We are completing the review of the rates of consumption of artillery ammunition of the Russian artillery in the First World War (see Appetite for War. The consumption of artillery ammunition by the Russian army in the First World War)
Three-inch artillery rates
The rate of the average combat consumption or the average daily consumption of artillery rounds in a certain period (operational period) differs depending on the nature of the hostilities. For example, a meeting engagement in a maneuver war, an offensive against a defending enemy, a breakthrough for a fortified belt, defense in a maneuver or positional combat situation left a direct imprint on the consumption of the most common type of artillery ammunition. As well as the duration of the corresponding operation. The established norms of the average daily consumption of shots do not exclude the need to calculate the norms of shots necessary for the implementation of the corresponding operation - and the established norms of the average daily consumption serve as the starting data for calculating the total number of required shots.
To establish the average daily combat consumption of artillery shots from the experience of the positional stage of the war, the data on the average daily consumption per barrel (with "observing the necessary savings in consumption"), which Upart determined, based on the experience of the spring battles of 1916 on the Southwestern Front, are used - the figures were reported to the chief GAU (28.06.1916, No. 971). In accordance with these data, the daily average consumption was determined: for a 76-mm light cannon in 60 rounds, for a 76-mm mountain gun in 25 rounds, for a 75-mm Japanese Arisaka cannon in 40 rounds per barrel. The calculation of the number of shots required to hit targets when breaking through a fortified zone (destruction of artificial obstacles, etc.) was based on the "Manual for the fight for fortified zones" Part II. "The action of artillery when breaking through a fortified zone." It, as noted earlier, was published by Upart in 1917, and in Appendix VII to the document based on the experience of military operations in 1916-1917. indicated the approximate average consumption of projectiles per barrel - by day. For the 76-mm field (mountain) gun, it was determined as follows: for the first three days of the operation (attack and subsequent development of success) - 250 shells per day, for the next seven days (pursuit) - 50 shells per day.
To establish the average daily combat consumption of 76-mm guns for the maneuverable period of the war, as noted, you can use the data in the reports of the Southwestern Front regarding the average consumption of shots in the period August - September 1914. These data differ (which is quite natural, since because they refer to combat clashes of various nature and duration). In accordance with these data (on the day of the battle, the 76-mm cannon consumed from 20 to 63 shells), the average daily combat consumption is about 40 shells.
This calculation discarded the individual exceptional cases of huge expenditure of shells that took place at the beginning of the war, when some batteries fired several hundred rounds per day per three-inch tank.
The average rate of need (the rate of mobilization stock) in shots for artillery can be approximately determined by calculating the consumption for a long period of the war or for the war as a whole, but provided that there are no special restrictions on the expenditure of shots in the considered period of time, similar to what the Russian had experienced. armies from the fall of 1914 to the fall of 1915; and then a certain positive correction should be introduced into the corresponding calculation for the case of providing ammunition for operations requiring a very large expenditure, as well as for other unforeseen circumstances; when determining the size of the amendment, it is necessary to take into account the average combat expenditure rate, which is derived for a certain period of the corresponding operations.
Upart's data indicate that in 1916, 18 million 76-mm shells were used up. Accordingly, the average monthly requirement is 1.5 million (that is, 9-10 rounds per day) shots per 76-mm gun, but without a positive correction. To calculate this amendment, the standard of the average monthly combat consumption determined by the Unit is 2229000 shots for intensive battles for 5 months of 1916, from where, with a total number of 5500 - 6000 guns, about 400 shots per month or 13-14 shots per day will be released on one three-inch gun.
At the beginning of this year and then since August, there was a certain lull on the Russian front, when the flow rate reached about 5 rounds per day. E. Z. Barsukov, based on the specifics of the positional and maneuvering periods of the First World War and the experience of the Civil War, noted that the monthly average combat expenditure should be 400 rounds per 76-mm cannon per month, which is 4800 rounds per year and 14 shells per day.
The indicated average daily requirement for 14 76-mm shells was withdrawn according to the data of 1916, and, accordingly, refers to the positional period of the war.
