On Friday, July 10, for the first time in four years after the start of modernization, the Marshal Shaposhnikov ship of the Pacific Fleet went to sea. The former BOD, which is being rebuilt into a frigate, went to the first stage of sea trials. However, there are very uncomfortable questions about its modernization.
BOD project 1155
BODs of project 1155 became successful ships of the Russian fleet. Seaworthy, with two helicopters, with a keel and towed active-passive low-frequency (about 3 kHz) GAS, which is part of the bulky, but even by today's standards, a very effective Polynom complex, these were excellent anti-submarine warheads capable of being used anywhere in the world.
The following facts speak about the possibilities of the SJSC "Polynom". The ship with this complex exposed the entire underwater environment in the Persian Gulf while at the Strait of Hormuz. An excellent GAS for detecting torpedoes "Polynom-AT" was installed out-of-the-box; long before the appearance of the "Package NK" complex, an accurate control command was issued for the torpedoes attacking the ship.
The BODs were armed with PLUR, capable of operating at the maximum detection range of the "Polynom" and reducing the time of hitting a target to a minimum, two helicopters on board made it possible to organize a long search for submarines, and for a commander who was not afraid to violate the requirements of governing documents, there was also a scheme in which, while the helicopter is operating in the air in a search version, the control center expects a second one from it - in shock, with anti-submarine weapons.
It was a unique project for the USSR Navy.
Its downside was weak air defense, in fact making it impossible for independent operations of groups of such ships, and weak strike capabilities: there was simply no anti-ship missile on the ships, a strike on a surface target could be inflicted by PLUR in firing mode at surface targets or with the help of an air defense system, or cannons from a short distance.
Some of these problems were eliminated on the Project 1155.1 Admiral Chabanenko BOD, which received the Moskit anti-ship missile system, but at the cost of a significant reduction in anti-submarine ammunition. While in the ranks of the Navy there were ships with missile systems capable of fighting enemy ships, it was not so critical.
But by the mid-2010s, there were few such ships in the fleet, and the BODs of Project 1155 became the most numerous type of 1st rank warships.
By that time, not only was it ripe to equip ships with some kind of strike weapon, they were generally outdated and needed modernization.
The first one who waited for it was the Marshal Shaposhnikov BPK, which entered the plant in 2016, and today, after 4 years, is entering trials.
But the modernization turned out to be strange, if not worse.
Modernization "for furniture"
At first glance, upgrading the ship looks pretty decent and affects many of its systems, including weapons.
The upgraded BOD project 1155 received:
- a complex of missile weapons (KRO) "Caliber" (with the possibility of using cruise, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles), with vertical launch units (UWP) with 16 cells for missiles (at the same time, despite the statements of officials, the possibility of using the anti-ship missile "Onyx" raises doubts);
- KRO "Uran" with two four-container launchers PKR 3M24;
- the radars were updated with the installation of two multi-range (3-cm and dm-ranges) surveillance radars. The foundation has been established for a new bow radar control system (RLS) of the Kinzhal 9R95MR air defense missile system.
With the installation of the "Caliber" complex, the BOD acquired the ability to solve multipurpose tasks (including delivering long-range strikes against ground and sea targets).
The Uranus complex gave him the opportunity to participate in a battle with surface ships - even if the cells of the 3S-14 launchers are occupied by missiles other than anti-ship missiles (SLCM and / or PLUR).
However, upon close analysis, everything turns out to be not as good as it seems (and as stated by a number of media outlets).
First. The number of missiles of the Caliber complex for such a ship, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired and is acceptable only with a frankly "budgetary" modernization (in the case of Marshal Shaposhnikov, this is, alas, not the case, this repair and modernization turned out to be very expensive).
An example from the US experience: the modernization of the Spruyens destroyers with the replacement of the Asrok anti-submarine complex (a guided launcher and its under-deck store) with an ATC with 61 cells under the Tomahok CD, Asrok VLA PLUR and Standard-2 missile defense system (with the provision of guidance by their ships of the order with the corresponding air defense systems).
