It just so happened that I became a participant in a long debate about the circumstances of the mysterious crash of the South Korean ferry Sewol, which capsized and sank on the morning of April 16, 2014 during its flight from Incheon to Jeju Island. 304 people died, including many schoolchildren. The disaster resulted in a large-scale criminal investigation, during which 339 people were arrested (out of 154 people were sentenced), as well as a whole social movement that played a serious role in the impeachment of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, her subsequent arrest and sentence 25 years in prison.
The topic is very interesting for some assessments related to the defense capability of South Korea, the ability to act in a crisis, an unclear situation and strong psychological stress. The ability of the South Koreans to do this is so-so, which can be seen not only in the epic of the Sewol ferry, but also in an equally interesting case with the mysterious sinking of the Cheonan corvette in 2010. South Koreans easily fall into hysterics that quickly spread throughout society.
Almost from the first days of this shipwreck, which occurred under non-trivial circumstances, I had an opinion that contradicted what was written in the South Korean newspapers and what later became the official point of view on the causes of the disaster. Subsequently, I developed my position into a study of the causes of the ferry crash, written and published in English, in which I put forward my version of why it happened and how.
What made me challenge South Korean public opinion (also broadcast by journalists, in particular Oleg Kiryanov, in the Russian-language media)? First, the very surrealism of the picture. The ferry sank not in a storm, not in a typhoon, but in good weather, and for no apparent reason: when turning, a roll appeared, the load shifted, the ferry lay on the port side and then capsized. The South Korean Coast Guard insisted on this. But I immediately had a doubt about this: nevertheless, ships are built so that they would not tip over from a turn. Secondly, the case was not considered on the merits, because soon after the crash in the South Korean press there was just a wave of emotions and hysteria about the captain of the ferry, Lee Chung-seok, who was accused of having abandoned the ferry, escaped first, although he had to leave the last ferry, and even in the fact that he did not give the order to evacuate, so that the passengers did not interfere with his escape. Thirdly, I considered and still consider the captain's sentence to life imprisonment unfair without a detailed analysis of the reasons for the ferry crash.
In general, this story can be divided into three parts. The first part consists in the actual crash of "Sewol" and the circumstances of this. The second part is the rescue operation. The third part consists of subsequent statements and interpretations, in the stormy political activity around this topic. I was most interested in the first part, and I tried not to touch on other parts, so as not to go into numerous side topics. Although the South Korean version of the crash, in my opinion, was born as a result of the failure of the rescue operation, the reluctance of a number of people to bear responsibility for it, which later came in handy for the political struggle against Park Geun-hye, who was also accused of the ferry crash (along with accusations of other large and small misdemeanors).
I defined my position as follows: it is necessary to find out what exactly happened, because this is a matter of safety at sea. It's like in aviation, famous for its meticulous investigations: if you do not find out the causes of the crash, then another aircraft may find itself in a similar situation and another crash will result, which can and should be avoided. And the South Koreans will solve their political problems somehow themselves.
In view of the understandable limitations of the volume of the article, I will present some facts as well-known (those who wish can consult the English article on Wikipedia on the ferry crash; it provides a good commedium of background information and the necessary links).
It was a good ship
Where do we start? From the ship itself. The Sewol ferry was originally Japanese, built in 1994 by Hayashikane Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd in Nagasaki. It was one of the cruise ferries that have been built in Japan since 1981 and were primarily intended for sailing the Inland Sea between the islands. The ferry departed for 18 years in Japan, then was sold to South Korea and renamed. At the time of the crash, he was 20 years old.
"Sewol" had a displacement of 6835 tons, deadweight of 3794 tons. Length 145.6 meters, width 22 meters, draft 6, 26 meters. In Japan, the ferry had a passenger capacity of 804 people, in Korea, additional decks were added and the capacity was increased to 921 people (954 people in total, together with the crew). The ferry also accommodated 90 cars and 60 trucks.
