Recently, quite controversial materials have appeared in many media about a whole class of ships. We are talking about small missile ships, or MRKs, armed with "Caliber". The appearance of these ships over the last decade, perhaps, has become the only ray of light in our dark surface naval kingdom, which, we admit, is doing so-so.
Yes, "Caliber" is a good weapon, and their use at targets in Syria with RTOs made many people scratch their heads in the West. And now many believe that with the departure into the history of the INF Treaty, IRAs as a class will also have to become a thing of the past.
As unnecessary.
Yes, when this Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) appeared, the main squires of the world, the USSR and the United States, had to part with their ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers.
And great, there are enough weapons in the world as a whole to smash everything to ashes more than once.
But all this concerned, I repeat, ground-based missiles. And the sea remained. As a result, the United States simply began to massively install Tomahawks on all ships that were suitable for this, we had a Garnet, but mostly non-nuclear.
Then they created "Caliber", but they would not let the naval lie, somehow they implemented it, with such difficulties that in the 2000s they seriously started talking about the fact that "Fiddler" (that is, "Caliber") was not needed."
And then in general they began to write off the carriers of the "Caliber" one after another. Strange, but the impression is that someone wanted to complete the task of weakening the fleet as much as possible.
The fact that the situation in the navy has stabilized is in no way the merit of the naval command. The merit of the export variations of the Novator design bureau on the theme of the same "Granata", as a result of which the "Club" complex appeared. Let not so long-range, but very, very successful in both senses: anti-ship and offensive
However, subsequently, a chain of initially unrelated events occurred, which nevertheless caused the appearance of long-range cruise missiles in the fleet's arsenal, albeit in an extremely irrational way.
The first thing that changed the situation with cruise missiles was the critical situation with the financing of defense industry enterprises, in which exports became the salvation. The response of a single OKB “Novator” to this challenge was the emergence of the “Club” family of missiles - export missiles with a relatively short range, created using the backlog of the non-nuclear “Grenade”. The missiles turned out to be successful both in shock (against the coast) and in anti-ship versions.
And then our sworn buyers, the Indians, appeared, who not only became interested in missiles, but also ordered a series of Talvar-class frigates of Project 11356, standardly armed with Club complex missiles in a 3C-14 vertical launch system for eight missiles.
It is unpleasant to state, but it was the order for the Indian Navy that actually saved the whole business.
And then Project 636 submarines armed with the same missiles were also exported.
The situation turned out to be most amusing on the one hand, but commonplace on the other. For us, in principle, it has already become the norm when modern weapons are first exported, and then … and then it may not exist at all. And there is no need to go for examples, here it is, the first, and then you can remember the T-90, and the same Su-57 is ready to shove anyone away, if only they took it. But not yourself.
And then, as always, when the "Calibers" were completed "in spite of", for Indian money, suddenly they saw the light in the navy. Although there are witnesses and a serious "sticking" in 2006 at a meeting with the president.
Well then, again, as is customary in our country, the fire brigade began to shove "Calibers" onto any ships that could be adapted for this. The whole question is that the ships were minuscule.
This is how "Dagestan" appeared, which they began to modernize under the "Caliber" simultaneously with the completion. Happened. So project 11660 was "calibrated" at 11661, and project 21630 at 21631.
And off we go. MRKs are easier to build than frigates and corvettes, since a small missile ship is just a beefy missile boat.
Therefore, of course, the combat use of RTOs in 2015 turned out to be successful and, to put it mildly, did not please anyone in the West.
But let's be fair: the entire missile salvo of the Caspian Flotilla is several times less than that of any modern destroyer, even the Arleigh Burke. Fact, alas.
Move on. The project to bring RTOs to the "Calibers" was done "on the knee", as always, when our president began to express negative things. The leadership, who had frankly done nothing for the fleet, began to get out urgently. Hence, a completely indistinct rush, and a combat launch, timed to coincide with a birthday …
What happened in essence, what is an RTO and how useful is it?
The ship is definitely unhurried (25 knots) and close (2500 km at 12 knots). Seaworthiness exclusively for closed waters such as the Caspian or Black Seas. Autonomy - 10 days.
Air defense is very strong so-so. Frankly weak. With anti-submarine equipment it is even worse, but there is a certain reason: who will spend a torpedo on such a target? So, I think that if they understand exactly who is in front of the boat, they will spend it. But "Buyan" has practically nothing to defend with.
And there were repeated shots of criticism against the target designation system.
In general, those who call the project 21631 MRK a floating missile battery are right. This is the case. Another question is that in the absence of something better our naval leaders used these ships.
It is probably worth recalling that "Buyan" according to the project was supposed to be on the guard and defense of the economic zone. That is, to work in the near sea zone without any long trips there.
