On January 21, 2014, the Voennoye Obozreniye portal published an article "Light fighter?" The consolidated decision of the NTS can be summed up in three words: "To be a light fighter!" However, the author of the article has his own dissenting opinion on this matter. Without rejecting the author's right to his own opinion, we will try to analyze the article from a scientific standpoint, while asking a number of systemic and technical questions.
Question one: Can we talk about the inexpediency of including a light fighter in the armament system without considering the system itself as an object of analysis? (Note: system (from the Greek. Systema - whole, made up of parts; connection) - a set of elements that are in relationships and connections with each other, forming a certain integrity, unity). All systems theory textbooks have a firm "NO". The author of the article, proceeding from essentially correct reasoning with the use of information of a private, non-systemic nature, makes a systemic conclusion: class of key elements of stealth technology used in the F-22 and PAK FA. And also the lack of a large guaranteed market that would justify the huge investment in the development of the machine. In addition, there is no suitable engine for LFI and will not appear in the near future”.
The author put the whole system analysis into the following phrase: “… Huge spaces in the conditions of a sparse airfield network make a bet on heavy machines justified, at least it makes sense to have a lot of them, and it’s not a fact that it is more expensive than using mainly light equipment. because the latter will need more. " It is very similar to: “Everyone imagines himself to be a strategist, seeing the battle from the sidelines” from the famous work of Shota Rustaveli. And one more thing: “Yes, and many pilots are trained for one built aircraft during its service, it takes a lot of money for each one even before he gets into the cockpit of the aircraft he will serve for the first time. And the notorious attitude - 70% of light, 30% of heavy - is taken from the ceiling. " And this is A. P. Chekhov: "This cannot be, because it can never be." That, in fact, is the whole solution to the most complex systemic issue.
And what did the not yet completely destroyed applied military aviation science talk about and is still talking about? Science with the results of mathematical modeling suggests that only by optimizing the structure of a two-aircraft fleet of fighters can an increase in the complex “efficiency / cost” indicator of up to 20% be achieved (Fig. 1). When optimized at the level of the entire operational-tactical aviation (OTA), the gain due to the inclusion of a light fighter in the OTA combat assets system will be about 5% (Fig. 2). This is as it should be, because the higher the level of the system quality indicator, the more smoothly its dependence on the parameter-argument proceeds (the smaller the gain). However, in any case, it is hundreds of billions of rubles of Russian taxpayers for the life cycle.
The results shown in Fig. 1 were obtained by the method of mathematical modeling of the combat functioning of a calculated aviation formation (RAF) of a mixed composition. They were obtained under the condition of optimal distribution of tasks between light and heavy fighters in accordance with the following logic:
- when solving the problems of providing strike aviation to a depth lying outside the radar field, heavy fighters (TI) are used. Powerful radar and increased USP stock allow them to create their own information field and maximize the number of targets served;
- when solving the tasks of covering troops and front facilities, light fighters (LI) are used, since in the conditions of the detection range of air targets (CC) by ground-based radars, limited by the radio horizon, the combat capabilities of a heavy fighter will not be fully used;
- heavy fighters are used in the event that the losses of the lungs have exceeded the value requiring the replenishment of the RAF.
Actually, the author of the article also agrees with this, for example: “If we return to Russian conditions, then first of all we need to provide our own air defense, and if strike aviation in the event of a threat of war can be transferred to a threatened direction, then air defense fighters must be ready to take off at any time."
Shown in Fig. 2, the results were obtained under the condition of the optimal distribution of OTA tasks between all aircraft complexes (AC) included in its composition, taking into account the degree of their multifunctionality (the ability to effectively solve various problems without re-equipping the AC). The results were obtained under the condition of the sale in Russia of a unique two-aircraft fleet of fighters of different dimensions. This circumstance determined the relevance of their classification by weight.
Thus, the above conclusion about the inexpediency of developing a light fighter at the present time seems unfounded. In addition, it does not correspond not only to Russian conditions, for which the above results of park optimization were obtained, but also to world experience. According to the author himself: "Lungs are just the machines that form the basis of the air force fleet of developed countries."
