In 1935, in the USSR, the "Regulations on the passage of service by the command and command personnel of the Red Army" introduced personal military ranks. Five commanders of the Red Army became Marshals, among them S. M. Budyonny (1883-1973).
In the young Soviet state, he was a legendary man, the “father” of the red cavalry, a commander from the “muzhiks”; abroad he was called “Red Murat”.
But after the end of the “Stalin era”, the image of such a “horseman”, a narrow-minded cavalryman, gradually began to take shape. Even a whole layer of myths and anecdotes about the marshal was formed.
A revision of his merits also began - they remembered that the idea of creating the red cavalry belonged to Trotsky-Bronstein, that the real founder of the Red Army Cavalry Corps was B. M. Dumenko (the talented commander was shot on charges of anti-Semitism and preparation of a rebellion, although Stalin tried to justify him, but the positions of Trotsky-Bronstein were much stronger), Budyonny was his deputy. They began to accuse "Red Murat" of mediocrity, of the failure of the campaign against Warsaw in 1920, since he allegedly did not fulfill Tukhachevsky's order and did not transfer the Cavalry Army from Lvov to Warsaw.
A myth was created that Budyonny resisted the modernization of the Red Army, citing the famous phrase, whose belonging to the marshal has not been proven - "The horse will still show itself." The fact of his "inconsistency" in military affairs is given - an insignificant position occupied by him at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War - the commander of the cavalry of the Soviet Army.
The beginning of the military path
Born in 1883 on the Don, on the Kozyurin farm in the village of Platovskaya (now the Rostov Region), into a poor peasant family. In 1903 he was drafted into the army, served in the Far East in the Primorsky dragoon regiment, and remained there for long-term service. Participated in the Russo-Japanese War as part of the 26th Don Cossack Regiment.
In 1907, as the best rider of the regiment, he was sent to the capital, to the Officer Cavalry School, to take courses for riders of lower ranks. He studied at them until 1908. Then, until 1914, he served in his Primorsky Dragoon regiment.
During the First World War, he fought on three fronts - the German, Austrian and Caucasian non-commissioned officer of the 18th Dragoon Seversky regiment. Budyonny was awarded for bravery with St. George's Crosses (soldier's "Yegoriy") of four degrees ("full bow") and four St. George's medals.
In the summer of 1917, as part of the Caucasian cavalry division, Budyonny arrived in the city of Minsk, where he was elected chairman of the regimental committee and deputy chairman of the divisional committee. In August 1917, together with MV Frunze, he led the disarmament of the echelons of Kornilov's troops (Kornilov revolt) in Orsha. After the October Revolution, he returned to the Don, to the village of Platovskaya, where he was elected a member of the executive committee of the Salsk district council and appointed head of the district land department.
Civil War
In February 1918, S. M. Budyonny created a cavalry detachment, which operated against the White Army in the Don area. The detachment quickly grew into a regiment, then a brigade, and eventually became a division that successfully operated under Tsaritsyn in 1918 and early 1919. In the second half of June 1919, the Horse Corps was created. Its commander was B. M. Dumenko, but a month later he was seriously wounded, and the corps was commanded by his deputy - Budyonny. The corps took part in heavy battles with the Caucasian army of General P. N. Wrangel. Therefore, the military mediocrity of Budyonny, if it were a reality, would have been revealed very quickly, especially considering that one of the best white cavalry generals fought against him - Mamontov, Golubintsev, chieftain Ulagai.
But the corps under the command of the peasant Budyonny acted decisively, skillfully, remaining the most combat-ready unit of the 10th Army defending Tsaritsyn. Budyonny's divisions covered the army's retreat, invariably appearing in the most threatened directions, and did not allow units of Wrangel's Caucasian army to reach the flank and rear of the 10th Army. Budyonny was a principled opponent of the surrender of Tsaritsyn to White and proposed a counterstrike to the enemy's flank. Budyonny's plan had reasonable grounds and chances of success, since the Cossack units that stormed Tsaritsyn were exhausted and suffered serious losses. Wrangel wrote about this directly to Denikin. But the commander Klyuev showed indecision and ordered to leave Tsaritsyn. The retreat of the 10th Army was poorly organized, and Budyonny had to create special barrage detachments in order to prevent the disorganization of rifle units. As a result: the 10th Army did not collapse, the left flank of the red Southern Front was not exposed, and this is the merit of S. M. Budyonny.
