How the Red Army Air Force was beheaded
The war for the Soviet Air Force began much earlier than that Sunday morning, when German bombs fell on the "peacefully sleeping airfields." The heaviest losses, and in the most important, command link, Soviet aviation suffered already in May-June 1941. To this day, there is no clear explanation of why it was at the beginning of the summer of 1941 that a new wave of repressions covered the leadership of the military aviation and the military industry. Even against the background of other absurd and bloody acts of the Stalinist regime, the so-called aviator case is striking in its irrationality.
Sov. the secret certificate, which Lavrenty Beria submitted to Stalin on January 29, 1942, contains a list of 46 arrested persons who had not yet had time to be shot by that time. Next to each name was a very brief summary of the essence of the charges. This document immediately and unconditionally removes the sacramental question: "Did Stalin himself believe in the guilt of his victims?" In this case, such a question is inappropriate - there is nothing in the certificate that even the most gullible person could believe. The jealous and passionate Moor Othello was at least presented with "material evidence" - a handkerchief. Everything about the "aviator case" was boring, scary and disgusting. The Chekists did not find any "handkerchief".
There is nothing concrete in the charges brought against the arrested generals, there is not a single fact, not a single document, not a single real event, there is no motive for committing such a terrible crime, there are no accomplices “on the other side of the front” to whom the alleged “spies” passed secret information. There is nothing but stereotyped phrases: “… is exposed as a participant in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy by the testimony of Petrov and Sidorov. Against the surname of the conditional Sidorov, it will be written: "… caught by the testimony of Ivanov and Petrov." Moreover, all the time there are notes: "The testimony was rejected."
The obvious obsolescence of the accusations, which the doomed “admit” or even don’t even admit (although this does not change anything!), Is striking. Apparently, the Chekists were too lazy to come up with something new and relevant, connected with the world war, Hitler, Churchill, etc. From the old "cheat sheets" of 1937, accusations of a "Trotskyist-terrorist conspiracy" were rewritten, and there are people among the witnesses for the prosecution, shot many years ago! What could Comrade Stalin believe in here? In the testimony of those who "confessed"? Could Stalin not understand the value of these "testimonies" if he personally authorized the use of "physical measures" and did not even hesitate to personally inform the lower party authorities about this (the well-known cipher telegram of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 10, 1939) …
DOCUMENTS AND FACTS CERTIFY …
Without trying to lift the veil of secrecy over this tragic story, we will give only a simple and impartial chronology of events. However, even the chronology cannot be "simple" here, for what is the starting point? As a rule, the "case of aviators" is associated with a certain meeting of the Main Military Council (GVS), at which the issue of accidents in the Soviet Air Force was considered. With the light hand of one honored admiral, the following legend went for a walk through the pages of books and magazines:
“During the report of the Secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief Rychagov took and blurted out:
- You make us fly on coffins, that's why the accident rate is high!
Stalin, walking along the rows of chairs, froze for a moment, changed his face and, with a quick step, came close to Rychagov, said:
- Wee shouldn't have said that.
And after saying this again, he closed the meeting. A week later, on April 9, 1941, by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Rychagov was removed from office and doomed to death."
After the minutes of the GVS meetings were published in 2004, it became clear that the entire scene described (including the very fact of Stalin's participation in the council meeting) was fictional. In the period under review, four meetings of the Main Military Council were held (December 11, 1940, April 15 and 22, May 8, 1941), but Rychagov was not even mentioned there. On the other hand, the issue of accidents in units of the Air Force was indeed discussed, but not at the GVS, but at the Politburo of the Central Committee (and not for the first time). In April 1941, accidents in long-range aviation units became another reason for discussion. The result of this discussion was the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of April 9, 1941 (Protocol No. 30).
Four were found guilty: People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, Chief of the Red Army Air Force Rychagov, Commander of Long-Range Aviation Proskurov, Chief of the Operational Flights Department of the Air Force Headquarters Mironov. The most severe punishment was provided for Mironov: "… to prosecute for a clearly criminal order that violates the elementary rules of the flight service." In addition, the Politburo proposed (that is, ordered) to remove from office and prosecute Proskurov. As for Rychagov, he was dismissed from his post "as undisciplined and unable to cope with the duties of the head of the Air Force." The drug addict Tymoshenko was reprimanded for the fact that "in his report of April 8, 1941, he was essentially helping comrade Rychagov to hide the shortcomings and ulcers in the Red Army Air Force."
That, in fact, is all. No instructions were given through the People's Commissariat of State Security. Moreover, in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of April 12, 1941 (No. 0022), which essentially duplicated the text of the Politburo decision, a very important addition appeared: "According to the request of Lieutenant General of Aviation Comrade Rychagov, send him to study at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army." … As you can see, there is no talk of any "doom to death" yet. Finally, already on May 4, 1941, after a little “cooling down,” the Politburo made the following decision: Army, limit ourselves to public censure. " Considering that the Soviet prosecutors unanimously supported the Politburo's "proposals", the incident, it would seem, could be considered settled.