Question two: So what, after all, should be understood by a light fighter? The attempt to classify fighters as weapons by mass given in the article should be considered not entirely successful. The abundance of parameters and indicators used by the author in the analysis of almost all aircraft created in the world in the entire history of jet aviation for various purposes, for various purposes, differing in design and layout schemes, tactical and technical characteristics (TTX), number of engines, etc., allowed him only to gain a foothold in his own opinion. The reasoning contained in the article is far from science, since science ends where generalizations end.
Experience shows that in the conditions of the fundamental impossibility of a single definition of the object, the most constructive solution is to try to come to an agreement. At the same time, the question is reduced to the position (mercantile, corporate, scientific) on which the agreement should be made. The scientific position seems to be the most rational in determining the size of fighters, since the formation of a standard-size range of fighters is a stage in solving the park problem (one of the classical problems of the theory of operations research).
From a scientific point of view, any classification of objects presupposes the isolation from their entire set of those that satisfy certain general conditions and characteristics. For the purpose of classification objectivity, it should be based on some regularities. It should be borne in mind that the combat properties and effectiveness of the fighter will be determined by the values of its performance characteristics, which are optimized during the formation of the technical appearance, set in the customer's technical specifications and verified in tests for normal take-off weight. Naturally, it should be used as a classification criterion.
Taking into account the conventionality of the classification, one can agree with the division of all OTA aircraft into AK of "ultra-light", "light", "medium" and "heavy" classes proposed in the article. Moreover, in a number of publications there are even some justifications for such a classification. However, it should be borne in mind that the dimension of a fighter must be considered, first of all, not from the point of view of the mass of an empty aircraft, but from the point of view of its combat capabilities, its combat properties. The experience in the development of front-line fighters of the 4th generation (Su-27, MiG-29, MiG-31) and research on fighters of the 5th generation show that the fundamental in deciding whether a fighter is classified as a light or heavy class is such a property as the autonomy of actions - the ability to solve combat missions without the support of ground-based radar systems to great depths.
To ensure the autonomy of the actions of fighters in the interests of solving the task of escorting strike groups and air defense-missile defense, it is necessary:
- to provide the ability to create their own information field (preferably circular) using only airborne surveillance and targeting equipment (OPS);
- to provide a great depth of action (outside the radar field of ground-based radars and AK RLDN);
- expand the range and increase the number of weapons in ammunition;
- to increase the survivability of the fighter (the ability to avoid the impact of enemy air defense or to resist it).
Fundamental differences in the requirements for the autonomy of actions when solving cover and escort tasks led to the division of front-line fighters of the 4th generation into two classes: light, solving combat missions in the conditions of ensuring combat use by external systems, and heavy, solving combat missions at great depths autonomously, in the absence of such support.
In addition, the classification must be carried out in relation to promising or at least to modern combat aircraft with approximately the same combat properties. Analysis of the main directions of development of tactical (operational-tactical) aviation and the existing fleet showed that most of the aviation complexes can be attributed to multifunctional AK. With this in mind, the classification should be carried out in relation to modern multifunctional fighters.
In fig. 3 shows the distribution of a set of multifunctional fighters (MFIs) by mass characteristics in the coordinates "normal take-off weight - the mass of an empty aircraft". Analysis of this set shows that, in contrast to the distribution of combat aircraft by dimension into four classes proposed in the article, modern and promising multifunctional fighters can be conditionally divided into three classes in terms of normal take-off weight:
- light class, which includes tactical fighters such as Mirage 2000, Rafale, F-16C, EF-2000, Russian versions of the MiG-29;
- middle class, which include tactical fighters such as F / A-18C / D, Tornado, F-35C, MiG-35;
- heavy class (such as F-15E / I, F-14D, F-22A, various versions of the Su-27 and Su-30).
