The appearance and construction of armored trains in Russia was associated primarily with the development of railway troops. The birth of the latter in Russia practically coincided with the opening of the St. Petersburg - Moscow railway: on August 6, 1851, Emperor Nicholas I signed the "Regulations on the composition of the management of St. Petersburg - Moscow railway". According to this document, 17 companies were formed with a total number of 4340 people, who were entrusted with the protection of the railway, as well as maintaining the railway tracks and other infrastructure in working order.
In 1870, the railway units were included in the engineering troops, and in 1876, on the basis of the existing companies and teams, the formation of railway battalions began. By the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war (spring 1878), the Russian army had only three such battalions. The Russo-Turkish war showed the need to increase the number of railway units and their significant role in modern combat operations. In addition, the proposed construction of the Trans-Caspian railway, which was planned to be conducted in conditions of hostilities against the Tekins, required the participation of military specialists in the construction. As a result, by 1885 the number of railway battalions in the Russian army reached five, while three of them were consolidated into a railway brigade.
Artillery and machine-gun carriage (with an observation tower) of an armored train of the 9th railway battalion. Southwestern Front, 1915. Please note that the outer skin of the machine-gun carriage is made of planks (RGAKFD).
In subsequent years, the formation of new parts of the railway troops continued, which actively participated in the construction of railways in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Poland, the Far East and China. By January 1, 1907, the Russian army had one regiment and 12 railway battalions, some of which were consolidated into railway brigades. The 1st railway regiment (in St. Petersburg) and the Baranovichi brigade (2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions) were stationed in European Russia, the 1st Caucasian railway battalion was stationed in the Caucasus, and the Turkestan railway brigade (1st and 2nd) was stationed in Turkestan. 1st Transcaspian battalions), in the Amur region - the Ussuri brigade (1st and 2nd Ussuri battalions) and in Manchuria - the Trans-Amur railway brigade (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Trans-Amur battalions). At the same time, the railway troops had different subordination: the bulk was part of the military communications directorate of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH), but the most trained units - the 1st railway regiment and the Zaamur railway brigade - were subordinate to the palace commandant and the minister of finance, respectively. This was due to the specifics of the service of these units - the regiment provided the movement of trains with the emperor and members of his families, and the Zaamur brigade was outside the Russian Empire and controlled the Sino-Eastern railway.
The Russian army entered the First World War with one railway regiment and 19 railway battalions, some of which were consolidated into four railway brigades. However, by the beginning of the war, there was only one railway battalion on the front line - the 9th, which had been operating since August 1914 in the zone of the Southwestern Front.
By the beginning of the First World War, the railway troops (except for the 1st regiment and the Za-Amur railway brigade) were subordinate to the military communications department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. The headquarters of each military district also had a military communications department.
In the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, created in July 1914, a military communications department was formed, headed by Major General S. L. Ronzhin, who previously headed the military communications department of the GUGSH. The chiefs of military communications of all fronts and military districts were subordinate to him.
Ronzhin Sergei Alexandrovich - was born on August 14, 1869, graduated from the Simbirsk Cadet Corps and the Nikolaev Engineering School (in 1889). He served in the 7th Combat Engineer Battalion. In 1897 he graduated from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in the first category. From December 13, 1902 - headquarters officer for special assignments under the commander of the Kiev military district, colonel (from April 22, 1907). From December 24, 1908 - head of the movement of troops in the Kiev region, from April 23, 1911, head of the department of the military communications department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, Major General (seniority from April 14, 1913). In October 1913, he was appointed assistant chief, and from May 22, 1914, head of the military communications department of the GUGSH.
On July 19, 1914, he was appointed chief of military communications under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, subsequently held the post of chief chief of military communications, Lieutenant General (1916). Since January 16, 1917, at the disposal of the Minister of War, and in May enrolled in the reserve ranks at the headquarters of the Odessa Military District.
During the Civil War, he served in the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, then emigrated to Yugoslavia. He died in 1929.
The chiefs of military communications who were at the headquarters of the fronts were subordinate to the chiefs of supply of the fronts. As a result, this subordination system turned out to be cumbersome and ineffective. In addition, the apparatus of the chief of military communications at Headquarters turned out to be small for solving the tasks facing him of ensuring military transport during the mobilization of the army, as well as when deploying new units of railway troops and ensuring their work.
So, with the beginning of the war, in addition to the existing 9 wide-gauge railway battalions, 5 narrow-gauge battalions and 3 narrow-gauge battalions on horse-drawn traction were deployed (the broad gauge battalions were intended for work on the Russian-gauge railways, and the narrow-gauge ones had to build and operate field narrow-gauge railways, while on some of them, instead of diesel locomotives, horses were used as draft power. - Author's note).
Despite significant difficulties and a lack of equipment and materials, the railway units of the Russian army in the first period of the war did a significant amount of work. For example, only in the frontline zone in the region of Ivangorod (North-Western Front) from 12 to 20 October 1914, 261 kilometers of railroad tracks were restored, which was more than 40 kilometers per day. A large amount of work was done by Russian military railway workers in Galicia - in 1914-1915 they restored 3,900 kilometers of railways destroyed by the enemy during the retreat.
In September 1915, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief approved the "Regulations on the Main Directorate of Military Communications", which determined the management tasks based on the experience of the first year of the war. The head of military communications at the Headquarters began to be called - the Chief of military communications at the Theater of Military Operations, and his apparatus was reorganized.
Front view of the artillery carriage of the armored train of the 9th railway battalion. Southwestern Front, 1915. The 80-mm Austrian gun M 05 is clearly visible. Please note that the armor is made of pieces of steel of various configurations - apparently they used what was at hand (RGAKFD).
Front left view of the artillery car of the armored train of the 9th railway battalion. Southwestern Front, 1915. A white inscription is visible on board: “9th railway. dor. battalion (RGAKFD).
At the same time, the departments of military communications of the fronts were reorganized, and their chiefs were taken out of subordination to the chief chiefs of supply and were directly subordinated to the chiefs of staff of the fronts. As of September 1915, there were 16 broad-gauge railway battalions, as well as 12 narrow-gauge and 2 spare battalions on the fronts.
