After the unsuccessful Crimean War of 1853-1856. the Russian government was forced to temporarily change the vector of its foreign policy from the western (Europe) and southwestern (Balkans) to the eastern and southeastern. The latter seemed to be very promising both in terms of economic (acquisition of new sources of raw materials and sales markets for industrial products) and geopolitical (expansion of the empire, weakening of Turkish influence in Central Asia and occupation of positions that threaten British possessions in India).
The solution to the problem of moving to Central Asia seemed very simple. By the middle of the XIX century. most of the Kazakh steppe was under Russian control; the local sedentary population gravitated towards Russia economically; Central Asian state formations (Bukhara Emirate, Kokand and Khiva khanates), torn apart by internal political contradictions, could not offer serious resistance. The main "opponents" of the Russian troops were considered to be long distances, impassable roads (it is difficult to supply food and ammunition, to maintain communications) and an arid climate.
Fighting against the highlanders in the Caucasus and the Polish uprising of 1863-1864. delayed the start of the campaign to Central Asia. Only in the second half of May 1864 did the detachments of Colonels N. A. Verevkina and M. G. Chernyaeva moved from the Syr-Darya fortified line and from Semirechye in the general direction to Tashkent (the largest city in the region, the population of which exceeded 100 thousand people.
Having set out on May 22, 1864 from Fort Perovsky, a small detachment of Verevkin (5 infantry companies, 2 hundred Cossacks, one hundred Kazakh policemen, 10 artillery pieces and 6 mortars), following up the river. Syr-Darya, two weeks later reached the city and fortress of Turkestan, which belonged to the Kokand Khanate. Bek (ruler) rejected the demand for surrender, but, not hoping for the success of the defense, he soon left the city to fend for themselves. And then the unexpected happened: the inhabitants of Turkestan showed stubborn resistance to the Russian troops. The fighting went on for three days, and only on June 12 the fortress was taken. For this victory N. A. Verevkin was promoted to major general and awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree. However, Verevkin did not dare to go with his small detachment to densely populated Tashkent, surrounded by a 20-kilometer fortress wall, and began to strengthen his power in the conquered territories.
Having a larger detachment (8, 5 companies, 1, 5 hundreds of Cossacks, 12 guns (a total of 1, 5 thousand regular troops and 400 people of the Kazakh militia) M. G. Chernyaev occupied on June 4, 1864 Aulie-Ata (fortification, located on the left bank of the Talas River on the way from Verny to Tashkent. On September 27, he captured the large city of Chimkent and attacked Tashkent on the move. However, the siege and assault on October 2-4 of the main Central Asian city ended in failure and on October 7 Chernyaev returned to Chimkent.
The Tashkent failure somewhat cooled the "hot heads" in St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the results of the 1864 campaign were considered successful for Russia. At the beginning of 1865, a decision was made to increase the number of Russian troops in Central Asia and to form the Turkestan region in the conquered territories. The head of the region was instructed to separate Tashkent from the Kokand Khanate and create a special possession there under the Russian protectorate. This task had to be done by M. G. Chernyaev, promoted to major general for his successes and appointed Turkestan military governor.
At the end of May 1865 Chernyaev with a detachment of 9.5 infantry companies with 12 guns again moved to Tashkent and on June 7 took up a position 8 versts from the city. The Kokand Khan sent a 6,000-strong army with 40 guns to rescue the besieged. On June 9, a counter battle took place under the walls of the city, in which the Kokand people, despite their numerical superiority, were completely defeated, and their leader Alimkula was mortally wounded. Frightened residents of Tashkent asked for help from the Emir of Bukhara. On June 10, a small detachment of Bukhara troops entered the city. Lacking the strength and time for a blockade or a long siege, Chernyaev decided to take Tashkent by storm. Artillery pieces made a breach in the wall and on June 14, 1865, as a result of a decisive assault, the city fell. On June 17, honorary residents of Tashkent came to the newly-made military governor with an expression of obedience and readiness to accept Russian citizenship.
