Research on what light aircraft carriers and aircraft with short / vertical takeoff and landing can actually do, that how much they turn out to be cheaper in the end for societies that already have at least some aircraft carrier forces and deck (in Russian terminology - ship) aviation, and that how an amphibious assault ship with a through flight deck can replace an aircraft carrier (even light and defective), it was not necessary by itself. It was necessary to assess which direction in terms of the development of aircraft carrier forces the domestic fleet is heading, and in which direction (the other) they are now trying to push it. And I must say that everything is not simple here.
Options for Russia
According to "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030", approved by presidential decree No. 327 of July 20, 2017, it is planned to create a naval aircraft carrier complex in Russia.
What kind of complex this is, the question is still open. The navy wants a big aircraft carrier, and the navy is right about that. It is possible that somewhere a tactical and technical assignment for such a ship or a TTZ project has already been formulated. However, there are nuances.
The practice of naval development in recent years in Russia shows that often scientifically grounded decisions or at least simply already launched and practically feasible projects simply collapse by the personal will of individual figures who are influential enough to overturn the normal decision-making procedure with a kick, opposing the established order with a personal one. incompetence due to the position of power and corruption interest at the same time. This is how the project 20386 appeared, which destroyed the possibility of updating the domestic anti-submarine forces in a reasonable time, this is how the project 22160 appeared, which the fleet now simply does not know where to stick in, and this is useless vessel (just like that) in the end it just defiles from one base to another.
Could something like this happen to the future carrier forces? Alas, yes.
Two pieces of news to think about.
The first has already appeared in the very first article on the topic: "According to Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, a vertical take-off and landing aircraft is being developed in Russia.".
Second: on December 2, 2019, President Putin at a meeting on the problems of military shipbuilding stated:
“In the coming years, it is necessary to actively build up the combat capabilities of the fleet. This largely depends on the planned arrival of frigates and submarines in the Navy's combat composition, developed for the use of Zircon hypersonic missiles … as well as destroyers and landing ships."
I must say that with all due respect to the personality of V. V. It is impossible not to notice Putin that the achievement of supremacy at sea and in the air is a prerequisite for the use of landing ships and assault forces as such. And this outside the combat radius of the base aircraft can only be achieved with the help of naval aircraft. However, the "Foundations", according to which we should still have aircraft-carrying ships, he approved.
However, individuals "several levels below" may have their own interest.
Even before the fire on the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov", it was hinted to the author that he might not get out of repair. Moreover, in the testimony of people who survived the flooding of the PD-50 floating dock, there is such an interesting thing as a "strong push" that people on the floating dock felt before the start of its flooding.
Then the fire that happened "out of the blue". This is some kind of strange chain of coincidences, as if we are being pushed somewhere.
The British also had a similar fire, like the AV Victories, quite moderate in consequences, but after it the government of Harold Wilson, who seemed to be eager to turn the third most powerful country in the world into a tame dog of the Americans, decommissioned this aircraft carrier, although it still could serve. Have we got our own "Wilson" somewhere, even in a low position?
Let's go from the other side. In 2005, a number of specialists from GOSNII AS wrote a book “Aviation of the Russian Navy and scientific and technological progress. Creation concepts, development paths, research methodology … This work, full of both interesting facts and a curious material, contains one amusing statement. The authors point out that every time, when in the USSR, research work on aircraft carrier topics was intensified, in the West in the specialized press there was just a shaft of publications describing in paints how wonderful light aircraft carriers are, how much they give to the countries that are in them. are invested, and that, generally speaking, this is the future main path of development of aircraft carrier forces.
At the exit, however, appeared "Nimitz", then "Fords" and in the worst case, "Charles de Gaulle" and "Queen Elizabeth".
The fact that there is a lobby in Russia, although weak (and hidden), puzzled by the question of depriving our country of at least some significant aircraft carrier forces, will not be obvious to many, but it does exist, and informational support for the idea “let's write off Kuznetsov” and instead of it we will construct a pair of UDC with "verticals" too - otherwise it simply would not have been able to spread so widely.
Let's give a banal example of another idea that was spread by the same methods.
There is an opinion, and this opinion has a lot of supporters, that nuclear submarines armed with anti-ship missiles (SSGNs) are such a super-weapon that can literally sweep any number of aircraft carrier groups from the face of the oceans. The apologists of this idea think that they themselves have reached this point, or they appeal to the times of S. G. Gorshkov, when such submarines were "registered" in the Navy.
