This material by G. Malyshev is presented as a discussion from the point of view of an ordinary person and does not pretend to have any deep military scientific knowledge. Since some points in this publication look controversial or superficial, we asked an armored vehicle specialist to briefly comment on the author's statements.
In the recent past, the Nizhniy Tagil Tank Plant produced a new model of the main battle tank called the T-90MS "Tagil". The tank immediately attracted attention with interesting technical solutions that were not previously used on serial domestic vehicles. It looks very impressive and modern - the design, although not from the studio "Pininfarina", is definitely a success. The tank can claim the right to be considered one of the most powerful tanks in the world today.
It would be very interesting to analyze the design of this tank as much as possible. Find out what the designers did right and what did not, and what further improvements are possible in the design of this interesting machine.
Brief characteristics of the T-90MS are as follows:
Dimensions:
- Weight 48 tons.
- Length 9530 mm.
- Width 3780 mm.
- Height 2228 mm.
Armament:
- Cannon-launcher 125-mm 2A46M-5 or 125-mm 2A82 - the main combat means of the tank, designed to destroy all types of ground, surface (within reach) and low-speed air targets. Ammunition load 40 artillery shells of various types: BOPS, OFS, KS or guided missiles (UR) 9K119M "Reflex-M".
- Paired with a gun 7, 62-mm machine gun 6P7K (PKTM). It is designed to combat enemy manpower, which is located within the firing angles of the main armament. The machine gun is paired with the cannon and has the same sector of fire. Ammunition 2000 rounds 7, 62mmx54R of various types. This weapon is installed in a completely new circular turret with a developed turret niche.
- Remotely controlled machine gun T05BV-1 with 7, 62-mm machine gun 6P7K (PKTM). Designed to fight enemy manpower, which takes cover either higher than the main armament firing sector, for example, on the upper floors of buildings, on steep mountain slopes. Either below the main armament firing sector, in shelters, dugouts or directly at the tank in the so-called. "Dead zone" for a tank cannon and a coaxial machine gun. Thus, as conceived by the designers, the combat stability of the tank should be ensured in cramped and urban combat conditions. Ammunition 800 rounds 7, 62mmx54R of various types.
Fire control system, observation and target detection:
- Fully digital highly automated FCS "Kalina" with integrated CIUS. Thermal imaging and television devices intended, including for circular observation.
Security:
- Multilayer combined armor of the latest design in the frontal part.
- Spaced booking in the side section.
- The newest built-in dynamic protection "Relic".
- Local protection of ammunition.
- Measures to reduce the thermal and noise signature of the tank.
Mobility:
- Multi-fuel diesel engine V12 В-92С2Ф2 with a capacity of 1130 hp. (831kW) + automatic transmission.
- Power-to-weight ratio ~ 23hp / t.
- Maximum speed 60-65 km / h on the highway.
- Cruising range of 500 km.
The tank is based on the previous modifications: T-90A and T-90S. Now let's understand in more detail what differences we see on this machine. What immediately catches the eye can be listed point by point:
1. A new tower with a developed aft niche.
2. New 125-mm cannon 2A82.
3. New dynamic protection "Relic".
4. The complex of active protection of the KAZT "Arena-E" tank is absent on the tank.
5. The set of optoelectronic suppression of the KOEP "Shtora" is missing on the tank.
6. Finally, the tank received a normal rigid armored bulwark of the hull, generously "flavored" with elements of reactive armor (ERA) "Relik" and lattice screens in the stern.
7. The anti-aircraft gun with a large-caliber 12, 7-mm machine gun NSVT has sunk into oblivion. Its place was taken by a new machine gun mount with a 7.62 mm 6P7K machine gun.
8. A slightly more powerful engine V-92S2F2 + automatic transmission.
9. The tank received an additional power unit in an armored container attached to the rear of the hull on the left.
What else can you say about this car?
1. The hull, as with the previous modifications, was mostly left over from the T-72.
2. In the undercarriage, there are also no significant differences from the T-72.
3. The new "Kalina" control system is clearly superior to the 1A45T "Irtysh" of the T-90A tank.
Now let's try to analyze all these points. What has been done and what theoretically, in my opinion, could have been done. So, let's begin.
Specialist comment. The model of the modernized T-90S main battle tank shown at the REA-2011 arms exhibition was primarily aimed at foreign customers, so some of the systems mounted on it were in export performance. In this regard, I would like to point out to the author that the 125-mm 2A82 cannon is not installed on the export tank, the 2A46M-5 cannon is installed on it.
As for the explosive reactive armor kit, 4S22 elements are installed on this tank, since 4S23 is prohibited for export.