Nevertheless, despite a significant increase in units, the equipment of the railway troops remained rather weak. In addition, there was a shortage of experienced specialists, and the quality of training units was far from what was required.
By September 1917, the number of railway troops was more than 133 thousand people, they included 12 brigade directorates, 4 regiments and 48 railway battalions of a wide gauge, as well as 20 park horse operating brigades, 8 steam and horse narrow-gauge parks, a tractor-excavator department and a military plant providing parts with the necessary equipment. But, despite this, the railway troops were not enough to meet the growing needs of the front.
In the course of hostilities, there was also a change in the tasks facing the railway troops. If by August 1914 they focused primarily on the construction and operation of narrow-gauge field railways, then by the fall of 1917 the railway workers were mainly engaged in the construction and restoration of broad-gauge railways.
THE FIRST STEPS
The idea of using railway rolling stock for combat purposes arose in the second half of the 19th century on the basis of the development of railway transport. At about the same time, the first armored trains appeared.
The Russian military department closely followed all the novelties: it had information about the use by the British of the armored train in Egypt in 1882, and about the use of "steel fortresses" in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1901. However, as in other countries, then the idea of using armored trains did not find support from the command of the Russian army.
The first Russian armored (more precisely, "armored" train appeared … in China. It happened during the hostilities known as the suppression of the so-called Boxer uprising (or the Ihetuan uprising, 1899-1901). In Russia it was also called the "big fist" uprising …
General view of an armored train of the 9th railway battalion. Southwestern Front, 1915. Two artillery and machine-gun carriages are visible, as well as an Austrian armored locomotive. Please note that the second artillery car is made more thoroughly, it has a roof and a door in the side (ASKM).
Scheme of the combat strength of the armored train of the 9th railway battalion as of the spring of 1917. It consists of two artillery and two machine-gun carriages (one of them with an observation tower for the commander of an armored train), an armored locomotive Ov (its armor is made like the armored train of the 8th trench), and a control platform with an armored observation deck (RGVIA).
At the end of May 1900, the Ihetuan rebels occupied the Chinese part of Tianjin. Foreigners who were in the city urgently began to strengthen their quarter, sailors from the nearby warships of European powers were hastily sent to the city. But by May 30, there were only a few dozen Russian sailors in Tianjin, a platoon of Cossacks and foreign volunteers. Naturally, this was not enough to protect the foreign colony, numbering more than 2000 people.
The Russian command immediately sent a detachment under the command of Colonel Anisimov to help, who landed in Tanga, where he captured several trains. As a result, by May 31, Russian sailors occupied the European quarter of Tianjin.
The next day, there were already about 2,500 troops from various European states in the city. To ensure communication with the squadron stationed on the Haihe roadstead, on June 2, at the Junliancheng station, an armed train was hastily erected, on which there were Russian sailors. The train ran along the railway line until the siege was lifted from the city on June 10, 1900.
According to the French researcher P. Malmasari, the crew of this train was 200 people. The author could not find any images or more detailed information about this episode. However, this composition hardly had any serious weapons and protection, given the limited time spent on its construction.
Around the same time, the board of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) developed a project for an armored train, according to which the Putilov plant manufactured sets of armor parts for 15 platforms and several steam locomotives. At the beginning of 1901, they were delivered to Manchuria, but due to the end of hostilities they were handed over to the warehouse as unnecessary. In fairness, it should be said that this armored train was primarily intended for transporting troops in the enemy's firing zone, and not for conducting firefighting. The author was not able to find images of the armored platform of the CER, but an idea of its design can be learned from the documents. The fact is that in the fall of 1916, the board of the Chinese Eastern Railway sent a proposal to the Main Military-Technical Directorate for the supply of armored platforms of its own design. The project was considered and sent for conclusion to the headquarters military communications department, where on November 4, 1916, the following conclusion was given on it:
“The armored platform proposed by the CER was designated, as follows from the drawing (there is no drawing in the documents. - Author's note), only for transporting troops along the fired sections of the path, since it has neither loopholes, nor any device for installing machine guns and guns. Therefore, in this form, the armored platform cannot be used for the combat service of armored trains. It is necessary to first carry out a number of additional reconstructions: arrange the installation of guns and machine guns, cut windows, protect wheels with armor, strengthen the springs, etc.
It is possible that due to the fact that the platform is 21 feet long, while the latest armored trains adopted 35-foot platforms, it would be easier to transfer all the armor to the new platform."
It was also noted that "the armor on the platform is a very valuable material," and it can be used to build new armored trains. It was decided to direct the platforms of the CER to the 4th root park, but this was hardly done.
During the Russo-Japanese War, to discuss the issue of armored trains, a commission was created under the management of the railways, which began its work in March 1904. During the discussion, she came to the conclusion that "it is inexpedient to use armored trains against large detachments of the enemy, armed with artillery, but at the same time found it necessary to have several armored locomotives at the Theater of Military Operations." The latter, again, were supposed to be used for military transport, and not for combat use. Nevertheless, in May 1904, at a meeting on rolling stock armoring, armor projects developed by the Putilov and Kolomna plants were considered. The project of the Putilovsky plant was recognized as more successful, but it had a number of shortcomings, and it was returned for revision, and after the end of the war, it was completely forgotten about.
IN THE FIRE OF THE FIRST WORLD
The First World War, which began in the summer of 1914, became a serious impetus for the appearance of armored trains. Moreover, their construction began immediately by all the belligerent countries on all fronts. Russia did not stand aside from this either.
Here armored trains were most actively used on the Southwestern Front, which was facilitated by a more developed railway network in this area. The first armored train appeared here in August 1914 - captured Austro-Hungarian carriages and a steam locomotive, as well as captured weapons, were used for its manufacture. The train was built in the 9th railway battalion, and it operated on the Western European track (1435 mm, the track of Russian roads is 1524 mm. - Author's note) in the 8th army's strip near Tarnopol and Stanislavov, and very successfully, despite the primitive design … This was facilitated by the maneuverable nature of the hostilities in Galicia - Russian troops advanced, and at a very significant pace: for example, the 8th Army from 5 to 12 August covered up to 150 kilometers.