Already from this reference information, the absurdity of the cause of the crash put forward by the South Koreans is quite obvious. If the ferry had a tendency to overturn on turns, then it would not leave the sea for 20 years. Then, the ship is big. The force to knock him on his side also had to be great.
It is also worth noting that the ferry was a good vessel, better than many ferries. The Japanese built it after the crash of the British ferry Herald of Free Enterprise in March 1987. The nasal ramp opened, the ferry banked and sank in just 90 seconds. The Sewol did not have a nasal ramp; for cars, two ramps were installed at the stern. There was a cargo hold in the bow of the ferry, and a crane was installed above it, on the ferry's tank. The Japanese learned their lessons and made their ferry as safe as possible.
The ferry was not overloaded
This is not to say that South Korean investigators did not think about the ridiculousness of their version of a ferry crash from a turn. They also tried to explain this by the fact that the ferry was overloaded, the new superstructure worsened the stability of the vessel, the cargo was not secured, and that is why the ferry went to the bottom.
True, they did it in a way that incriminates them. They composed and published in the press a fairy tale that the ferry was supposed to carry only 987 tons of cargo, and had on board in its last voyage, according to various estimates, from 2142 to 3608 tons of cargo. For the public, everything seems to be clear: the overloaded ferry could not but capsize. Only this is deceptive clarity.
They wrote that the South Korean Maritime Register allegedly set a cargo limit of 987 tons. For some reason, this limit was not known by the Korean Shipping Association or the Coast Guard. Moreover, a document certifying it was never presented. After all, this is the main proof, the main explanation - a copy of this document indicating the loading limit should be everywhere and everywhere. But it was not there, I never managed to find it. As well as other ship documents: ship's declaration with a list of cargo, ship's log. The documents were definitely taken from the ferry either during underwater search operations, or after the ascent, but they never reached the public. With documentary evidence in this case, it is very bad, in fact, nothing, which only inflates suspicions.
In general, I believe that the limit was thought up retroactively. Why? That's why.
First, a merchant vessel with a deadweight of about 3800 tons can carry about 3500 tons of cargo, since all other cargo (fuel, supplies, water, etc.), in general, is not too large. They are trying to make more cargo capacity, since the profitability of sea transportation depends on it. The limitation of cargo to 987 tons for a vessel with a deadweight of 3794 tons or 26% of deadweight is pure absurdity from the point of view of the economics of sea freight.
Secondly, the weight of the load can be calculated. On its last voyage, Sewol took on board 124 passenger cars (1.5 tons each - 186 tons), and 56 trucks (8 tons each - 448 tons). Total cars - 634 tons. The weight of the cargo that he could take can be roughly calculated by the dimensions of the car deck and hold. The length of the deck according to the ferry scheme is about 104 meters, the width is 20 meters, the area is 2080 sq. meters. 124 cars and 56 trucks occupied about 1370 sq. meters (5, 4 square meters for a car and 12, 5 square meters for a truck). In fact, a little more, but this cargo could fit on the deck. The cargo hold 20 meters long, 20 meters wide and 7 meters high (volume 2800 cubic meters) could accommodate seventy 20-foot containers (each 39 cubic meters). Their weight with a full load of each container would be 1,680 tons. On the deck of the tank, as seen in the photo, there were at least 12 containers (up to 288 tons in weight). Thus, "Sewol" could take on board 82 containers (up to 1968 tons at full load) along with cars. That is, the maximum weight that the ferry could take on its last voyage could not exceed 2602 tons, or 68.5% of the deadweight. It's ridiculous to talk about overload.
In reality, the load was less. It was reported that, in addition to cars, the ferry transported 1157 tons of cargo, including 400 tons of steel beams. If you add this cargo with the weight of the cars, calculated earlier, you get 1,791 tons of the total cargo, that is, less than reported and less than the ferry could take on board. The containers were heavily underloaded. Those of them, which were standing on the deck of the tank, fell overboard and floated for some time like floats, which means that they were far from the intended 24 tons for a fully loaded 20-foot container.