The author in vain complains about the lack of an active protection complex for the Arena-E tank, since it can be installed at the request of the customer. In the same way, at the request of the customer, the TShU-1-2M system can be installed. In addition, the modernized T-90S is equipped with an electromagnetic protection system (SEMZ) SPMZ-2E from mines with magnetic fuses.
Regarding the power block. While the tank is equipped with a V-93 engine with a capacity of 1100 hp. There is no automatic transmission (automatic transmission) on it, but there is an automatic gearshift.
New tower with a developed aft niche
How is it done. At first glance, the tower looks vulnerable compared to the T-90A or T-72B turrets. This is most likely the case. The T-72B and T-90A towers had relatively small dimensions and a special shape. The aft vulnerable part of the tower was narrowed and covered with a powerful armored front part within the course angles of ± 30º. And even such towers managed to break through from RPGs and ATGMs into the most vulnerable aft zones. Needless to say, getting into the aft or side part of the T-90MS tower, which is the size of the Leopard-2 or Abrams tower, will not be a problem at all. Thus, in terms of security, the aft part of the T-90MS tower is inferior to the security of the towers of all previous tanks of the T-72 model line.
It would seem - an obvious regression? Not at all. The fact is that the result of breaking through the aft or rear side of the T-72B turret, very often, was a fire or detonation of the ammunition load (AM) and, accordingly, partially or completely killed the crew. It's all about the location of the BC: in all tanks of the T-72 series, as well as in the T-90, T-90S and T-90A, only 22 rounds of separate-cartridge loading are located under the fighting compartment (BO) in the automatic loader (AZ) of the carousel type. This carousel, in contrast to the loading mechanism (MZ) of the T-64 and T-80 tanks, is relatively well protected: in front by the most powerful frontal armor of the hull, in the back - by the engine, on the sides - by road wheels and side screens. In addition, the "terrain screen" itself rarely allows you to hit a tank in the lower part of the battle regiment.
The problem was mainly in the placement of the rest of the BC. These 23-26 rounds with shells or UR were located literally everywhere: on the floor, on the walls of the hull and practically along the entire rear hemisphere of the tower. The limited internal space of the T-72 tank simply does not allow placing this firepower, which does not fit into the AZ carousel, somewhere else. As a result, this "non-mechanized" ammunition usually ignites or detonates - then how lucky (which is worse is not yet known).
One can argue, they say, on the old T-34-85, KV-85, T-54, T-55, IS-3 and T-10 tanks, the ammunition was located about the same. In this case, the comparison is irrelevant. The ammunition load of these tanks consisted of unitary rounds. The charge of gunpowder was placed in a metal sleeve and the fire hazard of these old machines was incomparably lower. And the charges in the partially burning T-72 liner are ready to blaze from any touch of the cumulative jet.
The way out of this situation may be as follows - do not take into battle that part of the ammunition, which is located in the non-mechanized ammunition rack. But then you will have to rely only on those 22 shots that are in the AZ carousel. Often they did it. But this, of course, does not suit either tankers or self-respecting designers. The problem was finally solved in the T-90MS tank: the carousel for 22 shots was left, additionally protected by local armor, and the remaining 18 shots were placed in the aft niche of the turret, equipped with knockout panels similar to the Abrams and Leopard-2. If you wish, these 18 shots can also not be taken with you. In a city battle, it would probably be better to do so.
As a result: despite the fact that the T-90MS turret has become more vulnerable to enemy fire compared to the turrets of its predecessors - T-72B or T-90A, the level of tank survivability, and more importantly, crew survival, has become incomparably higher. The level of survivability of the T-90MS and the survivability of its crew in the event of a tank defeat, in principle, began to correspond to Western tanks. Another plus of such a turret is more comfort and a larger interior space for the crew compartment of the tank.
How could it be done. Apparently not at all. If you do not take into account some extravagant novelties, then other technical solutions do not fit this tank. The old Soviet layout with the placement of the entire BC together with the crew has outlived its usefulness. And from a certain point of view it is unreasonable to place the ENTIRE BK in the aft niche, following the example of the Abrams, and practically unrealizable within a given mass of 50 tons. So set off.
Specialist comment. The author is seriously mistaken, drawing conclusions about the decrease in the protection of the turret of the new tank. The turret in the projection onto the plane still provides protection within the course angles of 30 degrees, and from the stern it is securely closed by an armored box.
In general, the fighting compartment of the modernized T-90S tank, including the turret, is much less vulnerable than that of its predecessors. In other words, the whole point about the new turret of the tank contains a lot of reasoning about what is not.
