August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in 1943. The Battle of Kursk was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. First, the Red Army on the Kursk salient repelled a powerful enemy blow from selected Hitlerite divisions. Then the Soviet forces launched a counteroffensive, and by August 23, 1943, they had thrown the enemy back to the west by 140-150 kilometers, liberated Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov. After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, and it completely seized the strategic initiative into its own hands. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and went over to strategic defense, trying to preserve the previously occupied territories.
The situation at the front
In 1943, the war developed under the sign of a radical turning point on the Soviet-German strategic front. Defeats in the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad significantly undermined the power of the Wehrmacht and its political prestige in the eyes of allies and opponents. At a meeting at the Wehrmacht headquarters on February 1, 1943, impressed by the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad, Hitler pessimistically said: “The possibility of ending the war in the East by means of an offensive no longer exists. We must clearly understand this."
However, having received a tough lesson on the Eastern Front, the military-political leadership of the Third Reich did not look for any other way out but to continue the war. In Berlin, they hoped that there would be some kind of change in the world arena, which would allow them to maintain their positions in Europe. It is believed that Berlin had a secret agreement with London, so the Anglo-Saxons delayed the opening of a second front in Europe until the last moment. As a result, Hitler could still concentrate all his forces on the Russian front, hoping for a successful outcome in the fight against the Soviet Union. I must say that the top of the Reich believed and hoped until the very last moment that the USSR would quarrel with Britain and the United States. And this will allow the German Empire to retain at least part of its positions.
The Germans did not consider the war against the USSR completely lost, and even greater forces and means were available to continue it. The German armed forces retained a huge combat potential and continued to receive the latest weapons, almost all of Europe was under German rule, and the neutral countries remaining in Europe actively supported the Third Reich. In February - March 1943, German troops under the command of Manstein made the first attempt to take revenge for the defeat on the Volga. The German command threw large forces into the counteroffensive, including large masses of tanks. At the same time, Soviet troops in the southwestern direction were greatly weakened in previous battles, and their communications were greatly stretched. As a result, the Germans were again able to capture Kharkov, Belgorod and the northeastern regions of Donbass that had just been liberated by Soviet troops. The movement of the Red Army towards the Dnieper was stopped.
However, the successes of the Wehrmacht were limited. Manstein failed to arrange for the Russians “German Stalingrad” to break through to Kursk and encircle significant masses of Soviet troops on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Although the Red Army lost a number of the newly liberated areas, it repulsed enemy attacks. The strategic situation on the Soviet-German front has not changed. The Red Army retained the initiative and could go on the offensive in any direction. It was obvious that a decisive battle lay ahead and both sides were actively preparing for it.
In Berlin, they finally realized that it was necessary to carry out a full mobilization in order to continue the war. A total mobilization of human and material resources was carried out in the country. This was done at the expense of the removal of skilled workers and other specialists from the national economy, who were replaced by foreign workers (for example, the French), slaves and prisoners of war driven away from the East. As a result, in 1943, the Wehrmacht was drafted by 2 million more than in 1942. German industry has significantly increased the output of military products, the economy was completely transferred to a "war track", previously they tried to avoid this, hoping for a "quick war." The work of the tank industry was especially stepped up, which provided the troops with new heavy and medium tanks of the "tiger" and "panther" type, new assault guns of the "ferdinand" type. The production of aircraft with higher combat qualities - Focke-Wulf 190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft - was launched. In 1943, compared with 1942, the production of tanks increased almost 2 times, assault guns - almost 2, 9, aircraft - more than 1, 7, guns - more than 2, 2, mortars - 2, 3 times. On the Soviet front, Germany concentrated 232 divisions (5.2 million people), including 36 allied divisions.
Correspondent K. M. Simonov on the barrel of the German self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", knocked out at the Kursk Bulge
Operation Citadel
The German military-political leadership determined the strategy for the 1943 campaign. The German headquarters of the supreme command proposed to transfer the main military efforts from the Eastern Front to the Mediterranean theater in order to exclude the threat of the loss of Italy and the landing of the Allies in southern Europe. The General Staff of the Ground Forces was of a different opinion. Here it was believed that it was necessary, first of all, to undermine the offensive capabilities of the Red Army, after which efforts could be concentrated on the fight against the armed forces of Great Britain and the United States. This point of view was shared by the commanders of the army groups on the Eastern Front and by Adolf Hitler himself. It was taken as the basis for the final development of the strategic concept and planning of military operations for the spring - summer of 1943.
