In my publications on Voennoye Obozreniye (and not only), I have repeatedly considered the issue of the American nuclear arsenal, the difficult, if not worse, situation with it, with the development and production of new warheads and everything connected with it. In particular, they talked about the currently unrealizable plans to create warheads (BB) of especially low power for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) "Trident-2" D5. In addition, not reflected in the official plans of the National Nuclear Safety Agency (NNSA) of the US Department of Energy, the country's main nuclear organization. Obviously, due to the practical impossibility of creating any new ammunition in the medium term (12-15 years at least). But, as it turned out, there is a solution that allows both to fulfill the stupid demands of politicians, and supposedly create something like that. True, the solution looks so-so, if not worse …
What are these ultra-small charges for Trident-2 for? The top military-political leadership of the United States declared them "a response to Russia and China in the field of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)" and "a measure to counter Russia's violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)." Well, it is clear why Russia in terms of tactical nuclear weapons: the total superiority of the Russian Federation in the field of tactical nuclear weapons is a secret of the Punchinelle, the whole question is only in the degree of this superiority, how many times, or, rather, what exactly to write in the word with the ending "… … It is not very clear why China is mentioned: the Chinese arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, in general, is small. But, apparently, a significant number of non-strategic carriers among the Chinese frightens the Americans. Regarding the INF Treaty, it is also, in general, understandable, although it is ridiculous when some of the American leaders accused China of "violating" this treaty, which it did not sign. But for Americans, this is normal.
The idea of such an ultra-low-power AP is understandable - the Americans are well aware that their small arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in the form of half a thousand (out of 3155 once released) free fall bombs B-61 of various series (with a capacity of up to 170-340 kt) is not a competitor to the multi-thousandth and developed diversified arsenal of the RF TNW. And it’s not even a matter of quantity, although it’s too: the reliability of delivery of bombs is extremely low, of course, if we don’t bring "light and warmth" (or, if you prefer, "democratic values") to some aboriginal people without normal air defense. No, this is also a weapon and is quite applicable, but something else is also needed. But he is not. And the ongoing alteration of all 4 (B-61 mod. 3, 4, 7 and 11) of the remaining modifications of the B-61, out of 11 created, in the 12th modification, a kind of ersatz-KAB (well, there is a GPS correction, but to name her planner cannot) - does not solve the problem. This bomb is also not far away, the survivability of the carrier will hardly increase, the reliability of delivery, too. Its power is greatly reduced (up to a maximum of 50 kt), the accuracy is higher - but that's all. And here you can get "ersatz-TNW", with high delivery reliability and high reaction time. And the lack of opportunities to recreate medium-range ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future can also be compensated for by the same Tridents-2 with such BB. It would seem that…
It is not very clear why the American political leadership decided that such "ersatz-TNW" could be used without the risk of receiving a massive nuclear missile strike from another superpower's strategic nuclear forces in response? After all, it is not clear from the missiles what power the warheads have and what their task is. It is also not very clear what the British thought on the same account, which of the 8 SLBMs that are now installed instead of 16 on their SSBNs on patrol, some of them are equipped with BBs in the minimum power configuration. But it is obvious that the Americans used the English idea as a ready-made one. It is clear that this is how they are trying to compensate for the complete absence of TNW, but such problems are unlikely to excite the enemy, therefore the answer will be massive and a BB with charges of normal power. In general, this is a very dangerous idea, such blocks. But the mechanism for implementing the White House's decision in the absence of the possibility of producing new nuclear weapons turned out to be quite curious and even amusing.