The military and political presence of Russia in the Turkestan region was growing. But her opponents, represented by local feudal-clerical circles and their foreign patrons, did not give up either. Ordinary dekhanes and pastoralists, too, were still restrained in their attitude to foreign aliens. Some saw them as invaders, so the propaganda of "ghazavat" (holy war against "infidels", non-Muslims) had a certain success among the people. At the beginning of 1866, the Bukhara emir Seyid Muzaffar, enlisting the support of the Kokand ruler Khudoyar Khan, whom he helped to seize the throne, demanded that Russia clear Tashkent (the capital of Turkestan. Negotiations between the parties did not lead to anything. The hostilities began, in which success was again on the side of the Russians. On May 8, 1866, the Bukhara army suffers a severe defeat at the Irdzhar tract. On May 24, "in hot pursuit" a detachment of Major General D. I. Romanovsky (14 companies, 5 hundred Cossacks, 20 guns and 8 rocket machines) takes by storm the heavily fortified city of Khojent (a junction of roads to Tashkent, Kokand, Balkh and Bukhara) located on the banks of the Syr-Darya river. October 18 (Jizzakh. Jizzakh and Khojent districts were annexed to Russia. (1)
Conquered in 1864-1866 territories made up the Syr-Darya region, which, together with Semirechenskaya in 1867, was united into the Turkestan general-governorship. The first governor-general of the region was an experienced politician and administrator, engineer-general K. P. Kaufman. M. G. Chernyaev with his adventurous manners, in the opinion of the Russian "top", was not suitable for this position.
The reasons for the successful actions of the Russian detachments against the numerous troops of the Central Asian rulers were revealed in his memoirs by the former Minister of War A. N. Kuropatkin, a young second lieutenant after graduating from the Pavlovsk school, who arrived in the fall of 1866 to serve in Turkestan: “The superiority of them (the Russian troops (I. K.) consisted not only in the best weapons and training, but mainly in spiritual superiority. and the consciousness of belonging to the glorious Russian tribe, our soldiers and officers went to the enemy, not counting him, and success proved that they were right. The glorious deeds of Chernyaev and others, together with a sense of superiority over the enemy, developed in the troops the determination to seek victories not in defense, but in the offensive … (2)
The peculiarities of hostilities in Central Asia demanded the development of a kind of tactics not provided for by the army regulations. “According to the same local conditions (wrote A. N. Kuropatkin, (it was necessary to always hold on during actions against the enemy, both defensive and offensive, assembled, in readiness to repel the enemy from all sides. providing troops from all four directions … Measures were taken to avoid movement in the rear of single people and small teams. We tried to have our "base" with us … (3)
The main burden of the Central Asian campaigns fell on the shoulders of the infantry. "She decided the fate of the battle," (Kuropatkin testified, (and after the victory, the main work on the creation of a new Russian stronghold was entrusted to her. The infantry built fortifications, temporary barracks and premises for warehouses, led roads, escorted transports. Russian infantry, which also suffered the main losses in killed and wounded …
Our cavalry, which consisted of Cossacks, was few in number … That is why, when meeting with excellent forces, our Cossacks retreated, or, dismounted, met the enemy with rifle fire and waited for help … (4) The Cossacks were also used for reconnaissance and postal service. in this case they were assisted by Kazakh policemen, who also served as guides.
The purpose of the hostilities was to capture strategically important settlements, most of which were heavily fortified. “Having approached the moat of the fortress with accelerated siege work, they began the assault, most often before dawn. The companies assigned for the assault secretly gathered against the chosen point … with their own ladders and at a signal … they got out of the trenches, pulled out the ladders and ran with them to the fortress wall … It was necessary to reach the ditch, lower the thick end of the ladder into the ditch, swing the ladder and throw the thin end onto the wall. escarpment for shelling the enemy … There were several stairs at once and our heroes, challenging each other's place, climbed the stairs at a time when the enemy took their own measures against them. hit with rifle fire, and at the top of the wall were greeted with batiks, spears, checkers. centuries , (finished by A. N. Kuropatkin. (5)
And what about artillery? (Of course, Russian cannons were more perfect and stronger than the enemy's, especially on the battlefield. But "the artillery preparation of that time could not make large gaps in the thick Asian walls," although knocking down the upper part of the fortifications, "greatly facilitated the assault on the stairs." (6)
The year 1867 passed relatively calmly, except for two clashes of the Jizzakh detachment of Colonel A. K. Abramov with the Bukharans on June 7 and early July near the Yana-Kurgan fortification, on the way from Jizzak to Samarkand. Both sides were preparing for the decisive battle. By the spring of 1868, Russian troops in Turkestan numbered 11 battalions, 21 hundred of the Orenburg and Ural Cossack troops, a sapper company and 177 artillery pieces, (a total of about 250 officers and 10, 5 thousand soldiers, non-commissioned officers and Cossacks. Constant army of Bukhara the emirate consisted of 12 battalions, from 20 to 30 hundreds of cavalry and 150 guns, (a total of about 15 thousand people. In addition to the regular troops in wartime, a large militia of armed residents was assembled.
