The approach of the two empires to the solution of the Polish question was fundamentally different from the German-Prussian course of depolonization. If Austria-Hungary preferred to assimilate the Poles, then Russia - to give them a separate "apartment" like the Finnish.
Viennese waltz dancing in Krakow
For the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs, in fact, only half German, the Polish question was by no means so acute. But in Vienna, too, they had no illusions about him. Of course, the Habsburgs reduced the economic and cultural oppression of the Polish population to a reasonable minimum, but they severely limited all political initiatives: any movement of the Polish lands towards the beginning of autonomy, not to mention independence, had to come from Vienna.
The presence of a large Polish colo in the parliament of Galicia, hypocritically called the Sejm, did not in the least contradict this line: the external signs of "constitutionality" were frankly decorative. But we must remember that in Vienna, with all the thirst for an independent policy, for example, in the Balkans, and therefore in relation to their own subjects - the Slavs, they were still slightly afraid of the Berlin ally.
The same one constantly reacted nervously to any steps not even in favor of the Slavic population of the dual monarchy, but to those that at least did not infringe on the Slavs. It often came to direct pressure, and not only through diplomatic channels. So, back in April 1899, Holstein (1), on behalf of the German Foreign Ministry, considered it possible to directly threaten Austria-Hungary if she did not strengthen the anti-Slavic course in internal affairs and tried to independently seek rapprochement with Russia. Threatening that the Hohenzollerns might sooner come to an agreement with the Romanovs and simply divide the Habsburg possessions among themselves (2).
But, apparently, it was only a threat. Its real side expressed the desire of German imperialism, under the guise of pan-German slogans, to annex the Austrian lands up to the Adriatic, and to include the rest in the notorious Mitteleurope. I must say that even the reckless Wilhelm II did not dare to put pressure directly on Franz Joseph. However, in the Polish question, this, apparently, was not very necessary. The aged Austrian monarch actually did not differ much in his attitude to the "arrogant" Poles from the other two emperors, much younger and much tougher - Nikolai Romanov and Wilhelm Hohenzollern.
In the end, it was with his filing that even Krakow was deprived of not only republican status, but also minimal privileges. Projects with the coronation of someone from the Habsburgs in Krakow or Warsaw, which at first glance are very flattering for their subjects, clearly pale in front of such concrete steps in the opposite direction. The elimination of autonomy in Galicia was all the more offensive for the Poles against the background of the special status acquired by Hungary in 1867.
But Schönbrunn's stubborn reluctance already in 1916, just a few days before the death of Franz Joseph, to include "his" Polish lands in the Polish kingdom created impromptu, turned out to be an even greater anachronism (3). The part of Poland that fell to the Habsburgs (Galicia and Krakow) by divisions cannot be considered poor. The coal of the Krakow Basin, the Wieliczka Salt Fields, a lot of oil and excellent opportunities for the development of hydropower - even in our time, there is a good potential, and even in the 19th - early 20th centuries.
But for the Austrians it was a hopeless province, "hinterland", where industrial goods from Bohemia and Upper Austria had to be sold. Relatively normal development began in 1867 with the introduction of the Polish administration, but the geographical barrier - the Carpathians and the customs border with Russia - continued to play their negative role. Nevertheless, the very fact of the Polish government attracted thousands of people to Krakow, primarily the intelligentsia. However, under the impression of Galician freedoms, she did not even think about breaking away from Vienna.
Moreover, it was on the central government that the Poles were betting in their confrontation with the East Slavic population of the region - Ukrainians and Rusyns. The peculiarity of the position of the Poles in Galicia, who for the most part hardly believed in the prospect of a "third" crown, was reflected in the rather high popularity of the Social Democrats, who skillfully prepared a political cocktail of national and openly leftist slogans. It was from among them that the future leader of the liberated Poland, Józef Pilsudski, came out.
Independence? This is ballast
Is it any wonder that the overwhelming majority of independent Polish politicians in the 10s of the XX century, and some politicians before, in one way or another, relied on Russia. The well-known Polish lawyer, moderate socialist Ludwig Krzywicki admitted: “… the national democracy already in 1904 discards the demand for an independent Poland as unnecessary ballast. The Polish Socialist Party only starts talking about autonomy. The public mood has moved even further. Trust in Russia was so strong that, not without reason, a few groups that still retained their old position complained that a reconciliation of the worst kind is taking place in Poland - reconciliation with the entire Russian society."
