We want to consider an interesting and important question - about the consumption of artillery ammunition by the Russian army during the First World War. The sources for the preparation of the article were the work of large and actually the only specialists on the issue under consideration: Major General (Russian and then Soviet armies), Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, full member of the Academy of Artillery Sciences E. Z. Barsukov and General of Artillery (then Chief Artillery Directorate and Supply Directorate of the Red Army) A. A. Manikovsky, as well as some other (including statistical) materials.
The root of the problem
At the beginning of the war, all the warring armies found themselves in a critical situation - as a result of the expenditure of ammunition procured before the war at erroneously low rates (on the assumption that the conflict was short-lived).
The French artillery, brought up on the technique of wasteful shooting in the squares, used up 1000 rounds per gun in the very first battles of August 1914. On the Marne, it fired the last shells, and the parks sent on September 15, 1914 to the unloading stations for replenishment of ammunition returned empty (the kit was installed in 1700 rounds on a 75-mm cannon, but by the beginning of the war there were only 1300 rounds).
The lack of shots threatened the disaster of the German artillery - in the winter 1914-1915.
EZ Barsukov noted: "The Russian artillery was able to shoot perfectly with the observance of a reasonable economy of shells, but she was forced to resort to wasteful expenditure under the pressure of orders from senior commanders who were poorly familiar with the combat properties of artillery." As a result, the Russian artillery in the 5th month of the war was left without ammunition, having used up the mobilization stock of 76-mm shells (1000 for a light and 1200 for a mountain cannon) by the beginning of 1915.
To satisfy the colossal, completely unforeseen need for ammunition, the belligerent countries had to involve their entire industry in the manufacture of shells, gunpowder, explosives, pipes, etc. and transfer orders abroad - for huge sums.
How great was this need only for the Russian army can be judged by the following data, indicating the total amount of some ammunition prepared for stocks before the war and during the Great War of 1914-1917, namely:
The need for ammunition from other armies, both allies of Russia and its opponents, significantly exceeded the needs of the Russian army. So, for example, French factories from August 1914 to November 1918. about 208,250,000 pieces of 75-mm shells were manufactured, i.e. almost 4 times more than 76-mm shells were prepared for the Russian artillery (about 54,000,000), and shells of medium and large calibers (90-220-mm), French factories produced about 65,000,000 pieces, i.e. approximately 5 - 6 times more than was prepared for the Russian artillery.
The production of ammunition required a huge amount of raw materials. According to the calculations given in the work of M. Schwarte "Technology in World War", for the manufacture of shells, explosives for equipping the latter, shells, pipes, etc. in an amount corresponding to the production of every 10,000 tons of gunpowder, approximately:
The extraordinary expenditure of funds for the procurement of ammunition served as one of the most important reasons for the decline of the national economy in this period. Moreover, if, on the one hand, excessive procurement of expensive ammunition caused great damage to the national economy (millions of tons of fuel, metal and other raw materials are pumped out of the latter, workers are distracted, etc.), then, on the other hand, too careful calculations of the need for ammunition and erroneous plans to meet this need put the army during the war in a critical situation.
Shells for light field guns
The first researcher of the experience of the First World War in relation to the supply of ammunition to the army was the former chief of GAU A. A. Manikovsky, the third part of his work ("Combat supply of the Russian army in 1914 - 1918") covers precisely this issue. Unfortunately, the specified third part was published in 1923 after the death of A. A. Manikovsky - according to his unfinished sketches, which leaves an imprint on the content.
The third part of A. A. Manikovsky's work tells us, for example, about the high consumption (maximum during the war) of 76-mm shells by the Russian artillery in the 1916 campaign. 1.5 million per month, but when dividing 1,500,000 by 30 days of the month and by 6,000 (the total number of 76-mm field and mountain guns then at the front), we get 8-9 rounds per day per barrel - which, on the one hand, extremely insignificantly (especially in comparison with the volume of consumption on the French front), and on the other hand, it shows what the Russian artillery could achieve with these consumption rates.
However, this expense was considered "large". And the question of the reasons for the "large" consumption of 76-mm shells was investigated by the above specialist with exhaustive completeness, first of all, on the basis of the data of the report of General P. P. Karachan (seconded in October 1914 to the Southwestern Front with the task of finding out waste of 76-mm shells), as well as on the materials "Notes on the actions of the Russian artillery during operations on the Western Front 5 - 15 March 1916" (The note was compiled by E. Z. Barsukov based on the results of a field trip to the Russian Western Front of a field inspector general of artillery to find out the reasons for the failure of the March 1916 operation - and published by the Headquarters in the same year).
In the work of A. A. Manikovsky, it is quite rightly noted that the work of the Russian artillery was excellent, according to the testimony of both their own and those of their enemies, and that in the presence of such factors as excellent training of Russian artillery, an excellent 76-mm cannon and the proper amount of shells, “brilliant the combat result was completely ensured and there was no need to resort to that violence against artillery (by the senior combined-arms commanders), which, without improving the results, caused a waste of shells and premature wear of the material part."
