At about 14.50 the distance between the 1st Japanese Combat Squadron and the 1st Pacific Squadron became too great even for large-caliber guns, and soon after the Yakumo, passing under the stern of the Russian squadron, was hit, the firing ceased. The Russian squadron was moving on the SO80 course, following to Vladivostok, and no one was blocking its path, but it was clear that Heihachiro Togo would not let the Russians go without a new battle. There were still 5 hours until darkness, so the Japanese had time to catch up with the Russian squadron and fight with it: Wilhelm Karlovich Wittgeft had to draw up a plan for the upcoming battle.
Immediately after the end of the exchange of fire with the main forces of H. Togo, V. K. Vitgeft asked the ships of the squadron about the damage: it soon became clear that not a single battleship or cruiser was seriously damaged. This inspired certain hopes, and Wilhelm Karlovich discussed with his headquarters the tactics of further actions of the squadron. The officers spoke on two questions: is it possible to take away from the Japanese their advantageous position relative to the sun and what position of the squadron would be most advantageous for resuming the battle.
As for the sun, here, according to the unanimous opinion, nothing could be done, since in order to put the squadron between the sun and the Japanese it was necessary to be southwest of the battleships of H. Togo, and such a situation could not have been allowed: taking into account the superiority speed of the Japanese, such a maneuvering would only lead to the fact that the Japanese squadron would again block the Russians' path to Vladivostok. But on the part of the position, opinions were divided.
Senior flag officer, lieutenant M. A. Kedrov proposed to take the battle on the retreat, deploying the battleships in front formation. At the same time, he proceeded from the fact that in this case the Japanese would also have to catch up with the Russians, deploying to the front, and then the Russian squadron would have a certain advantage in the number of guns capable of fighting. There is even a calculation according to which, in a battle in wake columns, the Japanese had 27 guns of 8-12 inches and 47 caliber 6-dm in an onboard salvo, and the Russians - 23 and 33, respectively. But in battle, the formation of the front, the Russians would have had 12 cannons of 10-12 inches and 33 six-inch guns against 8 12-inch, 6-and 8-inch guns and only 14 and 6-inch guns (by the way, a mistake was made here, since the Kasuga's bow tower housed not 2 eight-inch guns, but one ten-inch gun).
Chief of Staff Rear Admiral N. A. Matusevich proposed to rebuild the squadron in the bearing system (the ships turn sequentially 8 points to the right, and then “all of a sudden” 8 points to the left), and then, when the Japanese approached, try to get closer to them. According to N. A. Matusevich, the Japanese are afraid of short distances and they shoot worse at them, which is why the Russian squadron could gain an advantage.
VC. Witgeft rejected both of these proposals. Until now, H. Togo did not show a desire to engage in close combat and there was some hope that this would be the case in the future. V. K. Vitgeft did not want to get closer at all, based on the following considerations:
1. A battle at a short distance will entail severe damage, having received which many ships of the squadron will not be able to go to Vladivostok at all, and of those who can, some will not be able to do this in a large (by the standards of the Russian squadron) move and all this will lead to the fact that far fewer ships will break through to Vladivostok than they could.
2. During the battle at short distances, there will be great damage among unprotected artillery armor (here we mean guns 75-mm and below, usually standing openly and not in casemates). This will undoubtedly weaken the ability of the ships to withstand attacks from enemy destroyers, and the Japanese, according to V. K. Vitgeft, they pulled at least 50.
In general, the plan of V. K. Vitgefta looked like this: he hoped to avoid a decisive battle on July 28 in order to escape into the night with undamaged ships and a sufficiently high squadron speed. At night, he hoped to break away from the Japanese squadron, and in the evening pass east of about. Tsushima. Thus, in the opinion of the Russian commander, the squadron will overcome the most dangerous section of the route at night.
