In 2025–2040, the United States, Great Britain and France will expire the operating life of most of the currently existing carriers and delivery vehicles of strategic nuclear forces. Preparations for replacing such systems begin 10–20 years before they enter service. Thus, the second decade of the new century is becoming the time for making decisions on financing the construction of new strategic nuclear weapons.
TRIADS, DIADS AND MONADS
At present, the US's strategic nuclear forces (SNF) are represented by a triad, France by a dyad, and Great Britain by a monad.
The naval, ground, and air components of the United States Strategic Nuclear Forces triad are: nuclear-powered missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (SLBMs); land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); heavy bombers B-52 with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) equipped with nuclear warheads, and B-2 bombers with nuclear bombs (previously the aviation component of the triad also included B-1 heavy bombers, from which the execution of nuclear missions, and their nuclear bombs were removed from service in 2003).
The French SNF dyad consists of a naval component (SSBN with SLBMs) and an aviation component consisting of Mirage 2000N and Rafale F3 fighter-bombers capable of using air-launched cruise missiles with ASMP-A nuclear warheads. Previously, France also had a ground component in the form of medium-range ballistic missiles. The monad of the British strategic nuclear forces are SSBNs, which have long supplanted the aviation component of medium bombers.
The main component of the strategic nuclear forces for the United States and France and the only one for Great Britain are SSBNs with SLBMs, which respectively carry the majority, almost all or all of the country's deployed nuclear warheads (YABZ). The SSBNs of these states at sea were and will remain invulnerable to the anti-submarine forces of their opponents, at least until the 50s of our century. Therefore, maintaining the existence at the present and in the future of this component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Western countries is for them the primary task for ensuring strategic nuclear deterrence by intimidation and defense of vital interests.
"OHAYO" PREPARE REPLACEMENT
Let's start with the US Ohio-class strategic missile submarines in their prime.
The first four of 18 built SSBNs entered service in 1981-1984 and began patrolling in 1982-1984. They were originally designed for 20-25 years of service, then life expectancy was extended to 30 years. Congress opposed the Navy's proposal to remove them from service, as a result of which these four SSBNs were overhauled in 2002-2008 with the replacement of the reactor core and were converted into carriers of sea-launched cruise missiles in conventional weapons (SSGNs) and special operations groups. In 2004, their lifespan was extended to 42 years. They began patrolling in their new capacity in 2007-2009. Completion of operation of the first four Ohio-class submarines is expected sometime in 2023-2026.
The operating 14 Ohio-class SSBNs entered the fleet in 1984-1997 and began patrolling in 1985-1998 for 30 years of operation. However, already in 1999, their service life was extended by 40%. In 2010, the US Department of Defense "Nuclear Review" discussed the issue of reducing the number of SSBNs from 14 to 12 in 2015-2020, depending on the assessment of the future structure of strategic nuclear forces and the aging of existing SSBNs. Incidentally, the recent recognition of the existence of a "ragged" patrol schedule (each lasting from 37 to 140 days), explained by the operational need or the requirement to increase the invulnerability of SSBNs, may be a sign of the onset of aging problems. But, judging by the plans announced in 2014, there will be no reduction in the number of SSBNs, and all 14 SSBNs are to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2027–2040. It is possible that by that time, in 42 years, these submarines will perform 126 patrols each (for comparison: the first currently operating second-generation SSBN in 28 years completed only 80 patrols, that is, it went on 120 patrols in 42 years; the first-generation SSBN performed in average 69 and maximum 87 patrols).
According to the current plans of the Navy, 12 new Iowa-class SSBNs will begin patrolling in 2031-2042. In 2030–2040, the fleet will be forced to make do with only 10 SSBNs, this circumstance prompted some public organizations to consider the availability sufficient and demand the construction of only 10 or even eight new SSBNs. The leadership of the Navy, stating the need for a debate about the existence of the triad, achieved the creation of a separate fund to ensure the construction of new SSBNs (there is no money on the account of this fund yet), and the submariners immediately announced that at least 12 new SSBNs were needed. Returning from the future to the present, we see that in our century, the planned start dates for the construction of new SSBNs have already changed several times with a time spacing of several years (2017-2021). Likewise, the idea of the required number of SSBNs was changing. Let's see what decision the next, already republican administration, will make.
At the turn of 2025-2030, it is planned to create a new air-launched cruise missile to replace the AGM-86.
