During the end of World War II, the once powerful fleet of Nazi Germany was in a state that could be described in one word - ruins. About half of the ships were destroyed during the hostilities, some were sunk by the Germans themselves before surrendering. All four German ships of the line were killed, three so-called "pocket battleships", two of the three heavy cruisers. The hull of another unfinished heavy cruiser was in Konigsberg, and the unfinished aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin sank in Szczecin. Of the six light cruisers, only one survived, 25 of 42 destroyers were killed during the hostilities, 4 more were sunk or badly damaged in their bases. Of the 1188 submarines, 778 were destroyed during the war, 224 were flooded by the crews themselves during the surrender. According to rough estimates, about a third of the German ships remained afloat, a significant part of which had varying degrees of damage.
The trophies of our fleet by the end of the war were relatively small. Like the fascist ground forces, the German sailors strove to retreat west and surrender to our allies. This, by the way, was demanded of them by the order of the commander-in-chief of the German Navy, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, appointed by Hitler's successor. In the ports occupied by Soviet troops, mainly either heavily damaged or unfinished ships and auxiliary ships, unable to go to sea, remained. When the Soviet government raised the issue of dividing the ships of the German fleet, the British, in whose zone of control the bulk of the German ships were located, modestly kept silent, while the Americans, it seems, at that time were more concerned with how to deal with their gigantic fleet, for keeping it in peacetime was beyond their means even for them. Therefore, the Allies mainly supported the Soviet side regarding the division of the German fleet.
According to the memoirs of N. G. Kuznetsov, back in April 1945 I. Stalin instructed him to think over the issue of using captured German ships. By the beginning of the Potsdam Conference, the General Naval Staff had prepared for the Soviet delegation preliminary data on the composition and fate of the German fleet. On May 23, I. Stalin sent letters to W. Churchill and G. Truman, where it was indicated that, since the surviving ships and vessels of Nazi Germany surrendered to the British and Americans, the question arises of allocating its share to the Soviet Union. The USSR "can with good reason and justly count on at least one third of the military and merchant fleet of Germany." Stalin also insisted that Soviet specialists get access to materials on the surrender of the German military and merchant fleets and the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their actual state.
Our side did not receive a concrete answer to this appeal, but both addressees proposed to include this issue on the agenda of the upcoming meeting of the Big Three.
On the morning of July 19, a meeting of the Big Three Foreign Ministers took place in Potsdam. V. M. Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, made proposals for the division of the German fleet. They boiled down to the following: to transfer a third of the German ships to the Soviet Union, including those that were under construction and under repair on the day of surrender; transfer also a third of weapons, ammunition and supplies; transfer a third of the German merchant fleet to the USSR; complete transmission by November 1, 1945; to create a technical commission of representatives of the three powers for the reception and transfer of ships.
At a meeting of heads of government, which began a few hours later, Churchill proposed to separate questions about the fate of the German merchant fleet and the Navy. Not objecting in principle to the division of the first, he insisted that the German merchant ships should be used in the near future in the interests of the war with Japan and that they should be divided later, within the framework of reparation payments to Germany. Considering the difficulties of transferring them to another theater and the fact that many of them previously needed solid repairs, their military use seemed very problematic. Thus, the British tried to delay the resolution of the issue.
Speaking of the navy, Churchill proposed to destroy the bulk of the German submarines and to divide only a few of them among the Allies to study new technology and experiment. Churchill's next phrase, apparently, alerted Stalin: "As for surface ships, they should be distributed equally between us, provided that we reach a general agreement on all other issues and that we disperse from here in the best possible way." The head of the Soviet delegation sharply remarked that the Russians did not ask for a gift from the allies and believed that they were rightfully claiming a third of the German fleet. The Soviet side demanded that the allies recognize this right, but did not object to the use of German merchant ships in the war with Japan. Having achieved this recognition, Stalin proposed to return to this issue at the end of the conference. In a conversation with Kuznetsov, he dropped: "I hope there will be changes in the composition of the British delegation soon. Then we will resume the conversation." Changes in the composition of the British delegation did take place - the Conservative Party lost the parliamentary elections on July 5, which was announced on July 26. The British delegation at the conference was headed by the new Prime Minister K. Attlee.
