The most widespread method of encryption in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was cross-stitched codes. There was a certain hierarchy of their use: 2-digit codes were used by the lower levels of the armed forces, 3-digit codes were used in subunits up to the brigade level, 4-digit codes were intended for armies and fronts, and, finally, the highest 5-digit code was used only to encrypt strategic information of the highest level. Border guards, internal and railway troops used their own code systems, and the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used mainly the mentioned 5-digit codes. It was the 5-digit codes that turned out to be the most stable - throughout the war, such ciphers could not be read by either enemies, neutrals or allies of the Soviet Union. But other, less complex systems turned out to be quite in the teeth of the cryptanalysts of fascist Germany.
Since May 1943, for a year, a decryption unit worked in Army Group North, which received more than 46 thousand intercepted messages encoded with 4-, 3- and 2-digit codes. From this sea of information, it was possible to hack a little more than 13 thousand, that is, about 28, 7% of the total. Interestingly, the Germans naturally focused on 4-digit codes, hoping that the most valuable information would be hidden in such dispatches. The significance of the operational information obtained in this way is clearly described by one of the reports of the German codebreakers on the work in February 1944: “The decrypted correspondence contained information on the operational situation, on the concentration areas, command posts, losses and reinforcements, the order of command on the lines of attack … In addition, the content These messages made it possible to identify seven tank units and their numbers and establish the presence of twelve more tank units. With rare exceptions, this material was processed in a timely manner, and the information obtained was used in practice."
The text of the Soviet military cryptogram, translated into German, decrypted by the cryptanalysts of Army Group North
In fairness, it should be noted that the decryption data had the status of tactical, since the Germans could not get access to strategic data until the very end. In this regard, a German decoder once said: "Russia lost the First World War on the air and won the Second World War there."
A definite disadvantage of actually manual encryption was the huge time spent on encryption and further decryption, which sometimes led to tragedies. So, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov on June 21, 1941 at 17.00 receives an order from Stalin and Timoshenko to bring the troops into high alert. Writing, encrypting and sending the directives to the Western military districts took several hours and, as the president of the Academy of Military Sciences Mahmut Gareev writes, "many formations did not receive any orders at all, and the explosions of enemy shells and bombs became a signal of battle alarm for them." Such tragic sluggishness was intended to exclude the subsequent orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense numbered 375, 0281 and 0422. In this regard, the instruction of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov is exemplary, in which he wrote extremely succinctly at 2:40 on June 22, 1941: “Operational readiness No. 1. Immediately". As a result, the fleets met the aggression of Nazi Germany fully armed. In general, the leadership of the Navy was particularly sensitive to working with classified data: on July 8, 1941, the "Instruction on measures to preserve military secrets (for wartime)" (Order of the People's Commissariat of the Navy No. 0616) was introduced.
Wartime required new solutions in the field of information security. In 1942, a cryptographic council began work in the 5th Directorate of the NKVD, which during the war carried out work on 60 special topics related to encryption. The leadership of the Red Army was also active in the direction of regulating the work of the encryption service. With a slight delay, but in 1942, a number of special orders of NGOs were still issued: No. 72 on the procedure for sending secret correspondence and No. 014 together with No. 0040 on conducting closed telephone conversations, radio and telegraph transmissions. Already in 1943, the "Manual on the cipher-staff service in the Red Army" went to the army units.
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
In any story about the encryption business of Soviet specialists of the Great Patriotic War, one cannot do without the reviews of our illustrious commanders. So, Georgy Zhukov wrote in this connection: "The good work of the cipher clerks helped to win more than one battle." Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky recalls in his memoirs: “Not a single report on the upcoming military-strategic operations of our army has become the property of fascist intelligence services. As the chief of the General Staff, I could not do for a single minute without HF communications, which, thanks to the high consciousness and skill of the signalmen, provided the best possible operational leadership of the operating fronts and armies. " Marshal Ivan Konev also highly appreciated the level of communication during the war years: “I must say in general that this HF communication, as they say, was sent to us by God. She rescued us so much, was so stable in the most difficult conditions that we must pay tribute to our equipment and our communications, specially providing this HF communication and in any situation literally on the heels of those accompanying during the movement of all who are supposed to use this communication. " “Without HF communications, not a single significant military action has begun and has not been carried out. HF communications were provided not only to the headquarters, but also to the command directly on the forward lines, at sentinel posts, and bridgeheads. In World War II, HF communication played an exceptional role as a means of command and control of troops and facilitated the performance of combat operations,”Marshal Ivan Baghramyan said about the role of HF communication in the war.
Statistical calculations speak very eloquently about the scale of the work of Soviet signalmen: 66,500 km of overhead communication lines were restored and built, 363,200 km of wires were suspended and 33,800 km of pole lines were built. By the end of World War II, signalmen served nearly 33 thousand km of HF communication lines, and by September 1945, almost 37 thousand km. During the war with Nazi Germany, such samples of classification techniques as "Sobol-D", "Baikal", "Sinitsa", MES-2, SI-16, SAU-14, "Neva- C "and SHAF-41. More than 20 thousand soldiers and officers of the government communications troops were awarded medals and orders, 837 servicemen did not return from the front, 94 are missing …
Probably, one of the most significant assessments of work at the front is the feedback from the opposing side. Jodl, during interrogation on June 17, 1945, reported: “The bulk of the intelligence on the course of the war - 90 percent - consisted of radio intelligence materials and interviews with prisoners of war. Radio intelligence - both active interception and decryption - played a special role at the very beginning of the war, but until recently it did not lose its importance. True, we have never been able to intercept and decipher the radiograms of your headquarters, the headquarters of the fronts and armies. Radio intelligence, like all other types of intelligence, was limited only to the tactical zone."
Stalingrad battle
The most interesting thing is that the Headquarters quite often refused to encrypt information for transmission over communication networks altogether. So, during the preparation of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, a directive was issued to the front commander:
“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command categorically prohibits you from forwarding in cipher any considerations on the plan of the operation, to issue and send orders for forthcoming actions. All plans of the operation at the request of the Stake should be sent only in handwritten form and with the responsible executor. Orders for the forthcoming operation should be given to the army commanders only personally on the map."
In fact, most of the counterstrike issues were personally decided by the representatives of the Headquarters, Vasilevsky and Zhukov, who were present at the fronts. Moreover, before the offensive itself, the Stavka sent a number of directives to the fronts over a direct wire and in unencrypted form. They spoke about the cessation of all offensive operations and the transition of the fronts to a tough defense. This misinformation reached the Germans, reassured them, which became one of the decisive factors in the success of the operation.
The first in Russia monument in honor of military signalmen was opened on May 11, 2005 in the memorial complex of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War in Mozhaisk
Work classified as "special importance" on the fronts of the Great War did not remain in the shadow of oblivion, the feat of the Russian cipher clerks has not been forgotten and will live on in our days and in the future. A new round in the history of the Russian encryption service happened after 1945. It is no less interesting to study.