And the point here is not even that two-thirds of the Polish lands were under the rule of the Romanovs - this was precisely one of the reasons for the openly anti-Russian position of radicals such as Pilsudski. It is just in Russia, where the Poles did not even in 1905 go to an open revolutionary action, that the question of Poland's independence had time to really mature, and not only "latently", as mentioned above.
For several years it has been widely and openly discussed both in the press and in the State Duma. Practically any legislative act, be it the question of the zemstvo or the well-known "Stolypin" project of separating the Kholmshchyna, during the discussion immediately put the Polish question as a whole on the agenda anew. First of all, the topic of autonomy was touched upon, and this despite the small number of the Polish colo even in the first Duma (37 deputies), not to mention the next, where the number of Polish deputies was decreasing (4). Let the very word "autonomy" the deputies, who once received a personal shout for it from the tsar's uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, were afraid like fire. Indeed, in reality, and not on paper, the idea of political, cultural and economic isolation is autonomy.
For half a century after the tragic events of 1863, many Russian liberal-minded politicians have clearly realized their readiness to give Poland at least broad autonomy, and at most - its own crown, best of all - in union with Romanov. The well-known words of Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky: "Russia does not need Poland", which were openly said in the State Council already during the war, long before that were repeatedly sounded from the lips of politicians both in secular salons and in private conversations.
The Russian elite, of course, kept in relation to Poland the "genetic memory" of the national liberation uprisings of 1830-31 and 1863. (5). However, the low revolutionary activity of the Poles in 1905-07 forced not only liberals to take a different look at Poland. The Conservatives, who had previously categorically rejected the idea of a “free” Poland, actually accepted it during the World War, albeit in their own way. This position was voiced at the Russian-Polish meeting by Prime Minister I. Goremykin, who cannot be suspected of liberalism: “there is Poznan, etc., there is autonomy, there is no Poznan, there is no autonomy” (6). To which, however, he immediately received a reasonable objection from I. A. Shebeko, a Polish member of the State Council: "Can the solution of the Polish question really depend on the successful outcome of the war?" (7).
The autocrat from the Romanov family since 1815, after the Congress of Vienna, among his many titles also bore the title of Tsar of Poland, a relic of absolutism, for which one is ashamed not only in front of his home-grown liberals, but also in front of his "democratic" allies. However, when the prospect of a clash with Germany and Austria rose up to its full height, it was decided to put forward common anti-German interests to the fore. No, such a decision was made not by the emperor, not by the Council of Ministers or even by the Duma, only by military intelligence.
But that also meant a lot. The future Russian supreme commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, at that time the commander-in-chief of the St. Petersburg military district and the actual head of the military party, completely trusted the scouts. And in the last pre-war years, she, perhaps, had more influence than all political parties put together. It was the Grand Duke who, according to the memoirists referring to his adjutant Kotzebue, repeatedly declared that the Germans would calm down only when Germany, “defeated once and for all, would be divided into small states, amusing themselves with their own tiny royal courts” (8).
Not Helm, but Kholm, not a province, but a province
From the height of the imperial throne, the great powers were allowed to turn their ardor against the main enemy - Germany. The Tsar, impressed by the pro-Russian programmatic work of the leader of the Polish National Democrats Roman Dmowski, "Germany, Russia and the Polish question", decided to "allow" on a fairly large scale the propaganda of Polish-Russian rapprochement on an anti-German basis. The neo-Slavist circles hoped in this way to strengthen the position of the supporters of the monarchist union with Russia in the Kingdom of Poland and to use the rapprochement with the Poles as an instrument of weakening their rival in the Balkans - Austria-Hungary.
The Russian elite decided to play the "Polish card" not least because on the eve of the war there was a sense of calm in Russian Poland. Moreover, against the background of anti-German sentiments, a rather favorable economic situation was developing in the Kingdom. Thus, the rates of industrial growth in the Polish provinces were higher than in Great Russia, the Stolypin agrarian transformations, despite the unceremonious Russification, found fertile ground in Poland.
