The reorganization of the People's Liberation Army of China sets the stage for major changes, as the transition to a new command structure affects all its branches of the military
The People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), a military force loyal to the Chinese Communist Party, has embarked on the most serious restructuring since its founding in 1933. The restructuring of President Xi Jinping will fundamentally reform the four types of PLA: the army, navy, air force, and missile forces.
Before looking at the platforms in service with the ground forces, it is important to understand what constitutes China's military reform. One of the fundamental changes was the abolition of seven military districts adopted on February 1 and their replacement by five joint military commands. Xi Jinping said that each Command is responsible for "maintaining peace, containing wars, winning battles and responding to security threats from their strategic directions."
The main reason for the restructuring is the creation of a maneuverable force that can quickly respond to emergency situations. It streamlines the command hierarchy, since each theater of operations under the Central Military Commission (CMC) can deploy troops in its own direction in wartime and peacetime, which makes it possible to achieve combat readiness faster. Military Commands were organized to exercise control over their specific geographic areas. The idea here is that one Theater Command would deal with several strategic fronts, and not several Commands would deal with one strategic front.
Joint conduct of hostilities is also simplified by transferring all four branches of the Armed Forces (AF) to the command of the theater commander. As a result, it eliminates the need to go through the cumbersome chain of command when requesting the necessary funds from each type of aircraft. In addition, it is hoped that the combat training regime will become more effective, as the services of the Armed Forces will conduct joint training in a more coordinated manner.
Dr. Malcolm Davis, Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), expressed his opinion: “I believe that the main challenge facing the PLA is to provide effective combat training in a single combat space, which seems quite realistic. Therefore, exercises need to be conducted less according to the scenario, real competition is needed in order for the opposing forces or the troops of the conditional enemy "to be able to defeat" their troops. " The PLA has a lot to gain from defeats in exercises, and this will help avoid defeats in future wars. But will the political agenda, personal interest and bureaucratic obstacles allow it?"
Five forces
So what are these five Commands? Eastern Command looks at Japan and Taiwan across the East China Sea. It is critical for the PLA, as the government does not rule out the use of force to unite Taiwan with mainland China. The command has three army groups: 1st, 12th and 31st.
Given the rising tensions in the South China Sea, the Southern Command is equally important. It controls troops near the Vietnamese, Myanmar and Lao borders in the provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou; in addition, it includes subunits of the sea and airborne assault forces. He also has three army groups at his disposal: the 14th, 41st and 42nd.
Landlocked, the largest in area, Western Command protects nearly half of China's mainland. It is also responsible for internal security in Xinjiang, Tibet and other areas. Of course, taking into account all geographical and political factors, the Indian border is a super-strategic object and therefore the Western Command has three army groups, the 13th, 21st and 47th, as well as ten divisions / brigades and the Tibetan and Xinjiang military districts.
The Northern Command must respond to challenges from the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia, Russia and northern Japan. Given the unpredictability of Kim Jong-un's regime, this Command will mainly deal with problems with North Korea. The command includes four army groups: 16th, 26th, 39th and 40th.
Central Command, headquartered in Beijing, defends the country's political heart with five army groups: the 20th, 27th, 38th, 54th, and 65th. This Command is the most powerful and largest, making it the PLA's strategic reserve. In addition, two of these armies (38th and 54th) are considered the PLA's trump cards.
However, the structure of the Central Command is partly a consequence of Beijing's old-fashioned thinking. Of course, the overall idea behind the formation of theater commanders was that they oversee their own strategic areas. What, then, is the purpose of a huge strategic reserve? In a sense, it seems that with this restructuring, the PLA has strengthened its core rather than its periphery.
However, a caveat is needed here. It is one thing to form new commands and call them "united" and quite another to act effectively as a united force. Although the PLA has carefully studied the American model and is keen to emulate it, the long tradition of army domination cannot disappear overnight. The combined forces and means require a certain culture, when each type of aircraft works comfortably with the other. Undoubtedly, there will be many difficulties in achieving this, especially with regard to the ground forces, which, once possessing undeniable superiority, are now in a sense beginning to play secondary roles.
Downsizing of departments
Another significant change in the PLA has been a sharp decline in the number of troops, especially in the army, which is estimated at 1.6 million. Xi Jinping announced at the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2015, "I announce that China will reduce its troops by 300,000." The reason for the planned cutbacks in 2017 is to rationalize the bloated military structures in order to remove all burdensome ballast structures. A smaller army means easier modernization of all types and types of troops.
