So you don’t want to sometimes once again return to the issues of strategic stability, nuclear missile weapons and all that stuff, but you have to. Because in the vastness of world and domestic media resources, schools of various experts in this issue float, from time to time, due to their overwhelming knowledge, they surface and delight us with regular revelations. Sometimes it’s something smart and valuable, but often it’s something that it would be better to keep in yourself, without carrying it to people. Unfortunately, these revelations are read not only by the military or industry specialists, or at least people who are more or less versed in the issue, but by ordinary people who can believe them at an uneven hour.
Here is another such revelation from a prominent specialist, one might even say, a hereditary specialist (dad was also an academician) in matters of strategic stability, Alexei Arbatov. Now he heads the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Speaking on the sidelines of the Luxembourg Forum in Geneva, he stated the following (quoted by RIA Novosti):
The new Sarmat missiles will be installed in vulnerable silos that were known 30 years ago. They fall into the crater of a nuclear explosion with modern guidance precision. Therefore, in my opinion, if the Sarmatians are deployed, then with one or two warheads, which makes them not a very attractive target. But if ten or twenty warheads are installed on them, then they become an advantageous target, since they can be hit by missiles with one or two warheads.
It is interesting that we have to talk about quite simple things, obviously unknown to the respected scientist. If he considers the silos in which the heavy ICBMs 15A18M R-36M2 Voevoda are now vulnerable, then let him show the more protected ones and tell where and who has them, and what kind of missiles are there. Because there are simply no more protected silos in the world. Unfortunately, we will not build new ones, and we do not really need it, so we will use the existing ones. It should be noted that the Sarmat program is generally built very economically competently, and where possible, units and assemblies from their predecessors are used there. We are, of course, not talking about the rocket units, but, say, transport and launch containers from the old 15A18 (R-36MUTTH) and from 15A18M (to a lesser extent) there are a lot of them left, why not use them? Or transport and installation and other units can be new (and they have already been tested), or existing ones, from 15A18M, can be used. As for the vulnerability of silos due to the fact that their coordinates are known, it is not so simple. The coordinates are known, but it is not so easy to destroy the mine, even with modern means. The object under the Yamantau Mountain is also known where it is - so try to destroy it. Or, say, a bunker under the Cheyenne Mountain - it is unlikely to be destroyed, although, they say, due to the old construction, it has its own vulnerabilities (exits from it).
As for the "modern guidance accuracy", it does not at all guarantee so far a direct hit into a silo (that is, hitting it in a crater from a nuclear explosion), and in general, Mr. would be 2 warheads, and from different missiles. If from one, then there can be no question of any guarantee - the rocket may not start, fall apart in the active section of the trajectory, not separate the warheads, but you never know what happened. And in relation to our best silos, their durability is so high that the probability of the silos performing its task (launching ICBMs) even with a direct hit may be higher than 0.5, that is, it would be better to assign 3 blocks (again, from different missiles). "Potential partners number one" does not have any data on the real resistance of our best silos, and not those invented by someone in the West or extrapolated from the data obtained from silos that remained in Ukraine. And Arbatov also clearly does not have them, just as Hans Christensen, discussed here in the articles, does not have them either.
In addition, our silos have long been covered with developed complexes of passive protection (jamming complexes in the optical, thermal, radar ranges, covering literally everything), and even before the sunset of the USSR, an active protection complex was tested (moreover, in two versions of protection - from high-precision conventional and from the actual nuclear warheads). And the development of these technologies did not stop later, and there are various indirect data that the silos of "Sarmatov" will be covered by them (if this is not already installed somewhere - of course, no one officially informs about this and is unlikely to be), which further increases the required outfit of forces to destroy one silo. But even 3 BB from three missiles, or monoblock ICBMs "Minuteman-3" with 300kt W87, or SLBMs "Trident-2", and preferably not with one hundred-kiloton W76-1, but with more powerful W88 - is already a lot for the cost of one silo, even if containing an ICBM with 10 or more unguided APs (or several maneuvering and gliding hypersonic "Vanguards"). For the simple reason that missiles and BB are now quite small, and there are many targets, and ICBMs, not only are not guaranteed to be destroyed in silos, but most likely they will not be there - our missile attack warning system now does not have any dead zones, its new orbital segment (in the form of an EKS system with a spacecraft of the "Tundra" type) is also being recreated, and a new generation of automated combat control system (ASBU) allows to reduce to the limit the time for making any decisions to attack any targets. Which was very small before. That is, in the event of an attack on Russia, our strategic nuclear forces will operate according to a counter or counter-counter variant, and the mines by the time they are "visited" by the enemy's BB will almost certainly be empty.
As for the idea of placing a heavy ICBM with 1-2 APs inside (if it is not an ultra-high-power AP, which may also be needed on a heavy missile, and there is such an AP on the 15A18M, or if these are not the aforementioned Avangard-controlled AGBOs), then it smacks of sheer stupidity or sabotage. Why then do we need a heavy ICBM for beauty? Heavy combat missile systems have their own tasks, which are not solved by light systems, and it is simply pointless to unload these ICBMs to such an extent, with the exception of the cases described above. It is better not to build them then. By the way, we still have light Yars ICBMs in silos, carrying up to 6 APs (they are on duty, obviously, with a smaller number of APs, most likely with 4). Why doesn't Arbatov declare them "vulnerable" too? Will the Americans have enough charges for all the mines and for the destruction of other targets? He did not try to count from the current small potential?
