A werewolf from Lubyanka stole more than 10,000 top secret documents.
They took him right at the Lubyanka. Immediately after duty. In front of the astonished colleagues, who had never seen anything like it, because for half a century the Chekists had not been hired at the workplace.
Another portion of "goods" was in his diplomat. He was so confident in himself that, even knowing about the past series of arrests and searches, he did not consider it necessary to hide, lie to the bottom. This primordially Russian hope of chance will cost him dearly later - a career security officer, a former intelligence officer, FSB lieutenant colonel Alexander Mezhov …
You will not find a single line about this detective story in print. Even after the verdict of the court, the "competent" authorities prefer to remain silent: it is calmer this way, Meanwhile, the case of Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov is one of the brightest pages in the history of modern counterintelligence. Bright and shameful at the same time.
For a good five years in the very heart of the Lubyanka the "mole" acted with impunity. During this time, he stole more than 10 thousand of the most secret documents. And even - the holy of holies - reports that the FSB leadership prepared for the Kremlin. These papers, telling about the secret operations of the Lubyanka, were to be read by only one person: the president. But in parallel, they lay down on the table for completely strangers …
After reading - burn
Spring 2000. The Kremlin declares war on Gusinsky. The oligarch himself ends up in prison bunks. In his empire - a series of searches.
The main booty awaits the prosecutor's office in the security service of Most, a mysterious, omnipotent structure created by former KGB generals.
Transcripts of telephone conversations of the best people in the country. Surveillance reports. Lovingly collected compromising evidence. (Subsequently, by the way, part of the Mosta database went to the side, and everyone can get acquainted with it through the Internet.)
Among this espionage luxury, the attention of operatives was attracted by a selection of weekly bulletins on the most notable events in the country, prepared by the Information Department of "Most". "To be returned or destroyed on site" was written on each of them.
Why such mystery? After all, such reviews are prepared by any large holding. But one had only to leaf through them, and this question disappeared by itself.
The newsletters contained what the newspapers did not write about. Stories about the most delicate operations of the special services. Analysis of the situation in the troops and the country. Details of counter-terrorist actions.
Even at first glance, it was clear that most of this information is secret. Access to them is ordered for outsiders.
But where could such valuable information come from to a commercial structure? This question needed to be answered, and as soon as possible. Who could guarantee that the "source" (or sources) of "Most" was not spying on anyone else at the same time? For example, the CIA or the BND?
The secret of the iron safe
When the FSB received the papers seized from Most, all doubts disappeared. There could be leaks only from here - from the Lubyanka. …
Most of the materials found were almost identical to the secret summaries and certificates of the FSB: Gusinsky's people did not even bother to rewrite them.
It only remained to establish which of the Chekists had access to the missing materials.
The circle was drawn quickly. Everything that was found in the "Most" passed through the Information and Analytical Department of the FSB. More precisely, the operational information group (GOI).
This non-staff unit was created specifically to prepare materials for reports to the leaders of the state and the FSB. All the most valuable, important and secret was accumulated here.
The alarm was sounded at the Lubyanka. If one of the GOI employees "leaks" documents to the side, this is tantamount to death. It is impossible even to imagine the degree of damage that such a traitor could cause.
All GOI workers were taken under a hood. The main suspicions were caused by two - Major F. and the head of one of the departments of the IMU, Colonel S. (for obvious reasons, we do not give his last name). Both were searched. Directly
let's say not to no avail. Major F. found a Mauser with cartridges. Colonel S.'s work safe - 110 thousand dollars. Cash.
The unlucky security officers were detained. But, alas: their sins had nothing to do with "Most" - they had no files …
Since we will not return to these people anymore, I will say right away that during the investigation, other, no less dramatic circumstances were revealed. Colonel S. - he was Kazakh by nationality - he soon admitted that he handed over official documents to his fellow tribesmen from the "competent" bodies of Kazakhstan: mainly of an economic nature. He brushed aside selfish intent completely: he said that he acted out of only patriotic feelings.
But a witness found by the prosecutor's office - lieutenant colonel of the GUBOP of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - told the exact opposite. According to him, the Kazakh Chekist has repeatedly made recruiting approaches to him, as they call it in the special services. The lieutenant colonel was also from Kazakhstan, aero brother even held a respectable post in the analogue of our FSB. Colonel S.
However, no one needed the scandal. Formally, the CIS secret services do not spy against each other. 10 years ago, they all signed a corresponding agreement: ironically, in Alma-Ata.
Making a fuss meant worsening the already difficult Russian-Kazakh relations. The Kremlin could not agree to this. The story of Colonel S. has not received a logical development. The criminal case against him was terminated under an amnesty …
At some point, it seemed to the counterintelligence officers that they were at an impasse. They sifted all GOI employees through a fine sieve. Anyone who had access to the disappeared materials. …
To no avail. But the bill did not go for weeks - for a day. Every day of delay could be too costly for the state.
… Luck came in the guise of one of the Most Security Service officers. A search in his computer revealed files with similar documents.
There was no point in unlocking. The man was forced to name the person who supplied him with classified materials.
