75 years ago, on January 12, 1943, Soviet troops launched a de-blocking operation near Leningrad (Operation Iskra). After a powerful artillery preparation, shock groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, the 67th and 2nd shock armies, went on the offensive.
General situation in the Leningrad direction
By the beginning of 1943, the situation in Leningrad surrounded by German troops remained extremely difficult. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated from the rest of the forces of the Red Army. Attempts to release the blockade of Leningrad in 1942 - the Lyuban and Sinyavinsk offensive operations, did not bring success. The shortest route between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts - between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, 12-16 km), was still occupied by units of the 18th German army.
In the streets and squares of the second capital of the Union, shells and bombs continued to explode, people died, buildings collapsed. The city was under constant threat of air raids and artillery fire. By November - December 1942, the city was severely depopulated. As a result of mass mortality, evacuation and additional conscriptions to the army, the population of Leningrad decreased by 2 million in one year and amounted to 650 thousand people. The overwhelming majority of the remaining population was employed in various jobs. The lack of land communication with the territory under the control of the Soviet troops caused great difficulties in the supply of fuel, raw materials for factories, did not allow to fully meet the needs of the troops and the civilian population for food and basic necessities.
However, the situation of Leningraders in the winter of 1942-1943. it was still much better than the previous winter. Some of the Leningraders even received an increased food ration compared to the all-Union level. Electricity from the Volkhovskaya HPP was supplied to the city via a cable laid under water in the fall, and fuel via an underwater pipeline. The city was supplied with the necessary food and goods on the ice of the lake - the "Road of Life" which resumed work in December. In addition, in addition to the road, a 35-kilometer railway line was built right on the ice of Lake Ladoga. Day and night, many-meter piles were driven continuously, which were installed every two meters.
Soldiers of the Volkhov Front on the offensive during the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad
Forces of the parties
THE USSR. The operation involved the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation. By the end of 1942, the Leningrad Front under the command of Leonid Govorov included: 67th Army - commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Dukhanov, 55th Army - Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov, 23rd Army - Major General Alexander Cherepanov, 42- I Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaev, Primorskaya Task Force and 13th Air Army - Air Colonel General Stepan Rybalchenko.
The main forces of the LF - the 42nd, 55th and 67th armies, defended themselves on the Uritsk, Pushkin line, south of Kolpino, Porogi, the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga. The 67th Army operated in a 30 km strip along the right bank of the Neva from Poroga to Lake Ladoga, having a small bridgehead on the left bank of the river, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka. The 55th rifle brigade of this army defended from the south the road that passed along the ice of Lake Ladoga. The 23rd Army defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, located on the Karelian Isthmus. It should be noted that the situation on this sector of the front was stable for a long time, even a soldier's saying appeared: “There are no three (or 'there are three neutral') armies in the world - Swedish, Turkish and 23rd Soviet”. Therefore, the formations of this army were often transferred to other, more dangerous directions. The 42nd Army defended the Pulkovo line. The Primorsky Task Force (POG) was located at the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
Artillery Lieutenant General Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov at his desk. Leningrad front
The actions of the LF were supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Tributs, which was based at the mouth of the Neva River and in Kronstadt. He covered the coastal flanks of the front, supported the ground forces with his aviation and naval artillery fire. In addition, the fleet held a number of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, which covered the western approaches to the city. Leningrad was also supported by the Ladoga military flotilla. The air defense of Leningrad was carried out by the Leningrad Air Defense Army, which interacted with the aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the front and the fleet. The military road on the ice of the lake and the transshipment bases on its shores were covered from Luftwaffe attacks by the formations of a separate Ladoga air defense region.
The troops of the Leningrad Front were separated from the troops of the Volkhov Front by a 15-kilometer corridor, the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, which closed the ring of the blockade of Leningrad from land. By the beginning of 1943, the Volkhov Front under the command of General of the Army Kirill Meretsky included: the 2nd Shock Army, the 4th, 8th, 52nd, 54th, 59th armies and the 14th air army. But they took a direct part in the operation: 2nd Shock Army - under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Romanovsky, 54th Army - Lieutenant General Alexander Sukhomlin, 8th Army - Lieutenant General Philip Starikov, 14th Air Army - General Aviation Lieutenant Ivan Zhuravlev. They operated in a 300 km strip from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen. On the right flank from Lake Ladoga to the Kirov railway, units of the 2nd shock and 8th armies were located.
