According to our unofficial statistics, during the Cold War and the confrontation between the USSR and the United States in the ocean, there were about 25 cases of collisions between submarines of the USSR and Russia with submarines of foreign states (mainly the United States). At the same time, we believe that 12 incidents of collisions occurred near our territorial waters. Of the 12 cases, 9 collisions occurred in the Northern Fleet, 3 in the Pacific Fleet. According to the same unofficial statistics, as a result of such collisions, 3 nuclear submarines of the USSR and Russia were drowned (K-129, K-219, K-141 "Kursk"). According to official statistics, which is confirmed by factual evidence, during the entire Cold War and the post-Soviet period, there were only 3 collisions between our submarines and American ones. (K-108 (Pacific Fleet) in 1970 collided with the American submarine "Totog", K-276 (SF) in 1992 collided with the US submarine Baton Rouge, K-407 (SF) in 1993 collided with the US submarine " Grayling "). All the rest, according to our version, collisions of nuclear submarines with foreign submarines are not confirmed by the facts. Often such information is taken from foreign media, which are looking for a sensation everywhere. Example: In 1968, the US Navy submarine "Scorpion" was lost in the ocean. The US government commission did not establish the exact reasons for the death of the submarine. Some American newspapers immediately published sensational information that the Scorpion was drowned by a Soviet submarine, allegedly in retaliation for the death of the K-129. Allegedly, the Soviet K-129 in March 1968 was sunk by the USS "Suordfish". Our experts and journalists immediately supported the version of American journalists that the K-129 was sunk by an American submarine. And they built the "iron" logic of evidence that this was so.
Why did the Americans find the place where the K-129 was killed, but we did not find it? Our version: because they knew exactly the coordinates of the collision of the Suordfish submarine with the K-129. The fact that the Americans had deployed a global hydroacoustic observation system in the Pacific Ocean, SOSUS, which made it possible to determine the location of various underwater objects with high accuracy, was not taken into account by us.
Why, when the K-129 was lifted by the Americans in 1974, it broke almost in half and the aft part was not raised? Our version: because as a result of a collision with the Suordfish submarine, the K-129 received a hole in the middle part of the hull and from this, the hull of the submarine broke during lifting. The fact that in the process of falling to a depth of more than 4000 meters, the K-129 submarine with the speed of a courier train crashed into the ground and from this could receive damage to the hull, we did not take into account.
Why did the Suordfish submarine enter the Japanese port with hull damage? Our version: Because she collided with K-129. The fact that the K-129 sank near the Hawaiian Islands and the Suordfish submarine, if it collided with it, would have been closer to the main US naval base in Hawaii, and not Japan, for repairs, we did not take into account …
From such considerations of our large and small military commanders of the Navy and some citizens, we still believe that the K-129 was drowned by the Americans, and in response we drowned the Scorpion. We have no evidence of the involvement of the American submarine in the downing of the K-129.
During the investigation of the K-219 SSBN disaster in 1986, rumors and versions were again born that the US Navy's submarine Augusta was involved in this disaster. These rumors were spread by foreign media, the command of the Northern Fleet and the crew of the SSBN K-219, and the leadership of the Navy supported them. From what logic of their reasoning was this version born?
The Americans did not make a big fuss, despite the fact that the K-219 sank near their coast, and this happened on the eve of negotiations between the presidents of the United States and the USSR. This means that the United States did not want to advertise the involvement of its submarine in this disaster.
On the body of the K-219 there was a silvery mark from some kind of external influence. Hence, it was a trace from the keel of the Augusta submarine, which destroyed the missile silo No. 6. As a result, the missile was crushed by outboard pressure, an explosion of fuel and oxidizer took place. The fact that even at the stage of preparation for the campaign, and then, throughout the entire voyage, into the missile silo No. 6 due to a malfunction of the mine equipment, outboard water was unauthorized, and the personnel hid this fact, was not taken into account. And the fact that "Augusta" "filigree" destroyed just the faulty missile silo No. 6, and the neighboring silos remained intact, did not surprise anyone in the Northern Fleet and in the General Staff of the Navy.
When towing the SSBN K-219, the towing ropes were torn, which means that the Augusta deliberately passed at the periscope depth between the damaged submarine and the towing vehicle, and the towing rope was cut off by the wheelhouse. The fact that not a single competent commander of a submarine, of any state, would have done this because of the danger of damage by the towing cable to the hull of his submarine and its outboard devices, our "specialists" did not take into account. The fact that such actions at sea, in peacetime, are a violation of the sovereign rights of the USSR, and not a single commander of a warship, of any state, would do this, did not embarrass our high-ranking leaders.