The German military-political leadership decided to conduct one major offensive operation in one strategic direction. The choice fell on the so-called. Kursk salient, where the Germans hoped to defeat the Soviet armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts, creating a huge gap in the Soviet front and developing an offensive. This should, according to the calculations of the German strategists, lead to a general change in the situation on the Eastern Front and the transfer of strategic initiative into their hands.
The German command believed that after the end of winter and the spring thaw, the Red Army would again go on the offensive. Therefore, on March 13, 1943, Hitler gave order No. 5 to forestall the enemy offensive in certain sectors of the front, in order to intercept the initiative. In other places, the German troops had to "bleed the advancing enemy". The command of Army Group South was supposed to form a strong tank grouping north of Kharkov by mid-April, and the command of Army Group Center - a strike grouping in the Orel region. In addition, an offensive against Leningrad by the forces of Army Group North was planned in July.
The Wehrmacht began preparing for the offensive, concentrating strong strike forces in the areas of Orel and Belgorod. The Germans planned to inflict powerful flanking attacks on the Kursk salient, which wedged deep into the location of the German troops. From the north, the troops of Army Group Center (the Oryol bridgehead) loomed over it, from the south - the forces of Army Group South. The Germans planned to cut off the Kursk ledge under the base with concentric strikes, encircle and destroy the Soviet troops defending there.
Disguised crew of MG-34 machine gun, SS Panzer Division "Dead's Head", near Kursk
On April 15, 1943, the headquarters of the Wehrmacht issued operational order No. 6, which specified the tasks of the troops in the offensive operation, which was named "Citadel". The German headquarters planned, as soon as the weather was good, to go on the offensive. This offensive was given decisive importance. It was to lead to a quick and decisive success, turning the tide on the Eastern Front in favor of the Third Reich. Therefore, they prepared for the operation with great care and very thoroughly. In the direction of the main attacks, it was planned to use selected formations armed with the most modern weapons, attracted the best commanders and concentrated a large amount of ammunition. Active propaganda was carried out, each commander and soldier had to be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive importance of this operation.
In the area of the planned offensive, the Germans pulled together additional large forces by regrouping troops from other sectors of the front and transferring units from Germany, France and other regions. In total, for the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the length of which was about 600 km, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones. These troops included about 900 thousand soldiers and officers, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 2 thousand aircraft. Particularly great importance was attached to the armored strike force, which was supposed to crush the Soviet defenses. The German command hoped for the success of the massive use of new equipment - heavy tanks "tiger", medium tanks "panther" and heavy self-propelled guns of the "ferdinand" type. In relation to the total number of troops on the Soviet-German front, the Germans concentrated 70% of the tank and 30% of the motorized divisions in the region of the Kursk salient. Aviation was to play an important role in the battle: the Germans concentrated 60% of all combat aircraft that operated against the Red Army.
Thus, the Wehrmacht, having suffered serious losses in the winter campaign of 1942-1943. and having less forces and resources than the Red Army, he decided to inflict a powerful preemptive strike in one strategic direction, concentrating on it selected units, most of the armored forces and aviation.
German shielded tanks Pz. Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel
The movement of tanks of the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" on the Kursk Bulge
A unit of German StuG III assault guns on the march along the road in the Belgorod region.
German medium tank Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf. G of the 6th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Army Group Kempf with tankmen on armor in the Belgorod Region.
German tankers at a halt and the Tiger tank of the 503rd heavy tank battalion on the Kursk Bulge. Photo source:
The plans of the Soviet command
The Soviet side also carefully prepared for the decisive battle. The Supreme High Command had the political will, large forces and means to complete the radical turning point in the war, consolidating the success of the battle on the Volga. Immediately after the end of the winter campaign, at the end of March 1943, the Soviet Headquarters began to think over the spring-summer campaign. First of all, it was necessary to determine the enemy's strategic plan. The fronts were instructed to strengthen their defenses and at the same time prepare for an offensive. Measures were taken to build up strong reserves. By a directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of April 5, an order was given to create a powerful Reserve Front by April 30, which was later renamed the Steppe District, and then - the Steppe Front.
The large reserves formed in time played a large role, first in the defensive and then in the offensive operation. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet high command had huge reserves at the front: 9 combined-arms armies, 3 tank armies, 1 air army, 9 tank and mechanized corps, 63 rifle divisions. For example, the German command had only 3 reserve infantry divisions on the Eastern Front. As a result, the troops of the Steppe Front could be used not only for a counteroffensive, but also for defense. During the Battle of Kursk, the German command had to withdraw troops from other sectors of the front, which weakened the overall defense of the front.
