The following abbreviations are used in the article: ArchVO - Arkhangelsk VO, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZabVO - Transbaikal VO, ZakVO - Transcaucasian VO, ZAPOVO - Western special VO, CA - Red Army, KOVO - Kiev special VO, LVO - Leningrad VO, MVO - Moscow VO, NGOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, ODVO - Odessa VO, OVO - Oryol VO, PriVO - Privolzhsky VO, PribOVO - Baltic special VO, PTABR - anti-tank artillery brigade, RM - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, SAVO - Central Asian VO, sd - rifle division, Siberian Military District - Siberian VO, SKVO - North Caucasian VO, SNK - Council of People's Commissars, URVO - Ural VO, HVO - Kharkov VO.
In the first parts, it was said that the two countries began to prepare for a war in Europe, including against the USSR, after the end of the First World War. Therefore, our country could not avoid participation in a future war. The only question was: how many countries will participate in the war with the USSR?
The government of the Soviet Union managed to postpone the start of the war. During this time, Poland and France dropped out of our opponents in the planned war. England was left alone on the edge of the abyss and no longer thought of a war with the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of England, Germany, Poland, France, the USSR and the United States at different times were unable to provide the necessary reliable RM, which led to negative consequences for these countries.
Hitler decided to begin preparations for war with the Soviet Union. He believed that this war would be much tougher than the war with "civilized" France and England. After the victory in this war, the fate of the Poles, Czechs, Balts and the inhabitants of the USSR was unenviable. From 50 to 85% of the population of these peoples were planned to be destroyed or resettled, which was akin to death. In a future war, the Soviet army and the people had to defend their right to life …
In the previous part, it was shown that the leadership of the spacecraft understood how the Germans would fight, but for some reason they could not use their knowledge on the eve of the war.
In December 1940, the spacecraft had 9 mechanized corps. After the appointment of GK Zhukov to the post of chief of the General Staff, the planned number of formed mechanized corps was increased from 10-11 to 21: 10 corps of the 1st stage and 11 - of the 2nd.
Mobilization plan and mechanized corps
On February 12, 1941, in Stalin's office, a draft document with proposals from NGOs on mobilization deployment, known as MP-41, was considered. Later, the document will include clarifications on changing the deployment scheme, wartime strength, on the formation and disbandment of large formations and formations, on a change in staffing, etc.
In accordance with this document, the spacecraft will have 314 divisions. In addition to these formations, the spacecraft had brigades, regiments and other units that are not considered in the article.
The presented document is the proposals of the spacecraft leadership for wartime, which, perhaps, will come only in 1942. This follows from the amount of technology considered in the document. For example, tanks:
… Establish the staffing of weapons and military equipment during general mobilization:
… tanks:
heavy (KB and T-35 tanks) - 3907;
medium (T-34 and T-28) - 12843 …
Such a number of tanks could not enter the troops in 1941. In May 1941, the mechanized corps of the 2nd stage were not planned at all to participate in the war with Germany. About this D. D. Lyulyushenko spoke the head of the Main Armored Directorate Ya. N. Fedorenko. Now it becomes clear that there are more personnel in the mechanized corps of the 2nd stage - after all, he was trained and prepared for the receipt of equipment in 1942.
On March 8, Stalin approved the list of command personnel of the new mechanized corps.
1940 NPO memo and 1941 planning
The note "On the Foundations of Strategic Deployment for 1940 and 1941" presented to Stalin and Molotov on October 5, 1940, contained two options for deploying spacecraft troops. The note was overloaded with assumptions and data on the number of troops for the Northern or Southern options, and also did not contain any conclusions. The note did not contain the main thing: which variant of the NKO and the General Staff was considered the most probable and how the deployment of troops in the West should be carried out. Naturally, such a document needed to be redone. The new version of the document is presented on the website "Electronic Exhibitions of Moscow Region".
In the memoirs of the military, it is said that Stalin chose the deployment of troops according to the Southern option. It is impossible to establish whether this is so, but it is unlikely that Stalin himself chose the option. After all, it is known that on many issues, before making a decision, he was interested in the opinion of specialists. It is possible that the leaders of the KA expressed their opinion, with which Stalin agreed …
In 1938, there was a similar situation when the chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov prepared a note to the People's Commissar for Defense K. E. Voroshilov, which said:
At this time it is difficult to say where the deployment of the main forces of the German and Polish armies will take place - to the north of Polesie or to the south of it …
Intelligence service carried out by our potential adversaries, the transportations to concentrate will determinewhere their main forces will be deployed, and therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change variant of our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of woodland.
