg versus 360 kg for vertical takeoff).
When landing in the new and the old way, the fuel consumption was 120 and 240 kg, respectively.
In terms of the specified 1400 kg for fuel, this meant an increase in the range of the vehicle from 75 to 250 km at low altitudes and from 150 to 350 km at high altitudes."
The numbers are quite interesting.
However, it should be borne in mind that if the takeoff with a short takeoff (SRS) justified itself, then the landing with "slip" was possible only in a calm state of the sea. The study of takeoff from the springboard (according to the "English model") showed that due to the complexity of the selection of the necessary engine thrust vector control algorithm, this method is not for the Yak-38.
At the same time, the WRC issue turned out to be much more complicated than “just vertical take-off”.
“On September 8, 1980 in the South China Sea, with an outside temperature of about 29 degrees, and a full refueling disaster occurred.
When performing an FQP with the TAKR "Minsk", the Yak-38 aircraft piloted by test pilot O. G. Kononenko, on the edge of the flight deck, sank, hooked his wheels to the parapet and, turning 120 degrees, went under the water.
The pilot did not attempt to eject, it is possible that he lost consciousness.
The plane sank at a depth of 92 m. A few days later it was lifted by a Zhiguli sea rescuer who had come from Vladivostok.
Deciphering the means of objective control showed that there were no failures.
However, when we once again analyzed the direction of the air flows on the deck, we found out that at the nose section there is a sharp deceleration, leading to a significant decrease in the lift of the wing and, as a consequence, to the subsidence of the aircraft.
To laminate the flow, we removed the bow restraint, installed baffles, screens and other measures.”
In this regard, the graphics of some sketches along the "vertical lines" in the part close to the simultaneous group takeoff with a short takeoff run raises certain doubts about its reality.
In any case, until the completion of all the necessary volume of research and testing. Which for the 1143 and Yak-38M for the "group WRC" no one even thought to carry out.
However, even with vertical takeoff, the Yak-38 provided (subject to timely target designation) interception of the Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers before their launch.
TAVKR project 1143 with effective ship interceptors
A sharp increase in the effectiveness of air defense due to shipborne interceptors would allow the TAVKR to actively operate in the far zone (including in cooperation with the Marine Missile Carrier and Long-Range Aviation).
We are not talking about "winning" Kiev "all the" Nimites ". The bottom line is that the sharply increased combat stability of the TAVKR and ship formations had systemic consequences on the capabilities of all our forces in the theater of operations, providing:
- effective interaction of ship formations (including nuclear submarines with anti-ship missiles ON) with MRA and DA;
- a sharp increase in the effectiveness of the grouping of missile nuclear submarines of project 675 with operational anti-ship missiles "Basalt" and "Vulkan" (subject to their inclusion in the order and the anti-submarine defense system of our operational formation);
- a significant increase in the capabilities of reconnaissance and target designation (with the possibility of using anti-ship missiles ON TAVKR as a reconnaissance target designator);
- a manifold increase in the capabilities and effectiveness of anti-submarine defense of ships and our compound due to the likelihood of active use of helicopters and such extremely effective means of destruction as the APR-2 "Yastreb" (there was nothing close in efficiency in the armament of the Navy ships).
The opportunities were …
However, even no one really worked them out. Even super-current experiments using the "Success" system as an AWACS after the death of their initiator died out.
The main problem of our aircraft carrier
First, "just quotes."
V. N. Kondaurov ("Life-long runway") about one of 1143:
“Day after day I learned the laws of inner life on the ship.
For example, meal times varied depending on whether the ship was at anchor or underway.
If you do not want to stay hungry, listen to the announcement of the watch officer on the intercom:
"Wash hands for the team!"
The pilots who were in the air at that time could not count on the galley in the future.
All over it was felt that the aircraft was on the ship in the role of "stepdaughter".
And even more "fun", almost "deja vu" with "some recent events" already about "Kuznetsov":
“- I am 202, what happened there?
- We do not have time to receive you on this tack, there is shallow water ahead, report the rest of the fuel.
- The remainder does not allow to go to the airfield.
- Wait above us. Now let's "jump" back and take this course again.
"It's a pretty thing - we will bounce back, until it passes, it will get completely dark", - Swearing weakly, with some apathy to everything that was happening, I removed everything that I let out and climbed higher. The minutes passed in agonizing anticipation, the twilight deepened, the fuel was coming to an end.
“Damn it! When will all this end ?!"
Finally, I get permission to enter.
After the end of the maneuver, it turned out that either I was in a hurry, or they were there “spreading the porridge on the plate,” but on the landing straight I saw that the TAKR had not yet finished writing its “curve” over the surface of the troubled sea.
Another passage over the ship that had already switched on the landing lights on the deck, another pass in which I simply could not help but sit down with the rest of the fuel.
Aviation Chief of the Baltic Fleet (2001-2004) Lieutenant General V. N. Sokerin:
Spring 2001.