The new structure will allow the Central Military Commission to control the PLA even more tightly, which, they complain, has had too much freedom for too long. Chairman Xi said the reform would reinforce the principle that "the Chinese Communist Party is the absolute leader of the military." In addition, Xi has given the relevant structures greater powers to control the PLA. Communism depends on tight control of the center, and these reforms, plus the desire to root out corruption and nepotism in the PLA, are aimed at strengthening it.
Davis believes that "the PLA needs to really reduce the vertical in command structures, plan operations at lower levels of command with more authority, encourage the initiative of all ranks and rather invest more in high-class NCOs than have so much authority and responsibility among senior colonels."
In accordance with the plans for the restructuring of the army, four main departments were also disbanded, in which the army component dominated: the General Staff, the political, supply and arms departments. A new army headquarters structure was formed, equal in status to the headquarters of the fleet and aviation, which thus made it possible to remove the advantages previously possessed by the ground forces. The formation of its own specialized headquarters will allow the army to more easily solve the tasks of its planning and development. The functions of these four departments were transferred to 15 new institutions directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission.
Along with the entry of the second artillery corps into the missile forces on December 31, 2015 as a full-fledged type of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Support Forces became another new structure created. The PLA worked hard to develop its high-tech capabilities in modern conditions, to create a structure that provides an "information umbrella" that could provide the military with accurate, effective and reliable data and guarantee strategic support. The Strategic Support Forces include three different types of troops: space troops, cyber troops, and electronic warfare troops, essentially the air and space army, the Internet army, and the electronic warfare (EW) army.
The space force relies on reconnaissance and navigation satellites to track targets and conduct reconnaissance. It is not clear whether their mandate extends to identifying, jamming and destroying potential adversaries in space satellites. Cyber Troops are responsible for defensive and offensive computer operations. Most likely, they will include existing cyber units. The electronic warfare forces, meanwhile, will focus on jamming and disrupting the operation of radars and communications. China understands that it must capitalize on high-tech information warfare to gain asymmetric advantages before and during any confrontation with its main adversary.
In the process of the major renovation, 18 army groups remained intact. However, the Chinese army has an excellent opportunity to continue its transition from a divisional structure to a more flexible brigade system, since a brigade in the PLA has a typical strength of approximately 4,500, compared to 15,000 in a division.
Defense budget
On March 6, China announced its defense budget, which increased by 7.6% over last year to $ 143 billion. Compared to double-digit annual growth in the past three decades (excluding 7.5% in 2010), this year's figure reflected the serious economic, social and demographic challenges facing China. American analysts Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff of the Naval War College and Indiana University commented: "Looking at the Chinese defense budget for 2016, it is clear that even military spending is influenced by the financial and economic realities of China."
If we take from the gross domestic product, then China's military spending is only about 1.5%. Of course, any talk about China's defense budget contains the assumption that official figures cannot always be trusted and some defense spending is not included in the bottom line.
The PLA has the second largest defense budget in the world, second only to the United States. Its activities have not yet reached the international scope that the Pentagon has reached; one of the reasons is the lack of allies and a network of military bases around the world. However, China is beginning to send forces and resources to this and is currently building its first overseas base in Djibouti.
Very large sums of money are spent on asymmetric weapon systems (eg missiles, submarines, cyber warfare, and space / satellite technology), giving Beijing a decisive advantage in its region. Analysts commented on this: “This is forcing the neighbors of the United States and China to embark on an extremely costly path of maintaining equal competitive opportunities. The PLA's current trajectory provides China with the opportunity to toughly challenge the interests of the United States and its partners in East Asia. For example, one of them is unrestricted access to safe international waters and airspace, on which all countries that seek economic prosperity rely."
Battle-ready platforms
Regarding the military hardware currently in service with China, Davis said: “When it comes to capacity enhancement, the real growth is in the Navy, Air Force and Missile Forces, but not in the Army. Nevertheless, the army is increasing its capabilities, especially in the field of tactical and operational mobility, and also emphasizes strategic mobility at the scale of military districts … the political influence of the Navy and other types of the Armed Forces”.
ASPI's Mr. Davis stated that "the PLA is steadily moving away from its infantry-dominated low-tech force status to mechanized force and, ultimately, information power." However, he expressed the opinion that the army "is at a crossroads and must be reorganized to meet modern challenges."