In fact, in the Soviet fleet, these ships were part of a very complex system, from which today almost nothing is left, and the concept of "SSGN as a superweapon" was very competently thrown into the unstable consciousness of domestic patriots by a very specific Russian-speaking resident of the city of Seattle, never a citizen of Russia which was, at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s. At the same time, the person quite works for himself in the American aviation industry and has good connections in the US Navy. Why he did this is still an open question. We will not poke a finger, just, if you are a supporter of this idea, then keep in mind that in fact it is not yours.
It is quite possible to trace the source of a set of ideas “why do we need an aircraft carrier, because you can put a dozen VTOL aircraft on an amphibious assault ship, here's an aircraft carrier for you,” if you set a goal. Ideas like that don't come up so easily.
Thus, we have a complex of the following events:
- from somewhere in the mass consciousness, the idea of using landing ships instead of aircraft carriers and vertical / short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft instead of normal ones has entered the mass consciousness;
- it seems that some of the same idea was thrown to the very top, in any case, Yuri Borisov claims that the creation of the SKVVP is being carried out "on behalf of the president";
- the only aircraft carrier and the infrastructure for its repair is pursued by a sequence of accidents and disasters, which in some places look somewhat strange and make one think about sabotage;
- the president announced that destroyers and landing ships will be the basis of Russia's naval power.
All these factors, taken together, indicate that the distortion of the path of development of the domestic aircraft carrier forces and the repetition of British mistakes by our country is quite real. And the fact that Russia is being pushed according to the British version is also indicative in many ways.
So far it is known that the "development" of the SCVVP is not really going on: this is not an experimental design development (R&D), the result of which should be a real aircraft. This is a scientific research work - R&D, and there is still a long way to R&D. Both the Navy and the Aerospace Forces are disengaged from this aircraft as soon as they can, and the reasons for this are quite obvious, because it will be just as worse than domestic aircraft with normal takeoff and landing, as the Sea Harrier was worse than the Phantom for the British Navy. It remains only to wish success to the sailors and pilots in disrupting this undertaking, this project really will not be of any use.
And still it is worth finishing off the idea of the usefulness of the hypothetical domestic "vertical" finally.
Vertical thrust versus horizontal speed
You need to understand that there is never enough money, and when channeling funding to one project, it is impossible not to cut funding for another project. When channeling money to SKVVP, you need to understand where they will be taken from. And be sure that it will be justified. And you also need to understand the time factor.
How much money and time will it take to create a hypothetical domestic SKVVP? It took two years so far. Already. And some money too. Fortunately, we have the opportunity to make a forecast, focusing, firstly, on how many such aircraft are being created in modern Russia, and, secondly, on how long it took to create them before.
The closest in complexity to the hypothetical SCVVP is the PAK FA / Su-57 program. Let's briefly go over it. First, about the time.
The creation of the fifth generation fighter started in 1986. Now it is 2020, and the plane is still not ready - there is no regular engine, there are questions about the radar with AFAR. All this will also be decided, but not today, but within a few years. If we assume that in 2024 we will have in the series a fighter with a second stage engine and a more or less localized serial N036 radar, then we can say that in 38 years the task of creating a new generation aircraft has been completed.
Let's briefly go over the stages: MiG 1.42 and 1.44, projects of the Sukhoi Design Bureau S-37 and later C-47 "Berkut", the work of the Design Bureau im. The cradles above the engines that gave rise to the AL-41F, together with the never-built Mikoyan LFI and the S-54 from Sukhoi, constituted the scientific and technical groundwork necessary for the design and construction of the fighter. In the early 2000s, those R&D projects were launched that eventually gave rise to the Su-57 and will soon give rise to its standard engine and radar. Without the previous array of work on experimental combat aircraft and engines for them, the PAK FA program would not have started.
Thus, it takes 35-40 years for our country to create a fundamentally new machine.
And if we count from the moment of the start of the PAK FA program, without taking into account the time spent on the previous backlog, then the countdown should be from 2001. That is, it is 19 years old today, and 23 in our hypothetical 2024.
But maybe there is an opportunity to somehow resolve the issue more quickly? Let's take a look at how these issues were dealt with before.
So, our first serial vertically taking off attack aircraft, which was truly combat-ready, was the 1984 Yak-38M. Little known fact - in terms of its qualities in shock operations, this machine surpassed the "Harriers" and lost first place among the "vertical" only in 1987, with the appearance of the "Harrier II".
Of course, in terms of its flight and technical characteristics, the Yak was much inferior to normal aircraft, but this was absolutely inevitable, the Harrier was also worse than the Phantoms, and the F-35B was significantly worse than the F-35C.