Fighter Rafale in a combat configuration with six Hammer air-to-ground missiles, four MICA medium and long-range missiles and two Meteor ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles, as well as three outboard fuel tanks with a capacity of 2000 liters
Source: Dassault Aviation
At the same time, MFIs with a normal take-off weight of up to 18 tons can be attributed to the light class, from 18 to 23 tons to the middle class, and over 23 tons to the heavy class. The ultralight class, which includes combat AKs, usually created on the basis of training aircraft, can hardly be considered fighters in the currently accepted sense of the word, even taking into account the fact that they are capable of conducting close air combat (BVB). The ability to conduct BVB is a prerequisite for any fighter. However, it is not a sufficient condition for solving problems of fighter aviation, which require a fighter to have a number of other properties. This, in turn, does not allow them to be classified as multifunctional AK. Studies show that with a fighter weighing less than 10 tons, it is impossible to achieve a level of efficiency that allows it to at least withstand a potential enemy in air battles, due to the impossibility of providing the necessary performance characteristics in a mass of up to 10 tons.
In addition, in relation to modern multifunctional fighters, the "heavy" and "medium" classes can be combined. Comparison of fighters of these classes indicates that they have no differences of a fundamental nature, necessitating their separation into independent classes. Multifunctional fighters of these classes differ slightly in maneuverability. In terms of flight range and armament, a heavy fighter, as a rule, is somewhat superior to the average. And these are the differences between types in the same class.
Thus, it is proposed to conditionally divide all OTA multifunctional fighters (like the front-line fighters of the 4th generation) into heavy ones with a normal take-off weight of up to 18 tons, and light ones - below 18 tons. This classification will be valid only for multifunctional fighters. And this is just a proposal aimed at achieving at least some unambiguity in determining the size of fighters when solving a park problem, justifying their role and place in the weapons system, the operational-tactical requirements arising from this and the effectiveness of solving combat missions, to which the author of the article is in the process reasoning about the dimension was forced to periodically apply.
Question three: How does the effectiveness of light and heavy fighters compare? When looking for an answer to this question, it is proposed to distinguish between the combat effectiveness of the MFI and the effectiveness of its combat use. Combat efficiency is a defining characteristic of an MFI, assessing the degree of its adaptability to inflicting combat damage on the enemy. It depends solely on the performance characteristics of the fighter - the weapon with the use of which the pilot solves the task assigned to him. The effectiveness of combat use is the combat effectiveness of the MFI, achieved (calculated) in specific conditions of combat use as part of the RAF, taking into account the capabilities of combat control and support systems. The introduction of this term is due to the need to take into account the contribution of support systems to the efficiency of using MFIs in solving problems of fighter aircraft. With a very high combat effectiveness of a fighter, the effectiveness of its combat use can be zero, for example, due to the lack of the ability to provide refueling.
Quite rightly, the author of the article refers to the equation of the existence of an aircraft: "In aviation there is such a concept as the equation of the existence of an aircraft, from which it follows that the specific weight of each component of an aircraft among machines of the same purpose with the same flight data is the same." However, this appeal is purely theoretical. Who can give an example of "machines (meaning aircraft) of the same purpose with the same flight data"?
The author uses exclusively the design sense of the equation of existence (the sum of the relative masses of the aircraft subsystems is equal to one) and at the same time misses its equally important component - the dependence of the combat properties, and, consequently, the combat effectiveness of the MFI on the distribution of the relative mass of its subsystems. For example, in order to increase the depth of actions of a fighter (the main operational and tactical characteristic) in the interests of solving the tasks of escorting strike groups, it is necessary to increase the relative masses of fuel, surveillance and targeting system and weapons, sacrificing for this the relative masses of the structure, power plant,crew with the means of ensuring its vital functions. Fortunately, with an increase in the normal takeoff weight, for which V. F. Bolkhovitin's equation of existence, and the constancy of the absolute masses of these subsystems, their relative mass decreases.
The equation of existence is the same fundamental law as the laws of conservation of energy, mass, and momentum. By analogy, it can be imagined as the law of the preservation of the combat properties of the aircraft, which establishes the laws of their change in accordance with the redistribution of the relative masses of the aircraft. For example, a decrease in the ammunition load of a medium-range missile launcher (ammunition load) while maintaining the normal take-off weight of a fighter can provide an increase in the relative mass of the power plant, thrust-to-weight ratio, maneuverability and, as a result, increase efficiency in close air combat.