It is characteristic that the prime minister himself adhered to purely nationalist views, calling the Poles "a weak and incapacitated nation" (9). Once in the Duma, he sharply besieged the same Dmovsky, declaring that he considered it the highest happiness to be a subject of Russia. Isn't it too harsh considering the fact that in April 1907 46 Polish deputies in the Second Duma, at the suggestion of Dmowski, put forward their very, very loyal proposals for resolving the Polish question?
“The Kingdom of Poland, within the boundaries of 1815, is an inseparable part of the Russian state, it is governed in its internal affairs by special regulations on the basis of special legislation. A special legislative Seimas, treasury and painting are established; administration headed by the Governor; court and judicial Senate; Minister - Secretary of State for Poland in the Council of Ministers of Russia; The Diet meets by the Highest command; The governor and the minister are appointed by the Supreme Authority; The supreme power approves the laws of the Seimas; from the competence of the Seimas are withdrawn the affairs of the Orthodox Church, foreign, army, navy, coinage, customs, excise taxes, post offices, railways,trademarks, creative property, government loans and obligations”(10).
However, in such loyalty to the tsarist power, the Polish colo was not alone. Both the Ukrainian community and the deputies from the Lithuanian Democratic Party strove exclusively for the autonomy of the regions of settlement of the peoples they represent within the united Russian Empire. After Stolypin's death, teaching in Polish was allowed in the communes, and the Orthodox Church abandoned attempts at expansion in the Greater Poland lands.
The appetites of the Moscow Patriarchate were limited to the beginning of the "eastern territories" (under Stalin, at least for the sake of decency, they would be called Western Ukraine and Western Belarus). The creation of the Kholmsk province, which was often called in the Russian manner “the land” and the actual transfer to the Great Russian lands of the Grodno province, very successfully fit into this strategy.
The very presentation of this question in the Russian parliament, absolutely incapable of doing anything real, caused "hysteria" among the leaders of the Polish faction in the Duma. Roman Dmovsky and Yan Garusevich understood perfectly well that the Duma debates were just a formality, and the tsar had decided everything for himself long ago. But I decided just at the suggestion of the Orthodox hierarchs.
It should be noted that the true background of this project was completely different - to stake out the "Orthodox lands" for the future. They began to lay the straw, not least because Russia's democratic allies regularly woke up the Polish question - at negotiations, when concluding "secret agreements", when drawing up military plans.
Well, if the allies so want it - if you please. "Resolve the Polish Question!" - a year before the war, the Octobrist Voice of Moscow exclaimed pathetically with the title of its editorial. Naturally, not without the knowledge of the court. And this is the leading organ of the party, which quite recently unanimously and fully supported the great-power aspirations of Pyotr Stolypin. The outstanding Russian prime minister, in his open antipathy to the Polish stake in the Duma and personally to Roman Dmovsky, did not conceal his desire to "limit or eliminate the participation in elections of small and powerless nationalities." In the Russian Empire, there was no need to explain who Stolypin had in mind here in the first place.
However, any shifts towards concessions for Poland were periodically met with hostility by the Russian leaders. So, after a long and well-propagated discussion, the project of municipal self-government for the Polish provinces was safely postponed "until better times".
Despite the fact that Prime Minister V. N. Kokovtsov, who replaced Stolypin, on November 27, 1913, the State Council failed the bill, believing that no such exceptions could be made for the national outskirts. At least, before the Russian lands, self-government, even in the most curtailed form, cannot be introduced anywhere. As a result of a short intrigue of the apparatus, already on January 30, 1914, Kokovtsov resigned, although the Polish theme was only one of many reasons for this.
Notes:
1. Holstein Friedrich August (1837-1909), adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, actually deputy minister (1876-1903).
2. Erusalimsky A. Foreign policy and diplomacy of German imperialism at the end of the XIX century., M., 1951, p. 545.
3. Shimov J. Austro-Hungarian Empire. M., 2003, p. 523.
4. Pavelyeva T. Yu. Polish faction in the State Duma of Russia 1906-1914 // Questions of history. 1999. No. 3. P.117.
5. Ibid, p. 119.
6. AVPRI, fund 135, op. 474, file 79, sheet 4.
7. RGIA, fund 1276, op.11, file 19, sheet 124.
8. Quoted. by Takman B. August guns. M., 1999, p. 113.
9. "Russia", May 26 / June 7, 1907
10. Pavelyeva T. Yu. Polish faction in the State Duma of Russia in 1906-1914 // Questions of history. 1999. No. 3. P. 115.