How long did it take for the Yakovlev Design Bureau, the Navy and the USSR as a whole to finally create a normal combat VTOL aircraft? We look at the stages:
1960-1967 years: the Yak-36 project, a stillborn demonstrator of the possibility of vertical takeoff, which, however, had a fatal influence on the brain of D. F. Ustinov.
1967-1984: epic with the first serial "vertical" - Yak-36M / 38. This machine was created for three years, then seven years it went to the series, after entering service it turned out that the aircraft were not capable of combat, they had to first be altered, sometimes directly on ships, this did not help, in 1980 they were sent to the war in Afghanistan, where finally then it was possible to find the optimal settings for the engines and nozzles during takeoff. After that, the aircraft quickly reached the limit of their combat effectiveness and showed that they would not be able to fight on them, after which the next modification was created, which became more or less combat-ready.
Total: 24 years before the first production-produced attack aircraft. And what about the Yak-41? He was prevented by the collapse of the USSR, but before the collapse of the USSR, they had been engaged in this machine since 1974 (the first drawings began to be drawn even earlier). Thus, 17 years passed from the political decision to create the aircraft to the start of its tests - and all this was before the collapse of the USSR. Then the Americans paid for several more years of testing and the construction of two more prototypes, and even that was not enough to at least approach the real capabilities of this machine. For today, there is documentation and one sample, suitable as a manual. He is now being dragged around workshops and laboratories as part of the ongoing research.
Thus, in the USSR, the timing of the creation of combat aircraft was not much less. But maybe it is we, Russians, who are so big, and we need to learn something in the West? Also no. For "Harrier" (if you count with "Kestrel", which is inseparable from the final machine), the journey from drawing to commissioning took 12 years from 1957 (the beginning of work on "Kestrel") to 1969 (the first serial "Harriers" in the Air Force). At the same time, this aircraft had avionics at the level of the Stone Age, and in the future it was necessary to develop its naval modification, which also cost time and money. Had the British taken Kestrel initially as a naval aircraft, they would not have been able to keep up at 12 years old.
A more recent example is the American Joint Strike Fighter program, which gave birth to the F-35. It began back in 1993, and she had previous studies. Only 13 years later, the F-35 was chosen as the winner in the competition, but only in 2015 did the first air force unit on these machines reach combat readiness, and the first F-35B SCVPs reached combat readiness only in 2018.
These are the real terms for the creation of new aircraft today.
How much does it cost in money? Let's leave America and focus on our financial realities. So far it is known that about 60 billion rubles were spent on the Su-57. But, firstly, in this amount there is not a penny from the period 1986-2001, there are no costs for the creation of the NTZ, and after all, there were only two flying aircraft in it, one MiG and one Su. Secondly, various accompanying R&D projects, which were financed through the Ministry of Industry and Trade, were not taken into account. Today, we, apparently, can say with confidence that the creation of a fundamentally new machine at the existing NTZ (let, for example, materials on the Yak-41/141 and "Product 201" will be considered NTZ) can cost about 70-80 billion rubles. If it turns out that the existing NTZ is not sufficient (and this is in fact already the case - otherwise, “on the instructions of the president,” ROC would immediately begin to create a “vertical”, and R&D began), then the amount should be increased, the time frame too.
Let's just say - realistically, if you resist properly and invest serious resources, you will get a ready-made SKVVP by 2040. Naturally, we are talking only about the first flying prototype.
But by that time, the fifth generation will already be outdated. Today, it is unclear exactly what the 6th generation fighter will be, while a number of domestic experts believe that it is impossible to implement the transition to a new level of combat capabilities while remaining within the framework of one machine, and we should talk about a system of various manned and unmanned aerial vehicles operating together. How to fit the work on the new "vertical" is an open question, but the fact that the transition to the next generation will turn out to be not cheap and more important than the "vertical" can be considered accomplished.
The conclusion from all this is simple: if now we “turn off the path” which our country took in 1982, that is, from the path of creating full-fledged aircraft carrier forces, with normal aircraft carriers and aircraft with horizontal takeoff and landing, then to create only one aircraft with short or vertical take-off and vertical landing will take us at least 80 billion rubles and at least 20 years of time - and this is only before the first prototypes, not before the series.
And if you do not fold? And if we do not fold, then we suddenly discover that the ship-based (carrier-based) fighter plane is in our series. We are talking about the MiG-29K.