In the fair opinion of A. A. Manikovsky, everything was very simple: it was only necessary to set certain tasks for the artillery, and the question of the technology of their implementation was left to the discretion of the artillery commanders themselves. But no - every combined-arms commander himself wanted to teach his artillery "how to shoot it, and at the same time less than with a hurricane of fire, and still not otherwise, as for whole hours, did not put up in any way."
Such "control" of artillery by the combined-arms commanders caused obvious harm. But only in 1916 from the Headquarters, on the initiative of the Field Inspector General of Artillery, separate instructions began to come in regarding the combat use of artillery, and then in 1916 "General instructions for the struggle for fortified zones were issued. Part II, artillery ", revised in 1917 into the charter" Instruction for the fight for fortified zones."
In particular, the Manual indicated that the reality of firing is achieved not by means of an unrestrained expenditure of shells, but by the conduct of methodical fire, by the expedient distribution of the latter along the front, with the observation of the effectiveness of each shot and the destruction it produces (§ 131). You should also remove from everyday life "hurricane" and similar types of fire, which generate a restless state of mind. And shooting without a clear goal is a criminal waste of shells (§ 132).
Supreme order of 23.04.1917, accompanying the "Manual", noted that, according to the testimony of the combatant commanders, the use of the "General instructions for the fight for fortified zones" brought tremendous benefits, while the violation of the key provisions set out in them often led to bloody failures, and the violation of the basic provisions was a consequence poor acquaintance of some combined-arms commanders with instructions for using the combat power of artillery. Finally, the following general indication of the same order should be noted: the Manual should be applied in accordance with the situation, avoiding the enslavement of numbers and norms, because no norms can relieve commanders from the responsibility to lead the battle and reflect.
A. A. Manikovsky considers all requests from the front regarding the supply of 76-mm shells and almost all the norms for such supply established by the Office of the Field Inspector-General of Artillery (Headquarters Unit) to be clearly exaggerated. In the 1st edition of his work, after a series of calculations and a comparison of various data, a tentative conclusion was made, which is based on the consumption of shots for 1916 (this consumption was determined by the Upart for the Petrograd Union Conference in January 1917) - that the real need was no more than 1.5 million rounds for 76-mm cannons per month. The author recognizes the artillery body of the Upart Headquarters as "competent", but only in some cases. The calculations of the average monthly consumption made by the Department for 1914-1915. recognized as sufficiently reliable, as a result of which the conclusions were drawn: since the flow rate is small, the demands of the front, respectively, are exaggerated. On the contrary, there is no faith in Upart's calculations of the average monthly consumption of shots for 1916, and the Upart's rate of 2,229,000 shots per month (for active combat operations for 5 months) is called exaggerated. The rate of 4.5 million per month, indicated in the note drawn up by the Department of the NashtaVerkh to the Emperor dated April 15, 1916, is considered A. A. primarily for heavy artillery.
On the contrary, EZ Barsukov considers the figures of the headquarters' artillery control bodies to be largely consistent with the real state of affairs.
So, he noted that Upart began to function at Headquarters only from 05.01.1916, and it was from that time that a strict record of artillery fires began to be kept - accordingly, Upart's calculations relating to the period of its existence and leadership of the artillery unit of the Army in the field are sufficient reasonable. On the contrary, the calculations of Uparta, compiled for 1914 - 1915. according to approximate data (when this body did not exist and there was almost no accounting of shots, and disorganized supplies at the front were not united under the leadership of the Headquarters), they are recognized as somewhat more dubious. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the average monthly consumption of 76-mm shells in 1914 - 1915. did not reflect the actual need for them. This consumption came out small, since at the front at that time there was an acute shortage of 76-mm shells, there was almost nothing to spend, and the need for shots was enormous at that time. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the requests of the front to send 76-mm shells, which have been received in abundance by the GAU since the beginning of the war, considering them exaggerated (as was the case in the first edition of A. A. Manikovsky's work), is wrong.
Upart calculated the need for 4.5 million 76-mm shells per month on the basis of data on the actual consumption of these ammunition for a certain period of active operations in 1916 on the Southwestern Front. The figure of 4.5 million 76-mm shells was reported in a note by the Chief of Staff to the Emperor, as necessary for the "full development of offensive operations on all our fronts" only for the next 2-3 summer months of 1916. The purpose of the note is to indicate to the Emperor the difficulty of carrying out the planned operations when it is impossible to meet the huge requirements for combat supplies,pointing out the need to establish the post of the Supreme Minister of State Defense (analogous to the post of the French Minister of Supply). A copy of the note, for information, was given by the head of Upart to the head of GAU A. A. Manikovsky.
In 1917, in connection with the events of the February coup, the order in the combat supply of the troops of the Army in the field, established by Upart in 1916, was violated. Accordingly, the most reliable data on combat supplies, as noted by E. Z. …
Therefore, all the figures given by us in this cycle regarding the consumption of artillery ammunition by the Russian artillery belong to the most competent specialist in this matter, who had access to the primary documentation - the former head of the Directorate of the Field Inspector General of the Headquarters artillery E. Z. Barsukov. The latter tried, on the basis of Upart's data, to establish: 1) the average combat consumption rate of 76-mm projectiles for the corresponding combat operations and 2) the average (mobilization) rate of demand (stock) of 76-mm projectiles for a long (annual) period of war (or the rate of consumption for average day of the year).