And today this crazy version about the involvement in the sinking of the K-219 American submarine "Augusta" continues to "walk" in the open spaces of book, magazine, newspaper and television information fields and in the minds of "the best specialists in underwater affairs."
In 2000, the nuclear submarine K-141 "Kursk" crashed. Despite the fact that the government commission did not find evidence of the involvement of foreign submarines in the death of the Kursk, most of our citizens believe the statements of certain officials of the Northern Fleet, the General Staff of the Navy, veterans - submariners that the K-141 Kursk died from - for a collision (was torpedoed) with the USS Memphis submarine.
What is the logic behind such judgments?
1. In the area of the exercise, the ships of the Northern Fleet were 3 nuclear submarines of foreign states (2 submarines of the USA and 1-Great Britain). The fact that these submarines were not detected by the forces of the Northern Fleet, since they were outside the area closed for navigation by other ships, is not surprising to anyone.
2. The Memphis nuclear submarine arrived at the Norwegian port with damage to its hull, and the Americans refused our specialists to inspect the hulls of the Memphis and Toledo nuclear submarines. There is a snapshot of a reconnaissance satellite, which clearly shows damage to the Memphis submarine. The fact that this photograph of an American submarine with a damaged hull is many years ago and belongs to a completely different US submarine, our interpreters of the collision version were not convinced of the erroneousness of such a judgment.
3. On the starboard side in the light hull of the nuclear submarine K-141 "Kursk", in the area of the 2nd compartment, there is a round hole. So this is a trace from the American Mk-48 torpedo with a depleted uranium tip, which pierced the solid hull and exploded in the 2nd compartment, hitting the personnel of the Kursk's main command post. The fact that torpedoes with "tips" never, in any state, were and will not be, our "soothsayers" do not guess. The fact that the strong hull of the submarine against this hole is not damaged also does not bother anyone. The fact that torpedoes, upon contact with the object of the attack, immediately explode, and do not pierce holes, many of our "underwater experts" do not understand. The fact that in peacetime, in the history of the submarine fleet of all states of the world, there was not a single case of attacks from submarines, both surface and underwater targets, our "newly-minted Jules Vernes" do not know.
4. The Americans are unambiguously involved in the death of the Kursk nuclear submarine, because after its death, the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States talked on the phone for a long time, and the director of the CIA immediately flew to Moscow for negotiations and wrote off a huge financial debt. According to the logic of our military and civilians, the leaders of states should not talk on the phone for a long time, and the CIA director cannot discuss the existing problems of relations between Russia and the United States in Moscow. In addition, the IMF and the IBRD cannot carry out interstate regulation of monetary and credit relations. And if they do it, then only with some intent (in this case, so that Russia does not raise a fuss about the involvement of the American submarine in the sinking of the Kursk).
5. When lifting the nuclear submarine "Kursk" to the surface, the remains of 1 compartment were cut off and left on the ground. So, according to the logic of many of our “best specialists of the underwater service,” the Russian leadership of the rescue operations did this deliberately in order to hide the evidence of torpedoing (collision) of the American submarine of our nuclear submarine. No one believed the rescuers' justification that when the nuclear submarine was lifted to the surface, the destroyed 1 compartment could fall off and disturb the centering of the load distribution on the cable equipment of the lifting mechanisms. Many were 148% convinced that since they were sawing 1 compartment, it means they want to hide the causes of the disaster.