Some people start to frown at the mention of this plane, but let's call a spade a spade - this is a GOOD plane. Moreover, it is in service not only in our fleet, but also in the Indian Navy - and it is not a fact that the Indians will not buy it yet. And this despite the fact that they already have more MiGs than we do. But they have a choice.
What are its disadvantages? There are basically three of them.
The first is the old radar station. Even the latest version of the "Zhuk" radar with AFAR does not fully meet the requirements of modern warfare. The second problem is the high landing speed. It is known that our deck pilots even observed retinal detachment from overloads during landing. I must say that this is abnormal, this should not be, and not only because of humanism, but also because this imposes restrictions on the maximum number of landings per day for an individual pilot and limits the possibilities for combat training.
The last problem is the lengthy and time consuming inter-flight service.
Potentially, in the future, if or when it comes to creating a catapult aircraft carrier, then a modification with a reinforced nose and a front landing gear that can withstand a catapult start will be needed.
What do we have in this way?
First, the plane already exists. We don't need 20 years of time and 80 billion of money to create it. Secondly, the example of the F-35C, for which the Americans developed a new wing to improve landing performance, shows that the problem of high landing speed can be solved. Moreover, the Americans solved it in 4 years - exactly that much later than the aircraft for the Air Force, the deck version "C" entered service.
Actually, when aircraft modifications are limited to a glider, they usually fit in several years - the Chinese made their carrier-based aircraft for a catapult launch in about the same time frame and they now fly from their ground experimental catapults.
The problem of radar with AFAR can also be solved in five to six years, if we deal with it: at least, money has finally begun to be invested in this issue. That is, a new radar may well appear on the new MiG, and in the same five to six years. All this, of course, will also require money and time - but incomparably less than a fundamentally new aircraft, and most importantly - we repeat - you won't have to wait for new aircraft, until there is a "new MiG" you can get by with those that are and are mass-produced.
The problem of maintenance looks difficult to solve - but in this parameter even our MiG is much better than the F-35, and secondly, to some extent the severity of this problem can be reduced with future modifications, although it will not be completely solved.
Thus, in terms of aircraft, Russia faces a choice of two paths.
First: to use a serial vehicle, which is in service with the fleets of the two countries, was once used in hostilities, has a double combat training version, which is not very bad by any standards, although it does not reach the F-35C, but as soon as finances allow, make a new modification, which will be created in about 5 years.
Second: to invest fantastic money in the project of a "vertical aircraft", which with a probability of 100% will have no better avionics than other domestic aircraft by the time of readiness, will lag behind the West as much as our conventional aircraft lag behind, and all this for the sake of so that in twenty years or more of hard work, get an airplane inferior to what we can have in a maximum of five years.
Common sense tells us that there really is no choice here, and those who try to present the matter as that it does exist, commit betrayal or stupidity, depending on who they are talking about.
For technological and financial reasons, the stake on serial equipment for us is still uncontested.
From which follows the second conclusion - the rate on an existing aircraft carrier is also still uncontested.
Kuznetsov and our near future
The propaganda of such ideas as "Aircraft carriers are outdated" and "Russia does not need an aircraft carrier", completely distraught in its intensity, has already dealt such a strong blow to the consciousness of our people that the fact of the presence of an aircraft carrier in our fleet simply fell out of the mass consciousness. The outrageous propaganda of the uselessness of American aircraft carriers played a cruel joke on us - our people are now convinced of the uselessness of this class of ships in general, and the result is that the future of the now Russian aircraft carriers has come into question. The Americans, on the other hand, are indifferent to our propaganda. Many individuals in Russia simply do not remember that we, generally speaking, HAVE aircraft carrier forces, consisting of one aircraft carrier and two (!) Aviation regiments.
Another thing is that they are incapable of combat. But this is for now.
Generally speaking, it is worth remembering that the first landing of a ship aircraft on a ship in our country was in 1972, the first combat use of ship attack aircraft in battle was in 1980, and in the same year the TAVKR with Yaks was used to put pressure on a foreign state - successfully. And it is also worth remembering that at the time of the collapse of the USSR, the number of aircraft-carrying ships in our country was as follows: 4 in service, 1 in trials, and 2 in construction, which made our aircraft carrier forces firmly second in the world after the United States, no Britain and France are there. did not stand in those years.