Clarification on the location of the ammunition. There are 22 shots in the automatic loader, in the non-mechanized stacking near the MTO partition there are 8 shots and another 10 shots - in an armored box isolated from the fighting compartment at the rear of the tower.
New 125-mm cannon 2A82
How is it done. The most powerful 125-mm smoothbore gun of the latest design 2A82 is a completely new development. It is believed that this gun is significantly superior to the previous 125-mm 2A46 series guns, 122-mm rifled 2A17 and 120-mm NATO-type Rheinmetall guns with a barrel length of 44 and 55 calibers. 2A82 surpasses them both in accuracy and in the power of fire. The same applies to the Chinese 125-mm cannon of the ZTZ-99A2 tank (Type-99A2), which is just an improved "pirate" version of the 2A46. However, the T-90MS can apparently be fitted with the old 125-mm 2A46M5 cannon, which is installed on the T-90A. From this we can conclude that tanks with the new 2A82 cannon will be supplied to the armament of the Russian army, and 2A46M5 tanks will be equipped for export. At the same time, knowing the realities of today, it is possible that everyone will do exactly the opposite.
How could it be done. Numerous experimental electrochemical and electromagnetic guns have not yet reached the stage of their installation in a real tank, so we immediately discard them. Alternatively, it would be possible to install a new 140-mm or 152-mm cannon on the T-90MS (for example, from the "object 292"). But, in addition to technical difficulties, this could provoke Western countries to similar modernization of their tanks, which means a new round of the caliber race. So at this stage, we decided to develop the 125 mm caliber, which has not yet fully revealed its full potential. And the 140-152 mm guns were left in reserve. Offset.
Specialist comment. It is completely incomprehensible why the author suddenly describes the possibility of installing the 2A82 gun on export tanks. I repeat that this gun is not ammunition compatible with the 2A46 modifications and is prohibited for export.
As for the powerful 152-mm 2A83 gun, which the author proposes to install on the T-90, this is impossible.
New reactive armor "Relic"
How is it done. Dynamic protection of the new generation "Relikt" refers to the built-in type of remote sensing. It increases the resistance of armor to cumulative ammunition by 2 times and 1.5 times the resistance to APCR shells. Front and top DZ closes the tank tightly and without gaps. Weakened zones near the gun are also covered with remote sensing elements. The roof over the driver's hatch is also closed. This is a test. But there is also a "fly in the ointment": the lower frontal sheet does not have it. This is a miscalculation - a tank can be pierced into the lower frontal plate. The T-72B had at least one row of Contact-1 NDZs there. The T-90MS has nothing, although theoretically it is possible to install hinged screens there.
Further - the side of the hull. It is closed until the MTO itself, just like the T-72B, and then there is a lattice screen. The T-72B had only rubber-fabric screens, so the T-90MS had a better solution. Let me explain. The rubber-fabric screens of the T-72B and T-72A simply initiated the detonation of a cumulative warhead (warhead) of a rocket-propelled grenade at some distance from the main armor of the side (70 mm). The lattice screen breaks the body of a rocket-propelled grenade or ATGM, they are destroyed on these sharp lattices. In this case, the warhead may not work at all.
The side of the tower - things are not so good here. For the T-72B, the tower was closed by the DZ up to half its length. The role of the anti-cumulative screens of the rear hemisphere was played by boxes of spare parts and elements of the OPVT. The T-90MS has a large and long turret, there is no DZ on the sides of the aft niche, and there is ammunition storage there. Another vulnerable area is the rear of the hull and the rear of the turret. There were cases when a rocket-propelled grenade that fell into the rear sheet of the hull pierced the MTO right through the engine and hit the fighting compartment of the tank, and there - people and ammunition. It is not noticeable that the designers paid any attention to this important aspect of protection on the new T-90MS tank. In terms of impact resistance to the rear of the hull, it is no better than the base T-72 "Ural".
How could it be done. Protect the turret and the hull with the elements of the Relikt DZ along the entire perimeter, including the lower frontal part of the hull. This will not increase the mass of the tank much, but the protection will become much stronger, and most importantly - from all sides, which plays a huge role in urban battles. In general, despite the clear progress, it is impossible to give an unambiguous offset. Although an obvious failure, too.
Specialist comment. Regarding the alleged "miscalculation" of the designers who did not protect the lower frontal part of the hull. I inform the author that NLDs account for less than one percent of hits - even from experience of fighting in a flat desert area. At the same time, the reactive armor elements installed on the NLD are definitely damaged when making any lengthy march off the roads.
The author's statements about the vulnerability of the tank to impact on the side and stern of the turret do not correspond to reality at all. DZ blocks on the sides of the tower cover the entire projection, and the armored box reliably closes the stern.
