The 80th anniversary of the Airborne Forces has been ignored by the President and Minister of Defense. They did not want to meet with the paratroopers and did not even send the usual on-duty greetings in such cases to the participants of the anniversary concert in the Kremlin Palace, where on July 31 of this year. there were about 5,000 people, including 28 Heroes of Russia, who at one time defended the Fatherland from disintegration (in the Chechen campaigns) and from humiliation (in the operation to force the Georgian president to peace).
The jubilee of every respected, honored artist of Russia receives more attention than the jubilee of the thirty thousandth branch of the armed forces, which has earned the respect of the people of Russia. It turns out that there is a reason for such "forgetfulness" - rumors about reform, and the actual disbandment and re-subordination of the Airborne Forces, are confirmed and concretized. This circumstance explains a lot.
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RF Armed Forces D. A. Medvedev is finally being relieved of the Airborne Forces and, at the same time, relieved of responsibility for the use of his operational-strategic reserve due to the lack of such. At the same time, the initiators of this "deliverance" also have a chance to convince the country's leadership of the usefulness of the military reform carried out by the Chief of the General Staff N. Makarov.
Indeed, the newly created strategic commands “all of a sudden, out of nowhere” appear combat-ready groupings of troops that can be used to threaten the enemy and to demonstrate to the senior military commander at least for a short time until the landing units drop to the level of general strategic impotence.
We understood the objectivity of military reform and initially supported its plan. The elimination of redundant management links and the optimization of the entire management structure while lowering the threshold for tactical independence of units were inevitable. However, the distance from conception to execution is enormous. Until now, Mr. N. Makarov could not present a single visible positive result from the goals stated at the beginning of the reform of the RF Armed Forces, including:
contrary to expectations, the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control of formations, units and subunits decreased. The reasons for this are the very low operational and technical training, as well as the lack of coordination of the management bodies from top to bottom. And where does this term come from if these controls have been shaken up annually for the last three years. At the same time, the number of hierarchical instances has not diminished at all, as stated by Mr. N. Makarov, and in the case of airborne formations, it significantly increases, eroding responsibility for the final result;
of all the newly formed brigades of constant readiness, not a single truly prepared and combat-ready one can be found. The main reason for this is the extremely poor training of the personnel of most of the subunits. The Ministry of Defense turned out to be unprepared for the transition to a year of conscript service: there are no appropriate methods and programs of combat training and a modern educational and material base, there are no internal regulatory and legal organizational and regulatory documents adequate to the new realities and conditions of service;
there is not a single professionally equipped military unit in the RF Armed Forces. The plans of the contract service failed due to the unpreparedness, inability and unwillingness of the leadership of the GOMU GSh, GUVR, GUK to organize training and recruitment of citizens for contract service (Smirnov V. V. and Pankov N. A.), to provide normal combat training, as well as military service in garrisons and units (N. Makarov). Economic considerations have nothing to do with it - the country has enough funds and citizens who want to serve the Fatherland for the same money, only in normal legal and living conditions;
did not appear and is not expected in the near future, declared by the Minister of Defense, an effective institution of junior commanders. The destroyed system of training military personnel in the Ministry of Defense does not want to be restored "at the behest of the pike" N. Makarov and N. Pankov. At the same time, in the Ministry of Defense, no one is involved in organizing pre-conscription training in civilian universities of students, that is, the same conscripts - potential junior commanders who have just matured during their studies and are professionally trained in specialized military registration specialties;
barracks hooliganism and hazing became even more sophisticated and angrier. Contractors and conscripts of different conscriptions end up in the same unit, often in the same barracks. Interethnic conflicts in military units were added to the non-statutory ones. The officers-educators, whose functions were to form a healthy moral and psychological climate in the barracks, were the first to be dismissed. In the absence of planned combat training in a subunit, the absence of criteria for an objective assessment of the place, the role of soldiers and sergeants in the team, the readiness of this team and its members to defend the Fatherland is inevitable. Then the main criterion for assessment and self-assessment becomes service life with all the ensuing consequences;
failed to restore the system of military-patriotic education of young people and their preparation for military service, incl. in military registration specialties. GOMU GSH (during the transition to a one-year term of service) have not developed and announced educational norms and standards for a conscript for VUS. These standards are not known today. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for licensing additional education institutions that carry out pre-conscription training (V. V. Smirnov is responsible for this). The declared creation of an interdepartmental commission (responsible A. Serdyukov) April 22, 2009 at the meeting of the State Council in Ryazan and in the instructions of the President, it remained an order - not a single meeting of the commission, as such, was held and not a single normative document appeared directly from the pen of this commission. The fruit of fruitless efforts, not at all by the Ministry of Defense and not by the interdepartmental commission, but by the unauthorized Central Council of DOSAAF of Russia - "The Concept of the Federal System for Preparing Citizens of the Russian Federation for Military Service for the Period Until 2020" (Government Decree No. 134R dated 03.02.2010) - not by ruling coordinated with disinterested federal ministries, does not create organizational and financial mechanisms for this work.
