In the previous article, we examined the medium-caliber air defense guns installed on the battleship Marat in the course of numerous interwar modernizations. Let me briefly remind you that at first the battleship received six 76, 2-mm Lender artillery systems, which for the beginning of the 1920s seemed not so bad an anti-aircraft gun. Subsequently, they were replaced by 10 more modern guns of the same caliber, placed in six single-gun and two two-gun installations 34-K and 81-K. These guns were relatively good anti-aircraft guns, made on the model and likeness of land guns of the same caliber 3-K, which, in turn, were a domestic version of the German 75-mm anti-aircraft gun, developed in the late 1920s and purchased by the USSR in 1930.., which the Wehrmacht, however, never adopted.
In general, the artillery system was not bad and had good ballistic qualities, but for firing at long distances it obviously lacked the power of the projectile, and the shelling of short-range targets was made difficult by the low speeds of horizontal and vertical guidance. In addition, 10 such guns per battleship, albeit not large by the standards of the interwar period, looked clearly insufficient.
The situation was aggravated by the primitiveness of fire control. Of course, an indisputable advantage was that rangefinders with a three-meter base were involved in servicing 76, 2-mm artillery, one per battery (only two rangefinders), but judging by the data of the PUAZO "Tablet", which controlled 76, were available to the author. 2mm artillery systems were extremely primitive. Apparently, they did not have calculating devices that allow calculating the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, that is, the anti-aircraft fire controller had to calculate such parameters manually, based on tables.
A similar situation was at the "October Revolution" - in 1934, when the battleship completed the modernization, its bow and stern towers were decorated with 6 "three-inch" Lender. Interestingly, the original modernization plans provided for the installation of 37-mm 11-K assault rifles (four installations), but, due to their unavailability, Lender had to manage. Accordingly, in 1940, six Lender guns were replaced with the same number of 34-K, and then, in 1941, two 81-K twin guns were installed on the ship. The arrangement of the guns was exactly the same as the Marat.
PUAZO "October Revolution"
As for the fire control systems, there is again ambiguity with them. The fact is that A. Vasiliev in his monograph "The First Battleships of the Red Fleet" indicates that the "October Revolution" received two anti-aircraft fire control posts, each of which was equipped with a set of imported PUAZO "West-5" mod. 1939 At the same time, the respected author notes that the connection between the anti-aircraft fire control posts and the guns was carried out by the "good old" Geisler and K, that is, the PUAZO was not equipped with means of transmitting information to the guns.
At the same time A. V. Platonov, who in his works always paid great attention to the descriptions of fire control systems, did not mention any Vesta-five on the battleship October Revolution or outside of it. According to A. V. Platonov's centralized control of anti-aircraft fire on the battleship was carried out by means of improved fire control devices "Geisler and K".
The attempt of the author of this article to somehow sort out all this has suffered a complete fiasco. As mentioned earlier, according to A. Vasiliev's data, PUAZO “Tablet” was installed on the “Marat” in 1932, but it is impossible to understand what it is, since such a system is not mentioned in the special literature known to the author.
In the comments to the previous article, one of the respected readers made an interesting suggestion that the "Tablet" was a "chilled" Kruse device. It was a fairly simple and primitive device capable of calculating data for firing, based on the hypothesis of rectilinear uniform and horizontal movement of the target. In fact, by 1932 it was the only PUAZO created and produced in the USSR and, as such, could well have been installed on the Marat. Further, alas, solid guesses begin. The fact is that in various sources Soviet anti-aircraft fire control devices are called differently. In one case, this is the Kruse device, "West", etc., in the second they are indicated simply by numbers: PUAZO-1, PUAZO-2, etc. So, we can assume that the Kruse devices are PUAZO-1, and the PUAZO-2 created in 1934 is an improved Kruse device and has its own name "West". Perhaps this device was installed on the "October Revolution", or some modification of it with the serial number "5"? However, no source reports anything like that. In addition, "West" is a domestic, not imported development, while A. Vasiliev points to the foreign origin of the instruments installed on the battleship. And, again, apparently, West was not developed in 1939, but five years earlier.
But in 1939, the serial production of a new device called PUAZO-3 began. Unlike the previous ones, it was made on the basis of the imported Czech PUAZO SP. Thus, PUAZO-3 has a tangible similarity with the devices mentioned by A. Vasiliev - it can (with a stretch!) Be considered imported, and was produced in 1939, but it clearly has nothing to do with West - this is a device completely different design.