For the offensive, shock groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were formed, which were significantly reinforced with artillery, tank and engineer formations, including from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. In total, the shock groupings of the two fronts consisted of 302,800 soldiers and officers, about 4,900 guns and mortars (with a caliber of 76 mm and above), more than 600 tanks and 809 aircraft.
Germany
The German high command, after the failure of attempts to take the city, was forced to stop the fruitless offensive and order the troops to go on the defensive. All attention was focused on bleeding, turned into ruins, but not surrendering Stalingrad. In the fall of 1942, an outflow of troops to the Stalingrad direction began from Army Group North. The 8th Air Corps was transferred to the Stalingrad area. Manstein left with his headquarters, who had to take Leningrad before. The 12th tank, 20th motorized and several infantry divisions were taken from the 18th German army. In return, the 18th Army received the 69th Infantry, the 1st, 9th, and 10th Airfield Divisions.
The formation of airfield divisions, due to large losses in the ground forces, began at the initiative of Goering in September 1942. The airfield divisions did not have a regimental level and consisted of 4 rifle battalions and an artillery battalion; they were manned by ground services of the Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery who had no experience in combined arms combat. They had different armament, including Soviet trophy. Thus, the German grouping near Leningrad decreased not only in quantity, but also deteriorated in terms of quality.
The Red Army was opposed by the 18th German Army under the command of Georg Lindemann (Lindemann), which was part of Army Group North. It consisted of 4 army corps and up to 26 divisions. German troops were supported by the 1st Air Fleet of Colonel-General of the Air Force Alfred Keller. In addition, on the northwestern approaches to the city, opposite the 23rd Soviet Army, there were 4 Finnish divisions from the Karelian Isthmus operational group.
The Germans had the most powerful defense and dense grouping of troops in the most dangerous direction - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge (its depth did not exceed 15 km). Here, between the city of Mga and Lake Ladoga, 5 German divisions were stationed - the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th army corps. They included about 60 thousand people, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. There were 4 divisions in the operational reserve.
Tank Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. N, tactical number 116 from the 1st company of the 502nd separate battalion of heavy tanks of the Wehrmacht, knocked out in the Sinyavin area from January 12 to February 5, 1943
Each village was turned into a strong point, prepared for a circular defense, the positions were covered with minefields, barbed wire and reinforced with pillboxes. From Leningrad, the defense was held by This 328th Infantry Regiment of the 227th Infantry Division of General von Scotti, the 170th Infantry Division of General Zander in full force and the 100th Regiment of the 5th Mountain Division, which had up to 30 tanks, about 400 mortars and guns. The defensive line of the Germans passed along the left bank of the Neva, the height of which reaches 12 meters. The coast was artificially ice-covered, densely mined, and had almost no convenient natural exits. The Germans had two powerful resistance centers. One - structures of the 8th hydroelectric power station, brick houses of the 1st and 2nd townships; the second - numerous stone buildings of Shlisselburg and its outskirts. For every kilometer of the front, there were 10-12 bunkers and up to 30 guns and mortars, and full-profile trenches stretched along the entire bank of the Neva.
The middle defensive line passed through workers 'settlements No. 1 and No. 5, stations Podgornaya, Sinyavino, workers' settlement No. 6, and Mikhailovsky settlement. There were two lines of trenches, the Sinyavino resistance knot, cut-off positions, and strongholds. The enemy used destroyed Soviet tanks, turning them into fixed firing points. They fringed the Sinyavinsky heights - the approaches, the base and the western slopes, as well as the Kruglaya grove. From the Sinyavinsky Heights, the southern coast of Lake Ladoga, Shlisselburg, the 8th hydroelectric power station and workers' settlement No. 5 were clearly visible. This line was the position of the divisional reserves (up to one regiment) of the German group. The entire space was under flank fire from neighboring strongholds and resistance nodes. As a result, the entire ledge resembled one fortified area.
The 227th Infantry Division (without one regiment), the 1st Infantry, 374th Regiment of the 207th Security Division and the 425th Regiment of the 223rd Infantry Division defended against the two armies of the Volkhov Front. The enemy's defensive line ran from the village of Lipka through workers' settlement No. 8, Kruglaya Grove, Gaitolovo, Mishino, Voronovo and further south. Along the front edge of the defense there was a continuous trench, covered with minefields, bumps and barbed wire, in some areas a second trench was also dug. Where the swampy terrain did not allow to go deep into the ground, the Germans erected ice and bulk ramparts, set up two-row log fences. Lipka, workers' settlement No. 8, Kruglaya grove, the villages of Gaitolovo and Tortolovo were turned into especially powerful centers of resistance.