Squadron battleship "Retvizan"
In other words, V. K. Vitgeft tried to fulfill exactly the order of the governor "to go to Vladivostok, avoiding battle as much as possible," but this, in fact, was the only way to break through, if not all, then at least most of the squadron. Until now, H. Togo acted rather cautiously and did not go into close combat, it is possible that this will continue to be so. Who knows, maybe the commander of the United Fleet decided not to get involved in a decisive battle, but wants first to weaken the Russians by night attacks by destroyers, and only the next day to give battle? But this option is also beneficial to the Russian commander: at night he will try to evade mine attacks, and if it does not work out, the squadron will meet enemy detachments with intact artillery. In addition, on the night of July 28-29, numerous numbered Japanese destroyers will burn coal and will no longer be able to pursue the Russian squadron, therefore, even if a decisive battle on July 29 cannot be avoided, the next night will be much less dangerous for Russian ships.
Thus, the decision of V. K. Witgeft should be considered quite reasonable to avoid short-range combat if possible. But it should be borne in mind that everything will have to happen as the Japanese commander decides - X. Togo had an advantage in speed and it was he who determined when and at what distance the battle would be resumed. Let's try to evaluate the proposals of officers V. K. Vitgefta with this point in mind.
Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the idea of moving in front lines is worthless. Of course, if Kh. Togo had suddenly accepted the “rules of the game” offered to him by the Russian commander, this would have led to a certain advantage for the Russians, but why would the Japanese be so substituted? Nothing prevented the 1st combat detachment from catching up with the Russians without turning into a front line, as Lieutenant M. A. Kedrov, and following the wake column, and in this case, the 1st Pacific Ocean immediately fell under the "stick over T" and defeat.
The proposal of Rear Admiral N. A. Matusevich is much more interesting. Lining up on a ledge, the Russian squadron had the opportunity to make a "all of a sudden" turn and rush to attack the Japanese who were not expecting such a thing. Such an attack could lead to the fact that H. Togo hesitated, and the correct battle would turn into a dump, in which the Russian squadron, which had destroyers and a cruiser at hand, could have an advantage.
Of course, the Japanese commander was able to avoid this, take advantage of his superior speed and avoid too close contact with the Russian ships. But nevertheless, it could have turned out in any way, and in any case, for some time the distance between the Japanese and Russian squadrons would have been greatly reduced.
To the assessment of N. A. We will return to Matusevich after completing the description of the 2nd phase of the battle and calculating the effectiveness of Russian and Japanese fire - without these figures, the analysis will not be complete. Now we note that the proposal of the chief of staff V. K. Vitgefta was a plan for a decisive battle, in which, of course, and regardless of the winner, both sides would have suffered greatly. But the problem was that such a manner of fighting directly contradicted the task of breaking through to Vladivostok: after a dump at "pistol" distances, the surviving, but obviously heavily damaged Russian ships would only have to return to Arthur or go to internment in neutral ports. This could have been done in case of complete impossibility of a breakthrough to Vladivostok (to die, so with music!), But the situation was just the opposite! After the main forces of the Japanese fleet broke the distance at 14.50, the Russians seemed to have a chance. So why not try to use it?
In addition to all of the above, there is one more thing to consider. N. A.'s plan Matusevich meant to put everything on a single chance, and if this chance does not work, then the Russian squadron will most likely be defeated. The fact is that the long absence of joint maneuvering practice did not affect the controllability in the best way, and complex maneuvering (ledge formation, “all of a sudden” turns to approach the enemy) would most likely have led to the disintegration of the 1st Pacific squadron. In this case, the Japanese, in whose abilities there was no reason to doubt, could attack the ships that had strayed from the formation and quickly achieve success. And V. K. Witgeft adopted the most conservative option - to go further in a wake column, and if the Japanese risk getting closer, to act according to circumstances.
And so it happened that the Russian squadron continued to go to Vladivostok in the same order. The cruisers kept a wake column to the left of the battleships approximately 1.5-2 miles from them, despite the fact that "Askold" was sailing on the left traverse of the "Tsarevich", and destroyers were going to the left of the cruisers. Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft gave his last orders. He gave a signal to N. K. Reitenstein:
"In the event of a battle, the chief of the cruiser squadron should act at his own discretion."