If we discard NATO, then in Eurasia there are five countries - two in China, one in service and one in the completion of India, one in Russia and one in Thailand. The USSR or Russia had to do with all of them, except for the Thai "Shakri Narubet". Our "Kuznetsov" and the Chinese "Liaoning" are Soviet sisterships, "Shandong" is a further development of what the West calls "Kuznetsov-class", "Vikramaditsya" is the former "Baku / Admiral Gorshkov" rebuilt already in post-Soviet Russia, and the Nevskoye Design Bureau took an active part in the creation of the Indian "Vikrant".
All Indian carrier-based aircraft of combat units are made in our country, and the Chinese are the development of the Su-33.
A certain, as many people think, "alienation" of Russia in relation to aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft is just a haze, directed from the outside, and nothing more. We must drop it already
The fact that against such a background there are individuals who are seriously arguing about the fact that "aircraft carriers are not for us" and about other similar things looks strange for a healthy person.
Let's go back to reality.
Aircraft carriers will only become obsolete when aviation is outdated and not earlier. An aircraft carrier is an airfield for aircraft that can be deployed where ground airfields are too far away. There are no airfields nearby? We need an aircraft carrier. Would you like to have an aircraft carrier? Give up national interests where you have no airfields NEARBY.
And if there are not "interests", but quite real threats, then REFUSE TO NEUTRALIZE THESE THREATS.
There are no other options and no need to try to come up with them.
It is almost impossible to fight without aviation even in very wild countries - at least if you mean a war with some sane goals, timing and reasonable losses. And airfields are not everywhere.
In more detail, these issues were discussed in the articles. Coastal Defense Aircraft Carrier and “The aircraft carrier question. Fire at Kuznetsov and the possible future of aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation " … The first of them reflects the early views of the command of the Soviet and Russian naval forces on the use of aircraft carriers in the country's defense, the second reveals their importance in the current political situation, and at the same time describes in detail how it is necessary to handle the "Kuznetsov" in order for it to become truly useful for the country ship, from changing approaches to combat training to improving. And this is exactly what needs to be done in the first place. It is this set of measures that should be the first step towards the revival (namely, the revival, not the creation!) Of our aircraft carrier forces.
What's next? The next step is to build a new one. The bigger, the better. And here it is worth listening to the senior command personnel of the Navy. Usually criticized (for the cause) in the case of aircraft carriers, our admirals in charge of shipbuilding are right more than ever.
Here's what, for example, the former deputy said. Navy Commander for Armaments Vice Admiral V. I. Buruk before his resignation:
“The Fleet believes that it is inexpedient to build light aircraft carriers for Russia from the point of view of the economic ratio“price-quality”. It is preferable to build aircraft carriers with a displacement of about 70 thousand tons, which allow carrying a larger number of aircraft on board."
Neither add nor subtract. The larger the ship, the stronger its air group, the less it depends on the seas at sea, the less accidents it has when moving aircraft on the deck and in the hangar, the easier it is for pilots to conduct combat work.
What if, for organizational reasons, such ships cannot be built? Then it is possible to study the issue of building an aircraft carrier of a class similar to the Indian "Vikrant" or the French "Charles de Gaulle", but with an important reservation - if it is possible to create a ship with seaworthiness at least at the level of "Kuznetsov" with a lower displacement. Approaches to such a task were described in the article “Aircraft carrier for Russia. Faster than you expect ".
And there is also a clearly stipulated condition - if calculations and experiments on models show that it will not be possible to ensure the required seaworthiness on such a ship, then there are no options, it is impossible to build such ships, and our country will have to take the "aircraft carrier barrier" for real.
This will not be the most difficult barrier that we have taken, even close, you just need to get together and do it. And this will not be the most costly of our barriers, we mastered more expensive events, and not so long ago.
Financial question
The last myth that remains to be debunked is that by betting on the use of "large" UDCs, or light aircraft carriers, as aircraft carriers, you can save at least on ships.
For an adequate assessment of investments, one thing must be clearly understood - we are not interested in the ship itself, but in what it gives. For example, for an URO ship, its missile salvo is important. And for the carrier forces, it is important how many sorties they can provide in SUM in a unit of time. Roughly speaking, we are not buying an aircraft carrier or aircraft carriers, but aircraft departures per hour, taking into account the seas.
For example, the same Falklands have shown that for light British aircraft carriers and their aircraft, even 20 sorties per day is an almost unattainable value. This means that for those hundreds of millions (billions at current prices) of pounds that the British cost to build three defective ships of the Invincible class, they could provide a theoretical limit of 60 sorties per day for a short period of time, but rather 45-51.
First, let's estimate how many sorties our current aircraft carrier, which we use as a "starting point" - Kuznetsov, can provide.