It should be noted that PUAZO-3 turned out to be a fairly successful system and quite successfully corrected the fire of Soviet 85-mm anti-aircraft guns during the Great Patriotic War. But nothing at all could be found about its use on ships. In general, it turns out to be a complete confusion, and the opinion of the author of this article is as follows.
I must say that both PUAZO Kruse and its improved version "West" differed in one design feature, which was completely insignificant on land, but was of fundamental importance at sea. The fact is that both of these PUAZO demanded a stable position relative to the ground. That is, when installing them in the field, a special adjustment was made so that these devices were located parallel to the surface of the earth - but in the sea, with its rolling, it was obviously impossible to do this. In order to ensure the operation of PUAZO Kruse or West, it was necessary either to make revolutionary changes in their design, or to create a stabilized post for them, but in the USSR they did not know how to do such.
Accordingly, the author's assumption is that the battleships "Marat" and "October Revolution" were planned to be equipped with "chilled" versions of PUAZO Kruse, as well as West, or, perhaps, PUAZO-3. But it was not possible to adapt them to work in rolling conditions, and it is possible that they did not even start this work, and there were no stabilized posts for them, so in the end these devices were never installed on battleships, limiting themselves to modernizing the Geisler systems and K ".
Medium anti-aircraft caliber and MPUAZO "Paris Commune"
But with the "Paris Commune", fortunately, there are no such puzzles to solve. In terms of the number of artillery barrels, its medium anti-aircraft artillery was the weakest - six 76.2mm Lender guns were replaced by the same number of single-gun 34-Ks. As mentioned above, on the "Marat" and "October Revolution" the number of anti-mine artillery was reduced in order to place two 81-K two-gun mounts in the stern, but this was not done on the "Paris Commune". In addition, the location of the guns also changed, they were installed on the Parisian not on the towers, but on the bow and stern superstructures, three guns each, respectively.
But on the other hand, the fire control of these guns should have significantly surpassed what was available on the other battleships. Measurement of distances to air targets was to be carried out by two rangefinders with a three-meter base, as on the Marat with the October Revolution, but MPUAZO SOM, devices specially designed taking into account the shipboard specifics of air defense. MPUAZO "SOM" had, albeit a primitive, calculating device, and in addition - two stabilized sighting posts SVP-1, located on the same sites as the KDP of the main caliber.
SVP-1 was an open platform mounted in a gimbal. A "three-meter" rangefinder was located on this site, and the post's sighting devices were already fixed on it. With the help of these sighting devices, the course angle to the target and the elevation angle of the target were determined. Thus, we can say that the "Paris Commune" from all three battleships received a full-fledged anti-aircraft fire control system. Alas, the first pancake turned out to be a little lumpy. The fact is that the stabilization of the SVP-1 post was carried out … manually. For this, the VS-SVP device was invented, which was served by two people. It consisted of two sighting devices in one body, located at an angle to each other 90 degrees. Thus, each sighting device, observing the horizon through his sight, could "twist" the SVP-1 so as to achieve its even position, which would occur when the sighting line was aligned with the horizon line. In case the horizon was not visible, it was possible to use the so-called artificial horizon, or the usual bubble inclinometer.
In theory, all this should have worked well, but in practice it did not function as it should - the sighting personnel had to put too much effort on the steering wheels (it seems that there were no electric motors, and the SVP-1 was stabilized manually!), But still did not have time, and deviations from the horizontal plane turned out to be too large. In total, only three SVP-1 posts were made, two of which decorated the Paris Commune, and one more was installed on the destroyer Capable. According to unconfirmed reports (this is indicated by A. Vasiliev, and he, alas, in describing fire control systems is not always accurate), both SVP-1s were dismantled at the Paris Commune even before the end of the war, although, again, it is unclear what happened this is before our troops drove the enemy out of the Black Sea region or after that. In any case, it is reliably known that in the future, more advanced posts were installed on the ships of the Soviet fleet.
It goes without saying that the presence of even a simple, but mechanical calculator, and albeit not very well working, but still capable of giving out the course angle and the elevation angle of the target of the posts, gave the Paris Commune undoubted advantages over the Marat and the October Revolution. On the latter, as the author suggests, the centralized control of anti-aircraft fire was carried out as follows: the range finder measured the range to the target, and reported it to the shooting manager, and he, with the help of ordinary binoculars, or something not much better, figured out the parameters of its movement "by eye", after which, with the help of tables, again "by eye" and manually determined the lead to the target, which was reported to the calculations of anti-aircraft guns. However, it is possible that he still had some kind of calculating device, but in this case, the initial data for the calculations had to be determined by the same “eye” and entered manually.