Photo from the site www.af.mil
What is the vision of the new American SSBN? The Americans refused to unify the fleet of multipurpose nuclear submarines and nuclear submarines with SLBMs based on Virginia-class submarines and relied on improving the proven design of Ohio-class SSBNs. The new SSBN will become less noticeable due to a decrease in its noise level due to the introduction of full electric propulsion, the use of a jet propulsion unit and a new hull coating. She will hear and see better thanks to a more advanced sonar system and new cabin equipment. It will be safer due to the use of X-shaped aft rudders. New SSBNs will have less time to be repaired as a result of the use of more advanced onboard equipment and the installation of new reactors designed to operate without recharging the core for 42 years of the life of each ship. The latter circumstance will ensure that 12 new SSBNs are on patrol with the same number of submarines as now, when there are 14 Ohio-class missile carriers.
The main difference between the new SSBN and the existing one will be to reduce the number of launchers of SLBMs from 24 to 16. This is tantamount to reducing the maximum possible nuclear ammunition load on each SSBN (taking into account the return potential) from the previous 192 and future 160 nuclear warheads on a second-generation boat to 128 YaBZ on a boat of the third generation. But if the new SSBN begins to have on patrol the nuclear ammunition that each SSBN has now (about 100 nuclear warheads), then this will mean maintaining the existing nuclear potential in the sea on patrolling SSBNs in the same quantitative composition, albeit in a modified configuration.
THIRD GENERATION IN BRITISH AND FRENCH
Since 2007, Great Britain has been working on third-generation SSBNs and on determining the required composition of its nuclear forces for the 60s of this century, taking into account the experience of creating and operating such ships.
Four SSBNs of the first generation, performing the task of strategic nuclear deterrence in 1968-1996, made during this time an average of 57 patrols (maximum 61) with an average rate of 2.3 patrols per year. According to the caustic remark of one of the Western analysts, in the 25th year of service, these SSBNs began to fall apart before our eyes. The next generation SSBNs were designed for 30 years of service. Four submarines were handed over to the Navy in 1993-1999 and began their mission in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2001. By April 2013, they had completed 100 patrols at an average rate of 1.6 patrols per year per SSBN (one at sea, two at base, one under repair). With such a sparing regime of use of these ships, one could assume that in 30 years each SSBN would have completed 48, and in 35 years and 56 patrols. But in the UK they started talking about the fact that the withdrawal of SSBNs from the fleet should start from 2022-2023, and the introduction of the first third-generation SSBNs into the fleet should be scheduled for 2024 (later, the commissioning date was postponed to 2028).
The British seemed to see that it was irrational to maintain four SSBNs for the sake of patrolling one, that having only 10-12 SLBMs in 16 launchers of each SSBN, and filling the rest of the launchers with ballast, is illogical, and that a ship with a displacement of 14 thousand tons for an ammunition load of 40 –48 YABZ - uneconomical. One gets the impression that they recalled the proposal made in 1992 in the United States to build SSBNs with a displacement of 8200-10700 tons with eight launchers for launching Trident-2 SLBMs. And already in 2010, an official statement follows that the new British SSBN will be equipped with only eight launchers and will carry 40 YaBZ. There was also information that the new reactor for SSBNs will be guaranteed to operate without recharging the core for 25 years (if necessary, its use can be extended to 30 years) and that three such reactors will be ordered so far. Everything about the third generation of British SSBNs will become known, probably in 2016, when the signing of the first construction contracts begins. It is likely that the first third-generation SSBN will begin patrolling in 2029, this time becoming a model for fulfilling the cost-effectiveness criterion.
Since 2014, France has begun preparations for the creation of third-generation SSBNs, which will replace the SSBNs introduced into the fleet in 1996, 1999, 2004 and 2010. If six SSBNs of the first generation served, counting from the first to the last patrol, on average for one SSBN for 22 years (Terribl completed 66 patrols in 23 years), then SSBNs of the second generation were built for a guaranteed 25 years of service with the possibility of extending this period by five years. The use by the French of the same sparing patrol regime as used by the British (one SSBN at sea, two at the base, one under repair), suggests that the service life of the first two second-generation SSBNs will not be 25, but 30 years. And this will require the commissioning of the first new generation SSBN no later than 2029.
THE MAIN WEAPON OF THE ROCKET CARRIERS
SLBMs are the main SSBN weapon designed to deliver weapons of destruction - nuclear warheads. American SLBMs of the Trident-2 type, with which US SSBNs have been patrolling since 1990 and British SSBNs since 1994, will be in service, judging by existing statements, until 2042.