45 years of the Baltic naval base. In the DOP in Baltiysk, there is nowhere for an apple to fall - half of the fleet staff arrived 50 kilometers away to “shed a tear of affection” on the occasion of the anniversary of the association created, as can be seen from the figure, after the war - the Main Base of the Baltic Fleet.
Spring 2001. No less pompous, with the participation of all admirals, the 40th anniversary of the division of surface ships in the same Baltiysk.
Summer of the same 2001. DOP of Kaliningrad (for information - it is a two-minute walk from the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet).
A solemn meeting dedicated to the 85th (!) - anniversary of the BF Air Force - the oldest air force association in the whole country, from the creation of which the chronology of the country's aviation comes. As you know, it was in the Baltic Sea, through the efforts, energy, labor and talent of naval officers (eternal memory and worship of aviators), that the domestic aviation, as such, and naval aviation, in particular, was created.
Invitations were sent to all admirals of the fleet management.
There are empty seats in the front rows in the hall: not a single person from the fleet (!!!). On our anniversary, the fleet did not help anything, but it spoiled everything it could …
During the Great Patriotic War, there were only seven Heroes of the Soviet Union - submariners and 53 - pilots in the Northern Fleet, but in peacetime post-war sailors "riveted" more Hero-submariners than there were pilots-Heroes during the war, and aviation after the war seems to be like "She was playing with pears" …
And the naval commanders are furious with regard to aviation, it is completely incomprehensible why to their own, and not someone else's, from the fact that according to the results of hostilities in World War II and, especially, after the creation of anti-ship aircraft missile systems, they clearly realized that incommensurate with the ship is not either in size or in the number of crew members, the plane is a kind of deadly scorpion for a ship of any rank, practically unpunished, all-seeing, cold-blooded and lightning-fast killer …
At the beginning of the last century, the navy gave birth to naval aviation.
Almost 100 years later, he is killing her."
These are not "fresh quotes"?
You can also "fresh" - see the article on the results of 2020 in the Navy, with a number of "wild" details about the state and combat training of the Naval Aviation (and references, for example, to how the BF Commander is proud of the raid of his "falcons" in only … 60 hours).
In the US Navy at the end of the 30s, the expression "black boots" was in vogue - about naval senior officers who often did not understand (and did not accept!) The new capabilities of aviation. And not in vain, at one time, in the United States, it was decided that only a pilot could be the commander of an aircraft carrier. This does not mean that a talented commander of a task force with aircraft carriers cannot leave destroyers or cruisers (and the experience of World War II also showed this). But the fact is that this problem exists, but for our Navy it has a factor of just a "stranglehold on the neck."
Moreover, in the course of the latest reforms, the situation has only worsened.
It is enough to compare the ratio of ships and aircraft in major events of the Navy in the USSR and in the Russian Federation, and it becomes clear that “for the sake of ships” (and especially “favorite boats”) our Navy quietly “strangled” its own aviation - to practically “decorative level”.
But what about the "air threat"?
I will reveal a "terrible military secret": when carrying out measures of operational combat training, the enemy's forces are deliberately and significantly underestimated (from the real ones). If we raise all the command and staff exercises (and similar events) of the Navy over the past 10-20 years, we have never and never "played" with the outfit of enemy forces (especially aviation), close to the real …
The phrase said by one of the teachers of the Naval Academy to his graduate student:
“The main thing is that there should be approximately equal shares of“red”and“blue”on the map. But there is a lot of both”.
Accordingly, in the current reality of the Navy, we are simply not talking about effective Naval Aviation, as well as about the real threat of air attack weapons (and here you can "hide behind a fig leaf" of shooting at ancient targets such as PM15 or "Saman").
You can take "golden towers" of "innovative radar systems" that are not able to specifically shoot down real targets.
It all started “not now,” but right now it has taken on especially ugly forms.
Our aircraft carrier?
And why is he in the ranks of the Navy - "one concern." Our admirals love to admire the boats at the exhibitions, and their "toy" planes do not carry any anxiety in themselves (unlike the real ones).
Yes, not all.
There are admirals and officers who have fought to change this. Something succeeded …
For example, save "Kuznetsov". But the "overall balance" is such that
our naval aviation is actually "trampled by black boots."
And, in fact, this is the main conclusion of the article.
Without "organizational aviationization" of the Navy, no technical measures will give results.
Moreover, if the state "right now" would give money "for an aircraft carrier", they would certainly be "effectively used". With the same "semi-swooning result" as "Kuznetsov" today.
At one time, at the initial stage of work on aircraft carriers and naval aviation of the US Navy, Captain Reeves conducted a huge amount of research exercises and tests, ranging from a variety of new technical samples and ideas to tactics and operational use of aircraft carriers and connections with them.
Nothing of the kind has been carried out in our fleet.
And if this is not carried out further, even very large investments in the fleet will not give any serious and effective result.
Until our naval thought begins to "boil and search" for a new, effective, finally emerging from the state of "convulsions" from fright
"If it didn't work out"
(and "as if by chance not to offend reputable businessmen")
we will not have a fleet.