Although Arbatov has always been a supporter of light ICBMs with 1 BB on board, despite the fact that such a "light" and "low-vulnerability" solution is also very expensive - 150 missiles are required to place 150 charges, and not, say, 30-50 or 15.
Arbatov refers to the Americans, they say, they have "Minutemans" in the same (in his opinion) vulnerable silos and with 1 BB inside. Minuteman 3 is, for starters, a light ICBM, both when it carried 3 BBs, and when it carries 1 now. He even saw silos "Minuteman" and "Voevoda", but at least any of ours? American silos cannot be compared, they are equipped with much more vulnerable sliding covers (they are useless for any damage or filling with earth), unlike our hinged covers, they do not have any systems for clearing and cutting the soil (in fact, self-excavation of the mine installation and some of it " feed "through the ground), and mechanisms for emergency removal of the cover also do not have. And the Americans do not need this, their ICBMs have never been the main carrier of their strategic nuclear forces, and in general their strategic nuclear forces have always been guided by the first strike, in the domestic literature it was even customary to call them not strategic nuclear forces, but SNF - strategic offensive forces, not strategic nuclear … This, however, is from a series of our scouts and foreign spies.
And, despite the fact that the United States is now declaring that it is not going to be the first to use strategic nuclear forces, this should not be believed, including because they did not even technically prepare for other options, except, of course, counter and response. oncoming strikes. We will not broadcast about the excessive peacefulness of the USSR or the Russian Federation - the term "strike at the appointed time" in relation to its nuclear forces in the USSR appeared, despite the promise not to use nuclear weapons first. And Russia did not undertake such propaganda promises. It is clear that a global thermonuclear or even a limited war is not the case when any sentiment is permissible. Therefore, it is better never to bring it to such a point.
But innovative ideas from Alexei Georgievich do not dry out.
In his opinion, the Sarmatians, equipped with one or two warheads, could have a reserve of seats so that Russia could quickly, if necessary, like the United States, restore its reusable nuclear potential.
Well, duty with a reduced number of charges in order to fit into the limits of the START-3 Treaty is an understandable and familiar business and is used by us, the Americans and the British. But to put on duty a heavy ICBM with 1-2 charges, hoping that the pre-war situation will develop along the line of gradual escalation of tension and will allow to quickly, and, most importantly, secretly, deliver all the warheads is arrogance. Even if it allows, it will be very difficult to do it covertly - the lids will have to be opened, and not all the mines at once, but in turn, and to do this when there are no enemy satellites overhead, in general, the case may be delayed. A submarine can still somehow covertly install charges, a mobile ground complex - too (try to find out what they do with it in the hangar, and most likely there will be no inspections in the pre-war period), but it is much more difficult for mine ICBMs. Not to mention that the expression "to restore the return potential" does not suit an academician. You can restore the number of charges to the standard one by realizing the return potential, which consists in the fact that there is a place where to put, and there is something to add.
But Arbatov also offers something else:
Due to this, we could put on alert more such complexes as "Yars", "Bulava", and build additional boats "Borey": we, apparently, will not fulfill the plan of eight boats by 2020, so it will be necessary after this period to build, and no longer eight, but twelve. And keep a reserve of warheads on the Sarmats, just as the United States does, keeping a reserve of seats on the Trident and Minuteman missiles. Then we, like the Americans, will have the opportunity to quickly, if necessary, restore our reusable nuclear potential.
Again, "restoration of the return potential", how can this be? And the academician should also know that the Americans have a rather complicated return potential. There is where to put, but what to put is still there, but not as much as it seems to someone who was stuck, apparently, in the 90s or early 2000s. So, for example, 450 Minuteman-3 ICBMs can in no way have a "return potential" - there are simply no charges for additional installation on them, although they once carried 3 charges instead of the current 1. Those charges are just taken from the untimely deceased ICBM MH "Piskiper", of which there were 50 with 10 BB on each, that is, the remainder of the charges belongs to the exchange fund and there are no others.
And due to what "this" - due to the setting on duty of a heavy ICBM, carrying fewer charges than a light one? This is what kind of economy should be brought to us - does Mr. Arbatov want to clarify his idea? About the completion of all 5 Boreev-A by 2020 - no one has planned this for a long time, 2-3 ships will have time to enter service by the end of 2020, this is quite enough, there is no rush here, the rest should be in time by 2023 … In addition, it is envisaged to build 6 more ships of this type in the 2020s, they will be laid down and will be built until 2027, although it is unlikely that they will have time to finish building by the end of the current GPV-2027.
In general, the respected full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences wanted to propose something very clever, but it did not work out. But let's recall the biography of Arbatov Jr. and his political predilections (anyone can look at Wikipedia or spend a little more time and figure out this issue for themselves). And let us conclude that his position does not look surprising. His dad also opposed the construction of aircraft carriers in the USSR and advocated the transfer of four islands to Japan, being, by the way, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since the time of Brezhnev. Only Georgy Arbatov was at the same time a participant in the Great Patriotic War, participated in the parade on Red Square in 1941, fought until 1944, and if he hadn't done anything good in life, that would have been enough.
And the son advocated the ratification of the START-2 Treaty, which is enslaving for the Russian Federation, which, thank God, was never ratified. He is also a prominent member of the Yabloko party and the author of treatises like this: "Beware, rake!" Which, by the way, did not prevent him from receiving the Russian government's media prize in the same 2016 for "popularizing foreign policy issues." Not everything, in general, is still okay in the state, since this is still happening.