A huge role was played by Soviet intelligence, which in early April 1943 began to report on the impending major enemy operation on the Kursk Bulge. The time of the enemy's transition to the offensive was also established. The commanders of the Central and Voronezh fronts received similar data. This allowed the Soviet Headquarters and the front-line command to make the most expedient decisions. In addition, the data of Soviet intelligence was confirmed by the British, who were able to intercept the plans of the German offensive in the Kursk region in the summer of 1943.
Soviet troops had superiority in manpower and equipment: 1, 3 million people at the beginning of the operation, about 4, 9 thousand tanks (with a reserve), 26, 5 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve), over 2.5 thousand. aircraft. As a result, it was possible to forestall the enemy and organize a preventive offensive of the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. A repeated exchange of opinion on this issue took place at Headquarters and the General Staff. However, in the end, they accepted the idea of deliberate defense, followed by the transition to a counteroffensive. On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters, where a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense, concentrating the main efforts in the Kursk region, with a subsequent transition to a counteroffensive and a general offensive. The main blow during the offensive was planned to be delivered in the direction of Kharkov, Poltava and Kiev. At the same time, the option of going over to the offensive without a preliminary defense stage was envisaged, if the enemy did not take active actions for a long time.
Soviet tank KV-1, with the personal name "Bagration", knocked out in the village during the operation "Citadel"
The Soviet command, through the Intelligence Directorate, front intelligence and the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, continued to closely monitor the enemy, the movement of his troops and reserves. In late May - early June 1943, when the enemy's plan was finally confirmed, the Headquarters made the final decision on deliberate defense. The central front under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky was supposed to repel the enemy's attack from the area south of Orel, the Voronezh front of NF Vatutin - from the Belgorod area. They were supported by the Steppe Front of I. S. Konev. The coordination of front operations was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky. Offensive actions were supposed to be carried out: in the Oryol direction - by the forces of the left wing of the Western Front, Bryansk and Central Fronts (Operation Kutuzov), in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction - by the forces of the Voronezh, Steppe fronts and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (Operation Rumyantsev) …
Thus, the supreme Soviet command revealed the plans of the enemy and decided to bleed the enemy with a powerful deliberate defense, and then launch a counteroffensive and inflict a decisive defeat on the German troops. Further developments showed the correctness of the Soviet strategy. Although a number of miscalculations led to large losses of Soviet troops.
Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge
Partisan formations played an important role in the Battle of Kursk. The partisans not only collected intelligence, but also disrupted enemy communications and carried out massive sabotage. As a result, by the summer of 1943, in the rear of Army Group Center, partisans of Belarus had pinned down more than 80 thousand troops.enemy soldiers, Smolensk - about 60 thousand, Bryansk - over 50 thousand. Thus, the Hitlerite command had to divert large forces to fight the partisans and protect communications.
A huge amount of work has been done in organizing the defensive order. Only the troops of Rokossovsky during April - June dug more than 5 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, installed up to 400 thousand mines and land mines. Our troops have prepared anti-tank areas with strong strongholds up to 30-35 km deep. On the Voronezh front, Vatutin also created a defense in depth.
Memorial "Beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge". Belgorod region
Wehrmacht offensive
Hitler, trying to give the troops as many tanks and other weapons as possible, postponed the offensive several times. Soviet intelligence several times reported on the timing of the start of the German operation. On July 2, 1943, the Headquarters sent a third warning to the troops that the enemy was attacking in the period from July 3-6. The captured "tongues" confirmed that the German forces would launch an offensive in the early morning of 5 July. Before dawn, at 2:20 a.m., Soviet artillery struck at the enemy's concentration areas. The grandiose battle did not begin the way the Germans planned, but it was already impossible to stop it.
July 5 at 5 o'clock 30 minutes. and at 6 o'clock. In the morning, the troops of the "Center" and "South" groups of von Kluge and Manstein went on the offensive. The breakthrough of the defense of the Soviet troops was the first stage in the implementation of the plan of the German high command. Supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire and air attacks, German tank wedges rained down on the Soviet defensive line. At the cost of heavy losses, German troops managed to penetrate up to 10 km into the battle formations of the Central Front in two days. However, the Germans could not break through the second line of defense of the 13th Army, which ultimately led to the disruption of the offensive of the entire Oryol grouping. On July 7-8, the Germans continued their fierce attacks, but did not achieve serious success. The following days also did not bring success to the Wehrmacht. On July 12, the defensive battle in the zone of the Central Front was completed. For six days of a fierce battle, the Germans were able to drive a wedge into the defenses of the Central Front in a zone up to 10 km and in depth - up to 12 km. Having exhausted all forces and resources, the Germans stopped the offensive and went on the defensive.