It is difficult to say why this signal was given. Wilhelm Karlovich, even before reaching the breakthrough, notified his flagships that he was going to rely on the instructions developed by S. O. Makarov, in which the cruisers were directly allowed to act at their own discretion in order to put the enemy in two fires, or to repel a mine attack - for this they should not have expected a signal from the commander. Maybe V. K. Vitgeft was dissatisfied with the passive behavior of N. K. Reitenstein in the first phase of the battle? But what could a detachment of armored cruisers do in the battle of battleships that fought at great distances? Most likely, it was just a reminder-permission to take the initiative.
Even V. K. Vitgeft summoned the chief of the 1st destroyer detachment, and when the "Enduring" approached the "Tsarevich" at a distance of voice communication, he turned to the captain of the 2nd rank E. P. Eliseev, asking if he could attack the Japanese at night. E. P. Eliseev answered in the affirmative, but only if the location of the enemy battleships would be known to him. Having received such an answer, Wilhelm Karlovich, nevertheless, did not give any order, and this caused bewilderment to many researchers of the battle on July 28, 1904.
However, the author of this article does not see anything strange in this. The Russian admiral did not know what the battle would turn out to be: whether H. would catch up with him. Togo in an hour, or three, whether the Japanese commander would prefer to stay at a great distance, or would risk getting close, whether the collision would take on the character of a short skirmish, or the squadron would face a long fierce battle, where will H. lead his detachment, when twilight comes, and so on. In these conditions, any order would be, perhaps, premature, so V. K. Vitgeft, making sure that nothing was in the way of the night mine attack, postponed the final decision to a later date. This is probably why he also ordered that "the destroyers stay at the battleships at night," so that in the coming twilight they have the latter at hand.
The Russian commander also issued several orders regarding the actions of the squadron in the dark: "Do not shine with searchlights at night, try to keep the darkness" and "Watch the admiral as the sun goes down."These were perfectly sound instructions: as the entire history of the Russo-Japanese war has shown, battleships and cruisers walking in darkness at night had a much better chance of avoiding mine attacks than those who unmasked themselves with searchlights and desperate shooting.
In general, V. K. Vitgeft gave the correct orders, but still he made 2 mistakes. Firstly, he did not inform the commanders of the ships of the place of assembly on the morning of July 29. The squadron was preparing to leave in the night, and it was very likely that the battle with the Japanese would resume and continue until nightfall. At night V. K. Vitgeft assumed to perform several sharp turns to confuse the enemy, and in addition, mine attacks were expected: under these conditions, one would expect that some of the ships would lose their place in the ranks, repulse from the squadron. Therefore, it was necessary to designate a rally point so that on the morning of July 29 it would be possible to add at least a part of the stragglers to the main forces, as well as destroyers, if they were to be sent into a night attack.
The second mistake had much more serious consequences. VC. Vitgeft made a completely logical and theoretically correct decision - in the upcoming battle to focus fire on the flagship battleship of H. Togo "Mikasa", and therefore ordered to report with a semaphore on the line:
"When you start shooting, shoot at the head."
The Japanese had to catch up with the Russian squadron, and Heihachiro Togo could hardly avoid the need to expose the Mikasa to the fire of the entire Russian line (as we will see later, this is exactly what happened). But the problem was that when the fire of several ships was concentrated, their target was completely hidden behind the columns of water from close falls, and the gunners no longer saw their own hits, and also could not distinguish the fall of their own shells from shells from other ships. All this sharply reduced the accuracy of fire, so in the Japanese fleet there was a rule according to which, if a ship could not effectively hit the target indicated by the flagship, it had the right to transfer fire to another enemy ship. VC. Vitgeft did not make this reservation, which was far from the best effect on the accuracy of the shooting of the Russian battleships.
Meanwhile, the main forces of the Japanese were approaching - slowly but steadily they were catching up with the 1st Pacific Squadron. The second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea began.