Armored train number 9 (former zhelbata) in service in the Red Army. 1919 year. From the old materiel of the period of the First World War, only an armored locomotive remained, in the foreground is the armored platform of the Bryansk plant with 107 and 76, 2-mm cannons in the semi-towers and six machine guns. (ASKM).
A larger type of armored locomotive of armored train 9 (formerly zhelbata) (ASKM).
The fact that there was only one armored train on the Southwestern Front can only be explained by the fact that there were very few railway troops at the beginning of the war - only one railway battalion (9th). The battalions that arrived at the front were immediately involved in combat work, and often simply had neither the time nor the opportunity to build armored trains. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1915, with the onset of a lull on the Southwestern Front, the construction of several armored trains began at once - the 3rd and 6th railway battalions, as well as the 4th mobile artillery workshop of the 8th Army. The last composition was built under the impression of the successful actions of the armored train of the 9th battalion, and was personally supervised by the commander of the 8th army, General Brusilov.
Armored train of the Marine Regiment of Special Purpose. Summer 1915. It is clearly seen that it consists of two 4-axle metal cars "Fox-Arbel", a 2-axle metal gondola car and a semi-armored steam locomotive of the Y series. For firing machine guns and rifles, loopholes (ASKM) are cut in the sides.
General view of a semi-armored steam locomotive of the I series from the armored train of the Special Purpose Marine Regiment. Presumably the winter of 1915 (RGAKFD).
"Revolutionary train" of the 10th railway battalion (formerly the Marine Brigade of Special Purpose). The beginning of 1918. Behind the front armored car "Fox-Arbel" is seen a carriage with two 76, 2-mm Lender anti-aircraft guns from one of the railway batteries for firing at the air fleet. Pay attention to the white anchor depicted on the front carriage - the "legacy" of the Marine Brigade (ASKM).
By this time, the Office of Military Communications (UPVOSO) of the Southwestern Front had already analyzed information about the actions of the armored train of the 9th Zhelbat, and also had information about the use of "steel fortresses" by both allies and opponents. Therefore, the UPVOSO of the Southwestern Front asked the railway battalions if they needed armored trains. On March 15, 1915, General I. Pavsky * telegraphed to Headquarters:
“There is only one armored trains, [at] the disposal of the 9th railway battalion, receives a combat mission on the instructions of the 9th army headquarters. The rest of the battalions do not have armored trains. The battalions that were asked [about] the need for [armored trains] in September [1914] answered that they were unnecessary. Currently, the 8th battalion confirms its uselessness, while the 7th battalion asks for 2 trains. According to General Kolobov, the aforementioned trains are not needed either for restoration or for the operation of [the railways]. In view of the disagreement, the headquarters of the armies were requested [about] the necessity."
Pavsky Ivan Vladimirovich, born in 1870, graduated from the 1st cadet corps, the Nikolaev Engineering School and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (in 1896). He served in the 3rd pontoon battalion, and from 1903 - in the military communications department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. At the end of 1905 - colonel, head of the department of military communications of the GUGSH, in 1911 - major general. In August 1914 he was appointed chief of military communications of the Southwestern Front, in September 1916 - assistant to the chief chief of supplies for the armies of the Southwestern Front. In 1917 he was promoted to lieutenant general, in August he was arrested by the Provisional Government, but then released. At the end of 1917, he served as the chief of military communications of the Don Army, at the beginning of 1918 he joined the Volunteer Army. In February 1919, he was appointed chief of the medical unit at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In 1920 he emigrated to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, where from 1921 he worked in the Ministry of Railways. When the Red Army units approached, in 1944 he left for Germany. He died on December 4, 1948 in the Fishbeck refugee camp near Hamburg.
The fact that the railway units were not particularly enthusiastic about armored trains is understandable. The main task of the railway stations was the restoration and operation of railways in the front line, and during the retreat, the destruction of the railway track and the entire infrastructure. Considering that the battalions had an acute shortage of not only qualified engineering and technical personnel, but also people in general, any distraction of soldiers and officers for other tasks was, to put it mildly, not welcomed by the battalion command. In addition, one should not forget that the gullets were not originally intended to be used to participate in hostilities, and they did not have a sufficient number of rifles, and they were not entitled to artillery and machine guns at all. Therefore, to staff the teams of armored trains, it was required either to train railway workers in artillery and machine-gun business (which was unlikely due to the lack of guns and machine guns in the battalions), or to send specialists from other branches of the military. Therefore, it is not surprising that the idea of building armored trains was not at first very popular among the officers of the military communications service, who were faced with other tasks. For example, on March 20, 1915, Colonel B. Stelletsky, who was in Lvov, reported to General Ronzhin at Headquarters:
“On the network of the Galician Railways there is one armored train consisting of an armored carriage and two wagons, which is at the disposal of the 9th railway battalion. Armored trains are not needed either for the restoration or for the operation of railways; the experience of the war in Galicia showed that there is no special need for them in combat terms.
If there is an urgent need to form a more protected composition, then this can be done using the material at hand from earthen bags."
Stelletsky Boris Semenovich, born on August 23, 1872. He graduated from the Odessa infantry cadet school (in 1894) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (in 1901). He served in the Warsaw and Kiev military districts, in February 1911 he was appointed head of the movements of the troops of the Kiev region, colonel (seniority from December 6, 1911).
With the outbreak of the First World War, he served in the department of the UPVOSO of the Southwestern Front, from December 14, 1915 - a staff officer for assignments with the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, from October 28, 1916 - head of the VOSO of the Danube Army.
In 1918 he served as chief of staff of the army of Hetman Skoropadsky, received the rank of cornet general. He emigrated to Yugoslavia, where he died on February 25, 1939.
Broken armored 4-axle car "Fox-Arbel" from the armored train of the Marine Regiment of Special Purpose. 1916 year. The car was destroyed by German artillery on March 10, 1916. At the left edge of the armor plate with loopholes we can distinguish a white anchor (ASKM).