In early April 1868, Emir Seyid Muzaffar proclaimed "ghazavat" against the Russians. In case of success, he counted on the help of the Turkish sultan, the rulers of Kashgaria, Kokand, Afghanistan, Khiva and the administration of British India. However, the anti-Russian coalition immediately began to disintegrate. Central Asian rulers took a wait-and-see attitude. A detachment of Afghan mercenaries of Iskander Akhmet Khan, not receiving a salary by the due date, left the fortress of Nurat and went over to the side of the Russians.
Russian troops, numbering about 3, 5 thousand people by April 27, concentrated in Yany-Kurgan. The head of the detachment was Major General N. N. Golovachev, but the general leadership of the military operations was assumed by the commander of the Turkestan military district, Governor-General K. P. Kaufman. On April 30, the detachment set out along the Samarkand road and, having spent the night in the Tash-Kupryuk tract, on May 1 moved to the river. Zeravshan. On the approach to the river, the vanguard of the Russians was attacked by Bukhara cavalry, but the head of the cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel N. K. Strandman with 4 hundred Cossacks, 4 horse guns and a rocket battery managed to push the enemy back to the left bank.
Bukhara troops occupied advantageous positions on the heights of Chapan-ata. All three roads leading to Samarkand, as well as the crossing over Zeravshan, were fired upon by enemy artillery. Having built a detachment in order of battle, Kaufman ordered an attack on the heights. In the first line were six companies of the 5th and 9th Turkestan line battalions with 8 guns. On the right flank, there were five companies of the 3rd line and 4th rifle battalions and a company of Afghans, on the left (three companies of the 4th battalion and half a sapper company. In reserve there were 4 hundred Cossacks with 4 horse guns and a rocket battery. The wagon train was built by Wagenburg) (a square of fortified carts (I. K.) guarded by four companies of the 6th linear battalion, 4 guns and fifty Cossacks. Having passed the Zeravshan sleeves in the water and then knee-deep in muddy rice fields, under cross-gun and artillery fire Russians began to climb the heights of Bukhara residents. The infantry acted mainly, since the artillery and cavalry did not have time to cross the river. The onslaught was so rapid that the Sarbazi (soldiers of the regular army of Bukhara (IK) fled, abandoning 21 cannons. Losses of Russian troops made up only 2 people killed and 38 wounded.
The next day it was supposed to storm Samarkand, but at dawn to K. P. Representatives of the Muslim clergy and administration appeared to Kaufman with a request to accept the city under their protection and then "into the citizenship of the White Tsar." The Governor-General agreed, and Russian troops occupied Samarkand. Kaufman sent a letter to Seyid Muzaffar, offering peace on the terms of the concession of the Samarkand bekdom, payment of "war costs" and recognition for Russia of all acquisitions made in Turkestan since 1865. There was no response to the letter …
Meanwhile, all the cities of the Samarkand bekdom, with the exception of Chilek and Urgut, sent delegations expressing their obedience. On May 6, Chilek was occupied without a fight by a detachment (6 companies, 2 hundreds, 2 guns and a missile division) of Major F. K. Shtampel, who, having destroyed the fortifications and barracks of the sarbaz, returned to Samarkand the next day. On May 11, Colonel A. K. Abramov. The ruler of the city of Huseyn-bek, wishing to gain time, entered into negotiations, but refused to lay down his arms. On May 12, Abramov's detachment, having broken the stubborn resistance of the Bukharians in the rubble and the citadel, with the support of artillery, captured Urgut. The enemy fled, leaving up to 300 corpses in place. The losses of the Russians amounted to 1 person. killed and 23 wounded.