Unfortunately, in practice, our naval aviation did not conduct flights at maximum performance for takeoffs and landings - we simply never had the required number of pilots who could fly from the deck. Before the Syrian campaign, the situation began to be rectified - the deployment of the 100th oqiap began, however, neither he nor the 279th that was previously available in the naval aviation for the Syrian operation did not reach, and the aircraft carrier, which by that time had already overdue all conceivable repair terms, was even less ready for a real war. As, however, and his crew.
But all this is fixable if you work, and there are hopes that when the ship does come out of repair, the naval aviation will be able to rehabilitate itself. In the meantime, we are left with a theory.
First, let us take it for granted that due to the need not to exceed the physical activity on the pilots, as well as due to the need to carry out inter-flight services for the entire air group in cramped ship conditions, we cannot provide more than two flights per plane per day. In fact, two is not the limit, but for now we use this assumption.
Hangar Kuznetsov allows you to easily accommodate up to 24 MiG-29 and several helicopters of the search and rescue service, apparently 6.
The deck of the ship can accommodate up to 13 combat aircraft of the Su-33 type, in the case of MiGs, most likely, it will be the same. We can assume that the deck allows holding up to 12 MiGs and one or two MSS helicopters on it.
The approach is logical, in which the maximum number of combat group sent "in one climb" is 12 aircraft. Relatively speaking, we place a strike on deck 1, as the Americans say, out of 12 cars, fueled and with suspended weapons, in the hangar - the second one, all serviced, just without fuel and weapons.
Then comes the rise of the first group into the air.
How long does it take?
Placing an aircraft at the launching position with a well-trained personnel is unlikely to differ from the speed with which the Americans roll their aircraft onto the catapult, that is, about 4 minutes per plane, on average. But here there is some opportunity to accelerate.
The fact is that when the group rises to strike, at least the first three planes can take off with a "conveyor belt" - three cars are at the starting positions, and three more are behind raised gas baffles with already working engines. In this case, the first three starts, let's say, with an interval of 30 seconds between the planes, which gives us three planes in the air in the first 1.5 minutes, in the next two, those that were behind the gas bumpers get up at the start, this is another 2 minutes for all three cars, plus another one and a half to take off the second three, in total after 5 minutes we have 6 cars in the air, and taking into account the 4 required for roll-out to the start of the first aircraft, it turns out 6 cars in 9 minutes.
Then the situation becomes more complicated - it is no longer possible to keep a queue for gas bumpers, there are already planes in the air, if necessary, an emergency landing must be made to clear the landing zone on the deck as quickly as possible, so the planes will be sent to the start from technical positions and after the first two triplets take off, we have 4 minutes for exit to the starting position for each triplet and 1.5 minutes for its takeoff. Total 5, 5. Since our battle group is 12 vehicles, and the first two triplets are already in the air, the other two will take off in 11 minutes. In addition to the first nine, we have 20 minutes for 12 cars. After that, they must be "brought together" in the air into a single formation and sent to the target. Let's say it takes another 10 minutes.
Total half an hour.
How long will it take for aircraft to complete a combat mission? If you don't run into fanaticism and act like Americans, then 500-550 kilometers can be taken as the maximum permissible combat radius in a real war. Suppose that the planes will fly to the target at a speed of 850 km / h, and they will fly back at the same speed. The group will then return in about 1 hour and 20 minutes. Then it will need to be planted on the deck. Thus, the crew of the aircraft carrier will have approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes to send the second group to strike. Adding here the 10 minutes that the group gathered in the air, we get an hour and a half.
Of these, the second group will need 20 minutes to take off after refueling and suspension of the weapon, respectively, to lift 12 aircraft from the hangar, their arrangement on the deck, refueling and suspension of the weapon remain 1 hour and 10 minutes.
Kuznetsov has two lifts, each of which can lift 2 planes at the same time. At the same time, it is not required to occupy them at the time of the rise of the air group to strike, therefore, the lifting of the first four aircraft from the hangar can be carried out even during preparation for takeoff of the first group. Then the lifts are blocked, the planes just stand.
Accordingly, after the last aircraft takes off in the first group, 4 aircraft from the next group will already be on the deck, and another 8 in the hangar. Refueling and suspension of weapons for four aircraft, and lifting eight more from the hangar (these are two raising and lowering aircraft lifts), which also need to be refueled and armed, do not look like something unreal in one hour, although they come out "in the butt", like in general, as a whole, takeoff according to the described scheme.