Therefore, it is proposed to have two options for strategic deployment - to the north or south of the woodland …
It is difficult to say why there was no similar conclusion in the prepared note in the fall of 1940.
Historian S. L. Chekunov on the forum of the site "Militera" noted:
The political decision (in the common people "directive of the Government") on military planning, on the basis of which the General Staff carried out planning in 1941, exists "with the signature of Stalin" …
Organizing measures in the spring of 1941 were carried out on the basis of an addendum to the development plan, which was formalized by the "resolution of the Council of People's Commissars" of 1941-12-02 …
The February-March version, this is the general standard planning, carried out in the development of the October instructions of Stalin …
For the February-March document, there is a whole bunch of working materials (maps, calculations, applications, etc.) … There are calendar plans, notes on working out the operational plan. Combat strengths were not worked out, options for transfer were not worked out, etc.
Vatutin made preliminary calculations “on his knees” at the beginning of June …
General Staff on strategic deployment
The leadership of the country and the spacecraft knew that a war with Nazi Germany was inevitable, but how the German generals would fight and when the war would start was unknown.
Some publications indicate that since December 1940, the leadership of the USSR was aware of Hitler's plans for a war with our country. It is clear that the leadership of the spacecraft in this case should have known about these plans. It seems that this is an attempt to falsify history in order to remove from under the blow of intelligence. But the intelligence agencies were not to blame for the fact that they faced massive disinformation at all levels, including Hitler, Goering and Goebbels. RMs have been rechecked, but they have been confirmed by misinformation coming from a variety of other sources.
On March 11, the General Staff prepared a document "On the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East." The doc says that
The document notes that Germany has up to 260 divisions, of which 200 (77%) will be directed against our borders. The number of troops allied to Germany is not considered in the article.
To conduct operations in the west (excluding the Finnish Front), the General Staff proposes to allocate: 158 rifle, 27 motorized, 53 tank and 7 cavalry divisions (78% of the total number of SC divisions). It is interesting that, in the opinion of the General Staff, in percentage terms, the number of divisions of the USSR and Germany concentrated on the border to the total number of formations turns out to be comparable.
It can be seen that the General Staff provides for the use in operations of all motorized and tank divisions available in the spacecraft, some of which will not be equipped with equipment in 1941. Therefore, the presented combat plan is the possible actions of the spacecraft in 1942 or later, when the mechanized corps of the 1st and 2nd stages will be largely equipped with equipment.
For operations against Japan, a fairly large Soviet grouping is intended in the amount of 37 divisions: 23 rifle, 6 motorized and motorized, 7 tank and one cavalry division from the Far Eastern Front, the ZabVO and the Siberian Military District.
In the considered copy of the document, there are inaccuracies:
- the spacecraft should have 60 tank divisions, and in accordance with the document under consideration, there are 61;
- there should be 32 motorized and motorized rifle divisions, and in accordance with the document there are 33;
- the number of cavalry divisions located in the territory outside the western districts is 6, not 9.
It is difficult to say in which grouping of troops there are inaccuracies in the part of the above divisions, since the numbers are mentioned (or used) twice and therefore cannot be misprints.
1941 training camp
On March 8, the Protocol of the Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) included the question "On the conduct of training camps for military-liable reserves in 1941 …". These training camps are considered to be Large training camps (hidden mobilization) associated with the preparation of the spacecraft for war in the spring and summer of 1941.
From 1939 until the beginning of the war, the two older ages of the enlistment staff were removed from the register. In the territories annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940 there was an untrained enrollment staff. Since 1938, categories of the population that had previously undergone military service or were trained in reserve (article by A. Yu. Some categories of people who had previously been deprived of their rights began to appeal. The untrained enlistment staff needed to be trained. According to plans in 1940, it was planned to attract 1.6 million people to training camps, but the Soviet-Finnish war changed these plans.
In the book “Stalin's Lost Chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 M. I. Meltyukhov wrote that the total number of conscripts in the reserve on July 1, 1940 was 11,902,873 people, of which 4,010,321 (34%) were not trained. The introduction of troops into the territory of Poland and the war with Finland led to the fact that the dismissal of servicemen from the ranks of the spacecraft was delayed and a large number of assigned personnel were called up. By the end of the war with Finland, there were 4,416 thousand people in the spacecraft, of which 1,591 thousand were assigned personnel.