The most reasonable requirement for the number of 76-mm shells for the period of mobile war is the telegram of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General from Artillery NI Ivanov, dated 10.10.1914, No. 1165, which was then confirmed by the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters. In this telegram, NI Ivanov reported that the average consumption on his front was 350 76-mm rounds per barrel for 16 days in August, or 22 rounds per day, which the general admits "very moderate." E. Z. Barsukov accordingly noted that if for periods of military calm (both in maneuverable and positional warfare), the consumption is equal to 5 shots per barrel, then the need for a period of maneuverable war on the average day of the year will be 22 + 5: 2, which gives all the same 14 shells per day for a three-inch (or 420 per month).
The consumption of shots in individual combat operations of a maneuver war is less than in a positional war, when, when making breakthroughs of a fortified strip, a huge consumption of artillery shots is required - to destroy barbed wire, destroy various fortifications, etc. positional war - after all, in a mobile war, clashes occur much more often than in a positional war - breakthroughs of fortified zones.
Drawing parallels with a later period, E. Z. Barsukov wrote that, defining the modern standards of combat supply, basic for the procurement of stocks in case of war and for preparing the mobilization of industry in wartime, the above monthly requirement for 420 shells for the 76-mm cannon follows. increase to about 500 - 600 rounds (the Petrograd Allied Conference in January 1917 determined the monthly requirement for a year of hostilities at 500 rounds for a 76-mm cannon), or up to 17 - 20 rounds per day. The number of active guns, the vastness of the upcoming theater of operations, the state of transport, the development and direction of communication routes, etc. will affect etc.). As a result, the presence of about 6,000 76-mm cannons (field, mountain, etc.) dictates the average annual requirement for war or the rate of mobilization stock of 76-mm shells - 20 rounds per day per gun.
Shells for howitzer and heavy artillery
During the First World War, the Russian Army in the Field experienced a shortage of rounds for howitzer and heavy artillery (especially for large-caliber guns), even more noticeable than the shortage of 76-mm shells. But at the beginning of the war, this defect was not fully realized, since, firstly, there was not enough heavy artillery, and secondly, around the issue of shots for heavy artillery, the extraordinary "hype" that was created during the war did not form around the issue of rounds for light 76mm artillery.
The demands of the Headquarters (Upart) to meet the needs of the Army in the field in relation to howitzer and heavy shots were not considered exaggerated by the rear, but at the same time they performed them very poorly, especially in 1914-1915. Even A. A. Manikovsky, inclined to see Upart's demands as "senseless" exaggerations, found Upart's demands for heavy artillery shots to meet the existing need. Moreover, as EZ Barsukov notes: “A. A. Manikovsky repeatedly reproached the Upart for its weak insistence on limiting the "dispersal" of the Russian production of 76-mm shells, leading to "obvious and irreparable damage" not only for combat supplies, especially heavy artillery, but for the entire national economy. In this respect, he was absolutely right in principle, but his reproaches to Upartu were directed to the wrong address. The Upart, as an organ of the active army at the front, had no power at all to create this or that supply "policy" deep in the rear. According to the laws of that time, all this was supposed to be in charge and only the Minister of War was supposed to dispose of all this”.
One way or another, but the demands made by Upart regarding the supply of the army with shots for howitzer and heavy artillery were considered modest, and they were, more precisely, even too modest.
Data on the average mobilization requirement, monthly and daily, and on the average combat expenditure of various kinds of artillery rounds are summarized in Table No. 1 (). For comparison, the same table contains data for the French artillery in the operation at Verdun in 1916. Subsequently, the French artillery's need for artillery fire during combat operations (average consumption) significantly exceeded that indicated in the table).
The French, according to Artillery Colonel Langlois, considered it possible to start an offensive operation only when the number of shots per gun was brought up to that indicated in Table No. 1. As can be seen from this table, the average daily combat expenditure of artillery fires assumed by the French significantly exceeded the average daily expenditure of Russian artillery - for example, 6 times for field guns. But the real consumption of shots near Verdun for a longer period than the 20 days indicated in the table turned out to be slightly less than expected.