The situation with the preparation of citizens for military service continues to deteriorate, since such statements and documents, producing irresponsibility and trust in the center, only discourage officials in the localities.
In the Russian Armed Forces in the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, until now, there has been a grouping (branch of service) - the Airborne Forces, which retained combat readiness and combat capability sufficient to quickly respond to local, suddenly emerging threats to national security. And we hoped that the Airborne Forces would remain in the hands of the country's military-political leadership as an instrument that would enable them to adequately and promptly respond to these challenges until positive results emerge and an analysis of the shortcomings of military reform. I repeat that we have always supported the strategy and concept of the reform, since they correspond to modern realities, challenges and threats, but they are being executed extremely ineptly and irresponsibly. Formations and units of the Airborne Forces, thanks to the decisions of the President and the Minister of Defense, announced in 2007 and 2008.to a lesser extent than other types and branches of troops were affected by the destructive measures of the stalled military reform. But apparently this very circumstance serves as a living reproach to the authors and performers of the creation of a "new look for the Armed Forces" and they decide to correct this situation. A Directive has been prepared, according to which the Airborne Forces Command becomes a subdivision of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (an administrative body that does not have operational functions), and the formations and units of the Airborne Forces are actually withdrawn from the reserve and direct subordination of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (General Staff) of the RF Armed Forces and transferred to operational subordination to the Commands strategic directions "North", "West", "South", "East".
From such a "castling" Russia gets the following results
1. Military. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are deprived of a highly mobile, combat-ready, operational group of forces capable of independently, with the support of the Air Force, to solve sudden operational tasks in local conflicts outside the Russian Federation, or in remote isolated territories, where the Russian state is actually getting richer today (and in the near future), its officials and oligarchs. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff lose the ability to strengthen and close dangerous areas with their operational-strategic reserve. The assertion that the strategic commands will be able to independently solve these tasks if they have separate formations of the Airborne Forces and army aviation (in the future, the formation of powerful helicopter formations is envisaged) is controversial and groundless. Firstly, it is not yet known and it is not known when powerful helicopter formations will be formed capable of transferring and supporting the combat operations of the operational assault force, at least as part of one brigade or airborne division. Secondly, the strategic commands do not have mobile assets and regular command posts prepared for the transfer and deployment in the areas where the assault force is used outside the Russian Federation or in remote isolated territories to control the actions of units and subunits of the assault. Thirdly, the strategic commands do not have the means and bodies for supplying supplies (ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants) necessary for the landing force to conduct hostilities outside the Russian Federation or in remote and isolated areas. Fourth, today there is neither knowledge nor experience (and it will not be soon) of planning, transferring, commanding and supporting combat operations of operational landings - and this is an integral and self-sufficient section of the art of war. Fifth, if a sufficient number of transport and combat helicopters appear in the foreseeable future, then why should the strategic command not prepare one or two brigades of constant readiness for use as a helicopter operational or tactical landing, based on specific conditions, assessing the development of the situation and potential threats at one theater or another.
2. Military-political. For whom and for what the Security Council of the Russian Federation was created and the President in 2010. the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation signed? Article 11 of the Concept: “The attention of international politics for the long term will be focused on the possession of energy sources, including in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and in other regions of the Arctic, in the Caspian Sea basin and in Central Asia. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of countries in South Asia and Africa, on the Korean Peninsula will continue to have a negative impact on the international situation in the medium term”. And further Article 12 “In the context of a competitive struggle for resources, the solution of emerging problems with the use of military force is not excluded - the existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies may be upset”. At the same time, the Military Doctrine requires the General Staff to "choose the optimal directions for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, the forms and methods of their use, based on forecasts of the development of the military-political situation, military dangers and military threats …". And further, the Doctrine determines that "… the formations of the RF Armed Forces can be operatively used outside the Russian Federation in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal legislation."