The number of enrolled personnel planned to be attracted to the training camp in 1940 (1.6 million people), and the presence in the ranks of the KA of 1.59 million in March 1940 significantly exceeded the number of people who were attracted to the training camp in 1941. In 1940, no one cared about Germany's opinion on the matter. If they were waiting for the war in the spring-summer of 1941, they could easily have called for up to a million people for training, or by an additional decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to double this number …
S. L. Chekunov wrote:
In the figure below, it can be seen that the rifle divisions stationed in the LMO and in the western VOs consisted of 28% of the scribes from the entire composition involved in training. How many of them were untrained is unknown. But there should have been a lot of them.
By June 22, 805,264 people had been drafted, with a limit of 975,870 appointees permitted by the Government. Consequently, 170,606 people were left to go through training camps in the second peaceful half of the year. If the command of the spacecraft was expecting a war in June 1941, then untrained personnel would not be involved in the training camp. They would attract trained people and most of them were drafted into the divisions of the western military units.
S. L. Chekunov
Of course, the postponement of the training camp and their increase in early May increased the combat and mobilization readiness of the Red Army. However, this has nothing to do with “hidden mobilization”, even “under the guise of training camps” …
We return to one of the postulates that need to be guided: about what the war will be like before 22.6.41 in the USSR did not know … The country's leadership did not proceed from the "History of the Second World War" …
Issuing 1941 training camps for Large training camps or covert mobilization is another attempt at falsifying history, just like saying that
Intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 1941-11-03 and its consequences
11th of March prepared intelligence report RU, in which it is noted:
as of March 1, 1941, Germany had 20,700 aircraft …, of which: combat - 10980, naval - 350, others - 9370 …
The German Air Force consisted of 5 air fleets (8 air corps) and two separate air corps … One of them is located in Italy, the other - in Romania and Bulgaria …
The summary shows the distribution of German Air Force combat aircraft in various territories:
The figure shows that the number of combat aircraft near our border from the fall of 1940 to March 1, 1941 did not change. As of March 1, 6.4% of the total number of aircraft were near our border.
Before the start of the war, intelligence did not report the presence of a single aviation corps headquarters or a single air fleet headquarters near our border. The lion's share of German aviation was relocated to border airfields on the eve of the war, and the data on this did not have time to enter the RU, the General Staff and the headquarters of the districts. The memoirs say that on the evening of June 21, the commander of the ZAPOVO learned about the increase in the number of German aviation at one (or several) airfields. In this case, as a disciplined campaigner, he would definitely report this to the People's Commissar of Defense …
March 15th comes out Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars "On the production of KV tanks for 1941", which defines the production of heavy tanks at the Kirov and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants. The leaders of the spacecraft are currently satisfied with the booking and armament of heavy tanks.
In the intelligence report of 1941-11-03, there is information about the construction in Germany of three new models of heavy tanks. It seems that the information about the development of heavy tanks in Germany greatly concerned the leadership of the spacecraft and the government. Or (which is more likely) the leadership of the KA worried about the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars.
In March 1941, Marshal Kulik arrived at the artillery plant number 92, assigning chief designer V. G. Grabin the task of developing a new weapon for the KV tank.
V. G. Grabin some time after Kulik's departure, Stalin called:
I want to consult with you. It is believed that a heavy tank is armed with a low-power cannon that does not meet the tasks of a heavy tank. Currently, the issue of rearming it is being considered: instead of the 76-mm cannon, it is proposed to put a powerful 107-mm …
On May 14, the first shot was fired from the 107-mm ZIS-6 cannon, and serial production was to begin on July 1. The armor-piercing shell of this gun had armor penetration of the order of 160-175 mm and could pierce through any tank in the Wehrmacht.
April 7 in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK the issue of strengthening the armor of the KV-1, KV-2, KV-3 tanks and the design of more powerful KV-4 and KV-5 tanks with a ZIS-6 cannon is being considered.
It was decided to install additional armor screens 25-30 mm thick on the most vulnerable spots of the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. The frontal armor of the KV-3 tank should have been increased to 115–125 mm and the ZIS-6 cannon installed.
Tasks were issued for the design and manufacture of the tank:
- KV-4 with armor of 125–130 mm with armor of the most vulnerable spots of 140–150 mm;
- KV-5 with 170 mm frontal armor and 150 mm side armor.