According to the testimony of the same Colonel Langlois, in the period from February 21 to June 16, 1916 (for 116 days), 1072 field guns participating in the battle from the French - 75-90-mm calibers were used up to 10,642,800 rounds (i.e. an average of 87 rounds per day per gun). This average daily combat expenditure is close to the actual Russian expenditure in the operations of the Southwestern Front in the spring of 1916 - up to 60 rounds per day per three-inch gun, that is, the French consumption exceeded the Russian consumption of field cannon artillery by 1.5 times.
As for the average mobilization (annual) need, then, as noted by EZ Barsukov, the average daily need for one field gun was approximately: in the French artillery in 1914, 9 shots, and in the period of 1918, about 60 shots; in German artillery in 1914 8 shots, in subsequent years much more; in Russian artillery in 1914 about 3 shots, in 1916 about 9 shots. But as explained above, the numbers 3 and 9 shots per cannon per day do not correspond to the actual needs of the Russian artillery in them, and it is more correct to determine the average daily need of the latter at least 17 shots per three-inch, and the average monthly need of 500 shots per cannon (if the army has 5, 5 - 6 thousand active field guns), as indicated in Table 1.
When comparing the total expenditure of artillery fires by Russian and French artillery over a long period of the First World War, and not for periods of individual operations, it is clear that Russian expenditure is negligible compared to the colossal expenditure of shells by the French even for individual operations (see tables 2 and 3; in numbers are rounded in the tables).
Table 2 shows the consumption of shots of guns of almost all calibers that were in service with the Russian army during the first 29 months of hostilities, that is, in 1914-1916. Consumption of 76-mm rounds in 1917 - about 11 million; respectively, only in 1914 - 1917. about 38 million 76-mm shells were spent on the Russian front.
Table 3 shows far from complete data; for example, for 1914, the consumption of only 75-mm shots is shown, the consumption of heavy shots of 220-270 mm caliber is not shown, etc. Nevertheless, the information given is sufficient to judge the huge consumption of shots by French artillery - not only for destruction for various purposes, but also for various obstruction, warning and other lights, i.e. about such wastefulness in the expenditure of shots, which the Russian artillery did not allow itself.
As can be seen from Table 3, the French 75-mm field artillery in 1914 by the end of the Battle of the Marne spent about 4 million rounds, while the Russian artillery for the whole of 1914 consumed only about 2.3 million 76-mm rounds. During 5 separate operations 1915, 1916 and 1918. French artillerymen fired 10 million 75-mm shells (including only for the "Somme" month 24 06. - 27.07.1916 - up to 5,014,000 pieces, and a record holder who "ate" more than a million 75-mm grenades, became the day of July 1 (about 250 grenades per cannon, and this does not include shrapnel), in addition to large-caliber shells.
Meanwhile, A. A. Manikovsky and some other persons considered the consumption of shots for the Russian artillery at 1.5 million per month excessively high, and the requirements of the Field Army of 2, 5 - 3 million 76-mm shells per month (or 14 - 18 rounds per cannon per day) "clearly exaggerated, even criminal."
For 1914 - 1917 the Russians used up about 38 million 76-mm rounds, while the French used up about 14 million 75-mm rounds in only a few operations. It should be admitted, notes EZ Barsukov, that “contrary to the established opposite opinion, the Russian artillery used up shots during the First World War, relatively not so much, if its consumption is compared with the consumption of French artillery shots. But in general, the consumption of shots in the world war was enormous in the Russian artillery; this expense would come out significantly less with the skillful use of artillery by senior commanders. He called for foreseeing the colossal expenditure of artillery shots in future wars - regardless of how well the army is trained in the art of using artillery and how careful the artillery is in spending shots. Saving shots, the specialist noted, is inappropriate when powerful support is required from the gunners - to decide the fate of the battle. And then the rate of fire of modern guns, allowed by the technical conditions, should be used, not particularly considering the consumption of projectiles.
The Russian rapid-fire three-inch "large" reel "of shells, which in a relatively short period of time it can shoot those 3 - 6 thousand shots, followed by damage to the gun. Accordingly, one should not forget about the need to protect guns from being shot - but not by reducing the number of shots or prohibiting the use of the full rate of fire of an excellent gun, as some recommend, but by careful handling of the guns, but by “correct and sufficient calculation of the mobilization need for guns and advance mobilization preparation of factories not only for the production of materiel and artillery ammunition, but also for the repair of guns."