To date, Russian experts do not have a single factual evidence that would confirm the fact of a collision or torpedoing of the Kursk nuclear submarine by an American submarine. Nevertheless, for more than 12 years, our and foreign media have been publishing "sensational revelations and interviews", making "horror films", staging performances about the torpedoing of the Kursk nuclear submarine by the Americans. The latest publications of the journalist G. Nazarov in the newspaper “Russkiy Vestnik” for August and December 2012 in the form of interviews with “brave and fearless officers of the Navy”, as it were, “summed up the results” of this ugly, long-standing lie. Who are they - these "brave officers" who revealed to the journalist "the secret of the death of the nuclear submarine" Kursk "? These are captains of the 1st rank of the reserve A. P. Ilyushkin, a former commander of the submarine, and V. I. Akimenko, deputy head of the mine and torpedo armament cycle at the Naval Training Center, a member of the government commission to investigate the disaster of the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine. Here are some of V. I. Akimenko to the questions of the journalist of "Russian Herald":
“Many books and articles have been written about the Kursk nuclear submarine, in which the authors try to show the truth from their position. As a rule, these authors are incompetent, do not know the essence of the problem, nor the technique … They use rumors, other people's thoughts heard at the table or on the sidelines ", …" … only those who were investigating the cause of the disaster can give interviews about the Kursk story, have truthful information from reliable sources, photo and video data, is a specialist miner who was involved in the operation of this type of torpedo. In my replies, I draw your attention to WHAT I KNOW WELL ", …" At the time of investigating the causes of the Kursk disaster, I served as deputy head of the mine and torpedo armament cycle at the V. I. L. G. Osipenko (Obninsk). Previously, he served for 7, 5 years on a nuclear submarine of the same project as the Kursk as a flagship miner, tested torpedoes (of which we are talking) and worked with the Sadko equipment (equipment for monitoring the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide in torpedo tanks). From the Department of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy, I was appointed to the commission to investigate the reasons for the death of the Kursk, since there were no submariners of this project there."
"Hydrogen peroxide when mixed with kerosene is not explosive - chemistry of the 9th grade of the Soviet school", "The back cover could not be boiled into the bulkhead of the 2nd compartment, since the bulkheads of the first four compartments were completely destroyed …" … "Ustinov's statement that the gases formed during the explosion, the back cover of the torpedo tube was torn off, just absurd ", …" The back cover of the torpedo tube No. 4 (where the training torpedo was located) was torn off by an effort of 395 kgf / cm², which could not have been created by the explosion of the torpedo oxidizer tank "," … tests at the base of the Navy Bolshaya Izhera showed under what conditions a tank with hydrogen peroxide can explode. We had to put more than 50 kg of TNT under it before it exploded."
“Unlike Ustinov, my opinion is completely different. Presumably - the accidental torpedoing of the Kursk by the American submarine Mamphis, which was watching our boat. In the main command post of the American submarine, a device is installed that, when approaching at a distance of less than 20 cables (this is about 3.7 km), takes control of the use of torpedo weapons if the BIUS (Combat Imformation Control System) and the torpedo complex are operating in combat mode. Apparently, the BIUS operator, the officer of the watch or the commander of the Mamphis forgot to turn it off when the contact with the Kursk nuclear submarine was lost after its ascent to the periscope depth. This assumption was developed jointly with representatives of the cycle of the Radio Engineering Service of the Training Center. L. G. Osipenko …. According to the analysis of pieces of the boat's hull and torpedoes, racks after lifting the "Kursk", the first American torpedo MK-48 presumably entered the left boulevard, an explosion threw it into the 2nd compartment, respectively, destroyed the body of the torpedo apparatus No. 4 in the lower part, which contained a training torpedo. This is where the remains of the group hydraulic torpedo tube and part of the torpedo come from at the point where the Kursk is located at periscope depth. … The second torpedo presumably pierced the hull of the boat in the area of the 12th frame, between the second and sixth torpedo tubes, tore out a piece of the hull measuring 2.2 mx 3.0, weighing about 6 tons and threw it onto the left side of the 2nd compartment of Sq. At the same time, the torpedoes on the left side racks detonated, which was shown by the results of the inspection of the 2nd compartment "…" The hole in the starboard side in the area of the 2nd compartment is a technological hole made by divers during the first inspection of the Kursk.
In the beginning, I would like to inform this "expert who knows everything well" that on the submarines of any projects there is no position of the flagship miner. All types of submarines have the post of commander of a mine and torpedo warhead. The position of the flagship miner is available only in the headquarters of divisions, brigades, and ship divisions. And now questions arise for Mr. V. Akimenko: “Where did he serve for 7, 5 years? On which nuclear submarine of the Kursk type (Project 949A) did he test 65-76A torpedoes and Sadko equipment as a flagship miner? Why does he not know what type of torpedo tubes on the nuclear submarine, where he served for 7, 5 years, stating that there are hydraulic torpedo tubes, although in fact they are pneumohydraulic? And these, as they say in Odessa, are two big differences. Which department appointed him to the “commission to investigate the causes of the Kursk's death”? In the Navy there is no "Anti-submarine weapons department", there is the UNDERWATER WEAPONS DEPARTMENT. I admit that an officer of a non-mine and torpedo specialty does not know the correct name of all the naval directorates. But an officer in the rank of captain of the 1st rank, who has a mine education and is engaged in mine and torpedo business throughout his service, does not know the correct name of his MAIN department, does not know the correct name of his position on a nuclear submarine, does not know his material part, this is from the category "You can't figure it out on purpose!" Hair stands on end when you think that Mr. Akimenko was appointed to the government commission as the best specialist in minerals! Then what other specialists-miners, not the best, represent?