In total, at the maximum pace in 1 hour 40 minutes, you can try to raise 24 cars to hit, provided that they were prepared for departure in advance, half were in technical positions, refueled and with a suspended weapon, and of the remaining 4 cars were on blocked lifts, four more in the hangar ready to be fed to the lifts, four behind them, the ASP are ready to be fed to the deck.
Immediately after this, the landing of the first group should begin, its placement in technical positions, fuel draining, removal of unused weapons, and cleaning of aircraft into the hangar. For this, the crew of the ship will have the same one and a half hours. Is it real?
Watching the landing animation. The person who made this video, many years ago, participated in the creation of domestic ship aircraft for Kuznetsov.
The video shows the landing of 9 aircraft, but the deck is not empty, one of the starting positions is occupied by a fighter ready for takeoff, one technical position is also occupied, and there is no stop on the lifts. Theoretically, there is no reason to believe that 12 cars cannot be put on a completely empty deck in the same mode. Thus, it will take about 12 minutes to land them at 60-second intervals without taking into account the time of approaching the glide path of the first aircraft and without taking into account possible misses by the cable or cable breaks.
At the same time, an impact on a 550-kilometer radius, in theory, leaves enough fuel for the entire group to land, although also without special reserves. On the other hand, we are making a rough estimate "on our fingers", and if later it turns out that for the declared number of air groups the exact combat radius should be no more than 450 km, then in principle it will change little.
Thus, after the landing of the first group, the crew will be required to drain the fuel from the aircraft in about an hour and 18 minutes, remove the unused ASP, and in groups of 4 cars lower the aircraft into the hangar, and then immediately proceed to receive the next air group.
What does this rough estimate show? It shows that when flying to strike with large forces, the maximum number of the strike group will be about 12 machines. If it is less, then not by much, most likely not less than 10. And in half a day the ship will easily send into battle and accept back two such groups, that is, almost all of its aircraft. Taking as the limit two sorties per day per pilot, we will get approximately 48 sorties per day, two per plane. It looks quite realistic.
Of course, when performing air defense missions, or when working on strike in small groups, 2-4 aircraft each, or under any other circumstances, the statistics will be different.
For example, the possibility of almost continuous lifting of almost the entire air group when working at a short combat radius is theoretically justified, however, this is only possible when deviating from the current safety standards, for example, in this case, in this case, there will inevitably be fueled aircraft with suspended weapons in the hangar, and the lifts will work in the moment of aircraft lifting into the air.
In addition, there will be no way to quickly interrupt the takeoff of an air group if a previously taken off aircraft suddenly needs to land, for example, due to a technical malfunction. But we know the approximate figure for a reference point - 48 flights per day. If the pilot can be sent into battle three times at knocks, then more, but this is already under a serious question.
Why do we need this criterion?
Then, if we are going to theorize about new aircraft carriers, then their ability to raise aviation should not be less.
And also because it is important for us not only to know with what performance the ship can provide aircraft lifting, we also need to understand the relationship between the capabilities of promising ships and the costs of them. How many flights per billion rubles per day will we be able to do with one or another variant of the development of the Russian aircraft carrier forces, that's what is important.
And here supporters of the concept "UDC instead of an aircraft carrier" will have to "make room" strongly.
First, about the prices.
How much can you really save on a UDC or a similar-sized aircraft carrier-carrier "vertical", if you build it, and not an aircraft carrier?
Let's compare.
Let's imagine that the Navy has built itself something like the Italian "Cavour" - 10 VTOL aircraft in the hangar, optionally, you can carry in it (instead of aviation) tanks, a little less than 30 kilotons of displacement. For the Italians, such a ship stood at a little more than $ 1.5 billion. Taking into account the fact that we cannot buy components on the world market, we will get about 2.
Well, or 140 billion rubles. This is quite logical, because the "small" UDC of project 23900, unable to carry aircraft, will cost approximately "from 50 billion", and for them there is most likely a ready-made power plant, electronic weapons there will be many times simpler and much more.
What do we have for 140 billion? Assuming that our "vertical" will be able to perform the same number of sorties per day as the MiG-29K from Kuznetsov, we get about 20 sorties per knock.
But Kuznetsov has 48. We need something comparable. Therefore, we must build another "Russian Cavour". And now we have the opportunity to perform 40 sorties at knocks. For 280 billion rubles.
However, here we must also add the cost of R&D for aircraft, because the development of "vertical units" costs money. Accordingly, another 80 billion is added to 280 billion, and our project is rounded up to 360 billion.