A similar situation was in the south, although the Germans achieved great success here. German troops wedged into the location of the Voronezh front to a depth of 35 km. They could not achieve more. Here collisions of large masses of tanks took place (the battle of Prokhorovka). The enemy strike was repelled by the introduction of additional forces from the Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. On July 16, the Germans stopped their attacks and began to withdraw troops to the Belgorod area. On July 17, the main forces of the German group began to withdraw. On July 18, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began pursuit, and on July 23, they restored the position that had been before the enemy went on the offensive.
The offensive of the Soviet troops
After bleeding the main strike forces of the enemy and depleting its reserves, our troops launched a counteroffensive. In accordance with the plan of Operation Kutuzov, which provided for offensive actions in the Oryol direction, the attack on the grouping of Army Group Center was delivered by the forces of the Central, Bryansk and left wings of the Western Front. The Bryansk Front was commanded by Colonel-General M. M. Popov, the Western Front - by Colonel-General V. D. Sokolovsky. On July 12, the first to go on the offensive were the troops of the Bryansk Front - the 3rd, 61st and 63rd armies under the command of generals A. V. Gorbatov, P. A. Belov, V. Ya. Kolpakchi and the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, which was commanded by I. Kh. Bagramyan.
In the very first days of the offensive operation, the enemy defenses, deeply echeloned and well equipped in engineering, were broken through. The 11th Guards Army, which operated from the Kozelsk area in the general direction of Khotynets, advanced especially successfully. At the first stage of the operation, Baghramyan's guards, interacting with the 61st Army, were to defeat the Bolkhov group of the Wehrmacht, which was covering the Oryol ledge from the north, with counter strikes. On the second day of the offensive, Baghramyan's army broke through the enemy's defenses to a depth of 25 km, and the troops of the 61st Army penetrated the enemy's defenses by 3-7 km. The 3rd and 63rd armies advancing in the direction of Orel had advanced 14-15 km by the end of July 13.
The enemy defense on the Oryol ledge immediately found itself in a crisis situation. In the operational reports of the German 2nd Tank and 9th Armies, it was noted that the center of combat operations had moved to the zone of the 2nd Tank Army and the crisis was developing at an incredible speed. The command of Army Group Center was forced to urgently withdraw 7 divisions from the southern sector of the Oryol salient and transfer them to areas where Soviet troops threatened to break through. However, the enemy could not eliminate the breakthrough.
On July 14, the 11th Guards and 61st armies approached Bolkhov from the west and east, while the 3rd and 63rd armies continued to push towards Orel. The German command continued to strengthen the 2nd Panzer Army, hastily transferring troops from the neighboring 9th Army and other sectors of the front. The Soviet Headquarters discovered a regrouping of enemy forces and the Headquarters betrayed the Bryansk Front from its reserve to the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of General PS Rybalko, which on July 20 joined the battle in the Oryol direction. Also, the 11th Army of General II Fedyuninsky, the 4th Tank Army of V. M. Badanov and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of V. V. Kryukov arrived in the zone of the 11th Guards Army on the left wing of the Western Front. The reserves immediately joined the battle.
The enemy's Bolkhov grouping was defeated. On July 26, German troops were forced to leave the Oryol bridgehead and begin a retreat to the Hagen position (east of Bryansk). On July 29, our troops liberated Bolkhov, on August 5 - Oryol, on August 11 - Khotynets, on August 15 - Karachev. By August 18, Soviet troops approached the enemy's defensive line east of Bryansk. With the defeat of the Oryol grouping, the plans of the German command to use the Oryol bridgehead for a strike in the eastern direction collapsed. The counter-offensive began to develop into a general offensive by the Soviet troops.
Soviet soldier with a banner in the liberated Oryol
The Central Front, under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky, with the troops of its right wing - the 48th, 13th, and 70th armies - launched an offensive on July 15, operating in the general direction of Kromy. Considerably drained of blood in the previous battles, these troops advanced slowly, overcoming strong enemy defenses. As Rokossovsky recalled: “The troops had to gnaw through one position after another, pushing out the Nazis, who used mobile defenses. This was expressed in the fact that while one part of his forces was defending, the other in the rear of the defenders occupied a new position, 5-8 km away from the first. At the same time, the enemy widely used counterattacks by tank forces, as well as maneuvering forces and assets along internal lines. Thus, knocking the enemy off the fortified lines and repelling fierce counterattacks, developing an offensive to the northwest towards Krom, the troops of the Central Front advanced to a depth of 40 km by July 30.
Troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts under the command of N. F. Vatutin and I. S. During the defensive operation, the Voronezh Front withstood the strongest enemy onslaught, suffered heavy losses, so it was reinforced by the armies of the Steppe Front. On July 23, retreating to strong defensive lines north of Belgorod, the Wehrmacht took up defensive positions and prepared to repel the attacks of the Soviet troops. However, the enemy was unable to withstand the onslaught of the Red Army. The troops of Vatutin and Konev dealt the main blow with the adjacent flanks of the fronts from the Belgorod area in the general direction to Bogodukhov, Valka, Novaya Vodolaga, bypassing Kharkov from the west. The 57th Army of the Southwestern Front struck bypassing Kharkov from the southwest. All actions were foreseen by the "Rumyantsev" plan.
On August 3, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, went over to the offensive. The troops of the 5th and 6th Guards armies operating in the first echelon of the Voronezh Front broke through the enemy's defenses. The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, which were introduced into the breakthrough, with the support of the infantry, completed the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht's tactical defense zone and advanced 25-26 km. On the second day, the offensive continued to develop successfully. In the center of the front line, the 27th and 40th armies went on the attack, which provided the actions of the main shock group of the front. The troops of the Steppe Front - the 53rd, 69th and 7th Guards Armies and the 1st Mechanized Corps - were rushing towards Belgorod.
On August 5, our troops liberated Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was given in Moscow for the first time in honor of the troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod. This was the first solemn salute during the Great Patriotic War, marking the victory of the Soviet troops. On August 7, Soviet troops liberated Bogodukhov. By the end of August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front came close to the outer defensive line of Kharkov. The German command, in order to save the Kharkov group from encirclement, threw reserves transferred from Donbass into battle. The Germans concentrated 4 infantry and 7 tank and motorized divisions with up to 600 tanks to the west of Akhtyrka and south of Bogodukhov. But the counterattacks undertaken by the Wehrmacht between August 11 and 17 against the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Bogodukhov area, and then in the Akhtyrka area, did not lead to decisive success. By counterattacking tank divisions on the left wing and the center of the Voronezh Front, the Nazis were able to stop the formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, which had already been drained of blood in battles. However, Vatutin threw the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. The 40th and 27th armies continued their movement, the 38th army went over to the attack. The command of the Voronezh Front on the right flank threw their reserve into battle - the 47th Army of General P. P. Korzun. In the Akhtyrka area, the headquarters reserve was concentrated - the 4th Guards Army of G. I. Kulik. Fierce battles in this area ended with the defeat of the Nazis. German troops were forced to stop attacks and go on the defensive.
The troops of the Steppe Front were developing an offensive against Kharkov. As Konev recalled: “On the approaches to the city, the enemy created strong defensive lines, and around the city - a fortified bypass with a developed network of strong points, in some places with reinforced concrete pillboxes, dug-in tanks and barriers. The city itself was adapted for a perimeter defense. To hold Kharkov, the Hitlerite command transferred the best tank divisions here. Hitler demanded to hold Kharkov at any cost, pointing out to Manstein that the capture of the city by Soviet troops poses a threat to the loss of Donbass."
German tank Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther", knocked out by the crew of the guard senior sergeant Parfenov. Outskirts of Kharkov, August 1943
On August 23, after stubborn battles, Soviet troops completely liberated Kharkov from the Nazis. A significant part of the enemy group was destroyed. The remnants of Hitler's troops retreated. With the capture of Kharkov, the grandiose battle on the Kursk Bulge was completed. Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov with 20 volleys from 224 guns.
Thus, during the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, our troops advanced 140 km and loomed over the entire southern wing of the German front, taking an advantageous position for the transition to a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper River line.
On the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Broken enemy vehicles after a Soviet air raid
The population of the liberated Belgorod meets the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army
Outcomes
The Battle of Kursk ended with the complete victory of the Red Army and led to the final radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The German command lost its strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. German troops went over to strategic defense. It was not only the German offensive that failed, the enemy defenses were broken, the Soviet troops launched a general offensive. The Soviet Air Force in this battle finally won air supremacy.
Field Marshal Manstein assessed the outcome of Operation Citadel as follows: “It was the last attempt to preserve our initiative in the East; with its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front."
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for deploying the actions of the American-British troops in Italy, the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany. Influenced by the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, the prestige of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.
The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of the Second World War. On both sides, more than 4 million people were involved in it, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft. In the Battle of Kursk, 30 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated, including 7 tank divisions. The German army lost 500 thousand people, up to 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3000 guns and about 1700 aircraft. The losses of the Red Army were also very large: more than 860 thousand people, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1600 aircraft.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. More than 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the rank of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachevsky.
Collapse of hopes. German soldier on the Prokhorovka field
Column of German prisoners of war captured in battles in the Oryol direction, 1943