Davis explained: “The army is facing a real problem in that Taiwan, as well as the South China and East China Seas, are identified as the main strategic direction according to the current Chinese doctrine. China does not face real military challenges along its land borders like the Soviet Union faced during the Cold War. The challenge comes in the form of Islamist forces that can influence the situation in Xinjiang, but it is more of a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency mission that is very different from traditional fighting.
“The point is not only what system the army will receive, but what its role and purpose is - this is the main question. With this in mind, we can discuss the latest armored platforms coming into service."
The ZTZ99A tank entered service with the elite armored divisions and brigades of the Chinese army. Norinco's chief engineer calls him "the world leader in firepower, protection, agility and information technology." It is armed with a 125-mm cannon modified for firing sub-caliber projectiles, and a system for recording the thermal bending of the barrel increases the accuracy of firing. The turret of the ZTZ99A tank is equipped with reactive armor, an active protection complex and a laser warning system receiver are installed.
The combat capabilities of the tank are enhanced by the broadband data transmission channel, which gives access to information from other combat platforms. The combat control system has a self-monitoring function, which can, for example, report on the need to replenish ammunition or refuel. Compared to the previous model ZTZ99 (Type 99), the ZTZ99A tank weighing 50 tons is equipped with a more powerful 1500 hp engine. The commander's day / night sight allows you to fire at targets in the search and strike mode. Although the ZTZ99 / ZTZ99A family represents the pinnacle of Chinese tank building, their number remains relatively small due to the prohibitive cost. More common in the PLA is the second generation ZTZ96 tank, which is also armed with a 125mm smoothbore cannon. An upgraded version of the ZTZ96A weighing 42.5 tons was shown in 2006.
Russian model
The ZBD04A BMP, which debuted at last year's parade in Beijing, has the same 100-mm and 30-mm cannon armament as its predecessor, the ZBD04. The ZBD04 armored vehicle weighing 21.5 tons produced by Norinco very much resembles the Russian BMP-3, but the ZBD04A is much closer to the concept of western BMPs. It is equipped with an improved fire control system, additional armor, and an information management system that interacts with a similar system of the ZTZ99A tank. It is clear that it is superior in capabilities to its predecessor, and therefore analysts expect more ZBD04A production than the 500 ZBD04 machines that were produced.
Another noteworthy new platform is the AFT10 self-propelled anti-tank missile system. It is armed with HJ-10 guided missiles weighing 150 kg, which are likely to be guided over fiber optic cable. Each AFT10 machine has two quad launchers, which allows 8 missiles to be launched before reloading. The missile with a range of 10 km is equipped with a solid propellant booster and a micro-turbojet engine. The AFT10 ATGM, which entered service in 2012, provides the PLA with long-range anti-tank capabilities.
The PLA also did not pass by the international trend of the increasing proliferation of wheeled armored vehicles. Now she is armed with two main families in this category. The first can be called the Type 09 8x8 family of Norinco, in which the main option is the ZBD09 infantry fighting vehicle weighing 21 tons, equipped with a two-man turret with a 30-mm cannon. The maximum speed on the highway is 100 km / h and on the water 8 km / h. New developments include a new self-propelled artillery unit ZLT11, armed with a 105-mm cannon.
The second family of wheeled vehicles in service with the PLA is based on the floating ZSL92 (Type 92) 6x6. A wide range of models are available, including the 17-ton ZSL92B with a turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. The family also includes the PTL02 anti-tank gun with a 105 mm cannon; according to some estimates, the PLA is armed with 350 such installations. The Type 09 and Type 92 armored personnel carriers give motorized infantry units the ability to quickly move on paved roads.
Infantry development
The PLA's standard assault rifle is the 5.8mm QBZ95 model. Its latest version, QBZ95-1, improved from an ergonomic point of view, was first seen in Hong Kong in 2012. It implements such improvements as an offset window for ejection of spent cartridges and a safety-translator for firing from the left hand. The rifle can be equipped with a 35mm QLG10A grenade launcher. The QJB95 squad machine gun with a drum magazine is a variant of the QBZ95 rifle and weighs 3, 95 kg.
The QBU88 infantry sniper rifle actually became the first 5, 8 mm weapon adopted by the PLA. It is equipped with a sight with 4x magnification, and the declared range is 800 meters. The large-caliber 12.7mm QBU10 rifle weighing 13.3 kg is also available to snipers. The PLA declares a "sighting range for living objects of 1000 meters and material objects of 1500 meters." When installing an infrared sight / rangefinder, the shooter gets the opportunity to fire at night.