The search for the optimal combinations of the relative masses of the AK, and, consequently, the optimal distribution of its combat properties is a complex scientific task, the solution of which requires special knowledge and special training. Its popular exposition can start with the well-known axiom: you have to pay for everything. So, you also have to pay for an increase in the dimension (mass and linear dimensions) of a fighter in the interests of increasing the autonomy of its use? And what then? Or don't you have to pay anything? After all, there is a point of view that the combat potential of a fighter is proportional to its mass! Let's try to figure it out.
Yes, indeed, an increase in combat power (by increasing the ammunition load and increasing the effectiveness of weapons) leads to an increase in combat potential. But all this is not so simple, otherwise the MiG-31, with a normal take-off weight of 37 tons, should have had the largest potential of Russian fighters. Combat potential must be assessed in relation to specific tasks and the conditions for their implementation. The task of covering is solved in conditions of limited radar field, which limits the line of interception. This, coupled with the transience of air combat, does not allow the heavy fighter to fully realize its potential, for this task it is oversized.
The increase in the size of the fighter has a negative effect on the combat readiness characteristics. So, for example, the take-off time of a light MiG-29 fighter from BG-1 is 3 minutes, and a heavy fighter MiG-31 - 5 minutes. In conditions of centralized control, when the lifting of the alert means is carried out only after the detection of an air enemy, this is essential. For example, at a target speed of 900 km / h, an increase in take-off time by 2 minutes will lead to a decrease in the interception line by 30 km. A decrease in the combat readiness characteristics will also negatively affect the effectiveness of the combat use of IFIs for solving strike missions in conditions of a network-centric nature of combat operations, the implementation of reconnaissance and strike actions, and the defeat of quickly detected targets.
MiG-31B
A decrease in the interception line as a result of a decrease in efficiency is the price to pay for ensuring the possibility of solving the most difficult combat mission of fighter aircraft - escorting strike groups. But a large ammunition load in conjunction with a powerful radar, multichannel escort / shelling of the computer center will provide the greatest efficiency in solving this problem. A heavy fighter is also indispensable when solving air defense-missile defense missions of the country in Russian conditions, first of all, in conditions of undeveloped infrastructure, sparse airfield network, for example, when repelling a raid from the northern and northeastern directions. This, in fact, is what the author of the article writes about.
It should be borne in mind that the final stage of any of the fighter's missions is air combat (WB): long-range - beyond visual visibility (VVB) and near - subject to visual visibility of the target. It is at these stages that combat effectiveness is manifested as a defining characteristic of the quality of MFIs. To assess the combat effectiveness in WB, it is customary to use the probabilities of hitting a target by a fighter and a fighter by a target. One of the features of air combat is the widespread use of electronic warfare by opponents.
Naturally, the enemy can interfere with the onboard radar. However, this cannot completely deprive the fighter of the opportunity to establish information contact with the target. The influence of interference will affect, first of all, the possibility of conducting DVB in difficult weather conditions, which complicate the use of an optoelectronic channel, since it becomes impossible to conduct it at large (30 … 50 km or more) distances in conditions of interference. And even if the DVB takes place, then under the influence of interference, the defeat of the enemy by medium and long-range missiles are far from reliable events. Consequently, in conditions of interference, BVB may turn out to be the main, and possibly the only way to accomplish a combat mission.
The condition for setting up a BVB is the detection of each other by the opponents. The probability of detecting a guiding center in the optical range will be determined by many factors, the main of which is the linear dimensions of the observation object. In fig. 4 shows the dependence of the probability of detecting a VC on its size. The results of modeling the BVB of hypothetical light and heavy fighters showed that, on average, over the entire set of possible positions of fighters, when an air battle begins, a light fighter will more than double the heavy one. Such simulation results are explained by the fact that when a target is lost during combat maneuvering, the pilot of a light fighter, having a smaller size, detects the enemy earlier. This provides him with an earlier use of the weapon. As a result, the effect is triggered, called by the author of the BVB model "the effect of the first start". Its essence lies in the fact that in the BVB, the fighter that used the weapon first receives the initial value of the probability of hitting the enemy, which can no longer be reduced under any circumstances.
Thus, the superiority of a heavy fighter in terms of fuel reserves, in terms of ammunition load, and in multichannel use of USP can be fully realized only when solving problems in the absence of a radar field. When solving other tasks, its combat capabilities will be redundant. That is why heavy fighters have found limited use both in the air forces of the producing countries (excluding the poorest among them - Russia) and in the importing countries.