On July 30, new Soviet proposals were submitted to the conference for consideration. They took into account the point of view of the British delegation on the fate of the German submarines - the main part of them was proposed to be destroyed. At the same time, the delegation of Great Britain made proposals. In a detailed memorandum on this issue, the British confirmed their position regarding submarines and, without disputing the necessity of dividing surface ships, pointed out that in this case it is necessary to take into account the Romanian and Bulgarian ships inherited by the USSR and allocate the share of France in the division. Obviously, to a certain extent they tried to smooth out the unpleasant aftertaste in relations with the French, which remained after the British formation in July 1940 struck French ships controlled by the Vichy government in Algeria. As for the Romanian and Bulgarian ships, as you know, at the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet delegation, given that at the last stage of the war, these countries were on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition, demanded a different attitude towards them than towards defeated Germany. Most of the Bulgarian and then Romanian ships inherited by the USSR in 1944 were returned to these countries shortly after the war.
In addition, the British believed that the section would take considerable time: it would require compiling lists of ships, taking an inventory, and agreeing on many technical issues. And finally, since the German crews remained on board their ships, the British delegation feared their sinking, as happened after the end of the First World War. Therefore, the British insisted that all preparations for the partition remain secret.
On July 31, a special commission met to draw up recommendations on the distribution of the German naval and merchant fleets. The Soviet side in the commission was represented by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov and the head of the political department of the Soviet military administration in Germany A. Sobolev. The US delegation to the commission was headed by Vice Admiral S. Cook, the British delegation - by Rear Admiral E. McCarthy. The commission recommended the division of all German surface ships, with the exception of those sunk and taken by the Germans from the Allies (the latter were returned to their previous owners), as well as ships under construction and repair, which could be brought into readiness for going to sea in up to six months. At the same time, the work should have been completed without increasing the number of skilled workers in German shipyards and without resuming the activities of German shipbuilding and related industries.
This point is especially important, since the strict terms set by the conference for the completion and repair of ships are now sometimes puzzling. The fact is that the decision on the division of the fleet was not supposed to conflict with another decision of the conference - on the demilitarization of Germany, including the elimination of military production. The commission did not come to a consensus on the fate of the submarines: the British and Americans proposed to divide no more than 30 submarines between the allies, the Soviet side believed that this figure should be three times more. Looking ahead, we note that the final decision of the conference included the proposal of the Western allies. The commission recommended to provide the ships transferred under the section with stocks of weapons, supplies and ammunition. To resolve specific issues of the distribution of German ships, it was proposed to create a tripartite naval commission, which was to begin work on August 15. The division of the German fleet should have been completed by February 15, 1946, i.e. six months after the start of the work of this commission.
On the evening of July 31, a meeting of senior naval commanders - members of the delegations - was held. It was attended by N. Kuznetsov, who chaired, as well as admirals of the fleet E. King (USA) and E. Cunningham (Great Britain), diplomatic advisers and naval experts were present. After lengthy disputes, Kuznetsov proposed to divide all ships into three approximately equivalent groups, and then draw lots. This proposal was accepted. The next day, he was approved at a meeting of the heads of government. Now the solution was to be implemented.
The Soviet side in the Triple Naval Commission was represented by Admiral G. I. Levchenko and Engineer-Rear Admiral N. V. Alekseev. The technical apparatus of the delegation included 14 people. It was planned to attract officers from the detachments formed in the Baltic Fleet to receive German ships and from the Naval Department of the Soviet military administration in Germany. The British delegation included Vice Admiral J. Miles and Rear Admiral W. Perry, the American delegation Vice Admiral R. Gormley and Commodore H. Rap. A preliminary informal meeting of the commission members took place on 14 August. It was decided that the heads of delegations would chair the meetings in alphabetical order, and that a technical subcommittee would be created to compile and clarify the lists of German ships.
