People in modern Russia are very fond of discussing the need to create a so-called professional army. Moreover, the supporters of this proposal are not only representatives of the liberal intelligentsia, but also a significant part of the population of our country who does not share its other views.
Many citizens of the Russian Federation are firmly convinced that a professional army is good by definition. Any opponent of this idea is declared a stupid retrograde, with whom there is simply nothing to talk about. Although there is very much to talk about. After all, you just need to think a little in order to understand what frankly absurd constructions lie at the heart of the myth rooted in the public consciousness.
WHAT ARE WE?
“Let those who want serve”, “Let well-trained professionals serve” - these theses are considered self-evident. In response, I would like to ask questions: who and when prevented people who decided to choose a military career from joining the army? Who and when did not admit them to the Armed Forces? Even in Soviet times, when the recruiting principle of recruitment was not subject to discussion, there was an institution of super-conscripts. And already in the post-Soviet period, attempts to attract professionals to the military system were extremely active. But somehow it didn't work out.
However, the liberal community easily explains this by the fact that the “brilliant idea” was ruined by “stupid generals”. What and how is not intelligibly explained. Ruined - that's all. Apparently, they stood in the way of well-trained professionals and did not let them serve. Those were torn, but - alas! Here, by the way, a passing question arises: where did the well-trained professionals come from? Is it possible that they were so trained in "conscript slavery"? Something does not fit with something here.
In fact, whoever sees his vocation in military service serves. First of all, we are talking about officers. As for the rank and file, it is easy to understand: in a developed country with a market economy (and Russia, with all the understandable reservations, is such), those who have not found their place in civilian life will go to serve in the army under a contract. That is, lumpen. Or at best, well-meaning people from the social bottom. Representatives of other strata of the population will choose a civilian profession, which gives many times more money with an incomparably higher level of freedom (and if they see their vocation in military service, they will go to the officers, and not to the rank and file). This happened in all developed countries, not excluding the United States. In the 70s and 80s of the twentieth century, when in the United States there was a refusal to draft, the quality of the personnel of the American armed forces deteriorated catastrophically.
This fact kills the thesis about "well-trained professionals", which is no less stupid than "let those who want serve".
And again the question arises: why are they professionals? Who prepared them well? You might think that if a person is drafted into the army, he is not a professional. And if the same person hired it, he automatically becomes a professional. By the way, the level of training is determined by its organization, and not by the principle of recruiting. In the Israeli army, for example, combat training is the highest, although the IDF is, one might say, the most conscripted army in the world, even women are obliged to serve in its ranks and no AGS is provided ("refuseniks" are sent to prison). At the same time, the excellent living conditions of the military personnel of the armed forces of the Jewish state are known, and the absence of hazing relationships in them.
The Israelis were able to create such an army, but what prevents us from doing it? Domestic zealots of the professional army are not in a position to provide explanations on this score. The only relatively clear answer: "Israel is surrounded by enemies." This is equivalent to the well-known expression "There is an elderberry in the garden, and there is an uncle in Kiev." The fact of the imposition of enemies on the territory of your country, of course, requires a conscript army (which will be discussed below), but it has nothing to do with the internal structure of the IDF. How does a hostile environment contribute to the excellent living conditions in Israeli barracks? Does the absence of enemy tanks behind the nearest outskirts prevent our army "from learning military affairs in a real way"?
And in the troops of Western European countries, which until the beginning of the 90s were all recruited without exception, the level of training of the rank and file was higher than in the hired Anglo-Saxon armies. The groupings of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the countries of Eastern Europe differed in the same way. A real professional Soviet army was stationed there, although it was recruited by conscription. It's just that abroad, unlike units on the territory of the Union, they did not paint dandelions green, and all two years of service were purposefully engaged in combat training. And if it does not exist, then a person will not become a professional at all, regardless of how many years he has served and whether he receives money for it. In addition, it is extremely difficult to make a professional from a representative of the social lower classes, not to mention a lumpen, even with a good organization of training and a length of stay in the military ranks. Especially in a modern army, where the main thing is to understand complex equipment, and not to run around the field with a machine gun.
IF NOT NECESSARY …
In fact, the acquisition principle is a purely applied thing. It is determined by what tasks the army faces, and nothing else. This principle has nothing to do with the level of economic and social development of the country and its political structure. If there is a danger of large-scale external aggression, the country needs a conscript army (at least because it is necessary to have a large prepared reserve). That is why in Israel or in such a very highly developed democratic country like South Korea, there is no question of abolishing compulsory military service. Therefore, before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, all Western European armies of NATO member countries were recruited by conscription. And now the "sworn friends" - Greece and Turkey, constantly preparing for war between themselves (and the Turks - with their neighbors in the east) - are not considering the possibility of abandoning it.