Complex of active protection of the tank KAZT [1] "Arena-E" on the tank is missing
How is it done. The newest T-90MS does not have KAZT, but such systems were installed on the old T-55AD and T-62D tanks. It is sad that there is no such a complex necessary for a tank.
How could it be done. Install the latest KAZT on the T-90MS. Expensive? The cost of a T-90MS tank blown up from an ATGM or RPG hit is even higher, not to mention the lives of tankers. Fails.
Specialist comment. Again, I repeat: this is a question for the customer. If there is an order for equipment, a full-fledged KAZT will be installed on the tank without any problems: for the Russian army it is "Afghanit", and for export supplies - "Arena-E". Both complexes are interfaced with the Kalina control system.
The set of optoelectronic suppression KOEP [2] "Shtora" is missing on the tank
How is it done. On the T-90MS there is no KOEP "Shtora", although it is on the previous models T-90, T-90A, T-90S and even on the Iraqi T-72M1. And here no. Meanwhile, the thing is useful because it significantly reduces the likelihood of guided missiles hitting the tank.
How could it be done. Install KOEP "Shtora-1" on the tank. Only not instead of DZ elements, as was unsuccessfully done in the T-90A, but on them. Fails.
Specialist comment. The same as above: at the request of the customer, this system can be installed on the tank without any problems.
Rigid armored bulwark of the hull with elements of the "Relic" DZ and lattice screens
How is it done. Finally, our tank received a normal hard armored bulwark, moreover, generously "flavored" with elements of dynamic protection. This is not the case on the previous modifications, or on the T-72B tanks.
In order to create something ultra-modern, it is necessary to catch the correct tendency, "where the wind is blowing," so to speak, and then apply a ruler to this correct vector and extend the line by 10 lengths of this vector. An example is the IS-2 heavy tank. How did it come about? Our designers caught the trend towards an increase in the caliber of tank guns: from 45 mm to 76 mm and, subsequently, to 85 mm, and for the Germans - from 50 mm to 75 mm and, finally, to 88 mm. Without following the adage "a teaspoon per hour", but simply taking and attaching a ruler to this vector and "lengthening" it, they immediately placed a powerful 122-mm gun, which provided the IS-2 with an overwhelming superiority in firepower over any tank in the world of that period.
But, unfortunately, this correct approach to design, for some reason, did not extend to on-board screens. Let me explain to the reader the meaning and purpose of the on-board screen. Its essence is that the screen initiates the operation of the cumulative warhead at such a distance from the main armor,. when its penetrating power drops sharply. If the screen is of a rigid structure and metal, then it also reduces the penetration and kinetic ammunition as it can change the angle of contact of the projectile with the main armor, tear off the “Makarov tip” from it, or simply damage the core. Rigid steel screens made of armor with a thickness of 10-20 mm appeared during the Second World War on German tanks Pz. IV and Pz. V "Panther", British "Churchill" and "Centurion". They were also on domestic T-28 and T-35 tanks. Since then, our western neighbors have been in no hurry to abandon them.
It is paradoxical, but true - despite the fact that on domestic tanks (T-28 and T-35) these screens appeared in step with the times, their further use and elements of their design in domestic combat vehicles followed a dubious development path. While most Western tanks had developed and quite "adult" side screens, which were already an integral part of their spaced-apart onboard armor, this was the case with us.
On the post-war T-54, T-55 and T-62, there were no side screens at all. All of their side armor was actually an 80 mm thick armored side of the hull, which was somewhat shielded by relatively large road wheels. Thus, tanks of these types were an easy target even for the first generation RPGs. On the IS-3M and a series of powerful tanks of the T-10 family, there were such "embryos" of side screens that only slightly covered the side from above.
Next - a new generation tank T-64A. On it stood six "skinny", swivel "vents" with dubious efficiency. It was the same on the first T-72s. The next step in the long-suffering path of development of the side screens of domestic tanks appeared on the T-64B, T-72A and T-80. They finally have a solid 10-mm side screen, BUT - rubber-fabric! It is clear that such screens, with a small gain in weight compared to metal ones, hardly protect against kinetic projectiles, are very easily damaged and torn off, exposing the weakly armored side of the hull. I am not even talking about how such a screen looks after several touches on an obstacle or hits (and the tank as a whole).
The next stage of evolution is the T-72B tank. It has the same rubber-fabric screen as the T-72A, but 4S20 boxes of Kontakt-1 ERA elements were hung on it across the entire area (up to the MTO zone). This significantly increased the protection of the side projection of the T-72B tank. But not everything is as good as it seems: the weight of the resulting structure turned out to be large, the thin rubber-fabric screen bends under the weight of the NDZ blocks. After two or three hits from an RPG or ATGM, all this "economy" can simply fall off with all the ensuing consequences.