Unfortunately, the beginning of the second battle is a big mystery, because eyewitness accounts and official documents directly contradict each other and comparing them absolutely does not clarify anything. The time of the resumption of the battle is unclear, the speed of the Russian ships is unclear, the position of the Japanese and Russian squadrons at the time of the opening of fire is unclear …
Official documents report the following - after 14.50, when the 1st phase of the battle of V. K. Vitgeft led his ships at a speed of either 14, or "about 14 knots." For the old battleships, this turned out to be too much, therefore, according to the "Conclusion of the Investigative Commission on the case of the 28 July battle":
"The line of our battleships at this time was significantly extended, since the end battleships - Sevastopol and especially Poltava were far behind."
"Poltava" lagged behind "especially strongly" for an understandable reason - in the 1st phase, the Russian ships did not receive critical damage, but a shell fragment on the "Poltava" hit the bearing of the machine, which caused it to warm up and had to reduce the speed, which was confirmed by many sources … In addition, the official point of view on this issue is confirmed by the memoirs of the senior officer of "Poltava" S. I. Lutonin:
"… the squadron is moving farther and farther, now there are already 20 cables to" Sevastopol "… the enemy is approaching, we are alone, our squadron is far away, and all enemy forces are about to fall on" Poltava "."
Further, S. I. Lutonin's description of the battle of "Poltava" with all the forces of the Japanese 1st combat detachment follows, and it began like this:
“I was in the battery and saw the enemy approaching closer and closer. The disposition of the Japanese ships was the usual, Mikasa was the lead one. This formidable enemy is located on our abeam, and is about to open fire and bombard the “Poltava” with shells. But what am I hearing? Two sharp shots from our 6-inch tower No. 1, I see, behind “Mikasa” two white haze appeared in its casemates, both of our shells hit, the distance was 32 cables, the time was 4 hours 15 minutes in the afternoon. The tower commander, midshipman Pchelnikov, caught the moment, he realized that it was necessary to stun the enemy, it was necessary to start a battle, and he started it, two shells saved Poltava from defeat.
In response to our call from all the left side of seven battleships a volley was fired at “Poltava”, but it did no harm, as it was disrupted prematurely. A mass of fountains rose between us and the enemy, Togo, probably, prepared a volley for 30 cables, and therefore the shells, before reaching two cables, sprinkled us with a bunch of fragments."
The matter seems to be clear. In the first phase, the 152-mm turret of Warrant Officer Pchelnikov was jammed in a position almost traverse (i.e. perpendicular to the ship's course) but slightly aft. S. I. himself Lutonin writes that this tower could only rotate within 2, 5 degrees. Therefore, midshipman Pchelnikov did not just catch the moment - he just, seeing that the Japanese flagship was about to go beyond the reach of his guns, fired a volley at him, guided by a completely natural desire for a naval sailor to harm the enemy.
It is difficult to say whether the midshipman got to the Mikasa or not. On the one hand, the Japanese side does not record hits on the flagship H. Togo at 16.15 or any time close to that, but on the other hand, the time of hits of several six-inch (and unidentified caliber, which could well be six-inch) shells were not recorded. So we can say that Japanese sources do not confirm or deny the hits of warrant officer Pchelnikov. These hits, or simply the fact that Poltava opened fire made the Japanese nervous and struck ahead of time. It is quite possible that the Japanese really tried to knock out the Poltava with one precise salvo of all the ships of the line (similar firing techniques were provided for by the old domestic manuals on naval shooting), but they fired ahead of time and missed.
So far, everything is logical and consistent, but further …
The fact is that the "Conclusion of the Investigative Commission on the 28 July Battle" does not at all confirm the words of S. I. Lutonin to open fire at 16.15. It reads
"At the end of the fifth hour, when the lead ship of the enemy armored detachment went abeam the fourth ship of our line, the battleship Peresvet, and was about 40 cables away from it, the second battle began."
Even if we assume that the “outcome of the fifth hour” is 16.45, then a half-hour difference with the data of S. I. Lutonin, but most importantly, midshipman Pchelnikov could not shoot at Mikasa when the latter was abeam of Peresvet, because by that time H. Togo's flagship battleship had long been beyond the reach of its tower!