Concluding the discussion of the obviously untenable "emergency version" of the reasons for the extermination of the leadership of the Red Army Air Force, it is worth noting that the widespread rumors about "a terrible accident rate in the Soviet Air Force on the eve of the war," to put it mildly, are incorrect. Moreover, the specialists have always known this. So, according to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters in 1934, one disaster in the Soviet Air Force accounted for almost twice as many hours of flight time as in British aviation. The figures quoted everywhere (“on average 2-3 planes die in accidents and catastrophes in our country, which is 600-900 planes per year”) are taken from the text of the same decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of April 9, 1941. Such documents had their own, worked out over many years, "style" and their own, not always reliable, statistics. Nevertheless, we will take these figures as a basis: 50-75 accidents and disasters per month. Is this a lot?
In the Luftwaffe, from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, 1924 people were killed while studying in flight schools and another 1439 were injured. In addition, during the same period, 1609 flight personnel were killed and 485 injured in accidents and disasters directly in combat units. Average 248 people per month. A month, not a year! In the second half of 1941, the Luftwaffe lost in accidents and disasters (according to various sources) about 1350-1700 combat aircraft, that is, from 225 to 280 aircraft per month - significantly more than the Soviet Air Force, which was many times superior in number, lost in 1940.
With an accuracy sufficient in this context, it can be calculated that in the summer and autumn of 1941 in the Luftwaffe the average flight time per accident and / or catastrophe was about 250-300 flight hours. And in the report of the Air Force Headquarters of the Western Special Military District of May 15, 1941, we read that the average flight time per damaged aircraft was 844 flight hours - an excellent indicator for that era. The accident rate in the Soviet Air Force was very, very low. This is a fact that you just need to know. It is much more difficult to give an adequate assessment of this fact.
The low accident rate may be due to both the high level of the pilots' flying skills and the unacceptably low, “sparing” combat training regime. Departures are different - you can twist wide circles over the airfield, or you can perform five dives in one training flight, respectively, the probability of accidents and the training of pilots will be fundamentally different. There are serious reasons to assume that many commanders of the Soviet Air Force took the path of minimizing risks to the detriment of preparing flight crews for war. In this regard, one cannot fail to mention the letter with which Proskurov addressed Stalin on April 21, 1941.
The first phrase of the letter reads as follows: "I consider it my party's duty to report on some considerations on the essence of preparing aviation for war." Note - we have before us not a request from the convict for clemency, but a letter from a communist addressed to the leader of the party (in terms of another era - a letter from a nobleman to the king, that is, "the first among equals"). Further, after all the obligatory praises addressed to the CPSU (b) and its leader personally, the essence of "considerations" begins. Politely, but persistently, Proskurov explains to Stalin that the main thing in military aviation is the level of combat training of the crews, and not at all the number of equipment destroyed at the same time: the restrictions are too great. They visited several units of the Air Force and were convinced that the command staff was too afraid of responsibility for flights in adverse weather conditions and at night … Dear Comrade. Stalin, we have never had a case in the history of aviation when a commander was tried for poor training of a unit subordinate to him. Therefore, people involuntarily choose the lesser of two evils for themselves and reason like this: "They will scold me for shortcomings in combat training, well, in the worst case, they will demote me by a step, and for accidents and disasters I will go to trial." Unfortunately, commanders who reason like this are not unique …"
We repeat once again that this letter was written on April 21st. On May 4, the Politburo recalls Proskurov's merits and explains to the prosecutor that the verdict should not go beyond "public censure." All this suggests that Comrade Stalin agreed with the sound logic of Proskurov's letter. No "coffins", no "Wees should not say so" are found. By the beginning of the war, Proskurov, in the same high rank of lieutenant general, was in command of the 7th Army's Air Force (Karelia). Yes, for a lieutenant general this is, of course, a demotion, but nothing more.
REPRESSIVE SHAFT
The first arrest, which undoubtedly should be attributed to the "case of aviators", took place on May 18, 1941. The head of the Scientific Testing Range of Aviation Weapons of the Red Army Air Force, Colonel G. M. Shevchenko, born in 1894, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1926, was arrested. There is no need to guess about the reasons for the arrest: the NPC of aviation weapons is the place where naive hopes (or, which happened even more often, advertising statements) about the combat potential of the next "miracle weapon" came into contact with the harsh prose of life (in particular, in 1942, it was in the Air Force NIP that it was found outthat for the guaranteed defeat of one German light tank, 12 sorties of the supposedly "anti-tank" Il-2 attack aircraft must be performed).