What is hidden behind such a wording?
If this missile is decommissioned in 2042, then it should have already been replaced by its successor, the new SLBM. As the past shows, the first Trident-2 missiles entered the Navy after nine years, and the delivery of the first 200 missiles was completed 12 years after the development of this SLBM began. Consequently, work on the creation of a new SLBM can begin in 2030 in order to complete the rearmament of US and UK SSBNs with a new SLBM in 2042.
In 1987-2012, 591 Trident-2 SLBMs were purchased for the United States and Great Britain with an increased service life from the initial 25 to 30 years. The upgraded Trident-2 missiles with extended service life will begin to enter the fleet in 2017. The Americans in 2015, and the British in 2000, have embarked on austerity in SLBMs by reducing missile expenditure on training launches. Taking into account the forthcoming reduction in the number of SLBMs on each SSBN (in the US to 20 and later to 16, and in the UK to eight), limiting the consumption of missiles for training launches and reducing the stock of missiles as a result of their aging, each combat-ready SSBN will have on board by 2042 full ammunition load of SLBMs.
New French SLBMs M51 entered service with SSBNs since 2010. It is possible that following the example of the British, who purchased 58 Trident-2 missiles, no more than 58 M51 missiles of two modifications will be purchased. Each SLBM in these three countries carries from one to six or eight nuclear warheads. Monobloc SLBMs of Great Britain with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 10-15 kt are destined to be used for substrategic purposes. Monoblock SLBMs of France are designed to destroy remote targets and create an electromagnetic pulse over enemy territory.
The Americans previously had the possibility of detonating only one YaBZ out of several on a multiply-charged SLBM. The receipt since 2008 of the upgraded Mk-4A / W76-1 warheads with a nuclear warhead extended to 60 years for the Trident-2 SLBM and the expected arrival of new TNO nuclear warheads for the M51 SLBMs expected from 2015 increases the capabilities of these missiles. The British will start creating new nuclear warheads for SLBMs in the 30s. According to media reports from 2008, the French intended in the second decade to equip their ALCM and SLBM with nuclear warheads of variable explosion power.
RESISTANT "MINITMAN"
ICBM "Minuteman-3", judging by the official statements of the military-political leadership of the United States, will be in service until 2030. This is supported by upgrades to at least 607 missiles. For the period 2025–2075, either permanent modernization of the Minuteman-3 missile or a new ICBM of stationary, mobile or tunnel deployment is required. From media reports it is clear that the possibility of creating about 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, silo, soil or rail-based, is being considered. But one cannot exclude such a turn of events when the United States will abandon ICBMs in order to reduce from several hundred to one dozen the number of stationary nuclear military facilities of strategic nuclear forces located on its territory and to secure a more advantageous position in the policy of targeting strategic objects. Such a proposal to eliminate ICBMs by 2022 was put forward in the United States as recently as 2012.
Dual-use aircraft (heavy bombers and fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons) are, unlike SLBMs and ICBMs, a reusable means of use.
In France, by 2018 or later, the rearmament of the strategic nuclear forces with Rafale F3 fighters, which have been carrying ASMP-A missiles since 2009, will be completed. Since the life of about fifty ASMP-A missiles will expire in 2035, the development of a new nuclear-armed aviation cruise missile (ASN4G) has begun in 2014, which will combine stealth with a speed of M = 7-8. Depending on the size of the new missile and the possibility of placing one or more of these missiles on one plane, you will have to make a choice between creating a new fighter or even a bomber for it. The abatement of the debate about the need to transform the nuclear dyad into a nuclear monad still promises longevity for the aviation component of the French strategic nuclear forces.
In the United States and Western Europe, the American F-35A fighter, designed to replace the F-16 and Tornado fighters in NATO as carriers of non-strategic nuclear weapons, will acquire this quality from 2021, having received the B61-12 high-precision nuclear bomb.
The new nuclear warheads should significantly increase the capabilities of the French M51 SLBMs.
Photo from the site www.defense.gouv.fr
The Difficult Fate of the Bombers
In the United States, the solution to the problem of renewing bomber aviation was accompanied by "strategic shuffling." If in 2001 in the "Nuclear Review" of the Ministry of Defense it was said about the need for a new bomber by 2040, then a few years later the task was set to equip bomber aviation with it within five years already in 2015-2020. The creation of subsonic or supersonic bombers (for example, 275 medium-range or 150 long-range vehicles) was considered as alternatives.