The QSZ92 semi-automatic pistol, both 9x19mm (for special forces) and 5.8x21mm (for officers), has been in service since the late 90s. Later, a 5, 8-mm QSZ11 pistol with an eight-round magazine was introduced. It is intended for “senior commanders, guards, pilots and taikonauts” and is not a replacement for the existing QSZ92 pistol.
The 5.8 mm QJY88 universal machine gun, weighing 11.8 kg with a bipod, has an actual range of 800 meters. Further, as the caliber increases, mention should be made of the 12.7mm QJZ89 heavy machine gun - the equivalent of the western 12.7mm M2 machine gun. It has a mass of 17.5 kg and can be used against targets at ranges up to 1500 meters. The 35-mm automatic grenade launcher Norinco QLZ87 with a maximum range of 1750 meters can fire from a bipod or tripod.
The 50-mm QLT89 / QLT89A grenade launcher for indirect fire is actually a light mortar. Hand weapons without a bipod weighing 3, 8 kg can fire at a distance of 800 meters. Norinco's 82mm PP87 mortar is capable of firing at a range of up to 4660 meters. However, the PP87 mortar weighing 39.7 kg was recently surpassed by the Type 001 mortar weighing 31 kg, which has a long range of 5600 meters.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Norinco PF98 anti-tank grenade launcher, which fills the gap between single-shot grenade launchers and ATGMs. It can fire either a 120-mm universal high-explosive fragmentation or a cumulative projectile. In 2010, the Hong Kong garrison showed an updated version of the PF98A with a modified fire control unit.
Artillery, landing troops
China is armed with more than 6,000 towed guns and 1,700 self-propelled howitzers of traditional Soviet calibers 122 mm, 130 mm and 152 mm. However, the PLZ05, the largest-caliber artillery mount, is distinguished by the Western-caliber 155 mm L / 52 cannon. This 35-ton installation from Norinco can fire laser-guided ammunition, and the range with the WS-35 projectile is estimated to be 100 km. Also, a relatively new 122 mm howitzer PLZ07 weighing 22.5 tons was put into service in 2007. In addition, China has also adopted the PLL05 120mm mortar-howitzer, based on the already mentioned Type 92 6x6 chassis.
The PLA is armed with about 1,770 multiple launch rocket systems. The most powerful among them is the PHL03, which entered service in 2004. The 12-barreled 300 mm launcher, firing at a range of 150 km, is a copy of the Russian 9K58 Smerch MLRS. The PLA's Rocket Forces have deployed a number of ballistic missiles, including short-range tactical missiles, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article.
The state-owned company Norinco manufactures specialized armored vehicles such as the ZBD03 for the airborne forces. The floating armored vehicle ZBD03 weighing 8 tons is equipped with a turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. The crew of the vehicle is three people, four paratroopers are located in the aft compartment. The ZBD03 parachute landing vehicle is again a copy of the Russian BMD, although the engine in the Chinese version is installed in the front.
Norinco also manufactures ZBD05 / ZTD05 amphibious assault vehicles for the Army and Marine Corps. The platform was first unveiled in 2006, a testament to China's growing focus on amphibious operations. BMP for landing operations ZBD05 with a length of 9, 5 meters is armed with a 30 mm cannon, while the light tank ZTD05 is armed with a stabilized 105 mm cannon. There are also sanitary, command and evacuation options. Machines weighing 26.5 tons develop a speed of 25 km / h on the water thanks to two powerful water cannons installed in the stern. The PLA is currently armed with up to 1000 ZBD05 / ZTD05 vehicles.
Davis expressed his opinion on this: “Look what the Chinese army, along with the marines, are doing in the context of amphibious capabilities, especially everything related to the South China Sea. The adoption of Type 081 amphibious assault helicopter carriers will be a big step forward. I believe the army's weakest point is that it has no real combat experience in high-tech combat operations. China has participated in peacekeeping operations and conducted joint exercises through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But unlike the US military … China has no real combat experience. Therefore, until the army gains this experience, it will remain a dark horse because we can only judge it by its teachings, its operational doctrine and the types of capabilities it invests in."
“It is clear that there is a process of improvement, rapid progress towards modern combined mechanized and information forces,” he continued. “But they have not yet achieved their plans, and it is rather risky to compare the Chinese army with the American or some kind of coalition. That is why the Chinese are more focused on air, space, sea, cyber and electronic warfare. These are the areas where they can win pretty quickly with relatively small losses."
