Not so long ago, our country could well provide itself with helicopter carriers. The picture shows the Project 1123 cruiser Moskva.
The Mistral deal can also be regarded as distrust of its own military-industrial complex
For about a year now, rumors have been circulating among specialists about the prospects for the acquisition of the French Mistral UDC for the Russian Navy. Now, after the president's visit to France and the joint statements made there, the matter seems to be ready to move on to a practical plane.
The first thing to note is that it is a rare case when there are so many different opinions on certain issues of prospective military development. - There are reasons for this: for the first time in almost 70 years (reparations are not counted), the state is openly adopting such a large complex of weapons abroad. Until now, the confidence that the domestic military-industrial complex knows and is ready to create everything that is required for the country's defense was complete.
Consequently, the Mistral deal can be regarded both as a distrust of its own military-industrial complex, which hitherto occupied an unshakable position in the state, and as a certain courage and flexibility in striving to follow in the construction of the Armed Forces (Navy) by the shortest path of achieving several goals at once, including being guided by the criterion "time - cost - efficiency" … In addition, this step can demonstrate independence from the opinion of us as a self-sufficient, universal, hitherto recognized supplier to the world arms market.
So far, one thing is clear: the leadership's step with the acquisition of the Frenchman is so extraordinary that it catches by surprise not only professional, but also less professional analysts-observers, simply fans of delving into the operational and operational-strategic "obstructions" of the consequences of one or another serious step in military development. So much so that it raises deep doubts whether everything here is completely clear even to those in front of whom all the cards are open and on whose professional recommendations the country's leadership is taking such steps. Not to mention the fact that only time and the course of events will give it a final assessment - it is difficult to draw any final conclusions and conclusions with a minimum of information. Meanwhile, some preliminary remarks and questions are not only admissible and natural, but also necessary (due to the undoubted importance of the matter) already now. Let's turn to at least some of them.
A. The crisis of naval armaments, which struck us, is so deep that today we are objectively unable to restore the naval composition and power of the naval groupings adequate to the obligations and statements made by the state with the forces and means of our own industry within the given time frame. And to hide it further would be a crime against the country: this could be followed by the failure of foreign policy.
B. UDC, the class of ships in question, have never been built in our country, and there is no doubt that attempts to create them on domestic soil would inevitably cause a lot of insurmountable difficulties. Meanwhile, in all modern fleets of the world, they are, or they are seriously concerned about their early acquisition, because not a single class of ships and weapons as a whole corresponds to such an extent to the trends in the development of forces and means of armed struggle in modern conditions. In this project, like nowhere else, the interests and capabilities of almost all types and even genera of the Armed Forces converge. In addition, most of the happy owners of these ships resorted to foreign help or cooperation in their construction and armament.
V. To the question (he is also asked) - is it not easier to restore our BDK I rank instead? up to 16 helicopters and several helicopters; in addition, the living conditions on a French ship are obviously an order of magnitude higher, which is extremely important in a long voyage to maintain the combat capability of the landing force. Especially in warm waters (whoever swam there knows what it is about).
D. At the same time, it is quite obvious that the commissioning of such ships cannot, in the most natural way, not require an appropriate number of escort ships to provide amphibious groups during the passage by sea in the areas of combat maneuvering and disembarkation, that is, the acquisition of UDC automatically stimulates the revival of naval shipbuilding.
E. The appearance of the UDC in the Navy, especially in that part of the project that involves the construction of two units at domestic shipyards, given the aircraft carrier design and architecture of the latter, cannot but contribute to the advancement (and along the right path) of the design and construction of new domestic aircraft carriers., about which our leadership also confidently declares. Whether it will be decisive - time will tell, but one thing is clear: it will never become superfluous …
This is something that lies on the surface and does not need additional information, access to which is limited for known reasons. At the same time, in the course of our reasoning, a whole series of natural questions cannot but arise, on the answer to which the effectiveness of the entire project will objectively depend, regardless of what our strategists and management think about this today.
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
As for the most ambitious examples, they relate to the period immediately preceding the RYV. Not having time to fulfill the Shipbuilding Program for the needs of the Far East on its own, Russia orders a number of ships abroad. Their grouping (from EBR, KR to EM) together amounted to 30% of the total composition of the first echelon of forces (1st Pacific Squadron). And these were not the worst ships!
The second goal, which was traditionally pursued by ordering ships abroad, was the natural enrichment of the domestic military shipbuilding with the best world experience in order to avoid lagging behind. All the best in technology, noted on "imported" ships, was immediately transferred to the projects of promising LK and KR. This is probably why the post-war "Andrew the First-Called", "Paul I" in the Baltic, "John Chrysostom" and "Eustathius" in the Black Sea were in no way inferior to the best English pre-dreadnoughts.