So, with all the inaccuracies, the Sevol cargo can be roughly taken as 1800 tons. It is also known that the ferry took 761 tons of water into ballast tanks. The weight of passengers and crew (467 passengers and 35 crew members) is about 30 tons. I determined the fuel weight from the average fuel consumption of two diesel engines of the Pielstick 12PC2-6V-400 with a total power of 11912 kW (0.2 kg per kW per running hour). The ferry made the trip from Incheon to Jeju in 16 hours, that is, the round trip required 32 sailing hours. Taking into account the fuel consumption when docked in the port, I assumed that the vessel had a supply of fuel for 48 hours, or 114 tons of diesel fuel.
Thus, according to my calculations, it turned out: cargo - 1800 tons, ballast - 760 tons, fuel - 114 tons, passengers and crew - 30 tons. A total of 2702 tons of net cargo or 71.2% of the deadweight. The ferry cannot be considered overloaded under any weather conditions.
In democratic countries, sometimes they plan and hang such noodles on their ears, which is surprising how people believe in this and still defend them with foam at the mouth in discussions.
The much talked about superstructure of the passenger decks weighed 239 tons, which is not much for the Sewol. This extra weight was easily balanced with either water or a heavy load such as trucks, construction equipment, or the steel girders already mentioned.
As for securing the cargo, on ferries, ships with limited seaworthiness, which usually have seaworthiness up to 4-5 points (5 points - wind up to 9 m / s, wave height up to 2.2 meters), it is rarely practiced. A five-point wave barely moves a ship 146 meters long. In addition, the Sewol had roll stabilizers, which were released at the time of the ferry crash. So, when the ferry was sailing in coastal waters, there was no practical need to secure the cargo, as is done on ocean-going ships.
Colliding with the tidal current
The South Korean official version of the Sewol ferry crash is thus a linden tree. So, as they say, that is, from the turn, the ferry could not sink. In addition, it later became clear that between 08.46 and 08.48 h. On April 16, the Sewol was heading 136 degrees and, by order of the third mate, Pak Han Gol, began to lay down on a course of 145 degrees. Helmsman Cho Zhong Gi turned the rudder 5 degrees to starboard. That is, there was no sharp turn, and over time, South Korean researchers were forced to admit it. And all this stream of emotions about the overloading of the ferry and everything else that was listed has lost all meaning.
Investigators clearly sought to find the cause of the crash inside the ferry, so that the captain could be blamed and so that against the background of this accusation, the Coast Guard's guilt for a poorly conducted rescue operation, which was actually unsuccessful, looked less bright and prominent.
I quickly came to the conclusion that the cause of the crash was outside the ferry. But which one? In the early days, versions were expressed about the collision of the ferry with an underwater rock (quickly rejected), then with an American submarine (rejected, but later). I rejected them immediately, because the underwater part of the capsized ferry on the starboard side was completely intact even in the photographs of it in a sinking state. Then the ferry was lifted up, and it became obvious with absolute clarity. No dents, no scuffs, not even stripped paint.
At the same time, eyewitnesses spoke of a certain strong impact on the ship. One of the officers, who was in his cabin, was thrown out of bed by him. The strike was also confirmed by the records of automobile registrars: cars were flying on the cargo deck. Captain Lee Jung Suk said at the trial that the course of the ferry at the moment when he jumped onto the bridge from his cabin immediately after the impact was 155 degrees. This statement was not later disputed by anyone. Not a weak blow that turned the ship ten degrees. Not weak, but leaving absolutely no marks on the body. And what could it be?
In search of an answer, I decided to find out what this place was. The Sewol passed the Mengol Strait, not far from the extreme southwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula. The first thing I learned about it was the strong currents caused by the ebb and flow. A large stream of water passes through the narrow strait (about 2 miles wide), and the current speed reaches 11-12 knots. They even planned to build a tidal power station there. Wow! This is half the maximum speed of the ferry. If the ferry went against such a strong current, then it could have serious problems.
