The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense refused the draft, citing the fact that starting in 2014, the Ukrainian army will switch to a contract basis. The last call will be held this fall.
It should be noted that the wound repeatedly in a number of media outlets disseminated information that the transition of the Ukrainian army to a contract basis would be postponed until 2017. However, representatives of the defense department have recently officially denied such rumors. According to the press service of the Ministry, the last conscripts will go to serve in the fall of this year and will be demobilized in 2014. It is in the next year that the defense of the Motherland will cease to be the duty of every Ukrainian youth who has reached the age of majority. This honorable duty will be fully entrusted to professionals.
During the formation of the Ukrainian armed forces and within the framework of the army's transition to a contract, doubts arose repeatedly. And this is not surprising, because the implementation of a comprehensive state program for the development and reform of the armed forces of Ukraine, calculated until 2017, requires huge funds - $ 16 billion, or about UAH 131 billion. This considerable, to put it mildly, money is supposed to be found through the sale of military equipment that is not currently being used. According to the Minister of War P. Lebedev, the list of such "unnecessary" property includes about two hundred military camps.
Also, according to the minister, the Ukrainian army will face big tasks. In addition to revising the structure and control system of the army and improving the training system for military specialists, it is planned to pay great attention to the fulfillment of tasks to equip troops with new and modern models of weapons and equipment, the participation of the Ukrainian military in international peacekeeping operations, and the intensification of combat training of personnel.
However, such bright prospects raise great doubts among experts, representatives of the Ministry of Finance, as well as the General Staff, whose deputy chief I. Kabanenko said that it would be possible to completely transfer the army to a contract basis only by 2017.
Despite the barrage of criticism, the head of state V. Yanukovych nevertheless endorsed the state program for the reform and development of the national army. According to this program, over the next five years, a significant reduction in the army is expected (from 184 thousand servicemen to 122 thousand). At the same time, about 40 percent of colonels and about 30 percent of generals will be dismissed. The only ones that will not be affected by the reduction are combat units and certain types of troops, in particular, the naval forces and the airborne troops, because by now they are almost 90 percent staffed with contract servicemen. Thus, according to the statement of Minister Lebedev, the number of servicemen who will be in a state of constant combat readiness will remain at the level of 70 thousand people, and those who are not directly related to ensuring combat effectiveness will be reduced, in particular, military doctors, teachers, builders.
It is also assumed that the funds that will appear after the reduction of the armed forces will be spent on the purchase of new weapons, provision of social guarantees for retired servicemen, as well as on ideological training. So, for example, since the spring of 2013, a discipline called "military-ideological training" has taken its place among the full-fledged training subjects of the Ukrainian soldier. It includes not only the history of the Ukrainian army, information about the traditions of the Ukrainian army, but also contains the foundations of state and law.
According to the state program, the salaries of contract servicemen will gradually increase. Note that at present, the income of the military leaves much to be desired.
Let us recall, however, that the announcements about the transition to a contract army do not mean that this transition will take place. We have been hearing such statements for almost two decades. Back in the period when V. Yushchenko came to power, that is, in 2005, specific dates for the transition of the armed forces to a contract began to be named. Yushchenko himself promised to make this transition until 2010, V. Yanukovych promised to do the same until 2011, then both 2014 and 2017 were repeatedly named.
Such a discrepancy in timing can be explained very, very simply. The point is that they are all unreal in practice. Back in 2008-2010, a Defense Survey was conducted in the country, in other words, an inventory of the problems and capabilities of the Ukrainian army. Previously, something similar was carried out in 2003-2004. Then, based on the data received, the so-called White Book (that is, the Defense Strategic Bulletin of Ukraine until 2015) was published. Based on the results of the 2008-2010 survey, a bulletin was also to be issued. However, the Blue Book (Strategic Bulletin until 2025), which is designed to contain specific management decisions on the army's transition to a contract basis, has not only not been approved yet, but has not even been completed yet.
In December 2011, the main provisions of the bulletin were officially published by the military department, however, the authors-developers of this document themselves say that a full transition to a mercenary army is possible only by 2025, apparently, bearing in mind that this is too long. to seriously think about whether there will be a professional contract army in Ukraine by that time or not.
Officially, the main obstacles in the process of creating a professional army in Ukraine are insufficient funding and the problem of housing. Thus, if necessary, the military department asks for money for its needs, backing it up with statements about the need for an early transition to a contract basis. But one serious question is overlooked: does the Ukrainian state need contract armed forces at all? What weapons will they use to fight?
If we talk about the Ukrainian version, it should be noted that initially the government, together with the military department, approached the issue of manning the army incorrectly, because instead of trying to staff the armed forces with highly motivated and highly professional personnel, it is trying to ensure the transition to a contract basis without increasing financial resources allocated for the needs of the army. Moreover, for some reason it is erroneously accepted to believe that a contract is always of good will, and a call is coercion. In reality, this is not entirely true. Voluntary conscription should be supported by the prospect of entering a state university on a budgetary basis, since the army itself is obliged to provide servicemen with a quality education. The socio-economic situation in some regions of the country is also of great importance. It must be borne in mind that in certain regions of Ukraine it is a great success for young men to get into the army, since it gives them the opportunity to get a certain profession and eat normally. In practice, it happens like this: the military registration and enlistment offices for some reason drag into the army those who do not want to serve there at all, but refuse those who are absolutely suitable for health reasons, but at the same time either have a too turbulent life or insufficient education.
In addition, unfortunately, the state cannot afford to pay salaries to soldiers at the level of at least five hundred dollars (at the moment, even officers do not receive such an amount). Thus, there is no point in relying on the financial side of the reform.
Another important reform issue is rearmament. Lebedev, assuming the post of minister, received from his predecessors several main programs for the supply of new weapons and equipment to the army, in particular, the Sapsan missile system, the An-70 medium military transport and the Oplot-M T-84UM battle tank, corvette "Vladimir the Great", project 58250. In addition, there are several modernization programs for MiG-29 fighters, Mi-2, Mi-9, Mi-8, Mi-24 helicopters, L-39, BMP-1 training aircraft. It makes no sense to mention the financing of these programs in this article, because it is impossible to understand in a few words the scale of their financing priorities.
The rearmament process, by the way, does not in any way depend on the transition to a contract. Of all types of weapons, only tanks and an infantry vehicle are intended for mass use by soldiers, so there is no need to recruit contract soldiers to master them. If we talk about other types of equipment, then even in Soviet times, almost all of them were serviced by officers.
Finally, some experts say that service life directly affects the level of combat training of soldiers. But, if you think about it, in this situation you should rather think not about recruiting contract soldiers (who, by the way, are just as incompetent in matters of combat training as conscripts), but to achieve professional training of fighters as soon as possible. To this end, you can increase the service life in the army, or you can reduce the time that soldiers spend on many hours of cleaning the territories, self-training without the necessary knowledge. The freed up time is quite enough to significantly raise the level of combat training.