In the interwar period (1905-1914), borrowing abroad was limited, although Russia, having lost a huge fleet in the previous war, desperately needed a modern ship composition. Nevertheless, as an exception, the world's best armored cruiser "Rurik" for Russia was nevertheless built in England. In equipping the newest destroyer Novik - first of all with machines and boilers - German experience was borrowed, and the turbines of new dreadnoughts - English, made by Parsons. Meanwhile, the lag in some technologies, primarily related to the installation and installation of unique super-heavy three-gun turrets with 14Ѕ to 54 caliber guns (manufacturing of running balls), the manufacture of the gun trunnions themselves, prevented the completion and commissioning of at least part of a series of very promising and powerful Russian battleships of the Borodino class. However, even then there was a crisis in the manufacture of especially powerful ship armor and some other technologies needed in military shipbuilding …
In Soviet times, the beginning of a massive modern domestic military shipbuilding was laid by borrowing Italian experience in the form of a light cruiser project, leaders, the purchase of an unfinished cruiser in Germany - but this was precisely a forced measure.
Further - only what we got under the lend-lease and reparations.
And then - all by yourself! Up to this day!
And what about yourself?
Indeed, what about yourself? Since the late 60s, and especially at the peak of its development, the Navy has become a modern fleet and cannot but command respect from its mighty opponents. Traditionally unbalanced, it nevertheless almost always differed in some kind of know-how, as they say, giving one-sided advantages, at least partially compensating for the disadvantages. Its imbalance itself, as a generic disease, would be correct to attribute not so much to the problems of the technological plan as to the costs of naval thinking, which traditionally did not receive due attention on national grounds (see the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov). Take the problem of problems - aviation; Firstly, it assumes a very long way to go: from mastering the very principle of flights from the deck of modern combat aircraft and helicopters to achieving the necessary operational and tactical standards for the combat use of carrier-based aircraft. In addition to formally agreeing with her in the ranks of the top leadership of the fleet, she must have interested, talented and competent performers who are within the most vital process of the practical implementation of the idea. At the same time, endowed with sufficient powers. The mistake of our management lies in the fact that the problem is considered possible to be solved by some one-time event, like that - they decided, built … and flew in the right way …
The concept of the problem of aviation is not at all limited to the banal absence of aircraft carriers in the Navy - this actually includes a very strange relationship that has developed among our amphibious, anti-submarine forces (to a lesser extent), strike, mine sweeping, search and rescue and other forces with helicopters, and the most various purposes and in mass quantities. The price for this phenomenon is that imbalance of the fleet in all its ugliness and helplessness, that is, its inability to independently act in the chosen directions of the ocean theater of operations without restrictions.
To strengthen the impression, let us point out the absence and non-use, still in the interests of the main ship formations, of the AWACS aircraft, although the experience of the 1982 Falklands War (with its convincing losses) put an end to the dispute about their absolute necessity. Almost 30 years separate us from these events, "… but things are still there!"
There are many such dangerous archaisms: in the structure of fleet management, in submarine forces, and in surface attack, anti-submarine surface and naval aviation. Only one lag in terms of the lack of ACS and IBS on modern NK and submarines is worth something. Today it is directly assessed by the inferiority in the combat effectiveness of the naval forces. How significant is even difficult to say! All other things being equal! However, let us return, as they say, to “our rams”.
So what does Mistral give us?
Of course, it tempts at first to find out the views of the modern command of the Navy (Armed Forces) at the expense of using such extraordinary, even exotic, for the Navy ships, their place in the country's defense strategy (as our new partners like to say). However, everyone understands that this is unrealistic! Therefore, we will continue to reason from logic - from the obvious.
1. Among the already quite numerous types of UDC in the world, the Frenchman looks quite attractive. By many criteria: here and "price - quality", and a continuous flight deck, and much more …
2. Abstracting from the inevitable costs in such cases, which Russian will refrain from not even adding its own flavor to the finished business (more on this below), we note: UDC of this type demonstrates the ability to transport at least 450 to the place of combat use (without special conveniences - up to 1200) paratroopers with standard equipment, a couple of hundred pieces of equipment and land them in a combined way at a previously inaccessible Navy pace and place at a depth that was previously inaccessible (using up to 16–20 helicopters for this).
3. The UDC is also extremely convenient for carrying out special operations both with the help of helicopters, high-speed radio invisible craft, and with the help of an ultra-small submarine, which can be brought into a docking chamber.
4. A ship of this type is extremely convenient as the flagship of the demining forces when organizing mine action (actions) in remote areas of the World Ocean - experience of the war in the Gulf, earlier - demining in the Suez Canal.
5. Having a continuous flight deck up to 200 m long, such a ship can be easily transformed into a light aircraft carrier; it is enough to equip it with a bow ramp (springboard) and an aircraft finisher. Australia, which also shows considerable interest in the acquisition of such ships, according to the press, assumes just such a variant of its use. In the presence of an SUVVP, you can only limit yourself to the ramp. By the way, the American UDC "Tarava" and "Wasp" have up to 6-7 such aircraft in their large air groups. This makes them truly versatile and self-sufficient ships in amphibious operations of any level.