The fact that the boat of the nearest MZ had to be used as a full-fledged combat missile ship is purely out of poverty. Conversion of a patrol boat into a floating battery was successful, but weak points remained.
Yes, they are very suitable for launches from the Black or Caspian Sea beyond the horizon. But in the Baltic or in the Mediterranean Sea, and even in the face of opposition from normal enemy ships - I'm afraid these will be targets.
Not only that, something more or less serious like the German "Saxony" will catch up and smear it with a thin layer on the surface of the Baltic Sea.
But we already have these ships, another question is, what are the proposals for their further fate in the light of the end of the INF Treaty.
Cruise missile. A very formidable and useful weapon. And, importantly, not so expensive. Can fly using navigation, skirting the terrain, and so on. Yes, you can shoot down, especially with modern air defense systems. But modern air defense systems are not yet for everyone. This is about us, the USA, Israel.
It is appropriate to recall here that in April 2014, during a missile strike on Syria performed by the US Navy, it was demonstrated that the CDs are quite normal for themselves.
However, cheapness and quantity are the keys to success. Massive salvo of cruise missiles - and hello. Try to neutralize it.
In this regard, everything is very sad here. A single salvo of cruise missiles from the entire Black Sea Fleet is less than a missile salvo of one Arleigh Burke. Alas.
In these conditions, a floating battery is quite a weapon.
However, the performance characteristics of the project 21631 MRK show that this is not even an attempt to re-equip the fleet with at least something, but rather just a substitute for the once-banned ground launchers by the INF Treaty.
But the substitute is so-so. It was a little expensive, because it was no longer a boat, but not yet a corvette. If for the money - half of the project 20385 corvette. But this is not the fault of the developers, but of foreign policy. All RTOs were designed for German MTU diesels, and because of the sanctions, the ships had to be altered for Chinese engines. The alteration came out both long and rather expensive.
In general, "Buyan-M" - this is the first pancake, which clearly came out lumpy.
But then the "Karakurt" project 22800 went further. It seems to be work on the errors. The Karakurt was provided with a high speed (30 knots) and better seaworthiness, they received a target designation complex, and were reinforced with the Pantsirya-ME air defense installation.
But in fact - the same floating rocket platform, that's a little more jovial. A large surface ship is not a rival for them, and submarines are still just a deadly enemy.
And the cost of an incomprehensible boat of 10 billion rubles is more than significant. However, "Karakurt" still looks more like a tactical strike unit than "Buyan-M".
And now, when the DRMSD collapsed, talk began that MRKs should be put under the knife because they are completely unnecessary. Say, the floating battery may well be replaced by a ground-based complex. The figures were even cited: a two-battery division of the Iskander OTRK, into which it is quite possible to load the Caliber, costs about six billion rubles and provides the same eight-missile salvo as the MRK. RTOs were worth nine billion in 2017. But the MRK, having fired the missiles, must return to the base, and the ground-based launcher is reloaded on the spot, with the help of the TPM.
Theoretically, for six billion, you can get not eight, but 16 missiles in a salvo. Many people speak in an “if” style. If you design a new installation like the French HADES, which seems to be indistinguishable from a conventional machine, if then, if this …
But many of those who called for "removing" RTOs under the knife simply forget that they are looking at the map. And the globe is round …
You can run across the entire border strip of ground-based OTRKs with "Calibers". Absolutely not a question, you can. But you can also track them. And fly a rocket through a continent stuffed with air defense and radars. This is if we are talking about the western border.
The floating battery of RTOs can quite calmly carry out launches on the border of the territorial waters of Turkey and Romania, for example, and hold at gunpoint, unlike a large territory. Do not forget that there are no more ATS countries, and there are no former Soviet republics in which ground-based missiles could be deployed either.
Kaliningrad … Turn the western outpost into a real land fortress? Well, it's even easier there: Poland and the Baltic States are close by. There is where to work in terms of interception. And how will Belarusians look at our missiles at home? I think there is no need to explain.
So a small rocket battery, capable of approaching 1000 km on the water surface, is not the stupidest thing even in light of the cancellation of the INF Treaty, no matter what they say.
Another question is that simultaneously with the release of RTOs, it is necessary to carry out a whole complex of retrofitting ships with "Caliber". It makes sense, it is a real help.
You can also modernize existing ships (from those that will smoke for another ten and a half years) and - certainly - submarines.
Some of the speakers spoke furiously about the new generation of corvettes and frigates, which must be equipped with "Caliber".
I don’t want to sound pessimistic, but we are still building corvettes and (especially) frigates … how to put it, so as not to offend anyone … not very successfully. But the RTOs are still quite capable.
So in our case, it's worth just building what we are able to build. That can take on board cruise missiles and strike them if necessary.
But when our destroyers and frigates begin to go down without any problems, then it will be possible to talk about the uselessness of RTOs.
But not before.