Since no war was expected in the near future, the terms were set sparing:
- by 15.05.41to complete the development of drawings and technology for shielding;
- from 1.06.41, the production of the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks should be carried out with a screen;
- KV-1 and KV-2 tanks located in military units should be screened in place, starting screening on July 1 and ending by 1942-01-01.
It was not so easy to expand the production of shielded hulls and towers, and only on June 19 the final protocol for the KV shielding scheme was approved.
The production of shielded hulls and towers was launched in the second decade of June. From the report of the military representative Dmitrusenko (06.21.41):
In early June, RMs arrive, which lead to a discussion of the issue of moving armies from the internal districts and to serious concerns about German heavy tanks. On June 9, the NKGB intelligence transmits to its agents an NCO request, in which, among other things, it is required to find out about the organizational and staff structure of the German heavy etc. The request noted:
it is especially important to identify by tanks: the maximum thickness and resistance of the armor; types of tanks with maximum weight and armament and the number of tanks weighing 45 tons and more …
June 13 People's Commissar of Defense signs a note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and to the Government "On the insufficient armament capacity of the new KV and T-34 tanks, as well as other models of promising tanks that are in design." Work on the creation of heavy tanks with powerful armor and weapons will be phased out after the start of the war, when it becomes clear that the Germans do not have heavy tanks like ours.
Strengthening the armor of the T-34
In the period from April 1 to April 21, 1941, two corps and two T-34 towers were fired upon. It turned out that the armor of the hull and turret, with the exception of the upper frontal plate of the hull, was penetrated by 45-mm shells at a distance of 600 meters and closer.
May 7 the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars "On the production of T-34 tanks in 1941" was issued. It dealt with the future production of the A-43 and A-44 tanks. Clause 10 of the decree concerned the shielding of T-34 tanks:
To oblige … to test two prototypes of the T-34 tank with additional shielding of the turret and frontal hull plate with armor thickness of 13-15 mm.
To provide shielding of 500 pieces in 1941. T-34 tanks located in military units by sending special brigades with material and tools to the field;
… STZ and Plant No. 183 have been producing shielded tanks according to the approved model since August 1941.
To supply the Mariupol plant to the plant number 183 in accordance with the production of shielded tanks, armor parts, starting from July 1941 …
In May, the first experiments on firing screens were carried out. It turned out that after their installation, the through-penetration limit of the projectile increased by 40-55 m / s. The documentation for the screens was ready by mid-June 1941. In July, two tanks received shielding and were tested.
Work related to the shielding of the T-34 tanks available in parts could, at best, be completed by the beginning of 1942.
Communication problems
General N. Gapich, the former head of the communications department of the spacecraft, wrote in his article "Some thoughts on control and communications issues":
On March 15, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense "On the distribution of duties between the deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense" is issued:
In addition to managing the activities of the General Staff of the SC, I entrust to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the SC, General of the Army, G. K.
Under the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, have:
a) GSh KA;
b) Control of the spacecraft fuel supply;
c) Communication department of the spacecraft;
d) Main Directorate of Air Defense of Spacecraft;
e) General Staff Academy …
General Gapich's immediate superior G. K. Zhukov wrote:
Major General N. I. Gapich, the chief of communications troops of the spacecraft, reported to us about the lack of modern communications equipment and the lack of sufficient mobilization and emergency reserves of communications equipment …
Consequently, the chief of the General Staff knew about the communication problems, but could not defend this issue in the spring of 1941.
General N. Gapich:
Later, at the beginning of 1941 [06/05/41 - approx. ed.], when JV Stalin became the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the NPO again presented to the Council of People's Commissars, already to Stalin, a draft resolution on the development of the communications industry.
But this time the decision remained the same …
It seems that the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect communication problems in a future war. After all, they were able to push the production of gliders six days before the start of the war:
General P. M. Kurochkin, the chief of communications of the PribOVO, describing the pre-war methods of combat training of the headquarters and command personnel of the signal troops of the army and district levels of command, pointed out one of the reasons that led to the loss of command and control in the first days of the war:
Combat actions of the German army against the USSR
On March 20, the report of the head of the RU "Statements, organizational measures and options for military operations of the German army against the USSR" was prepared. The report states:
The report draws conclusions:
1. On the basis of all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany.
2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year should be regarded as misinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence …
The report does not contain the RU's opinion on the most likely course of action. Everything is dumped to a heap before the management, which must make a decision.
