Tanks in Ukraine as part of the armed forces were in an extremely unsatisfactory condition at the beginning of the conflict. Combat readiness tended to zero largely due to the technical condition: the overhaul of most machines took place back in the USSR. Key points that directly reduced the combat readiness of tanks: natural aging of the electronic components of the sighting complex, the stabilization system of the gun, as well as the destruction of rubber parts of the power plant and transmission. The consequences were regular failures and a significant deterioration in the accuracy of shooting both from the spot and on the move. The armor protection of the tank also succumbed to the pernicious influence of time. Elements of DZ, as indicated in their book Main battle tank T-64. 50 years in service”authors Chobitok V. V., Saenko M. V., Tarasenko A. A. and Chernyshev V. L.
T-64BV. Source: forum.warthunder.ru
There is pure chemistry here: the plastic explosives PVV-5A and PVV-12M, which are part of the DZ, cannot retain their properties unchanged for 25 years. Someone will say: what about "Bulat", equipped (according to Ukrainian engineers) with the world's most advanced DZ "Knife"? Indeed, on 56 "Bulatovs" from 2003 to 2010, a DZ of this type was mounted, but 20 vehicles that came to the troops two years later had no reactive armor at all! Therefore, until December 2014, a third of the Bulats in battles were either completely deprived of DZ blocks, or they were equipped with a non-standard and outdated Contact. By this time, the situation on the fronts had reached such a state that the Ukrainians had to throw into battle even tanks intended for the Republic of the Congo in the T-64B1M modification - they were given to the National Guard of Ukraine. The next thing that reduced the combat effectiveness of the T-64 series was the "aged" powder charges, which caused a sharp change in the internal ballistics when fired. In some cases, propellants of the 4Ж40 type acquired blasting properties with all the consequences - an increase in pressure in the bore and its rapid wear. It would seem that the initial velocity of the projectile should naturally jump, but the combustion of such expired gunpowder occurs unevenly, sharply decreasing towards the edge of the barrel. As a result, the ammunition flies much slower, which negatively affects both armor penetration and accuracy. The increased explosiveness of "expired" charges, of course, plays one of the most important roles in the detonation of ammunition during attacks with the subsequent destruction of the tank's hull. In general, the Ukrainian army has not received new tank ammunition for the past 25 years, except for the Kombat guided missiles.
Now about the combat training of tank crews. Attention, in the units of constant combat readiness in 2013, the plans for driving combat vehicles were fulfilled by only 25%! In the reserve, they almost did not drive tanks and did not shoot - the plans were fulfilled by less than 9%. Units of the coastal defense of the Navy became a kind of tank elite, which exceeded the plans for driving, but the practice shooting was carried out only from the spot. There were and still are problems with personnel in the Ukrainian army. So, for example, former battalion-level military technicians without academic education came to key positions in the Central Armored Directorate.
A vivid example of the low level of training of tank crews in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Source: gurkhan.blogspot.com
At the early stage of the conflict in the Donbass, there was often a dense arrangement of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers mixed with piles of ammunition, which led to disasters during an artillery attack. A little later, tanks were buried as pillboxes, which excluded the use of one of the main trump cards - the mobility of the armored vehicle. Ukrainian experts argue that at the initial stage of the war, most of the losses of tanks were precisely from howitzers, mortars and MLRS. At the same time, it is argued that even in Ukraine there is no exact data on the percentage of damage to vehicles from various means of destruction. On the basis of photo and video materials, the team of authors of the book “Main battle tank T-64. 50 years in the ranks "concludes that 70% of the machines were destroyed by cannon and rocket artillery, and the rest goes to the expense of non-combat losses. And only a few T-64s have only damage (!) From ATGMs, RPGs and enemy tanks. However, for "Bulat" there are statistics - in the spring of 2015, 15 tanks out of 85 were irretrievably lost. Of these dead vehicles, only 3 have signs of being hit by anti-tank weapons. The most ineffective for T-64 armor, according to Ukrainian experts, are sub-caliber tank shells.
Destroyed T-64s near Mariupol. The source of the defeat is unknown. Source: vif2ne.org
The Armed Forces of Ukraine at the beginning of the civil war in Donbass began to quite regularly "supply" more or less serviceable T-64s to their opponents. The reasons were poor crew training. The vehicles got stuck in the most innocuous situations and were abandoned by tankers, as well as an elementary shortage of fuel. Of course, some of the vehicles were not just abandoned by the crews, but set on fire and blown up, which added to the statistics of the army's non-combat losses. Amusing assessments of the level of training and ambitions of the most zealous tankers. Participation in the "events" on the Maidan gives the right to some mechanics to send higher ranks, disregarding the rules for operating military equipment. And the T-64 does not like careless ones very much … Cases were recorded, then the cars on the march got up with burned out engines due to the lack of coolant. RPG-7, SPG-9, Fagot and Konkurs ATGMs, capable of penetrating up to 600 mm of homogeneous armor, worked from the anti-tank arsenal on the T-64 of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This, in fact, explains their weak effectiveness against the DZ-protected armor of Kharkov vehicles - it is possible to reliably hit the tank with such a weapon only when it enters the zones of weakened frontal armor, as well as the side and stern. In Ukraine, they claim that the T-64BV is capable of withstanding several hits (up to six) from RPGs and ATGMs, even in weakened projections. Moreover, they claim a unique effective DZ "Knife", which repeatedly saves the crew from sub-caliber (!) Ammunition. There were also tanks with more modern ATGM "Kornet", capable of penetrating 1300 mm of armor at a distance of up to 8 km, which, of course, complicates the life of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Only one single tank can withstand such a threat - the "Oplot" produced in 2009, which was exclusively equipped with a set of tandem DZ "Duplet". About whether this tank came into contact with the "Cornet", open sources are silent.
More examples of mutilated tanks, "not adapted to contain the internal detonation of ammunition." The anatomy of combat vehicles is very clearly visible. Sources: u-96.livejournal.com, sokura.livejournal.com
An interesting point of view regarding the low survivability of the sixty-fourth series in the event of armor penetration. One of the reasons Ukrainian experts say is the deplorable state of the tank's fire-fighting equipment, so even local fires are not eliminated and the vehicles are lost irretrievably. Numerous photo and video evidence of the rupture of the armored hulls along the welded seams with the separation, in particular, of the lower and upper frontal parts, is explained by the not at all low build quality. The story reads “it was calculated that way - the tank should not withstand the internal detonation of ammunition”, forgetting to mention the Syrian T-72s, which were seen throwing towers, but not in fatal destruction into fragments - isolated cases only confirm the rule. Is the Nizhny Tagil welded seam stronger than the Kharkov one?
The results of the still unfinished confrontation are the following conclusions: modern Ukrainian tanks of the Bulat and Oplot types, not to mention the "classic" T-64, were developed according to old patterns without taking into account the experience of hostilities in Syria, Transnistria, Libya and Chechnya, which It is expressed in the vulnerability of external fuel tanks and auxiliary equipment to small arms, weak armor of the sides and stern, as well as the burning of anti-neutron and lining in case of defeat.
The lesson of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine is quite banal - no country is protected from military clashes of this format, therefore, maintaining a tank fleet in good condition and an adequate level of combat training of crews is in many ways a guarantee of national security.