This "torpedo weapons specialist" claims that the mixture of hydrogen peroxide and kerosene is not explosive. Then how to understand the requirements of the factory instructions, which categorically prohibit the use of non-degreased tools and air hoses when working with highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide? How to understand the statement of the textbook for high school "General and Inorganic Chemistry" that poorly purified highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide is explosive? How to understand the statement of the factory operating instructions for peroxide torpedoes that when organic oils, dirt, metal and other objects get into highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, an explosion of hydrogen peroxide can occur?
When mixed with kerosene, hydrogen peroxide begins to decompose rapidly, releasing a large amount of heat. The decomposition of 1 kg of hydrogen peroxide releases 197.5 kilojoules of heat. If such a reaction takes place in a closed volume with a large amount of hydrogen peroxide, instantaneous decomposition of a huge mass of peroxide and instant release of a large amount of thermal (chemical) energy occurs. An explosion occurs, which gives rise to a shock wave.
The combination of hydrogen peroxide with kerosene in a practical torpedo 65-76 PV on the Kursk nuclear submarine caused the explosion of these substances and the destruction of the torpedo. The explosion of these substances gave birth to a shock wave. The shock wave, not gases, destroyed the back and front covers of torpedo tube No. 4, as well as the torpedo tube in the inter-board space and elements of the light hull in the nose. The shock wave spreads from the epicenter of the explosion evenly in all directions. The epicenter of the explosion was in the middle of torpedo tube No. 4. During the explosion of hydrogen peroxide, the pressure in the front of the shock wave was about 5-8 kg / cm². The back cover area is about 350,000 cm². Thus, a tremendous impulse of pressure was applied to the back cover at high speed. From such a load, the lid came off together with the ratchet lock and "welded" into the bow bulkhead of the 2nd compartment. But Mr. Akimenko does not understand this, since he does not even understand that at the moment of the 1st explosion all bulkheads of 2, 3, 4 compartments were intact and not destroyed. The bulkheads of these compartments collapsed after a second, more powerful explosion. When identifying the reasons for the explosion of hydrogen peroxide, Mr. Akimenko and other similar members of the commission, exploded the tank of peroxide with TNT. Of course, it did not explode, since there was no instantaneous reaction of the decomposition of peroxide and the release of a large amount of chemical energy. If these gentlemen had blown up a structure made of hydrogen peroxide, aviation kerosene, a 200 kg / cm² high-pressure air cylinder placed in a tight enclosed volume (like in a real torpedo), or a real torpedo, they would know how hydrogen peroxide explodes. What does RDX explosive consist of? From components of ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder. If you explode separately ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, there will be no explosion. But if these substances are combined together and detonated, we get an explosion of enormous force. But V. Akimenko, "a major specialist in peroxide torpedoes of the nuclear submarine 949A of the project," does not understand this.
What "left bullet did the American torpedo enter"? The word "bul" comes from the English "bulges" - bulge, protruding. In the USSR Navy in the pre-war period, this word had two meanings: for surface ships, the word "boule" meant special bulges in the underwater part of the ship's hull. The bulges had internal cavities. When a torpedo or a mine hit the ship's hull, these convex structures were destroyed first of all, thereby protecting the ship's hull itself from destruction. It was a kind of constructive protection of the ship from torpedo and mine weapons. For submarines, the word "buli" had a meaning and meaning as a lightweight submarine hull of one and a half hull design. That is, such submarines did not have a solid light hull, but had a light hull only in the middle of the submarine. This lightweight hull housed ballast and fuel tanks. Look at the sign "Submarine Commander". There are bulges in the middle of the submarine mark. This is boules, i.e. part of the light body. But all this was on pre-war surface ships and submarines. On modern surface ships and submarines, there are no such devices and bulges. […]
Not a single US nuclear submarine has a device for the automatic use of torpedo and other weapons. All warships, including US nuclear submarines, provide for automatic prelaunch preparation of weapons for use. But the command at the beginning of prelaunch preparation and for the use of any weapon always given by the ship commander (in wartime, such a command can be given by the officer of the watch). There was no computer robot that would itself give the command to use weapons on US warships, and I am sure there will not be.