Question four: What is the role of a light fighter in the world aircraft market? The fighters of the MiG and Su brands are part of the fleets of 55 countries of the world, while fighters of both brands are operated in 20 countries. Of these, 9 countries should be excluded from the potential Russian market segment, since 7 countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Czech Republic) have joined NATO, and the DPRK and Iran are under international sanctions. The type and number of combat aircraft in the Russian market segment are shown in Fig. 5.
Let the sighted see. And there is no need for reasoning like: “The countries that theoretically could buy from us hundreds of modern fighters can be counted on one hand in the world: India, China, Indonesia. India ordered 3 hundred Su-30s, but in order to acquire a light fighter, it contacted the French, China is trying to do its own thing, Indonesia could have bought it long ago, but apparently it doesn't hurt. Vietnam, with its large population and very serious problems with China, purchased 48 Su-30s, the rest of the buyers took from 6 to 24 aircraft in different configurations. That is, as soon as the Indian market closes, you can forget about the serious export of combat aircraft. " Speaking about the "serious export" of combat aircraft, the author shyly omits the words "heavy fighters" with which the conversation began. A very unprofessional sophistry (sophistry is reasoning based on a deliberate violation of the laws of logic)!
The last Su-30SM delivered to the airbase in Domna was built in 2013 (tail number "10 black", serial number 10MK5 1016). Domna, 2014-17-04
Source: Alexey Kitaev / VKontakte
And here are other results of assessing the state and forecast of market development. Analysis of the potential capacity of the Russian market shows:
1. The total number of combat aircraft of Russian (Soviet) production, delivered abroad and in service today, is ~ 5, 4 thousand aircraft, or 45% of the total world tactical aircraft market.
2. Among them there are ~ 3, 4 thousand fighters and ~ 1, 5 thousand percussion planes. Considering that during the times of the USSR there was the possibility of supplying aircraft of any purpose to a friendly country, it can be concluded that most countries consider the task of protecting their airspace a priority.
3. The Russian market, like the world market as a whole, is focused on light aircraft. So, among fighters ~ 76%, and among shock ones ~ 72% belong to the light class (normal takeoff weight is up to 18 tons).
This structure of the market has led to the fact that of the total income that has been steadily received by aviation enterprises to date, more than 80% were revenues from the sale of front-line combat aircraft. The absence in Russia of developments capable of satisfying the market needs for new AT models in 10 … 15 years will inevitably lead to the loss of a significant share of the combat aircraft market. An objective forecast of the dynamics of market changes in the period up to 2030 as a result of the emergence of China on it, obtained back in 2010 using a model for predicting the results of a tender (see the monograph by V. I. Barkovsky et al. "Methodology for Forming the Technical Image of Export-Oriented Aviation Complexes") is given in table. 1 and fig. 6.
Options for market proposals of the PRC and Russia
Source: Aviapanorama
When performing the forecast, the following was taken into account:
- the Russian segment of the market was formed as a result of deliveries to friendly countries on barter, on account of the state debt or as fraternal assistance of predominantly light combat aircraft (Fig. 5);
- satisfaction of needs by supplying it at market prices of a 5th generation heavy fighter seems even too optimistic at its market price of $ 100 million or more;
- for many countries of the Russian segment of the market, the tactical and technical data of the T-50 heavy fighter are redundant;
- T-50 deliveries may disrupt regional stability.
Analysis of the results shown in Figure 6 shows that the absence of Russian proposals in the class of light fighters will make it impossible to curb Chinese expansion in the AT market. The losses of the Russian segment of the market only due to the need to share it only with China by 2030 will amount to:
~ 30% with an export policy focused only on heavy class IFIs (from 46 to 32 countries);
~ by 25% in case of creation of an export-oriented MFI light class (from 46 to 39 countries).