Working conscientiously in such a position, Colonel Shevchenko could not help but make himself numerous and influential enemies. The position of the head of the Air Force Research Institute was just as deadly. The former head of the institute brigade commander N. N. Bazhanov was shot in 1938. The new head of the Air Force Research Institute, known throughout the country for a number of long-distance flights, a pilot, highly qualified engineer, holder of two Orders of Lenin, Major General A. I. Filin, at first enjoyed great confidence of Stalin himself. The then People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin writes in his memoirs:
“Once Stalin, after discussing some aviation issue with Filin, invited him to dinner. I still remember the beautiful, pale face of Alexander Ivanovich, a slender figure, an attentive gaze of blue eyes and a smile. At lunch, Stalin asked Filin about flight work and airplanes. He was interested in health … Then, after asking what kind of fruits the Owl liked, he ordered to bring him some fruits and several bottles of wine to the car. I looked at him all the time affably and amiably.
A few weeks later, one designer had to report: "Comrade Stalin, Filin is slowing down the test of my fighter, makes all sorts of claims," and a sharp turn took place in the fate of Filin.
- How so? Stalin asked.
- Yes, that points to flaws, but I say that the plane is good.
Beria, who was present, muttered something to himself. Only one word could be understood: "Bastard …"
And a few days later it became known that Owl was arrested …"
There is no doubt that there could be exactly two “designers of fighters” capable of complaining about the general to whom Stalin personally sent wine and fruit “from the tsar's table”: Artem Mikoyan or Alexander Yakovlev. Preserved in the so-called "Special folders" of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) document (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 34, l. 150), apparently, this list can be reduced to one "designer":
“The head of the Air Force Research Institute, Filin, misled the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR … hasty and technically unsubstantiated demands to increase the range of all fighters to 1000 km came personally and specifically from Stalin himself. its flight properties …"
The decision to remove Filin from the post of chief of the Air Force Research Institute was adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee on May 6, 1941. The exact date of his arrest is unknown. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the Air Force Research Institute was issued on May 27, the NCO order to betray the head of the Air Force Research Institute to a military tribunal was issued on May 31, but Beria's memorandum, drawn up in January 1942, indicated May 23.
On May 24, 1941, one of the most important events in the history of the Soviet Union took place. In the evening of that day (from 18.50 to 21.20), a meeting of the highest command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR was held in Stalin's office. The People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff Vatutin, the new (after Rychagov) Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Zhigarev, and the command of the five western military districts in full force were present. It is noteworthy that of the entire "inner circle" of party leaders who visit the Boss's office almost every day, only Molotov was admitted to this meeting (there were not even Central Committee secretaries Malenkov and Zhdanov who supervised the military department). That is all that is known to this day about this event. Neither the minutes of the meeting, nor its agenda have been published.
It is difficult to say if this is a coincidence, but after May 24, arrests followed one after another.
May 30, 1941. Arrested E. G. Shakht, born in 1904, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1926, Major General of Aviation, Assistant Commander of the Air Force of the Oryol Military District. Ernst Genrikhovich, German by nationality, was born in Switzerland. He came to the "homeland of the proletarians of the whole world", at the age of 22 he joined the Bolshevik Party. He trained as a fighter pilot, fought in the skies of Spain, and was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his personal courage and skill shown in air battles.
On the same day, May 30, 1941, the People's Commissar for Ammunition I. P. Sergeev and his deputy A. K. Khodyakov were arrested.
On May 31, 1940 P. I. During the war in Spain, Pumpur was the leader of a group of Soviet fighter pilots, among the very first to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded two Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner.
On June 1, 1941, Divisional Commander N. N. Vasilchenko, born in 1896, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1918, assistant inspector general of the Red Army Air Force, was arrested.
On June 3, 1941, important organizational decisions were made. The fact is that since the spring of 1941, military counterintelligence was organizationally part of the People's Commissariat of Defense (3rd Directorate of the NKO). This created certain difficulties and delays in the fabrication of "cases". Therefore, on June 3, the Politburo adopted the following resolution: "To satisfy the request of the NKGB to transfer this case for investigation to the NKGB before the hearing of Pumpur's case in court." Similar decisions were made later on other arrested persons, thus the Chekists were provided with all the conditions for intensive work.
On June 4, 1941, P. P. Yusupov, born in 1894, non-partisan, Major General of Aviation, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army Air Force, was arrested.
On the same day, June 4, 1941, two heads of departments of the Scientific Testing Range of Aviation Weapons of the Red Army Air Force were arrested: S. G. Onisko, born in 1903, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1923, and V. Ya. Tsilov, Born in 1896, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1918, 1st rank military engineer.
On June 7, 1941, G. M. Stern was arrested, born in 1900, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, colonel-general, head of the USSR Air Defense Directorate. True, Stern has never been a pilot, he is a career soldier, during the war in Spain he was the chief military adviser to the republican government, then chief of staff and commander of the Far Eastern Front. Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded two Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, and the Order of the Red Star.
On the same day, June 7, 1941, the People's Commissar of Armaments BL Vannikov (the future head of the Soviet Atomic Project) was arrested.
On the same day, June 7, A. A. Levin, born in 1896, Major General of Aviation, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District, was arrested.
The ending follows