It was understood that in the age of high-precision weapons, a bomber capable of carrying 27 tons of payload, like the B-52, or 60 tons, like the B-1, was not required. The idea arose of building not long-range, but "regional" ("intermediate") bombers. Earlier, a proposal was put forward to isolate bomber aircraft from the strategic nuclear triad and entrust it with the functions of delivering only non-strategic nuclear weapons. This would mean that with the commissioning of new regional bombers, the task of creating a non-strategic US nuclear force (bombers and dual-use fighters) was solved, which would significantly complement NATO's non-strategic nuclear forces (dual-use fighters and SLBMs in a sub-strategic role). Due to its ambiguity, this program was closed in 2009 in order to declare a priority next year and later schedule the arrival of the first new generation aircraft in combat units in 2024 for the use of conventional weapons, and from 2026 - for nuclear weapons.
Currently, the United States officially has 155 heavy bombers (TB) in service, in addition to this, there are several dozen TB in storage, conservation and testing. In 2014, it became known that the reduction of the TB fleet would begin in 2022.
Recall that the B-52 entered service in 1961-1962, it is designed for 5 thousand takeoffs / landings. The airframe allows the aircraft to have a flight time of 32,500–37,500 hours, more than half of this resource has been used today, so the aircraft could serve until 2044. The B-1 supersonic heavy bomber entered service in 1985-1988, is designed for 30 years of service and no less than 15,200 flight hours, and used about half of this resource. The inconspicuous V-2 has been in combat units since 1993-1998, could have served up to 60 years with up to 40 thousand hours of flight time, the first aircraft only recently gained 7 thousand flight hours. Provided that 80-100 new bombers arrive in 2024-2044, all B-1 and B-52 aircraft will be decommissioned by 2040, and the B-2 bomber will survive, if it does not exceed the foreseen accident rate, until the mid-40s years.
The new bomber, judging by the requirements published by the media in 2010, should have had a payload of 6, 3-12, 7 tons, a flight range of 7400-9200 km and a combat radius of 3600-4000 km (without refueling in the air) and stay in the air with refueling 50-100 hours. These requirements are close to the characteristics of the B-47E medium bomber, which entered service in 1953-1957 (payload 11, 3 tons, maximum take-off weight 104 tons, combat radius without refueling in the air 3800 km, stayed in the air with refueling 48-80 hours). If we summarize all that has been said in the past for the media and in the media, then the new aircraft is likely to become a long-range ("long-range") subsonic ("loitering", that is, with a long flight duration), an inconspicuous and affordable dual-purpose bomber with a missile and bomb armament. Official data on the capabilities of the new bomber are promised to be announced in April 2015. A new air-launched cruise missile with nuclear and conventional weapons will be created for it in 2025-2030, which will replace the AGM-86 missiles (the B-52 and B-2 bombers will also be armed with the new ALCM). Until that time, the comfortable existence of the B-52 fleet will be provided by over 350 modernized AGM-86B type ALCMs. It is believed that from 2030, only one type of aircraft carrier (B61-12) will remain in service with the US Air Force.
As you can see, the US Air Force in 2025-2035 will have a fleet of four types of bombers. This is either a miscalculation as a result of the abandonment of a large series of B-2 bombers and due to overly optimistic hopes for heavy B-1 bombers, or the anticipation of the need for four types of bombers for this period.
As for the nuclear ammunition of Western countries, it will be reduced by the US Armed Forces by 2022 to 3000–3500 nuclear warheads (according to 2011 data) and by 2030 to 2000–2200 nuclear warheads (according to data from 2005–2006), while For the British Armed Forces by 2025, it will be reduced to 180 YaBZ. France in the third or fourth decade, perhaps, will maintain its current quantitative level of nuclear warheads ("less than 300 nuclear warheads").
It should be emphasized that in this way the new US / NATO dual-use fighters will become carriers of new, already high-precision nuclear bombs no earlier than 2021. It is possible that new US intercontinental ballistic missiles will begin on alert somewhere in 2025-2030. It is likely that the new US bombers from 2026 will receive the ability to carry nuclear weapons, including new cruise missiles. New submarine strategic missile carriers of the United States, Great Britain and France will go on patrol no later than 2029–2031.
Obsolescence of delivery vehicles and means of delivery of nuclear weapons is inevitable and, to a certain extent, predictable. However, the specific timing of their replacement can be changed by the leadership of the countries, depending on political preferences or financial considerations. In the fog of the future, the contours of the renewal of the basis of the Western nuclear power - the naval strategic nuclear forces - are best guessed.
