But what else is there to do with these ideas about the transformation of the most widespread type of nuclear weapon in the US Armed Forces into a "nuclear eunuch." Given the irreplaceability (for now, and not forever, of course) for the United States of nuclear weapons and a decent rate of decline (in the first year of Trump's rule - 354 charges, or 9%), it is clear that the decline will not stop in the next decade. And somewhere by the end of the decade, the "pit" will be quite deep. In the 2030s (it is assumed), production will be restored to one degree or another. Unless, of course, the terms "float" again.
There is also an interesting point. The Americans have traditionally placed the bulk of their warheads on SSBNs. And SSBNs of the Ohio type, and they will begin to be gradually decommissioned from 2026. This is despite the ongoing programs of extending the resource and modernization of these very good missile carriers with excellent missiles (Trident-2 can be considered one of the masterpieces of underwater ballistic missile engineering along with R- 29RMU-2.1 "Sineva-2" / "Liner" or, say, R-30 "Bulava").
As we can see from the graph, after the repairs and recharging of the cores by 2020, the number of missile carriers in service will be maximum, 14, but after 2026 it will begin to fall by 1 ship per year, and so on until 2031, when it is planned to enter construction of the first Columbia-class SSBN in a series of 12 pieces. The schedule has been drawn up so that the number of missile carriers does not fall below 10, but already now there are very serious fears in the United States that it will be met. The program has traditionally been growing in price for the US military-industrial complex, and the terms are threatening to shift.
Schedule for the replacement of American SSBNs. The numbered squares are the Ohio-class SSBNs and the ship numbers, the x-sized squares are the Columbia-class SSBNs
At the same time, it is not at all a fact that the START-3 Treaty, which expires in 2021, and both superpowers reached the specified levels of carriers and charges only this year, will be extended. Despite the obvious profitability of his Russia, he, in general, is beneficial to both sides, because neither the Russian Federation, which has a formal reason to make START-3 a handle even tomorrow (American missile defense policy), will not leave it before the deadline, nor the United States, which likes to grumble about almost the "enslavement" of the treaty. Apparently, since Russia did not allow any inconvenient moments in it, the treaty immediately became enslaving. But it is very hard to believe that in 2021 it will be prolonged or there will be a new START-4 or some other name substitute treaty, given the current relations and their development trends. Relations are developing as positively as the American nuclear arsenal. Although, of course, sudden warming should not be ruled out.
That is, Russia may never be bound by the numerical limits of the treaty. And if 15 years ago we would have broadcasted on this occasion from every corner that we cannot afford to build up our arsenals, but the United States - yes, at least as much as necessary, and very quickly (remember such speeches, probably), then now the situation is "somewhat" the opposite. The reasons for this do not need to be explained to those reading this and previous materials on the topic. Of course, we do not draw money, but Russia has both production and financial capabilities to build up its arsenals, of course, if necessary. And the United States has the second, but the problems with the first and second cannot be quickly solved.
And there are already the first signs that Russia is already planning to develop its strategic nuclear forces proceeding from the non-extension of the strategic offensive arms regime, but also leaving opportunities for the preservation of the treaty regime. The recent news about the "cancellation" of the construction of SSBNs of Project 955B (number 4), and their replacement by 6 SSBNs of the additional series of Project 955A (the efficiency of 955B was not so much higher than the upgraded 955A than the price) - from the same series. As a result, by the end of the 2020s, we will get a grouping of Boreyevs in 3 units and Boreevs in 11 units, with 224 Bulava SLBMs with 1344 BB (6 per missile), that is, almost the entire START-3 limit can be selected only by these missile submarine cruisers. It is clear that it is possible to place a smaller number of charges on a rocket in order to fit into the limit, but they really want to have a lot of ships, clearly they do not hope for the Treaty. 11-12 would be enough. Or they are hoping for another new treaty, with higher limits, to which the United States, given its situation, will be extremely difficult to accept.
And the recent news that soon the grouping of old monoblock PGRKs of the Topol type will be finally replaced by ICBMs of the Yars series, and this, by the way, if we subtract the two regiments now transferred to the Yars, there will be about 7-8 regiments, that is, up to 72 ICBMs. And "Yars" carries, as you know, up to 6 BB, even if it is on duty, as it is supposed, with 4 BB. And there may come the turn of the single-block "Topol-M" in silo and mobile versions, and this is another 78 missiles. In general, along with the upcoming deployment of Sarmats instead of Voevod (if everything goes well, from 2020) and other unpleasant news for Americans like ICBM 15A35-71 with Avangard AGBO (in 2019 they will be officially announced as deployed), it seems that the Americans will not have time to experiment with the emasculation of thermonuclear warheads for political reasons.
When I read the news about low-yield warheads for the first time on one of our news resources, this phrase also caught my eye, which pretty much surprised me. And with reference to Christensen.
"On the other hand, the W80-1 could have been used instead of the W76-2, which has a circular probable deviation of 30 meters …"
After reading this phrase, for some reason, it immediately occurred to him that Mr. Christensen had completely lost his grip and forgot or did not know that the W80-1 nuclear warhead for the AGM-86 air-based cruise missile system could not be used in any way on the Trident-2 SLBM ", and even if you take the actual" physical package ", the warhead will have to be re-created. Yes, and the KVO does not depend on the charge, but on the carrier, nevertheless, and if it was like this on a cruise missile, then in a ballistic missile it will be completely different. But reading the primary source convinced us that Mr. Christensen is still not entirely bad, and this is our translators have problems understanding the text. Christensen writes about something completely different. The fact is that the unrealizable plans announced by the military-political leadership include the development of a nuclear-powered sea cruise missile. It is theoretically possible to release a series of nuclear Tomahawks, which have not so long ago been completely converted into non-nuclear ones, although why, if even the purchases of conventional Tomahawks are temporarily suspended (apparently, due to their "successes" in strikes against Syria, they took a break for modernization)? Moreover, there are no charges for them - they were destroyed long ago. And for a promising sea-based CD, there is nowhere to take the charges either - they are not there. The Americans will develop the rocket.
So, Christensen believes, and this is clearly his personal opinion, that the W80-1 charge from an aviation CD can be adapted to a marine CD. There are doubts about this - the missiles are very different, and it is not for nothing that at one time aviation CDs had nuclear warheads developed only for them, and naval and ground-based CDs were, in fact, with closely related charges. But even if such an alteration were possible, it would be another "Trishka's caftan" in a nuclear fashion. There are relatively few charges of this type, and now there are fewer airborne nuclear missile systems in arsenals than is needed even for a full salvo of B-52H bombers, and not all of them, namely, used as carriers (there are also test and training vehicles). And all these charges are intended, according to official documents of the NNSA and the US Department of Energy, to be converted into a modification of the W80-4 for the promising air-launched CD LRSO. And the US Air Force will simply not allow the US Navy to "squeeze" such a valuable resource, and their political influence "at court" will allow them to do so. Even if the Navy had more influence, and it was possible to take away a few charges (they simply won’t give a lot, they don’t), then such a castling of charges would only reduce the number of charges in the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, because naval CDs do not belong to strategic forces.
But this is unlikely to happen, although in the current reality, when the "promotion" of some imperious military-political action in the mass media is more important than its real geopolitical effect, anything is possible.
In the meantime, it became known that the US Congress rejected by a majority vote an amendment that sharply cuts funding for the development of W76-2. Obviously, a lot of the right people feed on this "complex" development.