That is, we will lose 7 countries in any case. It should be noted that the loss of 30% of the market with the degree of uncertainty characteristic of the conditions for solving such problems is not tragic. However, the picture changes with the transition from the number of countries of the lost market to the number of aircraft. So, we have already lost the market in more than 1200 obsolete and practically exhausted MiG-21s, since Russia has nothing to offer in such a price class of fighters. And in the next period (2020 … 2030) there will be a further collapse of the Russian market due to the withdrawal in terms of the resource of fighters of the 3rd and 4th generations. The service life of the MiG-23 (620 units) and MiG-29 (760 units) put on the market in the last century will end. In addition, Russia will lose almost the entire strike aircraft market (180 MiG-27 and 470 Su-17/22 fighter-bombers), which could be replaced by a two-seater version of a light fighter, given its versatility.
Thus, the current situation in the Russian segment of the aviation market, in the terminology of flight safety theory, can be assessed as “controlled movement to the point of disaster”, when the object is operational and controllable, and the crew does not even suspect that the parameters of its movement will inevitably lead to death. In this case, the aviation industry may die.
While on the Russian market the Irkuts, together with the dry ones, supported by Rosoboronexport, are fighting the Mikoyans, the Chinese are actively conquering our market (Fig. 6). And with the scanty needs of the Russian Air Force for combat aircraft of operational-tactical aviation and the absence of a balanced technical policy (the Russian type surpasses the total type of American and European countries), it is possible to reach production volumes that ensure profitability only by promoting the products of the Russian aviation industry to the foreign market. One cannot but agree with the assessments of the author of the article: “The Russian Air Force now has 38 squadrons of fighters. This gives a staffing number of 456 vehicles. With a complete replacement with PAK FA and LFI in a ratio of 1: 2, only 300 machines are used for LFI. Of course, there are also exports, where LFI should have an advantage over PAK FA due to a lower price."
If the problem of a light fighter is considered not from a corporate, but from a state standpoint, from the standpoint of preserving the aviation industry in Russia, it turns out that the issue is not in the ratio between light and heavy fighters. In this situation, even for the T-50 it will be problematic to organize a decent series. The question of the future of the Russian aviation industry, its ability to create combat aircraft and engines in demand on the world market, which are an independent export item. There will be no light fighter, another item of Russian export will disappear, and with it another - the engine.
But all these considerations and assessments will make sense provided the technical feasibility of a light fighter that meets the requirements of the Russian Air Force and the importing countries. And it was gratifying to hear, in speeches at the NTS of the military-industrial complex, an awareness of the special importance of a light fighter for the development of the market and the preservation of the Russian aviation industry.
The fifth question: Is the idea realizable? The author of the article devoted a lot of space to this issue, as if trying to please someone, and not try to at least get closer to the truth. Here, for example: “… With LFI, everything will be much more difficult … the LFI project can very easily eat up years of work by the most qualified engineers and generate something incomprehensible at the output, and it does not pull a full-fledged stealth like the PAK FA, and for the mainstream like the MiG-35 it is too expensive….
Of course, it is expensive, since the implementation of the idea of a light multifunctional fighter (LMFI) will require a lot of intellectual work of designers and scientists. However, it should be borne in mind that the creation of the LMFI will not be carried out from scratch. The country has a scientific and technical reserve (NTZ), created in the process of developing the PAK FA. It is impossible to agree with the author on the issue of using the obtained NTZ "… True, it will be necessary to develop not only the engine, but also all other equipment that cannot be taken from the PAK FA …".
Why won't it work? After all, NTZ was created for state money, and it is difficult to imagine that the state customer, who paid for it, will not be able to "tilt" the Sukhovites in this matter. There would be will. And if the already created NTZ is used, the costs of development work can be significantly reduced. There are other ways to reduce the financial burden on the budget, for example, the implementation of a strategy for the phased implementation of R&D, which implies the use of the RD-33MK engine at the first stage of R&D according to the LMFI, which practically eliminates the problem of the engine. And even if we do not conflict with the owners of NTZ, it turns out that the costs of developing LMFI will be negligible in comparison with the averted losses of the Russian market, and, possibly, of the aviation industry. There was money for the political PAK DA, with which only expenses are associated.
Specialists are not interested in the author's reasoning about the feasibility of a lightweight MFI of the type “… the question with a hypothetical promising LFI is more interesting. Obviously, it makes sense to develop and introduce into production a new aircraft only if it promises a sharp increase in combat capabilities compared to the modernization of existing models. Any radars with AFAR can be installed on the old modernized aircraft, thereby saving a lot of resources for development and restructuring of production … ". This recommendation lies on the surface, but there is a concept of "modernization potential", and if it is exhausted, then modernization is meaningless.