However, unlike the railroad workers, the command of the armies quickly realized what benefit armored trains could bring in the maneuverable war that was going on in Galicia at the time. Therefore, on March 21, 1915, the Headquarters received a telegram from the military communications department of the Southwestern Front from General Pavsky, which said the following:
“The army is asked to make armored trains: the 3rd - one, the 8th and the 9th - two each. Composition: a steam locomotive and two artillery platforms, a machine-gun carriage with an observation tower, one for track repairs and a safety platform. We have not yet received a response from the 4th Army, upon receipt I will report additionally. I ask for instructions on whether some of these trains can be manufactured at the road workshops of the Southwestern Front."
Apparently the answer to this telegram was positive, since already on March 26, 1915, General Pavsky reported to Headquarters:
“In view of the demands of the armies, General Kolobov allowed the railway battalions to make armored trains by their own means, following the example of the 9th battalion. Each was supposed to include a steam locomotive and 2-3 bro-neo wagons. For armament, it was supposed to use captured Austrian guns and machine guns, which were supposed to be allocated by the heads of the stage-economic detachments of the respective armies. The commanders of armored trains were supposed to appoint senior officers or company commanders from the railway battalions, and machine gunners and artillerymen were to be sent from the armies."
However, the offensive of the German-Austrian forces that began in April 1915 and the withdrawal of the armies of the Southwestern Front forced to curtail the work on the manufacture of armored trains, which were carried out in Przemysl, Lvov and Stanislav. Nevertheless, it was possible to complete the production of one armored train in Przemysl. In fact, it was a trophy Austro-Hungarian squad, which was repaired and put in order. This armored train entered the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion. Despite the fact that by the spring of 1915 there were only two armored trains on the Southwestern Front, they operated quite successfully. This was facilitated by the fact that Russian troops were withdrawing from Galicia, and armored trains fought rearguard battles, operating on the sections of the railways that had not yet been destroyed.
Polish armored train "General Konarzewski". Spring 1918. Before that, two armored cars of this composition were part of the armored train number 1 "Minsk Communist named after Lenin" (formerly the Marine Brigade). On the front wall of the car, the white anchor (YM) is clearly visible.
As a result, the VOSO administration of the Southwestern Front decided to build an additional number of armored trains, but not semi-handicraft, like the 9th and 2nd Siberian battalions, but a more "solid" design according to a previously developed project. General Ronzhin, the head of the Directorate General of the Headquarters, reported to General P. Kondzerovsky (the latter served as the general on duty under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. - Author's note) the following:
“The need to have armored trains at the railway battalions became obvious at the end of last year. The participation of armored trains in the affairs of this war has fully clarified their constant need.
A huge moral impression, especially at night, made by them on the enemy. An unexpected and successful raid by an armored train, acting quickly and suddenly, causes great devastation in the enemy ranks, makes a stunning impression on the enemy, and often contributes to the complete success of the infantry or its support in difficult times.
As a result, the 6th and 9th railway battalions working on the Southwestern Front, even before the beginning of this year, built one armored train each (in fact, the 6th armored train was ready in the spring of 1915, but due to the departure of the 6th battalion was transferred to the 2nd Siberian trough. - Author's note). The construction was done hastily, by its own means, without preliminary projects, not preoccupied with developing a structure, but applied to random types of Austrian cars. The carriages were simply sheathed with boiler iron and supplied with Austrian cannons and machine guns.
These trains, at the beginning of this year, began to go into battle, and, despite their primitiveness, provided very significant support to the troops of the combat areas adjacent to the railway lines.
A number of successful actions of such armored trains-bogeymen, especially the brilliant raid of the train of the 2nd Siberian railway battalion to the rear of the Austrian positions near Krasnoye in early June 1915, led to the idea of the need to have one armored train with each railway battalion, but not handicraft, but a deliberate design according to a pre-drawn up plan with the development of details."
As a result, in the summer of 1915, the construction of six armored trains began in the Kiev main workshops of the South-Western Railways - four according to the design of the 2nd Zaamur railway brigade, and one each according to the designs of the 8th trench and the 4th mobile artillery workshop. As a result, by November 1915, there were seven armored trains on the Southwestern Front (one more had died in battle by that time), and one was commissioned at the beginning of 1916.
Another shot of the Polish armored train “General Konarzewskh. Spring 1918. The front car of the armored train No. 1 "Minsk Communist named after Lenin" (formerly the Marine Brigade), not armored steam locomotive (YM).
As for other fronts, the construction of armored trains there did not receive such a scale as on the South-West, although they appeared there almost simultaneously with their "Galician" brothers.
So, in November 1914, one armored train appeared on the North-Western Front, near Lodz. Despite the fact that his design was far from perfect, with his actions he provided significant support to his troops. Subsequently, the composition acted as part of the parts of the Privislinsky fortified region.
Another armored train was built by the 5th Siberian railway battalion that arrived near Riga in June 1916. Like the previous line-up, it had a very primitive design.
Thus, by the autumn of 1915, the Northern and Western Fronts had only one armored train each, about which General N. Tikhmenev * reported to Ronzhin on September 29, 1915:
“One armored train evacuated from Ivangorod is located at the Polo-chany station, served by the Naval Regiment, and is under the jurisdiction of the Naval Regiment.
Another armored train on the Ocher - Kreuzburg section is served by the command of the 5th Siberian Railway Battalion and is under the supervision of Colonel Dolmatov, head of the Ochersky detachment."
Three weeks later, on October 20, 1915, Tikhmenev sent the following telegram to the chiefs of military communications of the Northern and Western fronts:
"It is recognized that it is necessary to have two armored trains at the front, I ask for your opinion and clarify whether equipment and weapons can be provided - two guns each and 16 machine guns each, Russian or enemy."
Given the small number of armored trains on the North-Western Front (it was divided into the Northern and Western in August 1915. - Author's note), in June 1915, General Ronzhin, who arrived from Headquarters in Petrograd, held negotiations with the leadership of the Main Military-Technical Directorate on the development of armored train project. It was supposed to make three trains of the same type for the needs of the North-Western Front.