And now I will try to translate this nonsense of the "brave naval officer" into the common human language. So, my translation of the words of Mr. Akimenko: The American nuclear submarine Memphis followed the nuclear submarine Kursk. During tracking, the combat information control system (BIUS) and the torpedo-missile system worked in combat mode, since the American submarine commander believed that he could be attacked by a Russian submarine. As a result of poor watch keeping by American submariners, the Mamphis approached the Kursk at an unacceptable distance of less than 20 cables. At that moment, the Kursk submarine surfaced to periscope depth and the Americans lost hydroacoustic contact with it. As a result of the confusion or forgetfulness of the American submariners, the main command post forgot to turn off the automatic attack combat system. The system turned on and fired two Mk-48 torpedoes without the knowledge of the submarine commander.
At the time of the shooting, the Americans had no sonar contact with the Kursk nuclear submarine and did not know where it was. BIUS still gave the command to launch torpedoes and torpedoes found our submarine. The first American torpedo MK-48 presumably entered the left ballast tank, the explosion threw the ballast tank into the 2nd compartment. The body of the torpedo tube No. 4, which is located in the inter-board space at the very top of the strong hull, next to which there are two more bodies of the torpedo tubes No. 2 and No. 6, collapsed only in the lower part. The bodies of torpedo tubes No. 2 and No. 6 were not damaged. The second torpedo, like a projectile with a shaped charge, pierced the submarine's hull in the area of the 12th frame, tore off a steel sheet of a strong hull measuring 2, 2 x 3, 0 m and threw it into the 2nd compartment on the left side. The firing accuracy was amazing, both torpedoes hit almost the same spot on the Kursk nuclear submarine, as when firing from an optical rifle. This happened because the American torpedo tubes are equipped with top secret developments of "fiber-optic gravity sights".
This is the meaning of the statements of Mr. Akimenko. Anyone who understands something in the sea service in the slightest degree will say that this is the delirium of a sick person. But this is said by a mine and torpedo specialist, a captain of the 1st rank, a cycle teacher at the Naval Training Center, a member of the government commission to investigate the causes of the Kursk submarine death. This is said by a person who "knows everything well." The most amazing thing is that they believe this nonsense.
Here are the statements on this issue by AP Ilyushkin, another "brave officer".
The torpedo fired at the Kursk pierced the light and durable hull of the boat and exploded inside the 2nd compartment. This is an indisputable fact. But this explosion could not destroy the other compartments of the boat. They were destroyed by the second explosion - after the explosion of the entire ammunition load of torpedoes, which was on the Kursk. This is the second indisputable fact. Hence follows the third fact - two torpedoes were fired at the Kursk."
The first indisputable fact is that behind the stern, located at the bottom of the Kursk nuclear submarine, at a distance of 80 - 150 meters, lay fragments of the bow of the nuclear submarine's light hull, sonar antenna, torpedo tube No. 4, practical torpedo 65-76 PV. How, in Ilyushkin's opinion, did they get there if the first American torpedo exploded in the 2nd compartment? Or did the Americans, who attacked the Kursk, carry these fragments behind the stern of the sunken nuclear submarine? Or maybe all these explosions of American torpedoes are the fruit of the utter imagination of Mr. Ilyushkin? Torpedoes never "pierce" the strong and lightweight hull of a nuclear submarine. Torpedoes, both ours and American ones, have proximity and contact fuses. These fuses will detonate the torpedo's ammunition if it passes near the submarine at a distance of 5-8 meters or only comes into contact with the submarine's hull. The torpedo itself cannot penetrate the solid hull of modern nuclear submarines. It can only be pierced by an explosive. The second indisputable fact is that no one from the government commission and the investigation team discovered the destruction of the solid hull in the area of the 2nd compartment, neither from "piercing" with a torpedo, nor from the explosion of a torpedo. And the third indisputable fact is that all Mr. Ilyushkin's arguments about torpedoing the Kursk nuclear submarine are no less than his elementary ignorance in matters of naval service. The saddest thing about this is that many of our citizens believe the statements of this "illiterate science fiction writer." […]