As the Warrior Maven resource writes in an article authored by a certain Chris Osborne, the Americans decided on the requirements for especially low-power nuclear warheads and began planning its development. This was announced by the press secretary of the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Michelle Baldanza. "The Nuclear Weapons Council met and approved the draft development plan. The Council agreed to authorize the National Nuclear Safety Agency (NNSA) to proceed with the appropriate scoping, schedule and costs," she added. She also said that so far it is only a set of tactical and technical requirements that will be guided by the initial research work (that is, the stage of research and development, and not R&D, if in our opinion). And then the same ubiquitous Hans Christensen from the Federation of American Scientists appears in the article, who gives a number of details on this project. It is interesting, of course, what of this they really whispered to him, and what he simply thought of, however, as will be seen from the text below, it will be real to guess about the “thought out” by Mr. Hans.
According to Christensen, it is planned to create an especially low-power W76-2 BB on the basis of a 100-kiloton W76-1 thermonuclear BB. After the castration of this block, that is, the removal of the entire thermonuclear, the entire thermonuclear stage of the charge, only the nuclear fuse will remain, which will give 5-6 kt, according to Christensen. To be honest, I doubt that the fraction of the fission reaction in the initial charge was only 5%, there is a feeling that the power of the fuse alone will be on the order of 10 or a little more kt, but it is not so important in the end. "It's much easier than making a completely new warhead," Christensen says, cleverly "forgetting" to add "especially if you can't build and manufacture this newest warhead." It’s not easier, it’s just that there are no other options. Christensen reckons the W76-2's circular probable deviation (CEP) will be 130-180 meters, like the W76-1. At the same time, on the issue of KVO, contradicting himself in a year ago, a "sketch" with radar fuses for the W76-1, where he indicated a completely different, advertising nature, KVO, and besides, leading it to a flat trajectory, although he was there would be completely, completely different.
Strictly speaking, the BB itself is called the Mk4A, and the W76-1 is its warhead, but that is what it is.
But here it is worth noting to Mr. Christensen that the accuracy of the lighter BB will not improve in any way, but most likely will deteriorate, and decently. This is if, in the process of vivisection of the charge, its centering is not disturbed, in this case, not only the accuracy will drop even more, but it is also possible for the BB to enter the dense layers of the atmosphere at a non-optimal angle, followed by destruction without triggering. The option of serious alterations of the hull and design of the BB will not suit the Americans in terms of price, and even in terms of time. There is, of course, an option when the thermonuclear components will be replaced by weight and size simulators and the weight, the weight distribution and centering of the BB will not change - then the KVO will remain unchanged. But with such a penny power, such accuracy will not be enough either for point or for protected targets, or even for area targets, it may not be enough - it depends on the purpose. That is, we get an ammunition with the effectiveness of a homeopathic "medicine", such a "nuclear oscillococcinum", but extremely dangerous in use due to the high probability of a massive response to its use.
Well, why then do you need to remake a good thermonuclear BB into some kind of victim of clandestine nuclear abortionists? And there are no ways to dramatically improve the accuracy in this case. More precisely, there is such a method, but the Americans are still completely inaccessible - they need to make a controlled and maneuvering warhead.
That is, provided that the information on W76-2 is correct, there is simply an attempt to do something that can be described as a "powerful response from Russia." And so that Mr. Trump could then write something like that on Twitter, that is, we have not a military bloc, but a "political" bloc. And another option to blind the required low-power BB in the medium term in a situation of impotence of the country's nuclear weapons complex, which knows how to do it, but cannot, is not invented in any way. But the idea itself is clearly idiotic and useless, that is, it is desirable that the Americans remade more of their W76-1 in this way, but they are unlikely to go for it. Most likely, if they do decide, then no more than a few dozen will be disfigured in this way. Also, the same question of identification is not clear - will they allocate special SSBNs of the Ohio type for such missiles? And how are they going to inform the adversary about the use of a non-strategic version of the rocket? However, there are similar questions around the Americans' dreams of a "quick global strike," which they are still very far from realizing, while Russia already has it, in different versions. There, after all, there are also non-nuclear applications, and variants with BB of especially low and low power, and so on. In general, this very question of identifying the severity of the launched threat, it is very important in fact and makes this whole situation very dangerous.
