During the first large-scale exercise of the US Air Force "Red Flag 17-01" in 2017, which started on January 23 at Nellis Air Force Base (Nevada), numerous tactical models of operations to gain air superiority and suppress the air defense of a mock enemy were practiced, in which the promising 5th generation F-35A multipurpose fighters, the F / A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, and the F-16C multi-role fighters, traditionally acting as the "aggressor", took part. Promising stealth fighters F-22A "Raptor" were used as support fighters for the F-35A.
According to a February 3 post by blogger David Sencioti on The Aviationist, the F-35A, armed with the 388th and 419th fighter wings deployed at AvB Hill, Utah, were able to achieve an outstanding win ratio (15: 1) over "Falcons" in air battles. Sensioti also focused on the high availability of the F-35A versus the F-16: 92% versus 80%, respectively. Of course, the opponents for the F-35A and F-22A, obviously, were selected such that not a single 5th generation vehicle would be conditionally intercepted by the enemy. Apparently, F-16Cs equipped with outdated AN / APG-68 (V) 9 SHAR radars were used as the "aggressor" vehicles, and the conventional armament was represented by software imitating the AIM-120C-5/7 missiles. Lightnings and Raptors, on the other hand, operated as virtual AIM-120D (C-8), with a 25-30% longer range, and their radars with AFAR AN / APG-81 and AN / APG-81 could boast 2 - 3 times longer range, excellent noise immunity and the ability to impose directional radio-electronic interference on the "aggressor".
At the same time, the author of the post, Sensioti, expresses stupid bewilderment regarding the auxiliary role of the F-22A "Raptor" in these air battles. Nevertheless, this role is extremely clear for any more or less knowledgeable lover of aircraft and modern military technology. It consists in the fact that the conditional launches of AMRAAMs from the F-35A are carried out in a passive mode with the onboard radar turned off and deactivated emitting radio communication and electronic countermeasures stations. This was done to conceal its own location from the radiation warning station of F-16C fighters. In this case, the Lightnings approached the target unnoticed, using their small RCS of 0.2 m2. The role of the F-22A was in target designation for the AIM-120D launched by the Lightning from a distance of 150-200 km. It is most likely that the Raptors followed the F-35A at a distance of 40-50 km with the radars turned on in LPI mode, and, having detected the F-16 "aggressors" at a distance of about 190 km, issued target designations to the board of the "encrypted" F -35A, which were never detected by the weak F-16C radars. AIM-120D long-range air combat guided missiles have hardware and software capabilities for receiving target designation both from the carrier aircraft and from third-party RTR / RER facilities, including other fighters and AWACS aircraft. For the exchange of tactical information and target designation coordinates between the F-22A and the F-35A / B / C, a specialized directional high-security radio channel MADL is used (for protection, a pseudo-random restructuring of the operating frequency is used).
It was with the help of this simple tactic, including the use of the F-22A, that it was possible to achieve a 15: 1 win ratio in favor of the F-35A. Without the help of the Raptors, it would have been approximately 3: 1 or 5: 1. The situation would be even worse for the F-35A if more modern F-16Cs equipped with AN / APG-83 SABR airborne radars were involved in the role of "aggressor". In many cases, it would have come to close combat, where the F-35A would never have outplayed a more maneuverable enemy - the F-16C. Now imagine a long-range aerial battle of the F-35A with our Su-35S, equipped with the most powerful fighter airborne radar with the PFAR N035 "Irbis-E" in history. In this case, the F-35A would have huge problems even with "remote" support from the F-22A, since the Irbis detects the Lightning (0.2 m2) from about 160 - 180 km. Even the use of directed REBs by AN / APG-81 would not bring tangible results, except that the RVV-SD / BD missile would be launched at the source of interference. The Americans, as usual, were able to raise the price of their F-35A pretty well, using the above tactics in the "Red Flag" exercises, and choosing the usual F-16C as a conditional enemy.
But during these exercises, another important task was also worked out - the conditional suppression of the enemy's air defense with the further application of a missile and air strike on the defended object. In this case, the F-35A and F-22A were also used, but promising electronic warfare and anti-air defense aircraft F / A-18G "Growler" were involved as support vehicles. These machines carried out the setting of powerful noise and barrage interference in the direction of the multifunctional radars of enemy ground air defense systems. Thus, the "stealth" fighters found themselves in a dense "veil" of interference from the AN / ALQ-99 station of the F / A-18G aircraft, which made it possible to approach the enemy's radar at 3-4 times closer distance. The so-called "electronic cover" tactic was used. As a ground-based enemy radar, a firing radar for illumination and guidance of the Patriot PAC-2 air defense missile system - AN / MPQ-53 was used.
This tactic can be considered today a very serious challenge for the ground and air components of our aerospace forces, because the majority of surveillance and multifunctional radars of our air defense systems, aviation radars "Bars" and "Irbis" are represented by passive phased array, the problem of which is the lack of the possibility of forming "dips" in the directional diagram the main lobe towards the EW source. This indicates a serious technological "gap", which can only be closed with the transition of the majority of combat units to promising radars with an active phased antenna array. As you can see, almost all of the US military aviation is switching from SHAR to AFAR at a very high rate, and this causes real concern.