Partially, the lack of missiles in the 3S-14 UVP can be compensated for by installing the "tactical" Uranium missile launcher on the Shaposhnikov, but again, with an absolutely insufficient ammunition load of eight anti-ship missiles (for example, for Indian carriers, the Uran-E missile launcher is practically 16 anti-ship missiles became the "standard": four four-container launchers "Uranov").
The saddest thing is that the problem of placing 16 "Caliber" on the Project 1155 ship was solved without any expensive "shredding" of the ship under the UVP - placing new missiles (two each) in the old launchers of PLUR KT-100 (with their rearrangement at an increased angle start)…. Well, we have a "very rich country" …
At the same time, the missile launchers of the Caliber family would not be launched strictly vertically, but at an angle to the horizon, which the design of the Caliber family of missiles quite allows. Read more about cantilever launchers in the article “At an angle to the horizon. "Caliber" needs installations for inclined launch ".
In the case of the KT-100, instead of each of the large-sized PLUR, a pair of transport and launch containers should have been installed. They would also be used to launch PLUR 91R and modifications.
But instead, the ship lost one gun for the same 16 "Caliber", but now in the UVP 3S-14.
Second. The replacement of two AK-100 gun mounts with the new A-190-01, with the Bagheera control system, looks extremely strange. It is unlikely that the technical condition of the gun mounts required their replacement, and it was much more reasonable to repair the AK-100 and replace the drives with high-precision ones, especially since the Puma control system was required to fully unleash the capabilities of the new accurate A-190. However, they “saved money” on “brains for a gun”: the MR-123-02 / 3 “Bagheera” radar control system was installed …
Third. After modernization, the critical flaw of Project 1155 remains: weak air defense. The destruction of such a ship even by a link of modern fighter-bombers is a matter of simply organizing a raid. SAM "Dagger" - a very good complex, but it is a defense of the close line with significant restrictions on the sectors of the use of weapons, insufficient range and height of destruction of targets.
Fourth. Preservation of the "rudiment" of the BOD, its huge and heavy four-tube torpedo tubes of 53 cm caliber, for absolutely "antique" torpedoes SET-65 and 53-65K. This is ridiculous given the very high cost of the Purga-1155 control system: the idea of turning the spindles of ancient torpedoes with mechanical data input by the “newest” system at a price of more than 300 million rubles, to put it mildly, is puzzling, especially considering that the new “Package-NK "(control system and launchers) would have cost less (!) This" Blizzard "with the ancient SET-65.
It defies any rational explanation. The space freed up after the dismantling of the ChTA-53 torpedo tubes made it possible to easily and simply mount any of the NK Package variants: both on a conventional SM-588 rotary mount and with a TPK lodgement mount. At the same time, the control center for the "NK Package" may well issue (and much better than the standard GAS "Package-A") the GAS "Polynom-AT". Do you need repair and modernization? Of course, but it should be borne in mind that "Polynomials-AT" are installed not only on all BODs of Project 1155, but also on the TARKR "Peter the Great" and the TAVKR "Kuznetsov".
The idea that such a large and valuable ship can do without anti-torpedoes is simply criminal. The presence of small-sized 32-cm anti-submarine torpedoes would also be very useful for him. Moreover, over the years that the ship was undergoing modernization, it would even have been possible to develop light 32 cm torpedo tubes with a pneumatic launch instead of the Paket launchers. Then the ship could be armed with dozens of light torpedoes and anti-torpedoes. Details and the essence of the problem - in the article “Light torpedo tube. We need this weapon, but we don't have it. .
But just at least in some form, the "Package NK" complex is vitally important on warships, especially on such as BODs, which the enemy will purposefully hunt.
But in the end, it is not on the BOD.
Fifth. Obviously, this modernization does not carry any sane concept and logic. "I blinded you out of what happened …" As a shock carrier, the modernized Shaposhnikov is weak, has extremely inadequate air defense, and serious shortcomings in PLO.