In some publications, the authors choose option 3 as the most likely. It is concluded that, knowing about the most likely option, Stalin was obliged to make the right decision. It's easier for these authors, because they know the history of the Great Patriotic War …
The figure shows a diagram for the report of the head of the RU. Does this scheme give an idea of how the German generals will fight? The opinion of the author does not give.
It should be noted that the presence of such associations as an army group was not detected by our intelligence against the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO until the beginning of the war. Although the headquarters of Army Group B (later the headquarters of Army Group Center) had been at the border since the fall of 1940. The headquarters of Army Groups "North" and "South" were also not found by our reconnaissance, although from the end of April 1941 they were also at the border. According to intelligence, there were only a few field armies near the border. Therefore, according to the presented scheme, it is generally not clear whether the strike will be delivered by reinforced armies, or the strike will be delivered only after the concentration of army groups in different directions and the redeployment of large mobile groupings.
In the North, an army group (or a reinforced army) is attacking Leningrad. How many mobile groupings are there, where will they be concentrated before striking, the total number of this grouping of this army group before the attack, how will military operations be conducted against the troops concentrated on the border? All this is unknown.
For the Central Group - the same questions as for the North. The arrow of the strike of the enemy grouping includes the entire border of the ZAPOVO. It is precisely such RMs that will be at the district headquarters on June 21: all tank and motorized formations that reconnaissance discovered are distributed along the entire border in the district's area of responsibility. On the borders of the district (Suvalkinsky ledge and the area of the city of Brest), no large tank groupings (even at least one tank division each) were found by reconnaissance.
In the material of the intelligence department of the PribOVO headquarters, prepared at 18:00 on June 21, all tanks, armored personnel carriers, cannons and infantry battalions are equally distributed over different sections of the border. There is no information on the directions of the strikes of the mobile groupings. There is only a grouping of mobile troops in the area of the city of Tilsit.
In the South, all blows converge at Kiev. Again, it is not known: how many mobile groupings will the enemy have, where are they concentrated, the total number of the grouping of this army group before the attack? One of the blows comes from the side of the top of the Lviv ledge. The same information will be at the headquarters of KOVO on June 21: a significant part of the tank and motorized formations are allegedly located at the top of the Lvov ledge.
According to the recollections of the former chief of the KOVO operations department I. Kh. Baghramyan, on the eve of the war, the main enemy attack in the direction of Krakow - Lvov, that is, at the top of the Lvov ledge, will be expected at the district headquarters. Where there were no mobile German formations, but the German command imitated them.
After 36 days (04/25/41), the military attaché in Germany, General V. I. Tupikov prepared a note addressed to the head of the RU, which does not speak of Germany's unequivocal plans to attack the USSR.
Events that could happen in the near future (regarding Sweden and Finland) did not happen.
IV Tupikov spoke about the possibility of an event that could postpone the war.
Numerous RMs about the movement of German divisions across the territory of Turkey and the plans of the German command to start military operations in the Middle East and on the North African coast - look like an event that could postpone the start of the war?
Or the numerous RMs about the conditions and an ultimatum from Germany - isn't this a reason to start negotiations with the Hitlerite leadership, somewhat postpone the start of the war and prepare the army for its start?..
After May 15, the General Staff prepared a document "On the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies." While preparing the document, there is still no certainty about the plans for the deployment of the German army:
Most likely, the main forces of the German army … will be deployed to the south of …, Brest, Demblin to strike in the direction of Kovel, Rovno, Kiev. This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by a blow. At the same time, one should expect a blow in the north from East Prussia to Vilno, Vitebsk and Riga …
The document uses the phrase "", in the crossed out another phrase - "", this emphasizes that during the development of the document it was not known exactly how the hostilities would unfold. Therefore, the claim that in the spring of 1941 intelligence revealed the main provisions of the Barbarossa plan is an attempt to falsify our history.
New formations in the spacecraft
In May 1940, the Republic of Moldova received information on the use of heavy tanks by the Germans. In the fall of 1940, messages similar to those sent in June probably also arrived (intelligence report no. 4):
About German heavy tanks
On the western front, the Germans use heavy 60-ton and 35-ton tanks ("T5-6"), armed with a cannon of up to 100 mm caliber. Two tank divisions were created from 35-ton tanks (the data needs to be clarified) …
In November 1940, the formation of 20 machine-gun and artillery brigades began,.
According to the staff, the brigade had 17 T-26 tanks, 19 armored vehicles, 30 45-mm anti-tank guns, 42 76-mm divisional guns, 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 36 76-mm or 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.