Nikolai Mikhailovich Tikhmenev, born in 1872. He graduated from the military school course of the Moscow Infantry Cadet School (in 1891) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (in 1897). He served in the 8th artillery brigade, the 2nd separate cavalry brigade, and the headquarters of the 3rd grenadier division. Participant of hostilities in China in 1900-1901 and the Russo-Japanese War, during which he served as the ruler of the office of the field management of the stages of the Manchurian army, and then - the ruler of the office of the chief of military communications of the 1st Manchu army. Colonel (seniority from December 6, 1907), clerk of the GUGSH and head of the GUGSh department (from September 1907 to September 1913). For participation in battles as part of the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front in August 1914, he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, Major General (from October 28, 1914). For the battles near Lev in the fall of 1914 he was awarded the St. George weapon. From February 1915 he was the brigade commander of the 58th Infantry Division, in May 1915 he was appointed assistant to the chief of military communications of the armies of the Southwestern Front, and from October 5, 1915 - assistant to the chief chief of military communications at Headquarters.
On February 8, 1917, he was appointed head of the military communications of the theater of operations, Lieutenant General (1917). In September 1917 he was enlisted in the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Odessa Military District. In 1918 he joined the Volunteer Army, where he held the post of chief of military communications, from March 11, 1919 - chief chief of military communications of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. In 1920 he emigrated to France. He died in Paris on June 22, 1954.
An armored locomotive of series I (the former armored train of the Marine Brigade) as part of the armored train number 6 "Putilovtsy" of the Red Army. 1919 (ASKM).
On August 11, 1915, the GVTU notified the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH) that the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had authorized the production of three armored trains in Petrograd for the North-Western Railways. In the same letter, the GVTU asked to release the weapons necessary for armored trains.
The GUGSH asked the Headquarters about the possibility of allocating guns and machine guns, but in response received a telegram stating that "the formation of armored trains was recognized as undesirable and not meeting modern requirements."
As it turned out later, the negative answer was received due to misunderstood information. On November 10, 1915, General Ronzhin reported the following about this:
“The beginning has already been made, but due to a misunderstanding caused by a telegram from General Kondzerovsky in Petrograd to Colonel Kamensky, the work was suspended. Learning about this in September from the communications of the railway administration and the head of the GVTU, I informed General Kondzerovsky on September 10 that I fully support the construction of armored trains, and the suspension of the established business was due to an inaccuracy made by General Kondzerovsky in the telegram."
But the moment was missed, and work on the design and manufacture of armored trains developed by the GVTU was stopped.
There were other attempts to make an additional number of armored trains for the needs of the Northern Front. So, on October 11, 1915, the commander of the 3rd railway battalion turned to the military communications department with the following request:
"In view of the lack of armored trains on the Northern Front, I ask you to help - provide a wagon and two Arbel platforms for equipping Arbel with your own means in the premises of the Vologda railway workshops."
Apparently already having experience in building an armored train, the battalion commander decided to make another train.
Team of the Polish armored train "General Konarzewski". Spring 1918. Left 4-axle car "Fox-Arbel" with two 76, 2-mm Lender cannons, right armored "Fox-Arbel" of the former armored train of the Marine Brigade (YM).
An armored carriage of one of the armored trains of the Caucasian army. 1915 year. The loopholes for firing rifles and windows with armored stands for the installation of machine guns (VIMAIVVS) are clearly visible.
A steam locomotive of one of the armored trains of the Caucasian army. 1915 year. It is clearly seen that he has only partial armor (VIMAIVVS).
On October 30, 1915, General Kolpakov, the head of the VOSO of the Northern Front, who was requested on this issue, reported to General Tikhmenev at Headquarters:
“The 3rd battalion began work on the construction of an armored train before I took office. Who entrusted the work and on what project I do not know. The battalion commander has been requested."
As a result, the initiative did not find support, and all preparatory work was curtailed.
In general, in the fall of 1915, due to the stabilization of the front, interest in the construction of armored trains dropped sharply. Work was carried out only on trains, the construction of which began in the summer. Nevertheless, on November 10, 1915, the head of the VOSO Directorate of the Headquarters, General Ronzhin, in his letter to the general on duty under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief reported the following:
“Currently, 6 armored trains are operating on the fronts: 4 in the South-West, one each on the North and West (the last two are the Warsaw-Vilna railway). In addition to these six, two armored trains are under repair. The fifth armored train of the Southwestern Front was killed in the Kovel-Rovno sector, shot by the enemy's heavy artillery as a result of damage to the track …
I hasten to inform Your Excellency that, on the basis of the extensive experience of the head detachments with and without armored trains, during the whole period of this campaign it has definitely become clear that the movement on the head sections, on which armored trains are usually located, is literally negligible, and is expressed in a rare supply, on average a day, 3-6 wagons of barbed wire and ammunition, and even then not every day …
On the southwestern front, where the work of armored trains is more intensive, instructions for the operation of armored trains in battle have long been developed. Both the commander of the front and the commanders of the armies, by all means, go to meet halfway for the earliest possible arrangement and arming of trains, thanks to which the Southwestern Front had at the same time 7 armored trains armed with the care of the front.
The actions of armored trains were more successful and less successful, but there was no case that the presence of armored trains, in any case, disrupted the movement on the head sections."
Armored train number 2 of the former Caucasian front as part of the Georgian army. Tiflis, 1918. It is clearly seen that the design of the front armored car is somewhat different from that shown in the previous photo. On board the inscription “Armored train No. 2” (YAM) is discernible.
It should be said that by this time the VOSO Headquarters had received a proposal from Colonel Butuzov with a proposal to manufacture armored motor cars. I liked this idea, and the Stavka gave the go-ahead for the production of two motorized armored cars. However, the indefatigable Ronzhin insisted that the number of armored trains be increased, and significantly:
“I admit categorically that there is an urgent need for armored motor-carriages. The number of such cars should correspond to the number of railway battalions, which, in view of the upcoming formations, will be expressed by the figure 33.
While there is a correspondence and exchange of views, 9 armored trains have been built on the fronts by their own means in European Russia and 4 in the Caucasus, on the basis of the tactics of which I once again consider it necessary to emphasize the urgency in the soonest practical development of this issue on the basis of the presented experimental data."