Knowing the state of permanent readiness units and formations, I would like to ask N. Makarov: what forces and means, what operational formations are expected to respond to these threats and challenges today? Or is it not provided at all? Then why and for whom the Russian President approves "Concepts" and "Doctrines"?
3. Geostrategic. If there are no prophets in your Fatherland, then take a closer look, gentlemen, how the Armed Forces are being built by our partners. The armies of most NATO countries and the United States have gone through military reforms in the past 20 years. China, post-Soviet republics. Everywhere there is a formation of a mobile component - an independent operational group directly subordinate to the military-political leadership, an increase in its role and weight in the general structure of the Armed Forces.
The current (Obama's) US defense budget makes it clear that America's military future lies in "expeditionary combat operations." Units of the American Marine Corps (175,000 men) stationed at overseas bases and ships are ready to take part in them at any time. For operations in the Near and Middle East, the Pentagon maintains the 18th Airborne Corps, which includes four divisions, three brigades, dep. regiment and support units. Its total number is 90 thousand people. These military units have administrative and operational independence.
NATO has formed a 25,000-strong rapid reaction force. The goal of the new operational formation, subordinate directly to the commander-in-chief of NATO forces, according to the NATO Secretary General: "To calm down countries that are experiencing growing fears about Russia."
However, our General Staff, as always in Russia, has its own special path - to show the whole world an example of how reforms cannot be carried out. Russia today is losing its national treasure - combat-ready and unique in its strategic and tactical mobility troops, which it did not have, and will not have, not a single army in the world. Apart from the Airborne Forces, Russia has no other military tool to respond to remote local calls.
A decade and a half ago (Russia was then going through a "time of troubles"), playing in "chess Eurasia" Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that "not having the ability to move troops over long distances to impose its political will and is far behind in technological terms from America, Russia and China does not have the means to constantly exercise political influence in the world … ". Today, China already has such an opportunity, and it is time for Russia to restore it, including by building up the BTA grouping. Let me remind you that it took only a day for two airborne units in 1968 to land and occupy the planned objects in years. Prague and Brno. In 1979. 103 Guards Airborne Division and 345 Guards. PDPs occupied all government and administrative institutions in the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, and ensured the planned entry of troops into this country. Without delving into the political meaning, in military-technical and operational terms, these were brilliant military operations. Neither the 18th VDK nor the USMC can boast of anything like that. Units of the Airborne Forces acted very quickly, decisively and effectively, defending the integrity and interests of Russia in the localization of all armed conflicts over the past two decades.
It is indisputable that, all other things being equal, amphibious formations and units are an order of magnitude more mobile than others, both when deploying to theaters of military operations and on the battlefield, their tactics and methods are more modern and most meet the conditions of local conflicts. These advantages will inevitably be lost if the projects of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces are implemented.
4. Social and political. Paratroopers, veterans of the Airborne Forces, public organizations of veterans of the Airborne Forces have always been and are loyal to the state power, considering themselves a part of the state, its defenders. The Charter of the Union of Russian Paratroopers contains a provision on the prohibition of the Union's membership in political parties and on the impossibility of admitting organizations pursuing political goals to the Union in the event of a consolidated choice of parties by individuals - members of the Union. This allowed the "Union of Russian Paratroopers" to preserve unity, corporate cohesion and become a truly massive and capable all-Russian organization capable of protecting its members and defending the interests of its corporation. However, it should be borne in mind that the practical implementation of the decision to disband the Airborne Forces and transfer their formations and units to the subordination of ground commanders will cause a negative reaction, not only of 30,000 airborne troops and a thirty thousand army of members of the Union of Russian Paratroopers, but also of the entire two million audience of capable men between the ages of 20 and 50-60 who have ever served in the Airborne Forces. This protest is already materializing on the Internet. Some perceive this "distribution" as a sign of an attempt to "merge Russia", understanding its defenselessness in the face of the "militant Saakashvili". We should expect a significant increase in the ranks of the "Union of Russian Paratroopers" and the cohesion of airborne organizations with a sharp and sustained surge of opposition sentiments in relation to the imperious state and military bodies: the President, the Government, the Ministry of Defense. And they need it …?