On the T-64BV, force screens were introduced under the side elements of the NDZ. It improved its appearance, but almost no strength.
Finally we come to the "flying" T-80U tank. He received an almost normal side screen - 10-mm armor with built-in elements of dynamic protection "Contact-5". Why almost? Because all this "wealth" reaches only half the length of the hull, and even the vulnerable T-80U ammunition rack is not completely covered by a powerful screen. Further into the stern is the same rubber-fabric screen as in the T-72A or T-80.
The T-90 series is generally a regression and a return back almost to the T-72A. Instead of the relatively normal side screens of the T-80U, T-72B and T-64BV, the T-90 has the same screen as the T-72A, and six such "squares" of armor with dynamic protection "Contact-5" - three from each boards. Moreover, they cover not the middle of the hull opposite the ammunition rack, which would be logical, but its front part. Strange construction. When the enemy is everywhere, turning your forehead towards him will not work.
And now, the T-90MS finally appeared. He has a normal armored side screen with grilles opposite the MTO. Everything is correct.
How could it be done. Everything was as it should be, but it had to be done 40 years ago - on the T-72 "Ural" tank! But still - Offset.
The place of the anti-aircraft mount with a large-caliber 12.7 mm NSVT machine gun was taken by a new remote mount with a 7.62 mm 6P7K machine gun
How is it done. The design of domestic medium and main battle tanks is interesting in that, with the constant improvement of the quality of the main armament, there was no progress in the auxiliary one. Auxiliary weapons have remained virtually unchanged for decades. The period of searches and experiments in this area for medium tanks remained in the distant past of the war and pre-war years. Starting with the T-55 and ending with the T-90A, the auxiliary armament consists of a 7.62 mm machine gun paired with a cannon and an anti-aircraft mount with a 12.7 mm machine gun on the turret roof. Of course, this scheme is outdated and needs to be changed.
Such an attempt was made on the T-90MS tank, but it was unsuccessful. The designers, at the cost of abandoning the large-caliber anti-aircraft gun, tried to adapt the tank to combat in urban environments and to provide the ability to effectively combat enemy manpower, primarily with grenade launchers. To do this, instead of a 12, 7-mm machine gun, they installed a more "nimble" and maneuverable anti-personnel machine-gun mount with a 7, 62-mm machine gun and very large vertical guidance angles.
So what happened? With regards to the anti-aircraft component. In the event of an air threat, the T-72B tank had two air defense echelons at its disposal:
1. Long-range - provided with guided missiles, allowed to fight helicopters and other low-speed air targets, range from 1, 5-2 to 4-5 km.
2. If the target broke through to closer, then a short-range echelon - an anti-aircraft gun with a 12, 7-mm NSVT "Utes" machine gun, entered into action. It operated at ranges up to 2–2.5 km. Everything is quite logical. The T-90A tank had an even more advanced remote-controlled anti-aircraft gun, similar to the T-64 and T-80UD.
But for the T-90MS tank, this close echelon was "cut off", which undoubtedly worsened its protective anti-aircraft properties. A 7.62 mm bullet is hardly capable of causing any serious damage to a modern attack helicopter, let alone bringing it down. But maybe now the tank will successfully fight the enemy infantry hidden in the urban jungle? Also no. The main problem of the tank in such a situation is to see the enemy in the window opening. At the training ground, living force is imitated by bright and multi-colored balloons that hang in the window openings. It is easy to guess that a real grenade launcher will not show off in a window opening with a grenade launcher at the ready in front of the muzzle of a tank gun directed at him. He will hide next to the window, behind the wall and look out from time to time, being sure that the tank crew does not see him, and wait for the right moment.
Now any devices capable of seeing through concrete walls like X-rays have not yet been invented, and therefore there is only one way out for the tank - to shoot a high-explosive fragmentation projectile into an empty window, where the enemy is supposedly located. Sometimes it helps when they guess, but no ammunition will be enough to shoot all the windows, doors and hatches. There is also a way to shoot with a machine gun at the wall next to the window or under the windowsill. If the enemy is hiding there, he will be defeated. But for this, the bullet must pierce the wall of the house. Can this be done by a 7, 62-mm bullet of a coaxial machine gun or anti-personnel installation of a T-90MS tank? Unlikely. This means that there will be almost no sense from it. But the 12, 7-mm bullet from the NSVT is quite capable of this. Conclusion: the new remote installation looks nice, but - Fails.