But the trouble is - this is the price of a catapult aircraft carrier. With the same air group as Kuznetsov's, with the same combat mission limits (approximately), for a modernized serial fighter, but - attention - with the possibility of placing AWACS aircraft on it in the future, even if Chinese, purchased, and transport made on their basis aircraft.
As a result, for the same money, we get opportunities that are never realized on the Russian Cavour, and potentially, albeit not great, but real superiority in the number of sorties per day.
After that, we start to have differences. For a catapult aircraft carrier, we need one crew, and for two Kavours, two are almost the same. This is money.
Infrastructure for basing needs double the size, tankers to provide fuel - double the size, and this is also money. Tanker - 3-4 billion minimum. Take it out and put it down.
At the same time, the technical risks for the second option are outrageous, the plane may not work out, and it is impossible to wait a long time - until the SCVVP flies, the ships cannot be laid.
And wait 20 years, if not more.
But you can look at the situation differently.
Let's say a 70,000-ton nuclear aircraft carrier was built in Russia for, for example, 500 billion rubles - as for the facilities for the Sochi Olympics. Did the Sochi Olympics ruin you?
What will the fleet get in terms of the number of sorties from such a ship? You can, focusing on the Americans, say that 100-120 a day without stress, since the air groups will be more than 24 aircraft.
How many Russian Kavurov do we need to work according to the same scheme? Five six.
And this is in the money already 700-840 billion for the ships themselves and 80 for the creation of SCVVP. Almost a trillion. And then the difference will begin to accumulate for crews, piers, supply tankers and everything else. For the same effect as one large ship.
And much more stringent weather restrictions - remember the small ships on the pitch.
In general, everything is like the British - one to one. No difference, up to and including a fire on the aircraft carrier being repaired. We just need to do it differently than they did in their time. We need to do the opposite.
Conclusion
At present, our aircraft carrier forces, consisting of an aircraft carrier (in fact, has long been just an aircraft carrier, the Granites from this ship have not been able to fly for a long time, and they are not needed on it) "Admiral Kuznetsov", as well as the 100th and 279th separate naval aviation regiments are not combat-ready. The regiments are insufficiently trained and have not yet reached the required level of combat readiness, and the ship is under repair, complicated by the unavailability of the dock necessary for its completion.
Nevertheless, this state of affairs is far from catastrophic - no later than 2025 the aircraft carrier will be in service again, and the regiments, if the information about the organizational conclusions following the results of the Syrian operation is correct, will be more or less capable of performing the tasks as intended.
The starting point in the further evolution of these forces should be bringing the Kuznetsov, its crew and aviation operating from it to the maximum possible combat readiness. In addition, the problem of basing both this ship and the air regiments must finally be resolved, since Severomorsk-3 is absolutely not suitable as a base for naval (deck) aviation.
In the future, it is necessary to find opportunities to implement the provisions of the "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030" in terms of creating a naval aircraft carrier complex. Although the development of one has not even begun, but if you focus on the statements of Vice Admiral Bursuk and other senior naval officers responsible for shipbuilding, then this should be a large ship with a nuclear power plant.
In case the creation of such a ship turns out to be impossible in the foreseeable future, it is worth exploring the possibility of building an aircraft carrier with a gas turbine power plant, and a displacement of 40 thousand tons, but only on the condition that it is possible to come up with a hull shape that would provide acceptable seaworthiness for such a ship.
Otherwise, there is no point in building it and in any case you need to look for an opportunity to get a normal ship for the fleet - up to its joint construction with another country.
But the ideas that are now actively promoted in the press that UDC can be used instead of an aircraft carrier, that it is possible to quickly create an aircraft with a short or vertical takeoff and vertical landing and replace the normal aircraft carrier forces with an ersatz from an amphibious assault ship and SCVVP, or even limit ourselves helicopters are harmful. Moreover, there are examples of such ideas being deliberately dumped from abroad in the past. The fact that neither the Navy nor the Aerospace Forces have any enthusiasm for research on the subject of SCVP is very indicative - they simply do not need it. And it’s not necessary, not because they don’t understand something, but because it’s not really necessary.
Taking into account the fact that behind the idea of replacing an aircraft carrier with a UDC with anything, individual figures in the "near-fleet" begin to loom, it is worth once again focusing on the fact that our country does not need defective aircraft carriers and their similarities for big money. Our country needs a moderately priced fleet with the maximum return on every ruble invested.
And normal aircraft carrier forces in the long term meet this requirement much better than crazy projects of aircraft with incomprehensible prospects and "ships for the poor."