As for armored trains in the Caucasus, the Caucasian Railway Brigade was involved in their construction. The project was developed at the end of 1914, each train consisted of a semi-armored steam locomotive and two four-axle armored cars. Their manufacture was completed by the summer of 1915. However, due to the specifics of the Caucasian theater of military operations, the use of armored trains here was limited.
As for European Russia, by the beginning of 1916 there were nine armored trains here: one each on the Northern and Western fronts (in the 5th Siberian trench and the Special Purpose Marine Regiment, respectively) and seven on the Southwestern Front: three standard trains manufactured according to the project of the 2nd Zaamur railway brigade, a repaired trophy Austrian (in the 2nd Siberian zhelbat), in the 9th zhelbat, an armored train made according to the project of the 4th reinforced art workshop and in the 8th zhelbat (made according to his own design). Another typical armored train, made according to the project of the 2nd Zaamur Railway Brigade, was lost in battle in the fall of 1915. Thus, a total of 10 armored trains were manufactured on the Southwestern Front.
The armored trains were subordinate to the commanders of the railway battalions. The issues of their supply were handled by the Headquarters military communications department, as well as the chiefs of the military communications of the fronts. In combat terms, armored trains were attached to the commanders of divisions and regiments operating in the railway strip.
Trophy armored train of the Austro-Hungarian army, captured by Russian units in the Przemysl fortress. Spring 1915. An 80-mm Austrian M 05 cannon is seen torn from the mount, one of the soldiers leans on a Schwarzlose machine gun (RGAKFD).
Since the railway troops did not have artillery and machine guns, some of the trains were equipped with captured cannons and machine guns (Austrian) or domestic ones transferred by order of the chiefs of artillery of the armies. Also, from the art units, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates - artillerymen and machine gunners - were seconded to serve on armored trains.
At the beginning of 1916, armored trains of the 2nd Siberian and 9th railway battalions, which had Austro-Hungarian steam locomotives, received new Ov series armored locomotives, manufactured in Odessa workshops. Structurally, they were identical to the armored carts of the armored trains of the 2nd Zaamur railway brigade and the 8th trough.
In March 1916, two standard armored trains of the 2nd Zaamur Railway Brigade were sent to the Western Front. The trains were planned to be used in the upcoming front offensive (Naroch operation), but due to the destroyed tracks in the area of the forward positions, this could not be done.
At the beginning of April 1916, one detached standard armored train was handed over to the command of His Imperial Majesty's own railway regiment.
On May 20, 1916, the numbering of all armored trains on the European fronts was introduced, about which General Tikhmenev notified the chiefs of VOSO:
“Please, by agreement between the NAC of the fronts, establish a general numbering of armored trains, starting with number 1 on the Northern Front. Also, number the armored tires, starting with number I. The location of trains and railcars with an indication of the battalion in which they belong, indicate in the statement. Please provide information on a weekly basis."
In general, despite this order, the numbering system for armored trains on the fronts was not rigid. For example, when the seconded armored trains were on the Western Front, they had their own numbering, and when they arrived at the South-Western Front, the numbering could change.
The same captured Austro-Hungarian armored train as in the previous photo. Fortress Przemysl, spring 1915. Perhaps this steam locomotive was used after repairs as part of an armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion (RGAKFD).
Armored train of the 2nd Siberian railway battalion at the front. Summer 1915. On the left is an Austrian armored locomotive, on the right - an armored car with an 80-mm gun. Pay attention to the disguise of the train with branches (RGAKFD).
Armored train of the 2nd Siberian railway battalion. Summer 1916. On the left, you can see a 2-axle armored car, camouflaged by branches, on the right - an armored locomotive, booked for this train in Odessa according to the project of the 2nd Zaamur Railway Brigade (ASKM).
For example, on July 27, 1916, armored trains of the Southwestern Front were deployed at the following points and had the following numbers:
No. 4 - 1st Zaamurskiy trench (typical), Klevan;
No. 5 - 1st Zaamurskiy trench (4th art workshop), Dubno;
No. 6 - 8th trough, Larga;
No. 7 - 2nd Siberian trough, Glubochek;
No. 8 - 9th trough, Larga.
Accordingly, at the same time, armored train No. 1 of the 5th Sibirskiy Zhelbat was on the Northern Front, and on the Western Front there were No. 2 and 3 standard ones, seconded from the South-Western Front, as well as No. 4 (sometimes it passes as No. 4M - sea) Marine Brigade of Special Purpose (at the beginning of June 1916, the Marine Regiment of Special Purpose was deployed into a brigade. - Author's note).
At the beginning of 1917, there was some rotation of armored trains at the fronts. The armored train of the 2nd Zaamursky Zhelbat returned to the Southwestern Front. In addition, after the disbandment of His Imperial Majesty's own railway regiment in March 1917, his armored train was handed over to the 3rd Zaamursky gorge. As a result, by May 1917, armored trains were distributed as follows.
On the Northern Front - in the 5th Siberian Railway Battalion, No. I.
On the Western Front, armored train No. 4M was transferred from the Special Purpose Marine Brigade to the 10th Railway Battalion.
On the Southwestern Front:
Armored train number 2 (standard) - in the 2nd Zaamurskaya junction;
Armored train number 3 (standard), the former of His Imperial Majesty's own railway regiment - in the 1st Zaamurskiy junction;
Armored train number 4 (according to the project of the 4th artillery master) - in the 4th Siberian junction;
Armored train number 5 (standard) - in the 3rd Zaamur junction;
Armored train number 7 (trophy Austrian) - in the 2nd Siberian trough;
Armored train number 8 - in the 9th trough;
An armored train without a number is in the 8th trough.
As you can see, the numbers of the armored trains were not rigidly assigned to the trains.