How could it be done. The main battle tank T-64A "grew" from the medium tank T-64, which, in turn, was a revolutionary machine that incorporated the latest achievements of design thought and industry, as well as the best technical solutions of Soviet medium and heavy tanks.
Why did I suddenly mention heavy tanks? Because for a long time in service with the Soviet army there was an exceptionally powerful and perfect tank, a meeting with which in battle for any other tank of that time would most likely be the last. His name is T-10M. A powerful, 52-ton handsome man, produced in the amount of 8000 units and which has been in service with the Soviet army for about 40 years. This tank had many technical solutions that favorably distinguished it from medium tanks and from main battle tanks too (not excluding the T-90MS).
The auxiliary armament of the T-10M consisted of a 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun paired with a cannon and another one of the same in an anti-aircraft installation on the roof of the tower. The armor-piercing 14, 5-mm bullet B-32 from a distance of 500 m calmly penetrates armor with a thickness of 32 mm along the normal. The total rate of fire of both machine guns is 1200 rounds per minute. This allowed the T-10M tank to “cut” any armored personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle in half without any problems, without even resorting to using the main 122-mm M-62-T2S cannon. Such machine guns also pierce the concrete walls of houses and shelters with a bang.
Thus, the T-10M in terms of firepower was fully adapted to the conduct of hostilities in the city. If necessary, he could "saw through" the wall along the entire floor, where the enemy could hide. These were the same machine guns that had to be installed on the T-90MS. At least one - in an anti-aircraft gun on the roof. For a coaxial machine gun with a cannon, there is a good alternative - a 12.7 mm YakB-12, 7 machine gun from a Mi-24V attack helicopter.
This machine gun fires 5,000 rounds per minute and is air-cooled - just what you need for the T-90MS. If the tank had one such 12.7-mm "lawn mower" and a powerful 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun in an anti-aircraft gun, the issue with air defense and actions in dense urban areas for the T-90MS would have been resolved with its devices. In the presence of an independent vertical guidance system paired with a 125-mm cannon 2A82 4-barreled 12, 7-mm machine gun YakB-12, 7, the tank will have all the qualities of a widely advertised BMPT and at the same time will not lose the main advantage of the tank - a powerful cannon. By the way, BMPT is not the first vehicle of this class in the world. If we analyze - the T-28 and T-35 are the direct ideological ancestors of the BMPT.
Specialist comment. There are a lot of words on an empty occasion. Let it be known to the author: in addition to the PKT, a 12.7-mm machine gun and a 30-mm AGS grenade launcher can be supplied to the platform for remote installation of the upgraded T-90S tank, depending on the wishes of the customer. Moreover, the digital ballistic tract of the Kalina MSA allows replacing the armament of the remote installation in the field, depending on the assigned tasks.
More powerful V-92S2F2 engine with automatic transmission
How is it done. The engine produces 1130 hp, which is 130 hp. more than the previous T-90A tank (1000 hp). Initially, there were rumors that the engine would produce 1200 hp, but apparently it was not possible to achieve it. The engine has a pleasant, smooth sound and provides the T-90MS with a specific power of 23 hp / t. The maximum speed of the tank on the highway is 60-65 km / h. This is not bad, but not the best indicator either. To comply with the saying “armor is strong and our tanks are fast…” T-90MS must accelerate to at least 70-75 km / h. A lighter tank should be faster than a heavy, western one. And in order to bring the T-90MS mobility indicators to the level of the T-80, it does not even need an engine, but, most likely, it will be enough to redo the gear. For example, the T-80BV tank with a mass of 43.7 tons and an engine power of 1100 hp. accelerates to 80 km / h. What prevents the T-90MS from driving in the same way? The engine is normal. It means that the transmission needs to be improved.
How could it be done. The limited MTO volume of the T-72 makes increasing the engine power a challenge. The same applies to the hull of the T-90MS tank, which is the direct successor of the T-72. It is necessary to improve the transmission of the tank, which was done, and to choose the right gear ratios. So it's all the same - Test.
Specialist comment. The installation of the V-93 engine, despite the increase in the mass of the modernized tank, increased its power density to 23.5 hp / t versus 21.5 hp / t in the T-90A and T-90S tanks. The planned installation of the V-99 engine will give an even greater increase in power density (up to 24.5 hp / t). As for the alleged "automatic transmission", I wrote about this above.
Additional power unit in an armored container
The body is almost identical to the T-72
The undercarriage is almost identical to the T-72
How is it done. These three points are summarized in one paragraph, because they are the result of one - the too small volume of the T-72 body. The firepower, protection and mobility of a modern MBT have long since "grown" from the size of the T-72. In the photo of the T-90MS from the side, you can see how a large heavy tower literally hangs over the small hull of the tank, as the equipment attached to it, which does not fit inside, protrudes from the back of the hull. What does this entail? Here's what:
1. The driver is, in fact, trapped. Its hatch is very small, with a cannon and a wedge of turret armor hanging from above. If something happened - don't get out.