If the threat of external aggression has disappeared, the army is either entrusted with the tasks of conducting overseas operations (and often of a police rather than a military nature), or it turns out to be largely unnecessary and remains a kind of mandatory attribute of the state. In the latter case, the conscription loses its meaning and the transition to the hired principle of recruitment naturally occurs.
The United States and Great Britain decided to abandon the recruitment of recruits-recruits during the Cold War precisely because these states, for purely geographical reasons, were not threatened by external invasion. Overseas operations (such as the Vietnamese) were rejected by society, which made the call impossible. By the way, it was not formally canceled in the USA, it is just declared "zero" every year.
Now, most of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance do not have any need for draft armies (although, except for Greece and Turkey, they are in Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Albania, Estonia, as well as in neutral Austria, Finland, Switzerland). The problem of lumpenization is being fought by raising money allowances, which makes it possible to attract into the armed forces not only representatives of the social lower classes. This naturally leads to a very significant increase in military spending.
The Europeans solved this problem simply: their armies are so small that the remaining personnel can be paid relatively well. The reduction of the armed forces leads in fact to the loss of defense capabilities, but the Europeans have no one to defend against. In addition, they are all members of NATO, the total power of which is still quite large. The Americans cannot do this, because they are fighting all the time, in addition, the United States is obliged to protect Europeans who refuse armies. Therefore, the Pentagon's budget has reached truly astronomical proportions. And more and more of the money is spent on the maintenance of the military personnel.
In the 80s and 90s, with the help of a sharp increase in monetary allowances and the introduction of many different kinds of benefits, the Pentagon improved the quality of the personnel of the US armed forces, getting rid of lumpen. But the second Iraqi war broke everything. She exposed another shortcoming of the mercenary army, much more serious than lumpenization. It's about a fundamental change in motivation.
A PROFESSIONAL DOESN'T HAVE TO DIE
Another favorite statement of adherents of the professional army is that "the military profession is the same as everyone else." This thesis is not just false, like the above "postulates", it is frankly vile. The military profession is fundamentally different from all others in that it and only it implies the obligation to die. And you can't die for money. It is possible to kill, but not to die. You can only die for an idea. That is why a mercenary army cannot fight a war that implies a high level of casualties.
The demotivation of professional European military personnel has taken on an openly shameful character. It all started with the famous events in Srebrenica in 1995, when the Dutch battalion did nothing to prevent the massacre of civilians. Then there was the uncomplaining surrender of the British marines to the Iranians, the repeated withdrawal of the Czech special forces in Afghanistan from combat positions, because the lives of the soldiers were in danger! All these "heroes" were professionals.
And in the United States, due to the growing losses in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was a shortage of people willing to serve in the army, which led to an instant decline in the quality of volunteer recruits to the level of the mid-70s. Lumpen and criminals were again attracted to the troops. And for gigantic money.
Fortunately for the States and European countries, even defeat in the overseas wars does not threaten their independence. A mercenary army is unsuitable for the defense of its own land, not only because in this case there is not a sufficient number of reservists. Much worse is the fact that professionals will not die for their homeland either, because they did not go to serve for this.
The professional troops of the six monarchies of the Persian Gulf, equipped with the most modern weapons in more than sufficient numbers, in August 1990 demonstrated absolute failure against the Iraqi conscript army. The armed forces of Kuwait before the war were simply huge in scale of this microscopic state and had a real opportunity to hold out for several days alone, waiting for help from the formally very powerful armies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In reality, the Kuwaiti professionals simply evaporated, without offering any resistance to the enemy, and the allied neighbors did not even try to help the victim of aggression and began in horror to call NATO for help. Then, at the very beginning of the first Gulf War - on January 24, 1991, the Iraqis launched the only offensive in that campaign on the Saudi town of Ras Khafji. His "defenders" ran immediately! They were also professionals …
Interestingly, after the liberation from the Iraqi occupation, Kuwait immediately switched to universal conscription. Moreover, he kept it until the final defeat of Iraq in 2003.
In August 2008, history repeated itself in the Transcaucasus. Although the draft is formally retained in Georgia, all mechanized brigades trained in NATO programs were recruited by contract soldiers. And at the beginning of the attack on South Ossetia, during the offensive against a weaker enemy, the aggressor was doing well. And then Russian troops came into action, approximately equal in size to the grouping of the Georgian Armed Forces. In addition, a significant part of the personnel of our units were conscripts. As you know, the Georgian professional army did not even lose, it simply collapsed and fled. Although, from the second day of the war, for the Georgians it was a question of defending their own territory.