However, the advantages of the Paris Commune MPUAZO were largely offset by the extremely small number of medium anti-aircraft caliber - only six 76, 2-mm 34-K guns. Many WWII-era cruisers had a significantly stronger medium anti-aircraft caliber. Of course, the Soviet admirals fully understood the weakness of such a composition of weapons, and according to the initial project, the Paris Commune should have received not 76, 2-mm, but 100-mm anti-aircraft guns. But they turned out to be too heavy to be placed on the towers of the main caliber or on the superstructures of the battleship and for this reason they were abandoned.
Small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery
The first Soviet battleship to be armed with small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was the October Revolution. In the course of modernization in 1934, along with six 76, 2-mm Lender guns, four 45-mm 21-K semi-automatic cannons and the same number of quad 7, 62-mm Maxim machine guns were installed on it.
Usually, the story of the appearance of the 21-K universal gun in the fleet is told as follows. In the USSR, perfectly understanding the need for small-caliber rapid-fire artillery, but having no experience in designing it, they bought quite remarkable 20-mm and 37-mm automatic cannons from the German company Rheinmetall. But, unfortunately, they entrusted their development and serial production to plant No. 8 located in Podlipki near Moscow, whose employees, due to their low engineering and technical culture, completely failed this task. As a result, the fleet did not receive from factory # 8 either the 20-mm 2-K or the 37-mm 4-K, which it had counted on very much, and moreover, it was left completely without small-caliber automatic weapons. But at least some anti-aircraft gun had to be put on the ships, and there was nothing left to do but adopt a 45-mm ersatz anti-aircraft gun, made on the basis of the anti-tank 45-mm cannon 19-K mod. 1932 …
In fact, the story with the German "autocannons" is not at all as simple as it might seem at first glance, but we will take a closer look at it when we get to the domestic 37-mm 70-K anti-aircraft guns. For now, we will only note that the German artillery systems really failed to bring to mass production, and that the naval forces of the Country of Soviets really in the early 30s were completely without small-caliber artillery. All this made the adoption of the "universal semi-automatic" 21-K an uncontested option.
What can you say about this good artillery system? She had a fairly modest weight of 507 kg, which made it possible to install it even on small boats, and had ballistics that were not the worst for its time, sending in flight 1, 45 kg projectile with an initial speed of 760 m / s. On this, her dignity, in general, ended.
Until 1935, 21-K were not "semi-", but, as they called it, "quarter-automatic": all their "automation" was reduced to the fact that the breech was automatically closed after sending the projectile. Apparently, these are the guns and received the "October Revolution". But the "semi-automatic", in which the bolt not only closed after sending the projectile, but also automatically opened after the shot, was achieved only in 1935. The calculation of the gun was 3 people, the rate of fire did not exceed 20-25 rounds per minute (according to other sources - up to 30), and even then it is not clear how long the calculation of such a rate of fire could support. The ammunition load included fragmentation, fragmentation-tracer and armor-piercing shells, and there were two fragmentation shells - one weighing 1, 45, and the second (O-240) 2, 41 kg. But it would be completely inappropriate to talk about the increased power of the projectile, because the 21-K ammunition did not have a distance tube. Accordingly, in order to shoot down an enemy plane, a direct hit on it was required, and such a thing with such a "density" of fire could have happened only by accident. Obviously, the 45-mm gun was a melee weapon, for which, in addition to the rate of fire, the vertical / horizontal aiming speed is also important. Alas, the data on 21-K give a very large scatter of these parameters, usually 10-20 and 10-18 degrees are indicated. respectively. However, such a very authoritative source as the reference book "Naval Artillery of the Navy" gives exactly the upper values, that is, 20 and 18 degrees, which, generally speaking, is quite acceptable and can also be recorded in the few advantages of this artillery system.
Nevertheless, there was very little sense from such air defense during the Great Patriotic War - in essence, these guns were only suitable so that the ship's crew did not feel unarmed, and the attacking aircraft had to take into account the visibility of anti-aircraft fire on them.
And the same can be said about 7, 62-mm "fours" "Maxim".
Without a doubt, "Maxim" was a remarkable machine gun for its time, moreover, its water cooling (and there is a lot of water in the sea) made it possible to maintain firing for quite a long time. But a rifle-caliber machine gun as an air defense tool was unconditionally obsolete in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Therefore, it is not surprising that the small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery of the "October Revolution" was radically strengthened even before the war, and instead of the artillery systems described above, the battleship received 37-mm 70-K machine guns and 12, 7-mm DShK machine guns.