In the summer - fall of 1919, the corps successfully fought against the troops of the Don Army. During the Voronezh-Kastorno operation (October - November 1919), the Cavalry Corps, together with the divisions of the 8th Army, defeated the Cossack units of Generals Mamontov and Shkuro. Corps units occupied the city of Voronezh, closing a 100-kilometer gap in the positions of the Red Army troops in the Moscow direction. The victories of Budyonny's Cavalry Corps over the troops of General Denikin near Voronezh and Kastornaya accelerated the defeat of the enemy on the Don.
In November 1919, the corps was reorganized into the 1st Cavalry Army, Budyonny was appointed commander of this army, he commanded the army until the fall of 1923.
In December 1919, the Cavalry Army occupied Rostov, the Cossacks gave it up without a fight, leaving for the Don. Parts of Budyonny tried to cross the Don, but suffered a serious defeat from the White Guard divisions. But this is probably not Budyonny's fault - the commander of the Southwestern Front, Shorin, ordered to force the Don head-on, but to force a large water barrier when the other bank is occupied by defending enemy units, it is not easy only with cavalry. Be that as it may, the defeat of the white armies in southern Russia was largely due to the actions of the Cavalry, which made a deep bypass of the white troops in February 1920.
Against Wrangel in the Crimea, Budyonny's army did not act very successfully - the army was unable to prevent the withdrawal of the main forces of the whites for the Crimean isthmuses. But here it is not only Budyonny's fault, the actions of the 2nd Cavalry FK Mironov were in many ways mistaken. Because of his slowness, Wrangel managed to withdraw his troops behind the fortifications of Perekop.
War with Poland
In the war with Poland, Budyonny's army as part of the Southwestern Front operated on the southern flank and was quite successful. Budyonny broke through the defensive positions of the Polish troops and cut the supply routes of the Kiev group of Poles, launching an offensive against Lvov.
In this war, the legend of the "invincible" strategist Tukhachevsky was destroyed. Tukhachevsky was not critical of the reports received at the headquarters of the Western Front that the Poles were completely defeated and flee in panic. Budyonny, however, assessed the state of affairs more reasonably, as evidenced by the lines from his memoirs: “From the operational reports of the Western Front, we saw that the Polish troops, retreating, did not incur heavy losses, it seemed that the enemy was retreating in front of the armies of the Western Front, keeping forces for decisive battles … ".
In mid-August, the Polish army struck at the Red Army troops that were bypassing Warsaw from the north. Tukhachevsky's right flank was defeated. Tukhachevsky demands to withdraw Budyonny's army from the battle and prepare it for an attack on Lublin. At this time, the 1st Cavalry Army was fighting on the Bug River and could not just get out of the battle. As Budyonny wrote: “It was physically impossible for one day to get out of the battle and make a hundred-kilometer march in order to concentrate in the indicated area on August 20. And if this impossible had happened, then with access to Vladimir-Volynsky the Cavalry would still not have been able to take part in the operation against the enemy's Lublin grouping, which operated in the Brest region."
The war was lost, but Budyonny personally did everything to win, the troops entrusted to him acted quite successfully.
20-30s
In 1921-1923. SM Budyonny - a member of the RVS, and then deputy commander of the North Caucasian Military District. He did a lot of work on the organization and management of stud farms, which, as a result of many years of work, bred new horse breeds - Budyonnovskaya and Terskaya. In 1923, Budyonny was appointed assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Red Army for cavalry and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1924-1937. Budyonny was appointed inspector of the Red Army cavalry. In 1932 he graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.