In the summer of 1917, the so-called "death units" began to be created in the Russian army. Any regular military units and units from a company or battery to a corps could be enrolled in them on a voluntary basis. As a rule, these were the troops that were least decayed by revolutionary agitation, retained their combat capability and advocated the continuation of the war. According to the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Brusilov of July 8, 1917, special insignia in the form of a red-black corner (chevron) on the sleeve and an “Adam's head” (skull) with a laurel wreath and crossed swords on the cockade were approved for the “death units”. In the documents of that time, "death parts" were often called "shock" or "shock" units.
General view of an armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion. Autumn 1916. The structure of captured Austrian armored 2-axle cars with "house" roofs is clearly visible: one gun and two machine-gun embrasures in the left, and four embrasures and doors for the crew in the right carriages. Pay attention to observation deckhouses installed on each carriage (ASKM).
The patriotic impulse did not bypass the teams of armored trains: the compositions of the 1st and 3rd Zaamur battalions at their meetings adopted resolutions on their inclusion in the "death" units. “Announcing this, I firmly believe that the armored trains of the“death”of the 2nd Zaamur railway brigade will be the pride of all railway troops of the great Russian army,” wrote the commander of the brigade, General V. Kolobov, to his subordinates.
In addition, the armored train of the 9th railway battalion, commanded by Captain Kondyrin, became the "shock" armored train of "death".
Confirming this, the crews of these armored trains fought heroically during the June offensive of the Southwestern Front. In fairness, it should be said that other armored trains of the front took an active part in the battles of the 1917 summer campaign, supporting their troops and then covering their withdrawal. In these battles, on July 9, 1917, an armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion was lost.
In the summer of 1917, the formation of an armored railway strike detachment began on the Southwestern Front. The initiator of the creation of such a unit was the captain of the 2nd Siberian railway battalion N. Kondyrin *. He was a great enthusiast of the armored train business, and had experience in commanding an armored train since the summer of 1915, first with a trophy Austrian composition as part of his battalion, and then with an armored train of the 9th zalbat.
In July 1917, Kondyrin turned directly to the Minister of War with a request to allow the formation of an armored train of "death". In the process of formation, the idea was further developed - to create a special shock railway detachment, including an armored train, a motorized armored wagon, an armored railcar and two armored vehicles:
“The past military entry of the armored train entrusted to me, built in the Przemysl fortress, gave me reason, with a deep conviction of success, to address the Minister of War by telegram with a request to grant me the right to form shock trains of“death”.
Having received the location of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the implementation of my idea of breaking through the front with the participation of a train, and the approval of the states, I hastened to take part in stopping the enemy's offensive. Three times train performance at the station. Gusyatin-Russkiy even more confirmed my idea of the moral combat value of the train in coordinated action with the infantry both during the offensive and during the retreat. The ingrained opinion that trains can perform combat missions and be useful only when retreating, doomed armored trains to inactivity for a long period of trench warfare …
Kondyrin Nikolay Ivanovich, was born in 1884. Graduated from the Nikolaev engineering school. He served in the 2nd Ussuriysk railway battalion, with the outbreak of the First World War - in the 2nd Siberian railway battalion, colonel (summer 1917). From December 1917 - in the Volunteer Army, commander of a technical company, major general (1918). In 1919 - the commander of the Armored Railway Brigade of the Don Army. Since 1920 - in exile in Yugoslavia. He died in 1936.
Scheme of the composition of the armored train of the 2nd Siberian railway battalion. Spring 1917. In addition to two artillery and machine-gun armored cars, it includes an armored car for storing ammunition (RGVIA).
All of the above convinces of the need for the train to operate in the most important directions, not only during the retreat, but also during the offensive, when the train must be attached to the strike group (division or corps), and connected with the actions of armored vehicles and a heavy battery, and, making up a shock armored detachment, to ensure a breakthrough of the front.
The actions of such a strike detachment can make a breakthrough, which the strike group can use in full under the following situation: the armored detachment is called to the area where the strike is expected, corrects the path to the trenches of the first line, and, if possible, beyond the trench line. Supported during the performance by armored vehicles, it quickly appears at the moment of attack in front of the enemy, and opens deadly artillery fire on buckshot, and machine-gun fire, equal in strength to the fire of two regiments, makes a stunning impression. Attached to this detachment, a heavy battery of Kane's or Vickers's rapid-fire guns mounted on special railway platforms opens fire on the enemy's reserves.
The unexpected appearance of a heavy battery, easily moving, quickly installing, does not give the enemy the opportunity to successfully fight such a movable heavy battery, which, moreover, can easily change position.
It is desirable for the artillery fire of such an armored detachment to be the most effective, to have improved observation means with the detachment: i.e. a kite balloon and 3-4 airplanes, as well as a searchlight and a radiotelegraph station.
With such means, the strike group can carry out a breakthrough or any other combat mission.
To quickly restore the path to guide the movement in this direction, the shock group must have a railroad strike battalion, which is part of the group, about the existence of which you raised the question."
At the suggestion of Kondyrin, it was planned to include an armored train in the armored railway shock detachment (the composition of the 9th trough was originally considered), a motorized armored wagon, the production of which was completed in the fall of 1916, armored tires, two armored cars and two 152-mm guns (the latter were planned to be installed on railway platforms) … Kondyrin was also supported in the management of the VOSO of the South-Western Front. So, the commander of the 2nd Zaamur railway brigade, General Kolobov, on July 27, 1917, reported:
“Welcoming the impulse of Captain Kondyrin, I ask for instructions whether he should not inspect all armored trains of the front and motorized armored wagon to choose the best one, and also recruit a team of hunters from all battalions”.
On August 25, 1917, a note was prepared in the theater department of the VOSO concerning the formation of an armored strike railway detachment. In particular, it said the following:
“This idea was based on the idea of having an armored detachment of sufficient strength to implement the idea of breaking through the enemy's front, combining uniform combat units (armored train, armored tires, motorized armored vehicles, armored vehicles) into one unit, armed with 6 guns (regimental artillery caliber) and 40 machine guns.
Having concentrated the indicated artillery and machine guns in one place, suddenly appearing in front of the intended point of attack, developing the most intense fire, they will prepare the attack, and with their presence they will create a rush and provide moral support to the attackers.
The actions of such a detachment are supported by its own strike group, and will create that breakthrough in the enemy front, which should result in the transition to mobile warfare.