A separate question: has it received modern control facilities, is it capable of "freely communicating" with the new corvettes of the Navy through the BIUS data exchange channels? Taking into account the refusal to install the BIUS "Sigma" on "Shaposhnikov", questions arise …
Here the question arises: is the modernization of the 1155 project necessary at all? Especially taking into account the service life of the ships (which becomes close to the limit for cable routes, the complete replacement of which is very costly).
Yes, we do!
How should have been done
1155 - This is the only mass ship of the 1st rank of the Navy with group-based helicopters. Alas, the new project of the frigate 22350 has a serious drawback: there is only one helicopter on board, which significantly limits its capabilities when solving a number of tasks.
Modern military-political conditions have set a number of new tasks for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Navy, including anti-terrorist ones. It should be understood that the Somali pirates have actually ended, but the problem of international terrorism does not just persist, but becomes more and more acute, and the enemy (terrorists at sea) have become much more prepared and dangerous. In this situation, for the ship of the oceanic zone, the group basing of multipurpose helicopters (at least two: one lands an assault group, the second covers) and effective assault boats become extremely important.
Speaking of helicopters, one cannot but recall their strike potential, which they clearly demonstrated, for example, during the 1991 Gulf War. Russia, almost completely devoid of aircraft carriers, will often have no choice but to use helicopters on missile ships. Helicopters are also invaluable for obtaining target designation against enemy surface ships in naval combat. But these should be somewhat different helicopters than they are now.
Read more about the capabilities of helicopters in naval warfare - in the article “Air fighters over ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea .
There are also questions about boats. The BL-680 boat is frankly weak, the BL-820 is not much better. Much more powerful and high-speed boats are needed, moreover, with a modern launching and lifting device (SPU), which ensures their use in conditions of developed waves.
And again - even if the "Package NK" complex was installed, the free space that would have remained after dismantling the ChTA-53 for 53-cm torpedoes would be enough to mount the SPU of the required type, and there would be a lot of space for boats. It was just someone who had to foresee.
The question arises: what should be the most optimal modernization of the 1155 project?
First. It should be moderate in cost, but massive modernization of the largest possible number of ships of Project 1155 in the shortest possible time, which is possible only without serious "shredding" of ships, i.e. installation of 16 "Calibers" in the standard KT-100 launchers. Technically, this is quite possible.
"Uranus"? This is our analogue of the American "Harpoon", about which it was said that it can be put into "the cigarette case of every ship commander." Its ammunition must be increased - not less than 16 anti-ship missiles. At the same time, placing the installations across the course of the ship, as was done on the corvettes of the 20380 project, they could be installed on the waist, in the same place where the crane was located before the modernization.
It is advisable to keep both AK-100 gun mounts (with the installation of the modern Bagheera radar control system and new surveillance radars).
Second. Introduction to ammunition in addition to the "Dagger" SAM 9M96 (with a channel for the radio correction of the SAM). The task can be solved in a complex way by replacing the long-obsolete BIUS "Lesorub" with a new "Sigma".
Third. Replacement of 53-cm torpedo tubes with the “Packet-NK” complex with the placement in place of 53-cm torpedo tubes of large seaworthy speed boats with a powerful launching and lifting device that ensures the use of boats up to 5 points inclusive.
Fourth. The Navy needs a modern multipurpose helicopter! The Ka-27M has a lot of disadvantages as an anti-submarine, and it is "none" as a multipurpose helicopter. Hopes for a "promising Lamprey" will become a reality no earlier than in 10-15 years, and today there is simply no alternative to a real and serious modernization of the Ka-27PL to an efficient and modern multipurpose helicopter.
It's a technique. But the main thing is that the organization is actually destroyed in the modern Russian Navy. Read more in the article “Destroyed management. There is no single command of the fleet for a long time .