On May 16, most of the Russian forces (13, 5 companies, 3 hundreds and 12 guns) under the command of Major General N. N. Golovacheva moved to Katta-Kurgan and on May 18 took it without hindrance. The Bukharians retreated to Kermine. The 11 infantry companies remaining in Samarkand, teams of artillery and missile batteries, 2 hundred Cossacks began to strengthen the city citadel. The precaution was not superfluous, for in the rear of the Russian troops, partisan detachments from the local population became more active. On May 15, one of these detachments, led by the former Chilek Bek Abdul-Gafar, went to Tash-Kupryuk to cut off the Russians from Yana-Kurgan. Lieutenant Colonel N. N. Nazarov, with two companies, a hundred Cossacks and two rocket launchers, forced Abdul-Gafar to retreat through Urgut to Shakhrisabz (mountainous region 70 km south of Samarkand. From May 23, from Shakhrisabz, in a gorge near the village of Kara-Tyube, large forces of militias began to accumulate. On May 27, A. K. Abramov with 8 companies, 3 hundred and 6 guns opposed them. The infantry occupied Kara. Tyube, but the Cossacks were surrounded by the superior forces of Shakhrisyabs. If not for the help of two mouths of soldiers, they would have had a hard time…. The next day Abramov was forced to return to Samarkand. On the way, he discovered that cavalry detachments of rebels had already appeared around the city …
On May 29, in Samarkand, a report was received from General N. N. Golovachev, that on the Zerabulak heights, 10 versts from Katta-Kurgan, a camp of Bukhara troops of up to 30 thousand people appeared. In Chilek, militias were concentrated to attack Yany-Kurgan, where there were only two companies of infantry, two hundred Cossacks and two mountain guns. Detachments of Shakhrisyabs concentrated in Kara-Tyube to attack Samarkand. According to the plan developed by the vassals of the emir of Bukhara by the rulers of Shakhrisabz, it was supposed on June 1 to simultaneously attack the Russian troops from three sides and destroy them.
The situation was becoming critical. To turn the tide, K. P. Kaufman, leaving a small garrison in Samarkand (520 men of the 6th Turkestan line battalion, 95 sappers, 6 guns and 2 mortars), with the main forces rushed to Katta-Kurgan on May 30. The next day, having overcome 65 versts in a day, he joined the detachment of N. N. Golovacheva. On June 2, Russian troops swiftly attacked the enemy on the Zerabulak heights. The Bukhara army, half diluted by the militias, suffered a complete defeat. Only the sarbazes tried to resist, but they were also scattered by artillery fire. "About 4 thousand corpses covered the battlefield, (wrote A. N. Kuropatkin. (All the guns were taken. The regular army of the emir ceased to exist and the way to Bukhara was opened …" in Kermina, there were only about 2 thousand people, including a small convoy, but the few Russian troops, having suffered losses, needed rest and putting in order.
Meanwhile, the warlike highlanders of Shakhrisabz, led by their rulers Jura-bek and Baba-bek, occupied Samarkand and, with the support of the insurgent townspeople, laid siege to the citadel, where a small Russian garrison had taken refuge. This is how he illuminates the events that followed in the memoirs "70 Years of My Life" by A. N. Kuropatkin: "On June 2, at 4 o'clock in the morning.., huge assemblies of mountaineers, residents of Samarkand and the Zeravshan valley with drumbeats, with the sound of trumpets, with shouts of" Ur! Ur! "Flooded the streets and rushed to storm the citadel. From the sakles and gardens adjacent to the walls, strong rifle fire opened at the citadel defenders. the citadels, hitting the infirmary and the courtyard of the khan's palace, where our reserve was. The attack was carried out simultaneously in seven places. In particular, the efforts of the attackers were aimed at capturing two gates and some breaches near these gates. Our small garrison had a hard time. " (8) The commandant of the citadel, Major Shtempel and Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov, mobilized for the defense all non-combatants (clerks, musicians, quartermasters), as well as the sick and wounded of the local hospital, capable of holding weapons in their hands. The first attack was repulsed, but the defenders suffered serious losses (85 killed and wounded.