It's a pity, I won't live to see the time when, after 50 years, our descendants will remember this tragedy. What will they say about it? Surely, today's delusional statements and assumptions about this disaster will be found in the archives. Of course, the fact that our nuclear submarine was torpedoed by an American submarine is much more attractive than the fact that our nuclear submarine was destroyed due to the low reliability of military equipment and insufficient naval training of the crew. The fact of torpedoing (collision) of our nuclear submarine by the Americans is much more sacrificial and heroic than the fact of drowning their nuclear submarine due to crew errors. Therefore, I am sure of this, and in 50 and in 100 years our descendants will talk about the sinking of the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine by the Americans. All these myths over the course of many years of history will acquire more and more "new and new details", which will be expressed by "experts" like today's Ilyushkin and Akimenkov. Only all these conjectures will not improve either the combat training of our nuclear submarine crews, or the design developments of military weapons and equipment, or the reliability of our warships. These myths will be a sedative for our future naval sailors, for designers of naval weapons and equipment, for shipbuilders and ship repairmen, for the heads of the Russian military department. Our weapons and equipment are reliable, the ships are modern and the best in the world. Our sailors are the best naval specialists. This is approximately how our descendants will reason after the next disaster of a Russian warship. They will also look for the involvement of foreigners in this next tragedy. After all, they will be sure that before the "extravagant Yankees" in peacetime, insolently, sank our ships.
Of the 25 cases of alleged collisions between our submarines and foreign submarines, 22 cases are unknown foreign submarines (not identified). We have no evidence of these clashes. Why did the most of such "clashes" take place in the Northern Fleet? Because the Northern Fleet operates in the Arctic Basin, where ice fields are present in the sea all year round, icebergs and ice hummocks are carried out into the open seas. It is difficult to accurately track their location. And to map the exact location of the drifting ice and iceberg is problematic. Therefore, always, before going out to sea, the ship's commander was instructed approximately like this: "When sailing at sea, be careful, you may encounter icebergs and ice fields." it was somehow to get out of this unpleasant situation. A collision with ice, iceberg or fishing trawl is a navigational accident and is the responsibility of the navigator and the ship's captain. This is where the salutary thought of a collision with an unidentified foreign submarine comes in. Such a clash did not entail punitive measures against the commander and navigator. Everyone knew that our hydroacoustics facilities were inferior to American ones in terms of technical capabilities. Everyone knew that our nuclear submarines exceeded American submarines in terms of noise level and acoustic interference. And if this is so, then objectively, our submarine commander could not prevent a collision with a foreign submarine. Chiefs will scold the commander for "an accidental collision with a foreign submarine", especially since there have been isolated cases of actual collisions, they will demand to "strengthen" surveillance at sea, and this will end the "repression" against the submarine commander. And they will “write off” the next navigation incident on “illiterate Americans”. It is almost impossible to prove that the nuclear submarine collided with ice, hummock, iceberg or trawl. The hull is damaged, the ice has melted, there can only be a trail of a cable from the trawl, which can be classified as you like. So this is an unidentified foreign submarine. It is impossible to hide the traces of submarine collisions. There will always be physical evidence of such a collision. Remnants of "alien" paint, "alien" metal, rubber objects will always be found on the damaged hull of our nuclear submarine. So where is the physical evidence of 22 "collisions with unidentified foreign submarines"? They are not here. And if they exist and they are hidden by the leadership of the Navy or fleets, then this is a malfeasance. Where are our international statements on all these 22 clashes? They are not there, since there is no material evidence of this. Where are the international statements and notes of protest on the facts of "drowning" by the Americans of our K-129, K-219, K-141 Kursk submarines? They are not, and cannot be, since there is no evidence of these cases. We suggest that Americans develop regulations to prevent underwater collisions. At the same time, in these regulatory documents we offer the Americans such actions and obligations of the parties that completely deprive the Americans of those advantages in submarine shipbuilding, in the technical and tactical capabilities of nuclear submarines, which they have today. Well, will the Americans do it? The answer is obvious.