In the "pre-reform" times, the Naval Operations Directorate (the "brain" of the fleet) was responsible for the "perspective" of the Navy, and now - "everything and a little bit", and sometimes these structures are not part of the Navy at all (such as support of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, "fontanka" - the marine branch of the "aviation" 30 research institute). This ruined management manifested itself most harshly and with extremely grave consequences in the modernization of the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR. Failure to meet deadlines and huge cost overruns resulted in incl. to serious "personnel consequences" in the Navy, and the "injured persons" of the Navy were responsible for the consequences of the erroneous decisions of persons and structures that generally "had nothing to do with the Navy."
"Nakhimov" and its modernization, as well as the general attitude of the fleet to the modernization of old ships, is a separate and very sensitive issue that requires separate coverage.
For now, let's consider how the chaos in naval goal-setting and management affected the modernization of the Shaposhnikov.
How did it happen that the expensive and complex project of converting a BOD into a frigate turned out to be so ill-considered?
It's simple: when drawing up the tactical and technical assignment for modernization, considerations were at the forefront that had nothing to do with assessing under what conditions and against which enemy the ship would operate, nor with the real risks of a war at sea against a competent one (let's pay attention to this - not necessarily strong, just understanding what he is doing) of the enemy, or simply to obtain a military force capable of fighting on the seas. No one thought about the survivability of this ship in battle, or about how it would be able to inflict damage on the enemy's aircraft - real ones, such that they would send aviation to a ship with a weak air defense, and submarines to a ship with a weak PLO, and would not kindly substitute under missile strikes their ships.
It just didn't matter. It was important to provide the “right” contractors with orders. It is important to show the country's top military-political leadership that the number of combat units with "Caliber" is growing in our country.
And making a full-fledged combat ship, while saving money, is not important.
The fleet today has little influence on the development of naval doctrines and strategies, and even does not manage naval formations. And its influence on the TTZ of promising weapon systems is limited.
Both the General Staff, and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, and industry have much more power and influence over the way our ships and submarines are created. And they do not always understand what they are doing, or are acting precisely in the interests of increasing the real combat capability of the Navy. Quite often the opposite is true
The main normative document that determines the directions of the development of the Navy is the "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030". All the tasks of the fleet in this document are reduced mainly to frighten the enemy with missile strikes. So "Shaposhnikov" received "Calibers" - adjusted for the interests of the industry in complex and expensive repairs, of course.
And about anti-submarine defense in "Osnovy" there is nothing. Well, the ship remained without her, everything is natural.
No one even thinks about the fact that the ship will have to fight.
And if the battle criteria do not become the most important for the modernization and construction of our ships, our fleet will continue to present a "set for parades", including for the main ones. Which, alas, have the misfortune to end with Tsushima and Port Arthur …
That's just both Port Arthur and Tsushima were arranged for us by the enemy, who has superiority in the number of troops and forces in the theater of operations, short communications and more advanced equipment.
The new Tsushima can be arranged for us by almost any medium-strength country that will systematically approach the development of its Navy and the use of shortcomings in our Navy.
Moreover, not even defeat in the war, but the failure of the anti-terrorist operation in the oceanic zone with the participation of the BOD project 1155, is not only human casualties, but also extremely negative military-political consequences. Meanwhile, even modern pirates are capable of arranging this today. At the round table of the Army-2016 forum on the topic of piracy, the report of the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided data on modern boats of pirate terrorists, against the background of which our boats BL-680 and BL-820 are “just puppies”, and our helicopters, due to the lack of adequate weapons (the crew's small arms are difficult to consider as such) are practically unusable … And this does not seem to bother anyone in the Navy …
The approach that was demonstrated during the modernization of the Marshal Shaposhnikov BPK, having become massive, gives almost anyone with impunity to gain the upper hand over the ships of the Navy in the power confrontation.
There remains only a faint hope that at least the "NK Package" and the update of the SAM ammunition for this ship will someday become a reality.
But Tsushima 2 looks like a much more likely option today.