Now it remains to find out whether the Sewol was going downstream or against it. In the American sailing directions “Sailing Directions (Enroute). Coast of Korea and China”stated that the northwest current began two hours after low water (LW) and ended two hours after high water (HW). Immediately after this, the reverse flow began in a southeasterly direction.
The time of the onset of the ebb and flow is indicated in special guides: “Tide Tables. 2014. Central and Western Pacific Ocean and India Ocean”. I looked in this handbook for April 16, 2014 and learned that in the nearby port of Busan, the tide peaked at 02.42 and the tide peaked at 09.04. At about the same time, the peak of low tide and peak of high tide were in the Mengol Strait.
It is known that the Sewol entered the strait at 08.27. He followed a southeastern course and for him the current, which began at about 05.00, was a counter current. It was supposed to end at 11.00, that is, the ferry entered the strait during the peak of the tide and the maximum speed of the current. He shouldn't have done that. The time of passage of the strait according to the schedule was about 06.00, when the current was still weak. But the ferry was delayed in the port of Incheon due to heavy fog, which prevented the vessel from leaving the difficult fairway. The delay led to unforeseen circumstances.
The ferry was heading 165 degrees until 07.30 on April 16, after which it made a turn and lay down on a course of 137 degrees (at 08.27). Until the moment of impact, the ferry traveled about 1.5 miles and began to smoothly turn to a course of 140 degrees, then to a course of 145 degrees. Between the turns, the ferry passed about one cableway in an arc. Then the steam entered the main stream of the tidal current at an acute angle.
In the Mengol Strait, which is actually a gap between two islands, the tidal current must be complex, it can split into several jets, but at the narrowest point, the jet is the most powerful and fastest. The sea around the islands was freshened by the runoff of numerous rivers, while the tide drove masses of salty, denser ocean water into the strait, this stream in the narrowness was, apparently, just such, noticeably denser. The ferry was sailing at a speed of 18 knots, and the jet of the opposite current - from 10 to 13 knots. For the Sewol, entering it at that speed was tantamount to running aground. A collision with a rapidly flowing mass of dense salt water - this is the impact that hit the bow of the vessel on the port side. This blow turned the ferry 10 degrees and banked it immediately, according to the helmsman's indications, 15 degrees to the port side. This is too much for the ferry. The cargo on the car deck and in the hold fell to the port side, making it impossible to straighten the vessel and predetermining the further increase in heel, flooding and overturning. All this happened unexpectedly.
The situation was surreal. On a long-established route, with a calm sea and fair weather, it is not clear why the ferry began to heel and sink. This is a situation from the category of "what cannot be." The roll, at first according to various estimates from 15 to 20 degrees, reached 50 degrees within 25 minutes after the impact. The crew members quickly realized that the Sewol would inevitably sink, and this came as a shock to them, breaking them down and demoralizing them. In my opinion, this was the main reason why they were unable to evacuate passengers. It takes time to cope with the state of shock, and it ran out very quickly for them.
In essence, the Sewol ferry disaster is a product of a coincidence that very rarely coincide in and of itself. But from this one can draw a conclusion about the fundamental danger of currents in such straits. Then it is possible either to close such straits for shipping altogether, or to oblige the dispatcher service, which controls the movement of ships, to close them at those hours when the currents are strongest.
Only this conclusion was not accepted in South Korea. This is understandable. It is more convenient to talk about the "killer captain" (such a definition was given to him by President Park Geun-hye, but the current opposition leaders in power already prefer not to remember this), and the president's guilt in the ferry crash, stir up emotions and hysteria, which is used to mobilize the masses in the purpose of any political campaign. Safety at sea remains out of the picture. For this they will have to pay one day with another crash with numerous victims. By the way, "Sewol" is the third ship that sank in South Korea with great casualties. The first was Namyeon (December 15, 1970, 232 killed) and the second was Sohe (October 10, 1993, 292 killed).
