Last year, the US Army once again began stirring about replacing the same BMP "Bradley". This is the third attempt in the last 20 years, and it is no wonder, in general, since these BMPs have been in service with the US Army and the National Guard since 1981.
That is, almost 40 years.
It is clear that upgrades, modifications and everything else can extend the life of a combat vehicle for a long time. You don't have to go anywhere for examples, just remember the BMP-1 (in service since 1966) and the T-72 (since 1973), and everything falls into place. Armored vehicles in general can live a very long time … There would be a desire.
There is a desire in the American army to change something. But there is definitely no exact certainty about what to change and how.
On the one hand, obsolete equipment must be changed. Any sane person would agree with this. Maybe not for something epoch-making, and God forbid, "which has no analogues in the world", but simply for a new one.
And now, the third attempt. OMFV.
Once again, a Stop command was given from Washington.
Not so long ago, many specialized media in the United States discussed everything related to this. The army canceled a previously announced competition for a new BMP and announced a revision of its requirements for the project.
What is the reason for such a sharp turn?
It turned out that the point is not at all an unnecessarily complex design from the technical side, and not even in the eternal compromise of armor and mobility. Everyone is silent about the combat component; it is known that the Bradleys have destroyed more armored vehicles in the two Iraqi wars than the Abrams.
It turned out to be in some of the nuances of the Eastern European infrastructure.
But we must start not even with European problems, but with what this OMFV project was all about.
The first attempt was the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.
Started in 2003 and was canceled in 2009. At its core, this program was not just a program to replace the old BMP. It provided for the development of a whole line of new types of military equipment, and the equipment of the brigades was supposed to include various types of robotic ground vehicles and drones. All this required the creation of wireless high-speed combat control networks.
At the implementation stage at that time, most of these systems and technological solutions did not meet the established requirements. The FCS program was created with a reserve for the future, when all innovations can be pulled up to the required technical and technological level.
The second attempt is the Combat Vehicle Ground (CVG) program.
Performed from 2009 to 2014. The essence of this rearmament program was reduced to the development of a single combat platform. The main task was to deliver the infantry squad to the front line and support it.
At its core, the new platform was supposed to be able to fight in one formation with the "Abrams" MBT.
The main reason for criticism of the CVG program was a serious increase in the mass and size of prototypes (up to 70-80 tons). This circumstance completely excluded or significantly limited the possibility of rapid operational deployment (including by the forces of military transport aviation). The rejection of the program led to the next modernization of the Abrams and Bradley.
The third attempt is just the OMFV program.
It was assumed that four firms would fight for the contract, General Dynamics Land System (GLDS), Rheinmetall & Raytheon (R&R), BAE Systems and Hanwha.
However, at the very beginning of October 2019, British BAE Systems and South Korean Hanwha voluntarily refused to participate in the competition.
According to the terms of the tender, only two organizations should participate in the final selection, which automatically became GDLS and R&R.
The main requirements for the new vehicle from the US Army:
- the weight of the new car must not exceed the weight of the latest modifications of the M2 Bradley;
- the C-17 transport aircraft must accommodate two cars;
- a set of additional dynamic protection;
- modular active protection MAPS;
- thermal imaging sensors of the third generation FLIR;
- automatic cannon of 50 mm caliber (in the future).
The Army wanted the OMFV to weigh no more than the heaviest armored Bradley variants, at about 45 tons. Logically useful for airlifting with the Air Force. Alas, it didn’t work, at least not yet.
But here there was a conflict between weight and protection from the ever-increasing calibers of armored vehicles of a potential enemy. It is clear who we are talking about when we talk about the actions of the American army in Europe. Not about Iran.
It became clear that something had to be done with the mass of infantry fighting vehicles. On the other hand, the US Army has never deployed more or less large operations with the help of transport aircraft. Never. Simply because this required just a gigantic number of aircraft, and the United States at all times operated to deliver equipment in large quantities by sea.
Yes, in all operations since World War II, the US Army has deployed military equipment by sea. It is both cheaper and the quantities are quite adequate. Air could throw something urgently, nothing more.
In addition, do not forget that the bulk of military equipment is stored in warehouses at military bases around the world. Where equipment is also delivered by sea. But the American brigades have everything they need in their warehouses, and even close to potential conflict zones.
Here, too, there is a certain limiting factor for equipment, but in the realities of the fleet and warehouses, this is volume.
And in the end, only one factor remains. The one that was discussed at the very beginning. Eastern European geographical factor.
When the US Army fights (or pretends to fight) in the deserts of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan, there are technical requirements. But when it comes to Europe …
Europe differs from Iraq and Afghanistan (many other places in the world) in the presence of two unpleasant factors.
These are rivers and Russians. In any order.
If we talk first about the rivers (we will leave the most tasteless for later), then these are the Danube, Elbe, Rhine, Vistula, Tisza, Prut … And just a huge number of small rivers, rivers and rivulets, which are still an obstacle in the way of technology.
And then there are either bridges, or pontoons, ferries and so on. That is, weight again.
What does this mean militarily? Well, this has been discussed so many times when it comes to tanks. "Abrams", "Challenger", "Leopard" … They all stepped over 60 tons and can not drive confidently everywhere.
The lighter Bradley is able to drive the infantry to the line of contact with the enemy, rush it, and perhaps even provide support to the infantry for a while. Until the tanks creep in.
But here is the second factor. Russians. No, they, of course, are almost knights, and, perhaps, even wait for the approach of tanks, but hardly in order to arrange a classic battle. Most likely, just not to hit the flies at retail, but to arrange a wholesale carnage.
And yes, it hit the Americans. What is the point of wasting time and money on the development of a new BMP if it cannot be used in the most promising theater of military operations?
Of course, there are bridges that will not collapse under the weight of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. There are ferries. There are engineering units that will establish the crossings.
Everything rests on the capabilities of a potential adversary. That is us.
That is why the American army has such a difficult dilemma: whether to build a heavy infantry fighting vehicle that will withstand fire, but will not go everywhere, forgetting about efficiency, or think again.
Apparently, they will think.
Never mind, Bradley will fight some more.