Why were there actual underwater collisions between our submarines and American submarines? Since the mid-60s of the 20th century, the Americans began to create a card index of the noises of our warships. Onboard noise classifiers were installed on all American submarines. The available card index made it possible to accurately classify the object of noise, its nationality, and what it was doing during the voyage (to detect the beginning of prelaunch preparation, launches of weapons, changes in the parameters of working mechanisms, etc.) In order to create such a card index, it was necessary to collect noises our ships from different distances, from different course angles, at different speeds, while our ships perform various training and combat missions. This was especially true of our nuclear-powered missile submarines. Therefore, the Americans climbed almost under the "belly" of our submarines. And with the sudden maneuvering of our nuclear submarine, in such a situation, the Americans lost hydroacoustic contact and a collision occurred. An illustrative example of such a collision is the collision of the K-314 nuclear submarine of the Pacific Fleet with the American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in the Sea of Japan. Only in this case, our nuclear submarine "got under the belly" of the American aircraft carrier. K-314 monitored Kitty Hawk's actions from the center of the warrant. At some point, hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier was lost. The commander decided to surface to periscope depth to clarify the situation. Upon surfacing, the acoustician reported to the commander that there was a group target in the aft sector, presumably with an aircraft carrier. The commander did not take into account this report of the hydroacoustics and continued surfacing. At periscope depth, the commander violated the rules for inspecting the water surface and after 3 minutes a powerful blow followed into the submarine's aft stabilizer. At a speed of 10-12 knots, the aircraft carrier hit the propeller and the left aft stabilizer K-314 with its right cheekbone. The submarine lost its speed and surfaced under the reserve propellers. The aircraft carrier did not even feel that it collided with someone. Only after the surfacing of our nuclear submarine and the discovery of a leak of aviation fuel from its punctured fuel tank, the Kitty Hawk realized that they had collided with a Soviet nuclear submarine. The entire anti-submarine defense of the aircraft carrier did not detect the presence of a tracking Soviet submarine in the center of the warrant and directly on the course of the Kitty Hawk. Well, the crew of the nuclear submarine K-314, due to the commander's illiteracy, was 20 seconds away from their death. If the nuclear submarine surfaced 20 seconds later, the aircraft carrier would cut it in half. Lucky! In this case, our submarine commander had information about the aircraft carrier, and the Americans did not find the submarine, but the collision still happened. And in the case when neither we hear the American, nor the American does not hear us, collisions at short tracking distances are inevitable. Although our submarine commanders are of the opinion that the American submarine commander has the technical ability to determine the depth of submersion of our submarine, this does not save them from an actual collision. This means that either we have an erroneous judgment about the technical capabilities of the American SACs, or the American submarine commanders act illiterately when tracking in a difficult situation.
Submarines of all states of the world, where they exist, as they performed reconnaissance missions in peacetime in the past, so they perform them today, and will continue to perform them in the future. The technical capabilities of submarines are being improved all the time. Today's Russian and American nuclear submarines have relatively equal opportunities to detect nuclear submarines in the near self-defense zone. With proper maneuvering, this zone provides collision avoidance in all sailing conditions. With proper observation and timely response of the crew to changes in the situation in the navigation area, none of the nuclear submarines, both tracking and tracked, will not collide. With relatively equal technical capabilities, the probability of a submarine collision in a submerged position will depend on the maritime and professional training of submarine crews. If our submarine commanders, when tracking any object, will prioritize the issues of secrecy of navigation and covert tracking, and at the same time the safety of navigation will not be ensured, then such tracking should be prohibited in peacetime. This provision should also be offered to our potential adversaries in negotiations on maritime issues. If we cannot provide proper underwater, surface and air surveillance in our nearby seas, near the territorial waters, this does not mean that foreign warships will not be there. This means that, first of all, it is necessary to create such an effective observation in these seas, which will allow our forces to immediately respond to "intruders", constantly know their position and intentions. Then, in principle, there should be no prerequisites at all for collisions in the nearby seas of submarines underwater. Then we will be able to secure our maritime borders.
From all of the above, we can draw conclusions:
1. No matter how perfect today's military equipment is, it will not be able to ensure the safety of navigation in peacetime with poor professional training of the crews of warships;
2. The professional training of submariners should be such as to exclude, in peacetime, dangerous maneuvering under water under various sailing conditions and in the performance of various combat training missions.
3. Stop creating and developing myths about the involvement of American submarines in the death of our K-129, K-219, K-141 Kursk submarines. These myths prevent us from objectively assessing our own capabilities and the fighting qualities of our ships. The Americans have nothing to do with these disasters. The causes of these disasters should be sought in paragraph 1 of these conclusions.
Everything that is stated above is only the personal opinion of the retired vice admiral V. Ryazantsev.
Evaluation of the Soviet Navy by S. G. Gorshkov