On August 15, the first meeting of the Triple Naval Commission took place in the building of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. It was decided that, first of all, it was necessary to draw up lists of German ships indicating the name, type, location and condition of each. It was decided first to deal with the division of minesweepers, submarines, and then the rest of the ships. However, the head of the British delegation said that he would not discuss the issue of minesweepers and submarines until they received a complete list and additional instructions. In addition, Admiral J. Miles suggested that the auxiliary vessels of the German Navy, previously registered with Lloyd, should be considered commercial and excluded from the section. The heads of the delegations of the USSR and the USA did not agree with this and decided: let each delegation present its own version of the definition of what is considered an auxiliary ship of the Navy. Soon, the Americans proposed to consider as such vessels of special construction and converted from commercial ones. The head of the Soviet delegation, Admiral Levchenko, supported this proposal. The British agreed.
A Technical Subcommittee was formed to compile the lists of ships to be divided. The Soviet side was represented by Rear Admiral N. V. Alekseev and engineer-captain 1st rank V. I. Golovin, English - Lieutenant Commander G. Watkins and American - Captain A. Graubart. To carry out on-site inspections, tripartite groups of experts were formed, who had to clarify the lists, get acquainted with the technical condition of the ships and pre-break them into three groups: A - ships that do not require repair, B - unfinished and damaged ships, which will take no more than six months, and C - ships, bringing to readiness will take a longer time and therefore subject to destruction. The first group of experts flew to England, the second worked in ports occupied by Soviet troops, the third went through Copenhagen to inspect Norwegian ports, the fourth was formed in the United States from people who were there.
The work of the experts lasted from the end of August to the second half of September. In the ports, the lists of ships were corrected, their technical condition was clarified. As a result, the original list of 1,382 ships expanded to 1,877 units. Inspection teams examined about 30% of the ships, mostly standard ones. It was not possible to do more because of the lack of time and due to the fact that a significant part of the ships and vessels were at sea at crossings, or in places where sweeping operations were carried out. As it turned out, the British had already transferred some of the ships to the Danes and Norwegians. At the same time, the technical maintenance and operation of the ships was carried out by German crews, who kept the ship organization, uniform and insignia of the Kriegsmarine.
The Soviet representatives faced obstacles from the British. They did not allow a detailed examination of the ships, prevented the questioning of the German crews. At the same time, many of the auxiliary mechanisms on the ships were dismantled, the British removed some of the equipment (especially radio and radar). Thus, it was not possible to obtain complete data on the auxiliary vessels. Nevertheless, extensive material was obtained, which served as the basis for further work.
Here are data on the condition of some large German ships, the fate of which is usually of particular interest. The aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin is sunk by its crew in shallow water with the ship's technical readiness of about 85%. After the ship was lifted by the emergency rescue service (ACC) of the BF, the degree of readiness was estimated at about 50%. Turbines were blown up on the aircraft carrier. The completion of the ship required three to four years, and the experts assigned it to category C. Heavy cruisers ("pocket battleships") Admiral Scheer and Lutzov, as well as light cruisers Emden and Cologne, according to experts, restored were not subject. On the cruiser "Cologne" there were no boilers, and its hull was cut almost to the center plane in a collision with the heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen". The unfinished heavy cruiser Seydlitz, damaged by Soviet aircraft and sunk by the crew, was raised by the ACC BF. The ship's readiness with working mechanisms was about 65%, but there was no weaponry. It was impossible to finish building the ship according to the German project, and converting it for our weapons would have been too expensive, especially since there were no ready-made artillery systems of 203 mm caliber in the USSR.
To be continued.