From 1937 to 1939, Budyonny was appointed commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, since 1939 - a member of the Main Military Council of the NKO of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar, since August 1940 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Budyonny noted the important role of cavalry in mobile warfare, while at the same time advocating the technical rearmament of the army, initiated the formation of cavalry-mechanized formations.
He correctly identified the role of cavalry in a future war: “The reasons for the rise or decline of cavalry should be sought in relation to the basic properties of this type of troops to the basic data of the situation of a certain historical period. In all cases, when the war acquired a maneuverable character, and the operational situation required the presence of mobile troops and decisive actions, the horse masses became one of the decisive elements of the armed force. This is manifested by a certain regularity throughout the history of the cavalry; as soon as the possibility of a mobile war developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased, and certain operations ended with its blows … We stubbornly fight for the preservation of a powerful independent red cavalry and for its further strengthening solely because a sober, real assessment of the situation convinces us of the undoubted necessity to have such a cavalry in the system of our Armed Forces."
Unfortunately, Budyonny's opinion on the need to preserve a strong cavalry was not fully appreciated by the country's leadership. In the late 1930s, the reduction of cavalry units began, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained for the war. The Great War proved him right - the mechanized corps turned out to be less stable than the cavalry units. The cavalry division did not depend on roads and fuel, like mechanized units. They were more mobile and maneuverable than motorized rifle divisions. They successfully operated against the enemy in wooded and mountainous terrain, successfully carried out raids behind enemy lines, in conjunction with tank subunits developed a breakthrough of enemy positions, developed an offensive and coverage of Nazi units.
By the way, the Wehrmacht also appreciated the importance of cavalry units and rather seriously increased their numbers in the war. The red cavalry went through the entire war and ended it on the banks of the Oder. Cavalry commanders Belov, Oslikovsky, Dovator entered the elite of Soviet commanders.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny speaks to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, August 1942.
Joseph Stalin, Semyon Budyonny (foreground), Lavrenty Beria, Nikolai Bulganin (background), Anastas Mikoyan head to Red Square for a parade in honor of Tankman's Day.
Great War
During the Great Patriotic War, Budyonny was a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. He was appointed commander of the army group of the Stavka reserve (June 1941), then - commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction (July 10 - September 1941).
The southwestern direction quite successfully held back the onslaught of Hitler's troops, counterattacked. In the North, in the Baltics, troops also operated under the general command of Voroshilov. As a result, Berlin realized that the troops of Army Group Center were under great threat - it became possible to strike from the flanks, from the North and from the South. The blitzkrieg failed, Hitler was forced to throw Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group to the south in order to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet group defending Kiev.
On September 11, the divisions of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead to meet Guderian from the Kremenchug bridgehead. Both tank groups united on September 16, closing the ring around Kiev - the troops of the Southwestern Front were in the cauldron, the Red Army suffered heavy losses. But, having tied up significant enemy forces in heavy battles, she gained time to strengthen the defense in the central strategic direction.
Marshal S. M. Budyonny warned the Stavka about the danger threatening the troops of the Southwestern Front, recommended leaving Kiev and withdrawing the army, that is, he proposed not waging a positional war, but a mobile one. So, when Guderian's tanks broke into Romny, General Kirponos turned to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, with a request to allow the evacuation of Kiev and the withdrawal of troops, however, was refused. Budyonny supported his subordinate and, in turn, telegraphed to Headquarters: “For my part, I believe that by this time the enemy’s plan to encompass and encircle the Southwestern Front from the Novgorod-Seversky and Kremenchug directions has been fully identified. To counteract this plan, it is necessary to create a strong group of troops. The Southwestern Front is unable to do this. If the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, in turn, is unable to concentrate such a strong group at the moment, then the withdrawal for the Southwestern Front is quite urgent … A delay in the withdrawal of the Southwestern Front could lead to the loss of troops and a huge amount of materiel."