Let us assume that the battle nevertheless began at 14.15, at the moment when Mikasa was abeam of Poltava. But "Poltava" was 2 miles away from "Sevastopol", and even if we assume that the standard interval of 2 cables was maintained between "Sevastopol" and "Peresvet" from "Peresvet" (taking into account the length of "Sevastopol" about 22.6 kbt. "Poltava" by 22.6 kbt, ie to go at a speed of 3 knots faster than V. K. that the battleships of H. Togo flew forward at 17 knots? !! And if the Russian squadron did not fight until 4:45 pm, then what was it doing then? Contemplated the shooting of the Poltava? "Could not knock out an battleship that fought alone against seven? And why in none of the memoirs (including that of S. I. melting nothing of the kind?
But the quite official "Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905" (Book III) adds intrigue, describing the beginning of the battle as follows:
“When the distance was reduced to 40-45 cables, the battleship Poltava, without waiting for a signal, opened fire. The battle began immediately along the entire line, and it began immediately with full intensity."
The exact time of the resumption of the battle "Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905." does not report, but from the context it is clear that this happened after 16.30. Let's say it's true. But why then did the Japanese not start the battle, attacking the much lagging Russian battleship, and opened fire only after they had reached the traverse of the "Peresvet", that is, when even the terminal "Yakumo" has long passed the traverse of "Poltava"? Why V. K. Vitgeft, who had previously shown himself to be a good commander in battle, left the Poltava to be devoured by the Japanese, leaving it two miles aft of the Sevastopol? And what - it turns out that the memoirs of S. I. Lutonin is completely untrustworthy, because in this case all his records of the resumption of the battle are false from start to finish?
Without insisting at all on his point of view, the author of this article assumes the following version of those distant events.
The Russian squadron after 14.50 had a course of 13 knots (V. Semenov, by the way, writes about 12-13 knots). "Sevastopol" was in the ranks, but the damaged "Poltava" gradually lagged behind. Then, as the "Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905" writes (by the way, contradicting itself):
“The commander of the Tsarevich turned to the Admiral and reminded him that the battleship has only 70 revolutions, that is, 13 knots of speed, the admiral ordered to raise the signal "More speed" and add speed gradually. We added 10 revolutions, but at this time Sevastopol and Poltava began to lag behind, which is why they again reduced them to 70 revolutions."
It is possible that it was precisely because of this signal "More speed" that the very "14 knots" or "about 14 knots" arose about which we read in the official descriptions of the battle, although the speed was increased briefly and soon again reduced to 13 knots. But during this increase in speed, the line was stretched and not only "Poltava", but also "Sevastopol" lagged behind (a description of which we see in the "Conclusion of the Investigative Commission"). However, later the speed was again reduced to 13 knots and closer to the beginning of the battle, the lagging battleships managed to pull up. It can be assumed that by the beginning of the battle "Sevastopol" took its place in the ranks (2 kbt from the stern of "Peresvet"), and "Poltava" lagged behind "Sevastopol" by 6-7 cables. The Japanese were catching up to V. K. Vitgefta with a speed of at least 15 knots. The fight resumed exactly as S. I. Lutonin - at the moment when "Mikasa" crossed the traverse "Poltava", but it happened not at 16.15, but closer to 16.30. Japanese ships hit Poltava, but unsuccessfully and fired at it for some time, but their lead ships, overtaking Poltava, quickly transferred fire to Peresvet, because the latter was flying the flag of the junior flagship, and therefore was a more tempting target … At the same time, the Russian battleships hesitated with the opening of fire, and began the battle either at 4.30 pm or a little later, but still not when the Mikasa reached the traverse of the Peresvet, but somewhat earlier.
The version presented above explains most of the logical inconsistencies in the sources, but this does not mean that it is more reliable than other possible hypotheses. Perhaps it is more logical, but logic is the enemy of the historian. Too often, historical events do not obey its laws. How many times has already happened: logically it should be so, but in fact it happened for some reason quite differently.
Only one thing can be said for certain: the Japanese 1st Combat Detachment, which had joined the Yakumo, slowly walked along the line of the Russian battleships, and at about 4.30 pm the Poltava shot began the second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea.