I would like to remind you that the equation of existence, which the author refers to when considering the issue of classification, should be fulfilled not only when creating new aircraft, but also when modernizing existing ones. At the same time, since the modernization is carried out with the aim of improving the combat and operational qualities of the sample, and, consequently, increasing or at least maintaining its effectiveness at the achieved level in more difficult conditions of combat use by increasing the functional characteristics of the subsystems, its mass increases. So, the normal take-off weight of the MiG-29 increased in the process of its phased modernization from 14.8 tons for the MiG-29A to 18.5 tons for the MiG-35, that is, in terms of dimensions, it crossed the border of light fighters. An attempt to further increase the combat properties will lead to a further increase in mass, a decrease in thrust-to-weight ratio and a decrease in efficiency in the BVB, that is, to the transformation of a fighter into a strike aircraft. But this is theory. It seems that the author's proposal to try to submit the MiG-35 to foreign customers as a new generation LMFS is destructive.
MiG-35 at the Bangalore Air Show in 2007.
Source: Alexander Rybakov
Even if we do not take into account the lack of efficiency, the MiG-35 cannot be considered as a light class fighter of the new generation for the following reasons:
1. The airframe of the aircraft, optimized for the requirements and technological capabilities of the 70s of the last century, is morally outdated and does not provide technical capabilities to meet the requirements for aerodynamic characteristics, the massive perfection of a promising fighter determined by aviation materials and technologies, and the visibility of the aircraft in the radar range.
2. The avionics of the aircraft do not meet modern requirements for the integration of equipment, which will not allow the implementation of modern concepts of an integrated MFI board, increasing its intelligence, creating a BASU, which provides not only automation of aircraft control, but also the development of optimal solutions in a specific tactical situation, which is especially for a fighter relevant.
3. The requirement for the survival of the LMFI cannot be met due to the absence of a circular information and control field, which will not ensure the full use of the capabilities of promising USPs (anti-missiles and missile launchers in anti-missile mode).
4. The absence of the SCS mode in the MiG-35 will lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of its use to destroy quickly detected objects in conditions of the network-centric nature of future wars.
As a result, the fears that the LMFI based on the MiG-35 will not have a high export potential are justified, since the well-known marketing condition will not be fulfilled: “a good product - in original packaging”. The design and layout of the MiG-29 is no longer such. Actually, this was confirmed during the Indian tender, despite the fact that a slightly different MiG-35 was presented for the tender.
In addition, the need to preserve and develop unique technologies for the development and production of light fighters, design and production teams that own them should be considered no less important for Russia. Indeed, in the time that has passed since the development of the MiG-29A, a twin-engine fighter weighing 14.8 tons, no one in the world has managed to repeat a similar project (F-16 is, according to the general conclusion in aviation circles, not a fighter, but according to our classification fighter-bomber, that is, a multifunctional strike AK).
As for the technical feasibility of the LMFI project, the author should be aware of the projects carried out in Russia on this topic. The openness of the article does not allow to provide specific data in it. One thing can be said: Russia is losing a lot by not promoting the development of the LMFI, a new generation of light class fighter, both with internal placement of weapons and with a conformal USP suspension. The reasoning given in the article on this score allows us to doubt the truth of the statement that there are no "Sukhov" and "Mikoyan" schools of design, expressed as one of the arguments for uniting the design potential when creating the UAC.
The author's reasoning contains the following passage: “If you look at the history of the Soviet, and then the Russian Air Force over the past 30 years, it is clear that, contrary to the assertions about the evil Poghosyan, who strangles MiG and light fighters as a class, the topic of LPI itself did not go beyond pictures and in the USSR. The C-54/55/56 family did not find support. … It seems to me that Poghosyan has nothing to do with it … . Do not slip into personalities. It seems that M. A. Poghosyan really has nothing to do with it. After all, every period of the history of the state requires the appearance of its own personalities, its own, as they say, heroes. And yet, the above statement begs the next question.