6. The use of such ships within the framework of a national defense strategy allows, through the possibility of conducting deep airmobile operations, to flexibly influence the situation in entire regions washed by adjacent seas (oceans), appearing from the directions traditionally rearward for the enemy. The very possibility of carrying out combat operations of this type with its help significantly enriches and promotes the theory and practice of military bases, giving them modern features in the form of special mobility in various environments (at the boundaries of environments).
QUESTIONS REMAIN
Then, as they say, there are questions that are inevitable in such cases.
Firstly, when it comes to an aircraft carrier or a universal amphibious assault ship (UDC), confirmation (achievement) of its declared operational-tactical capabilities, like nowhere else, is determined by the fact: what kind of air group and landing (in this case) floating craft are included in its package at least the standard armament of these ships or not.
Thus, for the UDC, the determining factors are the types and number of helicopters, the types and number of KVP, displacement landing craft transported in the docking chamber; according to accepted practice, they are also used for unloading other landing and auxiliary ships, ships of the amphibious group on the unequipped coast. At the same time, conventional weapons and weapons installed on such a ship: SAM, ZAK, etc., are relegated to the background in importance. In the sense that without much damage can be replaced by other, say, domestic complexes; in addition, it is customary to reliably defend such ships with specially designated warships and aircraft.
In addition, if we go along the path when, when buying the ship itself, we ignore the borrowing of its aviation and other special (landing) weapons (equipment), modern means of controlling the OBD, providing actions, - succumbing, for example, to the temptation to save money - then, completely naturally, we lose the opportunity and rely on the combat effectiveness declared by its creators.
In addition, I find it difficult to name the type of domestic transport and landing helicopter, adapted to shipborne, the more heavy cargo helicopter, helicopter, adapted to support special operations at a considerable depth; The main domestic attack helicopter, which is certainly part of the UDC air group, is hardly adapted for these purposes, etc.
In addition, the design of the aircraft-carrying ship, which includes the Mistral UDC, is adapted for certain types of aircraft weapons; Efficient maintenance of aviation equipment on board a ship requires a whole fleet of special equipment that is quite specific for each type of aircraft. It is quite clear that their design features, in turn, should allow, with the same dimensions of the ship, flight deck, hangars, to take on board, operate and carry out combat use without interference of the maximum number of aircraft, provided that the air group itself is balanced for typical or special tasks. … Therefore, preference is given, as a rule, to specialized aircraft, specially designed or structurally adapted for sea-based and use over the sea and from the sea. For example, the Mistral structurally has six helipads on the flight deck, suitable, among other things, for the use of the largest sea-based helicopters …
It is also quite clear that it is very difficult to easily and quickly adapt purely coastal-based helicopters for these purposes without a significant decrease in their combat effectiveness and the entire complex, not to mention the problems of flights over the sea …
TOTAL
Having examined all the obvious facts and circumstances relevant to the case, "lying at the top", we are approaching the following conclusions.
The decision to acquire a foreign ship (grouping of ships) with high combat capabilities looks like an interesting and noteworthy step, but leaves questions - their combat effectiveness will crucially depend on a number of conditions, the most important of which are:
- in what time will the ships of the Navy be transferred;
- whether we are in time with the deployment of escort forces for their full support and support;
- in what configuration of their main armament (helicopters and KVP), ACS (IBS) they will be;
- what weapons and weapons of self-defense these ships will be armed with;
- do we have time with the infrastructure for these ships, so that they do not stand on the roads for years, like their predecessors - domestic aircraft carriers, so as not to "cripple" them in any repairs, like their predecessors;
- what will be the structure of the crews of these ships and the system of their training, so that a conscript soldier with a service life of one year (he is a sailor, not just a specialist, the language does not dare to call it) would not overnight break expensive imported equipment and technology;
- Will our military science keep pace with the development of modern, effective methods of using these ships and weapon systems with their high operational and tactical capabilities?
Operational-strategic expediency, in addition, dictates a well-thought-out distribution of the UDC among fleets, future theaters, as well as a fairly high coefficient of their operational stress: ships at sea, among other things, are preserved better than idle at bases.
Finally, one should not think that we have so much productive experience in matters of the combat use of new ships and special forces transported on them - it is necessary to prepare in advance not only the command, but also the ideologists of their modern use.
The main thing is to avoid a repetition of the "Tsushima relapse", when the formidable-looking wake columns of battleships were considered sufficient to intimidate the enemy, while forgetting about the need for the ability to coherently, energetically maneuver and conduct effective fire at the enemy.
For this, proceeding from the actual diversity of the issues raised here, literally tomorrow it is necessary to begin their practical development, including the development of the necessary for the new UDC and the missing weapons and weapons.
