Seeing the instability of the newly formed units, scattering when only enemy patrols appear, as well as the rapid advance of Mamontov's corps deep into the front, the commander of the Special Group orders to begin a transfer to the Sampur region - Oblovka of the 56th Infantry Division - which should have been advancing from the railway line in the northwestern direction. The cavalry brigade of the 36th rifle division, assembled in the area of the village of Protasyevo (and recovered after the defeat), was ordered to strike from Protasyevo to the rear of the enemy on August 16.
For a more successful fight against Mamontov's cavalry, the commander-in-chief summoned the 21st Infantry Division from the Eastern Front.
The threat not only to Tambov, but also to Kozlov, the seat of the headquarters of the Southern Front, caused emergency measures to defend this city, since in fact it was defenseless until now: only 1, 5 companies of the guard battalion remained in the city.
The danger for the headquarters of the Southern Front to be captured by the enemy, forced to take measures for redeployment. On August 17, part of the headquarters was already closed and loaded into wagons. In case of the need to fight in the city itself, it was supposed to destroy the most important documents, and the responsible officers to fight to the last bullet. The threatened areas were hastily fortified. A special detachment of 1000 bayonets was formed in Tambov.
However, the poor organization and passivity of some of the local revolutionary committees (revolutionary committees), the low combat effectiveness of hastily put together units, the lack of experienced and persistent command and political personnel at the command's disposal - all this had the consequences of the failure of measures taken to stop the enemy who had broken through.
On the other hand, the measures taken by Mamontov himself ensured him, it is true, a very short-term and fragile, but - nevertheless, success. Among these measures, the greatest sympathy of the population was aroused by the distribution of Soviet, public and private property and reprisals against Soviet functionaries who had proved themselves negatively.
All the while refreshing his horse structure, Mamontov could advance at a speed of 60 - 80 km per day and appear unexpectedly in places where he was not expected - and it was impossible to overtake and stop the raid with the help of the infantry and the exhausted cavalry brigade.
On August 17, the main forces of the corps were in the Panovy-Kusty - Gryaznukha region 65 - 80 km south of Tambov.
On the morning of the 18th, Mamontov's units appeared south-west of Tambov, broke through the front of the fortified area near the village of Rudnev, and captured a battery of Reds near the village of Arapovo. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the Cossacks entered Tambov - without encountering resistance from a sufficiently strong garrison. The latter, at the approach of the whites, partly fled in panic, and partly surrendered.
The fleeing remnants of the Tambov garrison began to gather towards the town of Kirsanov, while the surrendered part of the garrison was disarmed by the Cossacks and dispersed to their homes (rifles were distributed to local peasants).
During the capture of Tambov, a heavy battery and an armored car acted on the part of the Whites.
The stations Saburovo and Selezny were also occupied by the Cossacks - and at the station. Saburovo they captured a train of 500 Reds. Cossacks were seen near the villages. Shakhmanka - 35 km south of Kozlov.
In Tambov, between 18 and 21 August, the Cossacks blew up a railway bridge and station facilities, destroyed warehouses (a military plant and Soviet institutions); supplies and property were destroyed and partially distributed to the population.
The first period of the raid is over.
Its results boil down to the following:
1) The offensive was carried out, as it were, along a corridor between the rivers flowing in parallel in the meridional direction of the river. Elan and Sawala - which seriously secured the flanking operation during the initial, most critical, period.
2) For 8 days, from 10 to 18 August, the main forces of the Cossacks traveled about 180 km in a straight line - or on average about 23 km per day.
So insignificant for the cavalry corps, the average size of the transition is explained partly by the fact that the corps was shackled by the slowness of its infantry, and partly by the fact that the offensive was carried out as if in jumps - with long stops in one place (2 days in the area of the village of Kostin-Odedets and about in the area north of the station Zherdevka).
Then the actual average speed of movement of the main forces of the corps is about 40 - 50 km per day, which is very significant for a cavalry corps, making a raid in a strip 25 km wide.
The speed of movement of individual patrols and small detachments was much higher and reached 60 and even up to 80 km per day (patrols appeared after the battles for the crossing near the village of Kostin-Oledets on August 11 and Sampur station on August 15 after stopping in the area of Zherdevka station).
3) For the red command, the breakthrough of the front by Mamontov, if it was unexpected, still did not introduce confusion into its activities. But the combat material at the disposal of the command, especially the command of the group and the front, to counteract the breakthrough and raid, in terms of its size, composition (lack of cavalry), combat effectiveness and insufficient training of the command personnel of both military and local units and institutions, was far from the height of the requirements presented to him at that moment. Therefore, attempts to capture the breakthrough Cossacks and plug the throat of the breakthrough were not only unsuccessful, but also harmful - some military units, without enemy pressure and contrary to the orders of the command, retreating further expanded the breakthrough.
5) For the main command of the Reds and for the command of the Southern Front, the conclusion naturally suggested itself: the troops at the front's disposal alone will not be able to eliminate Mamontov's raid - and it is necessary to call on local resources for help.
Mamontov's stay in Tambov and the unimpeded advance of the corps also worried the central authorities - after all, the process could take on a protracted nature with a possible disorganization of the rear. On August 18, the Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic issues an appeal to the population "On a Round-Up", in which L. D. Trotsky, comparing the breakthrough of the White Guard cavalry into the rear of the red armies with a raid of ravenous wolves, called on the workers and peasants of the Tambov province to come out to round-up the bursting Cossacks - with weapons and a cudgel. He demanded to surround Denikin's cavalry - and "tighten the lasso with a confident hand." The peasants were ordered to steal horses and cattle when the Cossacks approached, and food supplies that could not be taken away were destroyed. Trotsky entrusted the leadership of the peasants with the communist organizations, which should strive by organizing intelligence and partisan actions to facilitate the task of the regular troops sent to fight the Cossacks. Trotsky threatened with cruel reprisals those who would not oppose or even contribute to the "Denikin gangs."
On this he did not rest. The next day, Trotsky, in a new appeal "Courage from Despair", characterizes the equestrian raid as a step caused by the hopelessness of the current situation - as a result of the disproportionate strength of AI Denikin's forces in connection with the latter's campaign against Moscow. Trotsky compares the Mamontov raid to the rate of a gambler - trying to disrupt the game with one blow, overturning the power of the Red regiments by means of a blow to the rear. He considers Denikin's map a bat - "since the Southern Front held out, only trembling slightly at the place where the wasp stung him," and Mamontov is threatened with encirclement and inglorious death.