The sixth question: "Is there a subjective factor in the history of a light fighter?" The answer to this question is likely to be yes. In the early 1990s, under the conditions of the economic depression, the production capabilities of the aircraft industry created in the Soviet era turned out to be excessive, and the workload of enterprises, as never before, began to be determined by the personal qualities of their leaders, their ability to adapt to a chronic lack of funds. In these conditions (“there is no money and there will be no money”), the task of finding effective solutions to bring the aviation industry out of the crisis has become especially urgent. The demand for ideas could not fail to generate suggestions. One of them was the least costly for the budget idea of embedding in the global aviation industry, in its simplicity, clear to everyone.
What the implementation of this idea has resulted in, today the Russian media write almost every day. A great desire to find a solution did not allow the authors of the embedding idea to take into account that simple solutions, as a rule, lead to new problems that are even larger than the original one. For the integration it was necessary to pay something, to sacrifice something. Design Bureau named after A. I. Mikoyan.
This was a great sacrifice for Russia. At that time, the A. I. Mikoyan carried out a project on the 5th generation fighter MFI, which was an integrator of all the latest technologies in aircraft construction and related industries. In addition, the OKB was completing the modernization of the MiG-29 light fighter, and the MiG-29M would constitute the main threat to Western manufacturers on the world market of military aircraft. It is even difficult to imagine what would have happened to the market if the MiG-29M appeared on it in the 1990s at prices corresponding to that period of time.
Only the need to make sacrifices to foreign aircraft companies can explain the adoption of a number of decisions that defy common sense, such as:
- termination of work on the Su-27M and MiG-29M, which were in the final stages of testing (for the MiG-29M
a preliminary conclusion has already been received), despite the obviousness of a reasonable decision: certify fighters, and if there is no money to purchase them for your own air force, supply them to the Russian segment of the market;
- termination of the ROC "Directionator" at the stage of preparation of the RKD, carried out by the Design Bureau named after A. I. Mikoyan, later reopened, but already according to the PAK FA and given by the P. O. Sukhoi, the TTZ for which fell short of the agreed TTZ for IFIs according to various estimates by 20 … 30%;
- termination of work on the joint development of the MiG-AT trainer with France, to a greater extent than the Yak-130, which corresponded to the concept of the advanced training trainer “minimum costs for training a combat-ready pilot”, which led to the loss of the French market for the Alpha Jet trainer;
- loss of the competition for preliminary designs for LVTS, in which the MiG-110, the model of which was already in the workshop of the pilot plant, lost to the "paper" Il-112 due to the "great technical risk". At the same time, an objective assessment of the projects in 12 indicators showed that in 10 of them the MiG-110 won over the Il-112, and in two it did not lose;
- organization of a competition between the certified Tu-334 and the 80% foreign SSJ-100, which was absent at that time even on paper, in which the paper won;
- the lack of promising topics for RSK MiG for several decades, without which sooner or later any design organization turns into a workshop.
Let's submit to history the assessment of the decisions made, perhaps we are misunderstanding something due to insufficient information in strategic plans. Perhaps, for more than 20 years now, warnings from system analysts have been sounding in vain that Russia will eventually turn from a country that sells planes into a country that buys them? Perhaps, indeed, the bright future of the Russian aviation industry will come after all air carriers switch to Airbus, Boeing and others, Russian-made military aircraft will disappear completely, and the once glorified Design Bureau named after P. O. Sukhoi, left to support the operation of the Su-30 and T-50, will design the flaps of Chinese fighters? Interestingly, any of the authors of the concept of integration into the global aviation industry wondered why China does not set itself a similar task? After all, he has a much greater deficit of aviation technology.
This is how many questions arise related to LMFI. They will be removed only if constructive decisions are made in accordance with the recommendations of the NTS of the military-industrial complex, that is, after the opening of a full-fledged ROC. The aviation industry has never gotten closer to the abyss. In this situation, strong decisions are needed, first of all, on a light fighter, not such as, for example, carrying out R&D for 3 … 4 years since 2016, then a preliminary project of the same duration and 10 … 15 years of R&D since 2025. This is the road to nowhere.
Published in the magazine "Aviapanorama" №2-2014