On 12.2.41, a new mobilization plan was approved, after which the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to disband redundant cavalry divisions and 20 machine-gun and artillery brigades.
1941-11-01 from the Council of Defense under the Council of People's Commissars (it is most likely that we are talking about the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars) a letter comes about the formation of artillery brigades of the RGK. The heads of the Main Artillery Directorate sent a response on this issue:
1) To exclude the 45-mm gun mod. 1937, replacing them with 57-mm guns mod. 1941 of the year. Before the start of the gross production of a new 57-mm anti-tank gun, we consider it expedient to introduce into the brigade 37-mm anti-tank anti-aircraft guns mod. 1940 of the year.
2) Reduce the number of 76-mm divisional guns. To be allowed to equip brigades with 76-mm guns mod. 1939 as having less weight.
3) Due to the low mobility of the 76-mm anti-aircraft gun mod.1931 and an insufficient number of 76-mm armor-piercing ammunition, we consider it expedient to replace them with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns mod. 1939 on a four-wheeled gun carriage with better mobility and a proven armor-piercing round.
4) To oblige the People's Commissariat of Ammunition to provide the program of equipping the artillery anti-tank brigades of the RGK with the necessary amount of armor-piercing ammunition.
23 april the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On new formations in the KA" was issued, which spoke about the formation and formation.
The incoming RM repeatedly spoke about the presence in Germany of parachute divisions - 4-5 and airborne divisions - 4-5. This is probably why the spacecraft decided to form 5 airborne corps in order to keep up with the potential enemy. Only on the part of the Germans - it was disinformation …
Obviously, the presence of heavy tanks on the part of the enemy pushed the SC leadership to the introduction of 107-mm M-60 cannons into the PTABR. Since the M-60 guns were received in insufficient volume, when staffing the brigades, they were replaced with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.
The 85mm and 107mm cannons were clearly intended against heavily armored tanks. These guns, for various reasons (large mass and dimensions, spaced aiming elements) were not quite suitable for using them as anti-tank guns.
By the beginning of the war, PTABR were not provided with vehicles, which were supposed to arrive during 1941:
State Planning Committee of the USSR to provide for the allocation of non-profit organizations during 1941, in excess of the plan, to ensure the measures specified in this Resolution - 8225 trucks (of which 5000 ZIS-5 vehicles), 960 STZ-5 tractors and 420 Stalinets tractors.
From KOVO on 05/17/41 a telegram was sent to the People's Commissar of Defense:
For the emerging PTABRs, 600 ST-2 tractors, 300 STZ-5 tractors are required, for the artillery units of the formed motorized mechanized, tank and rifle divisions, 503 ST-2 tractors and 792 STZ-5 tractors are required.
The guns are coming in, there is nothing to carry. I ask for orders to accelerate the expulsion of the vehicle fleet of the formed parts …
By June 18, 75 ST-2 tractors and 188 STZ-5 tractors were shipped to KOVO for PTABRs, of which 50 ST-2 and 120 STZ-5 were sent to the 1st brigade. 25 ST-2 and 68 STZ-5 (165 units required) were sent to the 2nd brigade.
The other three KOVO brigades did not receive tractors.
By June 18, 18 tractors were shipped for two PTABR PribOVO.
On June 7, three PTABR ZAPOVO are half-manned with guns. By July 1, they promised to deliver 72 more 76-mm guns and 60 - 85-mm guns. At the same time, the 6th brigade had only 4 tractors, the 8th brigade had 7 tractors, and the 7th brigade had none at all.
The figure shows the locations of PTABR PribOVO and ZAPOVO. The figure additionally shows (approximate) directions of attacks by the German motorized corps and the directions of attacks expected in the General Staff as of 1941-15-05.
PTABRs ZAPOVO, having no transport, and disappeared in the crucible of war far from the places of advancement of the enemy strike groups. General Pavlov is not to blame for this, since the places of deployment were determined in the General Staff.
It should be noted that all PTABRs are far from the direction of the 2nd Panzer Group's strike in the area of the city of Brest, which was not discovered by reconnaissance until June 24. This direction did not cause concern in the General Staff before the start of the war.
The figure below shows the locations of PTABR KOVO.
If the NKO and the General Staff knew about the directions of the enemy's motorized corps strikes and the timing of the start of the war, then the PTABRs could at least be brought to positions by means of transport allocated from other units …
But that was unknown …