There is one more aspect to this problem. The conscript army is a people's army, so it is very difficult to turn it against the people of your own country. The mercenary army is the army of the regime that has hired it; it is much easier to use it for solving internal tasks of a punitive nature. That is why in most of the underdeveloped countries of the third world, the armies are hired. They exist not for a war with an external enemy, but for the protection of the powers that be from the population. Bangladesh, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gabon, Guyana, Gambia, Ghana, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, DRC (Zaire), Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Fiji, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Jamaica - all these countries have professional armed forces.
And it is for this reason that Germany still does not abandon the draft army, although from a geopolitical point of view, the need for it has been lost. The memory of the totalitarian past is too strong in the country. And even in the United States, where totalitarianism has never existed, literature and cinema from time to time give out "horror stories" about a military coup, and experts are constantly discussing the issue of how to strengthen civilian control over the Armed Forces.
No matter how you marvel at our beaten by riot police at the "Marches of Dissent" liberals who continue to demand from the Kremlin: "Take out and put us a professional army!" After all, OMON is a professional army, a power structure, fully recruited for hire. Alas, dogma is higher than reality.
OR EITHER
It is clear that the national myth about the professional army is based on the ugly living conditions of servicemen and, much worse, hazing. As it is easy to understand, the former are in no way connected with the principle of recruitment. As for hazing, it was born in the late 60s, when at the same time they began to call up criminals into the army and, what is much more important, the institution of junior commanders, sergeants and foremen was essentially liquidated. This gave a cumulative effect, which we are trying to clean up to this day.
There is nothing like this in any army in the world - neither in conscripts, nor in hired ones. Although "hazing" is everywhere. After all, the rank and file of an army unit (ship) is a collective of young men in the period of puberty, with a level of education no higher than secondary, oriented towards violence. At the same time, hazing relations in mercenary armies are manifested more often than in conscripts. This is natural, because a mercenary army is a specific closed caste, where the internal hierarchy, the role of traditions and rituals is much higher than in the people's conscription army, where people serve for a relatively short time. But, we repeat, nowhere else is there anything similar to our hazing, which has essentially become institutionalized. The increase in the share of contract servicemen in the RF Armed Forces has not at all canceled the problem, in some places it even aggravated, the crime rate among them is higher than among conscripts, and it continues to grow. Which is absolutely natural, since the problem of lumpenization described above has fully affected us.
The only way to deal with bullying is to restore a full-fledged institution of junior commanders, here we really need to follow the example of the United States (there is an expression “sergeants rule the world”). It is the sergeants and foremen who must be professionals, so a special, very strict selection is needed here in terms of physical, intellectual, psychological indicators. Naturally, it is implied that the future junior commander served a full term on the draft. However, he is not only obliged to serve well himself, but also to have the ability to teach others. That is why, when selecting for the position of sergeant (foreman), it is imperative to take into account the reviews of a soldier from his commanders and colleagues. The size of the sergeant's (foreman's) salary should be set at the level of the middle class, moreover, the Moscow one, and not the provincial one (and, of course, the lieutenant must be paid more than the sergeant).
The rank and file must be recruited by conscription. He should be provided with normal living conditions and only and exclusively combat training throughout the entire service life. Naturally, among the privates who have served on active duty, there may be those who wish to continue serving under the contract. In this case, selection will also be required, of course, somewhat less stringent than for the positions of junior commanders. It must be remembered that quality is more important here than quantity. The desire of a potential contract soldier to become such is not enough; the army must also have a desire to see him in its ranks.
The need to preserve the draft is explained by the fact that a country with the world's largest territory and the world's longest borders simply cannot have a “small compact army” (another favorite liberal mantra). Moreover, our external threats are very diverse and diverse.
The most serious among them is the Chinese one. The PRC will not be able to survive without external expansion in order to seize resources and territories - this is an objective fact. You may not notice him, but he does not disappear from this. Since 2006, the Celestial Empire has openly begun to prepare for aggression against Russia, and the scale of preparation is constantly growing. The situation is reminiscent of 1940 - early 1941, when the USSR was also openly going to attack (and with the same goals), and in Moscow they tried to "talk" about the problem, convincing themselves that Germany is a great friend to us.
Of course, someone will rely on the nuclear deterrence of the PRC, but its effectiveness is not obvious, as the "MIC" already wrote about in the article "The Illusion of Nuclear Deterrence" (No. 11, 2010). It is not a fact that the conscript army will save us from the Chinese invasion. But it is absolutely certain that a mercenary army will not protect us from him. It will "evaporate" just like the Kuwaiti and Georgian ones.
For Russia, the idea of creating a professional army is a grandiose and extremely harmful self-deception. Either our army will be conscripted, or we just have to give it up. And don't complain about the consequences.