2. The driver's observation devices had to be placed not on the roof of the hull, but in the cutouts of the VLD, thus creating a weakened zone - the "neckline" near the hatch.
3. A powerful engine cannot be installed - there is no place.
4. Fuel tanks (part) and auxiliary power unit are located outside the armored body. It is quite obvious that all this is extremely vulnerable to enemy fire.
5. The short six-point undercarriage has a capacity limit and is already approaching a reasonable limit for such an important parameter as specific ground pressure. In one word bold Fails.
How could it be done. Let's go back to the T-10M. Its body was ideally shaped with a wedge-shaped nose, curved sidewalls and large dimensions. A soft, semi-bearing undercarriage is also available.
The design of the hull and chassis of the T-10M tank allows:
1. Install the complete T-90MS turret.
2. Place the frontal plates at very large angles of inclination and, at the same time, equip a large and convenient hatch for the driver, through which he can always get out in any position of the gun.
3. The shape of the sides with curved walls greatly enhances its resistance to the effects of various ammunition and, at the same time, leaves volumetric reserved niches for placing fuel tanks, electronics or an auxiliary power unit.
4. Large size MTO allows you to install a powerful engine + auxiliary unit.
5. The seven-bearing undercarriage can withstand a weight of 60 tons or more. So the reserves for modernizing the T-10M are very wide. All that remains is to add rubber bands to the road wheels.
The drawings of the T-10M probably remained. It will hardly be very expensive to revive it in a new modern guise. Anyway, everything will pay off quickly. The second option is to follow the path of "object 187" - an improved modification of the T-72B. That is, just slightly lengthen the standard body of the T-72 tank. By the way, the Chinese took this path, as a result of which one of the most powerful tanks in the world appeared today - the ZTZ-99A2. Equipped with a 125mm missile-guided cannon and a ZM-87 laser combat launcher, this Chinese tank is a very dangerous enemy. It's better to overestimate than underestimate. Fighting him on the T-72B is unlikely to succeed, but on the T-90A or T-72BM it will also not be easy. The times of Damansky are long gone - it's time for the leadership of our armed forces to understand this.
The first variant with the T-10M hull, in my opinion, still looks more progressive. On "Type 99" and "Object 187", a semi-support chassis is asked for.
Specialist comment. On this point, I consider it unproductive to comment on the flight of thought of "sofa designers". This layout is over 50 years old! Here, each thesis is striking with deep ignorance. Although, however, for a common man in the street, it would be forgivable.
New fire control system "Kalina"
How is it done. The Kalina control system is clearly superior to the 1A45T Irtysh system of the T-90A tank: a full set of thermal imaging devices, automated weapon guidance, taking into account all kinds of data, including the bend of the gun barrel, automatic target tracking and much more.
The difference from the T-90A is that the cannon can be guided to a still invisible target according to the tank information and control system (TIUS). As soon as the target appears in line of sight - the next second a shot! Another important aspect is that the LMS is fully computerized. In order to equip a tank with new ammunition, for example, you do not need to readjust the sight. It is enough just to update the firmware of the OMS and everything is convenient and fast. However, the missile system remained the same - 9K119M "Reflex-M" with a firing range of 5 km. This is no longer enough.
For example, the guided missiles of the Mk. IV-LAHAT tank "Merkava" have a launch range of 6-8 km. Thus, a powerful Israeli tank for the first time surpassed domestic tanks "in their sandbox". The presence of guided missile weapons (URO) has always been an advantage of domestic tanks over Western ones, which did not have one [3]. Now everything has changed. To break away from competitors on the T-90MS, it is necessary to install a universal anti-aircraft anti-tank missile system with dual-mode guidance. Semi-automatic for shooting at tanks and purely automatic ("fire and forget") for shooting at aircraft. As for the firing range, it should be at least 10 km (especially for missiles).
In addition, it is unclear how the T-90MS will fight the ZTZ-99A2. After all, an attempt to measure the distance to it using a laser rangefinder will end with a response irradiation of the T-90MS with a powerful laser installation and the instantaneous failure of all optics (it will darken). What will happen next - I think it's clear. Against this background, the statements of some powers that be, they say - "we are not going to fight with China" look ridiculous. All of this is reminiscent of the Chamberlain Pact. And if they gather with us, gentlemen? Many people call the ZM-87 laser a "inhuman" weapon. It can damage the eyesight of the gunner and tank commander. Yes, it is inhumane, but even more inhumane to send into battle against the newest MBTs of the 21st century, people using technology developed 40 years ago. This is really inhumane!