Having heard the long-awaited surname, the operatives finally understood why their previous searches were in vain. The fact is that the consultant of the 7th department of the Information and Analytical Directorate of the FSB, Alexander Mezhov, was not part of the operational information group. He just … sat in the next office.
He was arrested immediately: on June 1. Immediately after duty. In his briefcase were already prepared for sale floppy disks with the next secret documents. There were no more questions. And in Mezhov's home computer, they found countless files stolen from the Lubyanka (most, however, he managed to erase, but experts from the FSB Research Institute completely restored them).
At the very first interrogations, it became clear: Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov has been successfully trading state secrets since … 1996.
Night thief
The road to treason is different for everyone. For the personnel security officer Mezhov, it began in the fall of 1996.
The state security officers were then paid pennies. Money was sorely lacking. And then the deadline for the repayment of the bank loan came.
Of course, Mezhov could easily find a job on the side. But either he didn't want to, or he was too lazy. Much easier (and more profitable) was the other way for him.
In the office next to him there was a group of operational information. The materials that flocked here were of undoubted interest for any special service, be it a private intelligence bureau or foreign intelligence.
It turned out to be quite easy to find a buyer: the information market had developed in Moscow for a long time, and Mezhov was well acquainted with one of its most active players - a retired KGB officer Vladimir Grigoriev.
In the fall of 1996, Mezhov's spy odyssey began. Several times a month - mostly at night - he enters the GOI room.
Actually, it is not allowed to let strangers here, but Mezhov is his own. Even leaving the office, the attendants leave in his care the switched on computer, where all the secret information is accumulated.
The rest is a matter of technology. A professional analyst only needs a few minutes to find the most interesting in the car and copy it to floppy disks. If he is caught at the computer, he explains that he is writing … a recipe book.
And the next day the floppy disk passes into the hands of Grigoriev. The calculation takes place on the spot: for each Grigoriev paid $ 100-200. (As established by the investigation, at least 13 thousand were transferred to Mezhov.) Later on, Grigoriev resold these materials to Media-Most.
But, as you know, appetite comes with eating. Having got a taste, the "culinary specialist" Mezhov finds another client; Head of Inkombank's information department Mikhail Ponomarenko.
Now, in addition to Grigoriev's "fees", he also receives a monthly salary of $ 500. (Subsequently, Ponomarenko will move to Norilsk Nickel, but this will not affect their relationship in any way, because the leaders of Nikel also wanted to keep abreast of the latest events.
Reviews prepared on the basis of Mezhov floppy disks were put on the table of the future Krasnoyarsk governor Khloponin.)
I name only two channels of information leakage: only what the prosecutor's office managed to prove. In reality, there were undoubtedly more of them. One of the buyers said during interrogation that Mezhov's diplomat always had several floppy disks. "This is not for you, and this is not for you," he said, sorting through the "goods", "but here is yours."
But not caught - not a thief. Mezhov was in no hurry to lengthen his term. He confessed only to obvious crimes. And although the investigation suspected him of many sins, most of them remained behind the scenes. Including the mysterious story of his relationship with … one English spy.
On Her Majesty's Secret Service
Former SVR officer Valery Oyamäe was hooked by the British four years ago. In Tallinn.
They pinned great hopes on their agent. It was not for nothing that the ICU resident himself recruited him. Jüri Pihl, Director General of Estonian Counterintelligence, held regular meetings.
In intelligence missions, which were then deciphered by the FSB, Oyamäe was ordered to collect information about famous political figures and possible approaches to them; on the leadership and operational staff of the Lubyanka. And many many others.
He was arrested in March 2000. Three months before Mezhov's exposure …
I have combined these two names for a reason. Mezhov and Oyamäe have known each other for a long time: they once worked together in foreign intelligence. After being fired, Oyamäe did not lose touch with his former colleague. The investigation had information that they continued to meet.
I would never believe that a foreign agent, a professional spy, would not take advantage of such an exceptional opportunity.
The list of documents stolen by Mezhov takes more than one page in the criminal case. Weekly summaries for the president on the most important national security issues. Cipher telegrams of the territorial bodies of the FSB. Briefs of the Office of Counterintelligence Operations. Secret information from key FSB units. Summaries of the situation in the Caucasus.
The overwhelming majority of the abducted were classified as "secret". Much - "Sov. Secret". Thanks to Mezhov, the results of dozens of counterintelligence operations, hundreds of developments and cases of operational accounting became the property of "glasnost".
He did not disdain anything. Dragged everything that tucked under the arm. And abstracts of speeches of the director of the FSB at various meetings. And the lists of the personnel of the Lubyanka. Even the results of the medical examination that the employees of his department went through.
It is no exaggeration to say that modern counterintelligence did not yet know a "mole" of such a scale …
Alexander Mezhov surrendered to the mercy of the winner immediately after his arrest. He) did not deny his guilt. Moreover, he wrote a letter of repentance to the director of the FSB, in which he asked to use his sad example for the edification of former colleagues, The court took these circumstances into account. The unlucky "cook" Mezhov received a relatively lenient sentence: 3 years and 1 month in a penal colony. This happened quite recently …