Unfortunately, Moscow saw the situation differently, and even such a talented General Staff officer as B. M. Shaposhnikov did not see the impending danger in time. It can be added that Budyonny had great courage to defend his point of view, because the marshal knew about Stalin's desire to defend Kiev at all costs. A day after this telegram, he was removed from this position, a few days later the front troops were surrounded.
In September – October 1941, Budyonny was appointed commander of the Reserve Front. On September 30, the Wehrmacht launched Operation Typhoon, the Wehrmacht broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops, and the troops of the Western (Konev) and Reserve fronts were surrounded in the Vyazma area. It was a disaster, but Budyonny cannot be blamed for this. First, the reconnaissance of the General Staff could not reveal the areas of concentration of the Wehrmacht strike groups, therefore, the available troops were stretched along the entire front and could not withstand a blow of such power, when the defending division had 3-4 enemy divisions (on the main directions of strikes). Secondly, Budyonny could not apply his favorite tactics of maneuver, it was impossible to retreat. It is stupid to accuse him of military mediocrity, Konev became one of the most famous war heroes, but he could not do anything either.
In fact, only in the North Caucasus was he appointed commander-in-chief of the North Caucasian direction (April - May 1942) and commander of the North Caucasian Front (May - August 1942), he was able to show his skills. When the Wehrmacht reached the Caucasus in July 1942, Budyonny proposed to withdraw troops to the borders of the Main Caucasian ridge and the Terek, reducing the overly extended front, and also to form two reserve armies in the Grozny area. Stalin considered these proposals rational and approved them. The troops withdrew to the planned Budyonny line in August 1942 and, as a result of fierce battles, stopped the enemy.
In January 1943, Budyonny became the commander-in-chief of the cavalry, apparently Stalin decided that it was time to show his skills to the young. The merit of Budyonny is that he helped the Red Army to withstand and learn to fight.
The most objective assessment of the activities of Marshal Budyonny in the Great Patriotic War can be called the words of the chief of staff of the South-West direction, General Pokrovsky:, this or that, action, he, firstly, he quickly grasped the situation and, secondly, as a rule, supported the most rational decisions. And he did it with sufficient determination. "
The son of the Russian peasantry did not disappoint his homeland. He honestly served the Russian Empire on the fields of the Russian-Japanese, World War I, with courage and skill he earned himself a reward. He supported the construction of a new state and served it honestly.
After the war, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 1, 1958, April 24, 1963 and February 22, 1968, and became Three times Hero of the USSR. He deserved it.
Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935) Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny receives a parade on Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1947.
Of the personal qualities of this worthy Person, personal courage and bravery can be noted (for example: in July 1916, Budyonny received the 1st degree St. George Cross for bringing 7 Turkish soldiers from a sortie to the enemy's rear with four comrades). There is a legend that one day the Chekists decided to "touch" the marshal. The Marshal greeted the armed guests of the night with a sword bald and shouting "Who is the first !!!" rushed at the guests (according to another version - put a machine gun out of the window). They hurried to retreat. The next morning, Lavrenty Pavlovich reported to Stalin about the need to arrest Budyonny (and described the event in color). Comrade Stalin replied: “Well done, Semyon! Serve them right! " More Budyonny was not disturbed. According to another version, having shot the Chekists who came for him, Budyonny rushed to call Stalin: “Joseph, counter-revolution! They came to arrest me! I will not surrender alive! " After that, Stalin gave the command to leave Budyonny alone. Most likely, this is a historical anecdote, but even he characterizes Budyonny as a very brave man.
He played the button accordion masterly, danced well - during the reception of the Soviet delegation in Turkey, the Turks performed folk dances, and then invited the Russians to respond in kind. And Budyonny, despite his age, danced, panting for everyone. After this incident, Voroshilov ordered the introduction of dance lessons in all military universities.
He spoke three languages, read a lot, collected a large library. He did not tolerate drunkenness. He was unpretentious in food.