The organization of such a railway detachment is fully consistent with both our technical means and the goal and the created situation at the front, especially since the detachment includes such a combat unit as an armored train, which includes several examples of the manifestation of military valor and awareness of the importance of its purpose, attesting to the higher authorities …
The need to establish the staff of the shock railway detachment is also caused by the fact that until now armored trains that have existed from the very beginning of the war did not have a certain staffing, and all officers and soldiers assigned to the armored train were listed in the lists of their units, and the first of these ranks fell in a very difficult financial situation, since those who were dismissed from their positions in the part, they fell into the position of junior officers."
Armored carriage of an armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion, right side view. The scheme was made in the spring of 1917 (RGVIA).
But due to the difficult political situation at the front, it was not possible to complete the formation of the armored railway strike detachment. An armored train of the 8th railway battalion was handed over to Kondyrin's disposal, it was also planned to transfer the Zaamurets motorized wagon after its repair in Odessa workshops, as well as two armored vehicles from the Special Purpose armored division (Jeffery, designed by Captain Poplavko).
The outcome of the combat activities of armored trains during the First World War was actually summed up by the congress of representatives of the railway troops of the Southwestern Front, held in June 1917. At the same time, representatives of armored trains organized their own independent section. The results of the discussion were set out in a decree signed on June 19, 1917. The main ideas of this document were as follows.
To eliminate all defects in the supply and equipment of armored trains with all technical and combat means, they must be a completely independent combat unit, with well-defined and permanent command staffs with the rights of separate companies, regardless of the railway battalions on which they operate. …
For the same purposes, armored trains in combat, technical and economic relations are directly subordinate to the head of the Military Road Department, and in terms of combat - to the head of the Combat Section."
Plan view of an armored train car of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion, the lower part of the diagram shown on the next page (RGVIA).
At the meeting, the staff of the armored train was developed, according to which its team consisted of three platoons - machine gun, artillery and technical. It was assumed that each platoon would be headed by an officer, "necessarily a specialist in his field and having combat experience." The machine gun platoon consisted of two squads (one per wagon ", in the artillery squad the number of squads depended on the number of guns of the armored train. The technical platoon included a locomotive brigade (7 people), a demolition team (5 people), a brigade of repairmen and conductors (13 people) and the economic team (8 people). In general, the state proposed for approval was quite viable, and was based on the experience of the combat action of armored trains of the Southwestern Front.
“Armored trains, as equipped with strong combat assets, are powerful combat units. As such, an armored train can be extremely important in infantry combat. Being protected from bullets and shell fragments, the armored train has the ability to approach, if possible, suddenly at a close distance to the enemy, and hit him with machine-gun and artillery fire, if possible, then to the flank and rear.
In addition to combat action, it is necessary to take into account the moral action, which is expressed in the extreme demoralization of the enemy, and the uplift of the spirits of those units with which the armored train acts as a strong combat unit. As a strong combat unit and as a measure of moral impact on infantry units, armored trains should be widely used on any sector of the front in all cases when there is a need for it. In addition to the performance of the armored train as a whole, the armament of the armored train can be used to support infantry units by placing machine guns in the trenches.
Machine guns and guns of an armored train can be used to fire at airplanes.
The demolition team of the armored train can be widely used during the retreat, working in conjunction with the demolition team of the railway lead detachment under the cover of the armored train.
In the event of an offensive, an armored train, rolling over the slopes of a foreign track, by quickly moving forward behind the advancing units, can provide them with significant support.
For 10 active combat months of the past period of the war, armored trains had 26 performances, not counting the frequent performances of an armored train of one of the battalions, information about which is not available in the subsection. It should be borne in mind that during 5 months of the greatest combat activity in 1914 and 1915 there was one armored train at the front, and during the active 3 months of 1915 - two armored trains, and only during 3 months of active operations in 1916 were at the front all currently available armored trains.
An armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion, left by the team at the Sloboda station on July 9, 1917, illustration from a German book of the 1920s (YM).
Summing up the activities of armored trains on the Southwestern Front over the past period of the war, we come to the conclusion that armored trains did not always justify the purpose assigned to them as special-purpose combat units, and were not always used when this was an opportunity and need.
Summing up, we can say the following. In total, during the First World War, Russia produced 10 armored trains, a motorized armored wagon and three armored tires at the European Theater and 4 armored trains in the Caucasus. In addition, there was a "combat" train in Finland, which was used to guard the sea coast. Of this number, during the fighting, two armored trains were lost on the South-Western Front and one on the North. Moreover, the latter, apparently, was simply left due to the lack of a steam locomotive. Assessing the effectiveness of the use of armored trains, we can say that the command of their role in battles was greatly underestimated. In particular, many representatives of the leadership of the VOSO Directorate of the Headquarters and the fronts believed that armored trains could operate successfully only in retreat, conducting rearguard battles with advancing enemy units.
A rather cumbersome and often ineffective system of subordination and supply of armored trains, as well as their presence in the composition of the railway troops, whose main task was the repair and maintenance of roads, played a negative role. In addition, the absence of permanent teams on the armored trains was not the most successful solution - both officers and soldiers were assigned to the composition, and could be replaced by others at any time. Naturally, this did not increase the combat effectiveness and effectiveness of the combat use of armored trains.
Not the best role was played by the fact that mainly captured weapons were used to arm the armored trains - 8-cm Austro-Hungarian guns of the 1905 model (8 cm Feldkanone M 05) and 8-mm Schwarzlose machine guns, as well as domestic mountain guns of the 1904 model. The firing range of the latter was very short.
Nevertheless, by the summer of 1917, a certain experience of operation and combat use had been accumulated. For example, it was decided to form permanent teams for armored trains, as well as to create a special armored train department in the command structure of the VOSO Headquarters and Fronts. However, the events of the autumn of 1917 and the subsequent Civil War prevented the implementation of these measures.
An armored train of the 2nd Siberian Railway Battalion, left by the team at the Sloboda station. July 1917. The open doors of the front armored car are clearly visible, as well as embrasures for firing machine guns (YM).