On modern tanks, the gunner and commander observe the target through color monitors. So the laser system of the Chinese tank will not harm their eyes. And it will only disable the tank's optics, and even then, if it does not have special anti-laser filters. Are there such devices on the T-90MS? I do not know, but if not, then it is urgent to install. Otherwise, the meeting with the "Chinese" will end badly, very badly. And it would not hurt the T-90MS to have a laser combat system similar to the Chinese ZTZ-99A2 tank.
In general, the OMS and other electronics of the T-90MS are of course modern, but nothing particularly outstanding is visible in it. It is impossible to give an unambiguous offset. However, it also fails.
Specialist comment. Regarding the author's reasoning about the insufficient firing range of the "Reflex" complex of 5 km, I would like to remind you that the range of direct vision on 95% of the terrain of the Central European theater of operations does not exceed 2.5 km.
About anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles for a tank with a range of 10 km, I can only say one thing: this is another thesis in the framework of the tendency of deep ignorance. Well, about the statements about laser weapons and their effects - the author urgently taught a school physics course.
Output: The T-90MS is a good, usable modern tank and can be considered one of the most powerful in the world. However, alas, he is not very keen on meeting the loud epithet “breakthrough”. Maybe it's the price of the tank. But there are things you can't save on. Modern weapons of this class simply cannot be cheap. The optimal "hodgepodge" of the world's best main battle tank looks like this:
- hull and chassis from T-10M
- tower and side screens from the T-90MS
- 125-mm cannon 2A82
- 12, 7-mm coaxial machine gun YakB-12, 7 from the Mi-24V helicopter
- ZU (remote) with a 14.5 mm KPVT machine gun from the T-10M
- gas turbine or diesel engine with power> 1500 HP
- additional power unit (inside the T-10M body)
- automatic transmission
- DZ "Relikt" along the entire perimeter.
In terms of hardware, something like this.
As for the electronics, the following systems must be installed on the tank:
- Complex of active protection of the tank "Arena-E"
- Complex optical-electronic suppression "Shtora-1"
- Universal anti-aircraft anti-tank missile system (UZPTRK) with a launch range> 10 km. Guidance - dual-mode (automatic / semi-automatic), as on the Ka-50/52 helicopter. Missiles can be either universal, or there must be two types of them - SAM and ATGM.
- Combat laser system, similar to the Chinese tank ZTZ-99A2. It is very important. Plus filters on optics to protect against such systems.
- System of psycho-physiological control over the state of the crew. It is no secret that a person can be simply scared in battle. He may also experience other negative emotions: anger, rage, confusion, hysteria, etc. All this negatively affects its combat effectiveness, or even may even lead to death. In the new tank, you need to mount a special powerful computer that can be interfaced with smart suits and tankers' helmets. The sensors located in them inform the computer about what emotions the soldier is experiencing at the moment. The computer, in turn, with special impulses must massage certain parts of the human cerebral cortex through sensors fixed on the head, completely removing harmful and completely unnecessary emotions in battle. The system should be under the control of the tank commander with the ability to turn off and on at his will.
- Means that allow the crew of the tank to see the enemy through concrete walls. A sort of "X-ray". There is nothing wrong with the fact that it can be harmful to the health of the enemy - this is the enemy. The system is necessary to ensure effective combat operations of tanks in the city. This is the next era after the advent of thermal imagers.
- Devices that provide at least the commander with visibility according to the principle of the "glass cockpit".
- System of electromagnetic protection against mines, lowering thermal and radar signature, aerosol and smoke screen.
- It must be possible to control the movement of the tank in battle by the commander using the joystick. This will reduce the crew of the tank to two people. Commander and gunner. In this case, the driver's workplace is left as a backup in the event of a joystick breakdown.
- BIUS integrated into the OMS of the tank. It should be common for tanks, helicopters, attack aircraft, radar and air defense systems. This will allow tankers to see the approach of enemy aircraft for many kilometers and direct their missiles at it in advance.
"Stuffed" in a similar way, the T-10M / 90MS "combined hodgepodge" weighing ~ 55-60 tons, will be an order of magnitude superior to any existing and promising battle tank of a potential enemy. Yes it will be expensive. Even more. But if this is not done, then the entire foreseeable future will still have to fight on the "ageless" T-72B:
Specialist comment. Regarding the proposals on the composition of the "hodgepodge", "iron" and other conclusions - it is better to completely refrain from commenting, so as not to say even worse.