Having more than twenty-fold superiority in numbers, the rebels continued to violently storm the fortress, trying to quickly put an end to its defenders. They again gave the floor to a contemporary of events (A. N. Kuropatkin: "At night the attacks resumed, and the enemy lit the gates. The Samarkand gates were extinguished and an embrasure was built in them, through which the besieged were beaten by the attacking grapeshot, but the Bukhara gates had to be destroyed by building a blockage behind them. At 5 o'clock in the morning, the enemy with a fairly large force burst into the opening of the Bukhara gate, but, met with hand grenades and a friendly blow with bayonets, retreated. At 10 o'clock in the morning, large enemy forces simultaneously burst into the citadel from two sides: from the western one at the food warehouse and the eastern one at the Samarkand gate. A heated battle ensued inside the citadel … The general reserve arrived in time to decide it in our favor. The enemy was thrown against the wall and thrown from it … At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, an even stronger danger threatened the defenders from the side of the Bukhara Gate. Crowds of fanatics made a desperate attack on the rubble in front of the gate and on the wall on both sides. They climbed, clinging to the iron cats, dressed on arms and legs, sitting on each other. The defenders of the dam, having lost half of their staff, were confused … But, fortunately, the revenue was close. Nazarov, having gathered and encouraged the defenders, stopped the retreating, reinforced them with several dozen weak (sick and wounded soldiers (I. K.) and success, pursued him through the gates through the streets of the city. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon the general assault was repeated, repulsed at all points. The second day cost the brave garrison 70 people killed and wounded. For two days, losses amounted to 25%, the rest, who did not leave the walls. days, were very tired … "(9)
An eyewitness to the bloody battles in Samarkand, the famous Russian battle painter V. V. Vereshchagin dedicated a series of his paintings to these events. The course of the Samarkand uprising was closely followed by the rulers of Bukhara and Kokand. If he succeeded, the former hoped to turn the course of the war with Russia in his favor, and the latter (to recapture Tashkent.
Not hoping, in view of their small numbers, to keep the entire perimeter of the citadel walls, the besieged began to prepare their last refuge for defense (the khan's palace. At the same time, "Major Shtempel … daily at night sent natives messengers to General Kaufman with a report about the difficult situation of the garrison. there were up to 20 people, but only one got to Kaufman. The rest were intercepted and killed or changed. The messenger brought Kaufman a laconic note on a tiny piece of paper: "We are surrounded, assaults are continuous, large losses, help is needed …" The report was received in the evening of 6 June and the detachment came to the rescue immediately. Kaufman decided to walk 70 miles in one passage, stopping only for halts … On June 4, 5, 6 and 7 attacks on the gates and breaks in the walls were repeated several times daily. The shooting did not stop, but our garrison in spite of extreme exhaustion and new significant losses, he not only repulsed the enemy, but made sorties into the city and burned it. Toron, a comparative lull set in, as it were by mutual agreement. On June 7, at 11 pm, the garrison of the Samarkand citadel saw, with an indescribable feeling of joy, a rocket soaring in the vicinity on the way to Katta-Kurgan. That went to the rescue of the heroes Kaufman … "(10)
The united Uzbek-Tajik detachments, leaving Samarkand, went to the mountains or scattered across the surrounding villages. On June 8, Russian troops entered the city again. On June 10, a representative of the Bukhara Emir arrived in Samarkand for negotiations. On June 23, 1868, a peace treaty was signed, according to which Bukhara recognized for Russia all its conquests since 1865, and pledged to pay 500 thousand rubles. indemnity and grant Russian merchants the right to free trade in all cities of the emirate. From the territories captured in 1868, the Zeravshan District was formed with two departments: Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. The head of the district and the head of the military-people's administration was A. K. Abramov, promoted to major general. Leaving at his disposal 4 infantry battalions, 5 hundred Cossacks, 3 artillery battalions and a missile battery, Governor General K. P. Kaufman with the rest of the troops moved to Tashkent.
The Emirate of Bukhara was made vassal to Russia. When the eldest son of Seyid Muzaffar Katty-Tyurya, dissatisfied with the terms of the 1868 treaty, rebelled against his father, Russian troops came to the rescue of the emir. On August 14, 1870, the detachment of A. K. Abramov was taken by storm by Kitab (the capital of the Shahrasyab beks, who decided to secede from Bukhara. In 1873, the Khiva Khanate fell under the protectorate of Russia).
The rulers of the vassal states of Central Asia obediently followed in the wake of Russia's policy. And no wonder! After all, the population under their control did not strive for independence, but, on the contrary, for joining the Russian Empire. Their brothers on the territory of Turkestan lived much better: without feudal strife, they could use the achievements of Russian industry, agricultural technology, culture, and qualified medical care. The construction of roads, especially the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, contributed to the rapid development of trade, drawing the Central Asian region into the all-Russian market.
The existence of formally independent enclaves on the territory of the Russian Empire also suited the tsarist government. It served as one of the reasons for the loyalty of the population of Turkestan and made it possible, if necessary, to resolve complex foreign policy conflicts. For example, in the 90s. XIX century, due to the aggravation of relations with England, part of the Pamir mountain khanates, which Russia claimed, was transferred to the nominal administration of the Bukhara administration (11). After the conclusion in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian agreement on the division of spheres of influence, this section of the Pamirs safely became part of the Russian Empire …