5. Moral and psychological. The transfer of disparate formations and units of the Airborne Forces to subordination to several undoubtedly responsible and self-sufficient commanders will objectively destroy the system of education and training of the personnel of these troops that has been taking shape for decades and has proven the highest efficiency. This factor was never taken into account by the General Staff at all. But, this objective reality, given to the General Staff in sensations, is not eternal. If from the military-technical and operational points of view, it is still possible to find controversial and groundless arguments in favor of the "distribution" of formations and units of the Airborne Forces to different commands, then the arguments of such "distribution" lose all meaning when taking into account the damage to the moral and psychological state and combat effectiveness of the personnel of the parachute airborne units and subunits. It is thanks to this factor that Russia has the opportunity to be proud of the victories and achievements of its army.
Science knows that a person uses the capabilities of his brain only 3-4%, the rest of his nerve cells "sleep". Scientists argue that parents can make the greatest gift to their child if they are able to give his consciousness, his brain confidence: "I can …!". In this state, in a child (in an adult, too, but less) some additional part of his nerve cells is included in the work, increasing intellectual, volitional and physical capabilities. In the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation since the times of the USSR, largely thanks to the intuition of V. F. Margelov, a unique method of appearance in the brains of young officers and young soldiers (in fact, the same children - boys from school) of this very realization "I can … !!!" has developed and took root. This method, which has become a system, is transmitted in the traditions of the troops, in the programs of "combat and political training", through the graduates of the Ryazan Airborne School, through overcoming the fear of parachute jumps, through corporate cohesion and responsibility not only for oneself, but also for the "landing", through the symbols of the landing forces, through the motto "Nobody but us!" and through much, much more, sometimes defying explanation: the atmosphere of the landing complex, training ground, class, barracks. Even if this awareness is not given to every paratrooper, even a quarter of the personnel of a unit with such an attitude leads the rest. The last decades have shown many illustrative examples of this: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yugoslavia, Georgia - this is a far from complete list of hot military conflicts in which the paratroopers with a smaller number endured the brunt of the most acute and responsible operations and battles. In the last decade alone, after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, more than 100 of them became Heroes of the Russian Federation (50% posthumously). This system of training and education will objectively collapse. It cannot be preserved without the Airborne Forces Command, without its own school, without personnel and organizational and mobilization bodies, without an education system, without the traditions of combat and airborne training, without the traditions of the amphibious brotherhood of servicemen and veterans.
Let me remind you the words of the Spartan king Leonidas (the leader of 300 Spartans), said to one of the Macedonian kings before the battle with the Persians at Thermopylae: “… I have warriors, and you have shepherds - you cannot stand it” (talking about 300 soldiers and 10,000 troops). So it is with the airborne formations a year or two after the implementation of this directive: the soldiers standing in the battle of a hundred thousandth army will inevitably turn into 30,000 "shepherds". Objectively, everything goes to that.
Today the Ryazan Airborne School is no longer subordinate to the Airborne Forces Command. It became an airborne faculty as part of a kind of amorphous training center for the Ground Forces (Combined Arms Academy). The command of the Airborne Forces has been removed from the pre-conscription training of young people and from being drafted into the Airborne Forces - this is now the function of the WMD of the military districts. Informally, the "Union of Russian Paratroopers" hardly manages to agree that the graduates of the youth clubs of the airborne profile, trained and willing to serve in the Airborne Forces, should be drafted into these troops. Now, the operational and combat training of the paratroopers will be taken up by those who have brought their formations and units to a "limited combat readiness" state.
First and second steps to "I can't …!" have already been made in accordance with the directives of the General Staff, which have the force of law for the command of the Airborne Forces. Shall we go further or shall we stop? It's not too late to take a step back. All that is needed is the will of the country's military-political leadership.
Not only the disbandment, but also the weakening of the Airborne Forces weakens Russia, depriving it of the opportunity to "impose its political will on others" and defend its national interests. The Airborne Forces should be kept in constant readiness precisely as a reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in his direct subordination with a minimum of hierarchical instances transmitting his decrees and orders, as a mobile multifunctional operational group of forces under a single command with administrative (formation, maintenance and training of troops), and operational (planning, combat employment and command and control of troops during an operation) functions.
We hope that there is still time to stop and subject to a serious analysis all the factors of the military reform with the participation of the Airborne Forces, including the above.