The situation for the attacking side was exacerbated by the wooded and swampy terrain in the area. In addition, there was a large territory of the Sinyavinsky peat excavations, which were cut by deep ditches and additionally reinforced with wood-earth, peat and ice ramparts. The territory was impassable for armored vehicles and heavy artillery, and they were needed to destroy enemy fortifications. To overcome such a defense, powerful means of suppression and destruction were required, a tremendous strain on the forces and means of the attacking side.
Soviet officers inspect the heavy German guns that shelled Leningrad. These are two 305-mm mortars M16 Czech-made by the company "Skoda"
A heavy Czech-made 305 mm M16 mortar captured by Soviet soldiers. Leningrad region
Operation plan
As early as November 18, 1942, the LF commander, General Govorov, sent a report to the Supreme Command Headquarters, in which it was proposed to conduct two operations east and west of Leningrad - Shlisselburgskaya and Uritskaya in order to “lift the blockade of Leningrad, ensure the construction of a railway along the Ladoga Canal and thereby organize normal communication Leningrad with the country, ensuring freedom of maneuver of troops”of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. The headquarters, having considered this proposal, demanded to focus all attention on breaking through the German defense in only one direction - Shlisselburg, which led to the achievement of the goal by the shortest route.
On November 22, the LF commander presented to the Headquarters a revised plan of the operation. It provided for the delivery of oncoming strikes - Leningradsky from the west, Volkhovsky - from the east in the general direction of Sinyavino. The rate on December 2 approved the presented plan. The coordination of the actions of both fronts was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov. It was planned to prepare the operation by January 1, 1943. Specific tasks for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were defined in directive No. 170703 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of December 8, 1942. It demanded that the two fronts defeat the enemy grouping in the Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and thus, “break the siege of the mountains. Leningrad, by the end of January 1943 complete the operation. After that, moving on to a solid defense at the turn of the river. Moika, pos. Mikhailovsky, Tortolovo, ensure communications of the Leningrad Front and give the troops a 10-day rest. In the first half of February 1943, it was ordered to prepare and carry out an operation to defeat the enemy in the Mga area and to clear the Kirov railway with access to the Voronovo, Sigolovo, Voitolovo, Voskresenskoye line.
Soviet soldiers in the attack near Leningrad during the beginning of the breakthrough of the blockade
Preparation of the operation
For the operation, two shock groups were formed: at the VF - the 2nd Shock Army of Lieutenant General V. Z. Romanovsky, at the Leningrad Army - the 67th Army of Major General MP Dukhanov. The LF strike group was to cross the Neva on the ice, break through the defenses in the Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg sector, defeat the enemy entrenched here, join up with the VF troops and restore communication between Leningrad and the mainland. In the future, it was planned to leave the formations of the 67th Army on the line of the r. Washing. The attack group of the VF was to break through the defenses in the Lipka, Gaitolovo sector (12 km wide) and, delivering the main blow to Sinyavino, capture the line Rabochiy Poselok No. 1, Sinyavino, defeat the Sinyavinsko-Shlisselburg enemy grouping and join the LF troops. The provision of the left flank of the 2nd Shock Army was entrusted to the 8th Army of General F. N. Starikov, who, with her right-flank formations, was supposed to advance in the direction of Tortolovo, pos. Mikhailovsky. The 13th and 14th Air Armies of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and the aviation of the Baltic Fleet (about 900 aircraft in total) provided air support and cover for the troops. Long-range aviation, coastal and naval artillery of the fleet (88 guns) were also involved in the operation.
The operation of the shock group of the Volkhov Front, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was entrusted to the commander of the 2nd shock army under the direct supervision of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky. The operation of the strike group of the Leningrad Front was to be carried out by the commander of the 67th Army under the direct supervision of the front commander, Lieutenant General L. A. Govorov. Marshals G. K. Zhukov and K. E. Voroshilov were representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters to coordinate the actions of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts.
The basis of the LF strike group was the 67th Army, built before the offensive in two echelons. The first echelon consisted of the 45th Guards, 268th, 136th, 86th Infantry Divisions, 61st Tank Brigade, 86th and 118th separate tank battalions. The second echelon consisted of the 13th, 123rd rifle divisions, 102nd, 123rd, 142nd rifle brigades, and the army reserve - 152nd and 220th tank brigades, 46th rifle division, 11th, 55th, 138th rifle, 34th and 35th ski brigades. The offensive was supported by the artillery of the army, the front and the Baltic fleet - a total of about 1900 guns and mortars and the 13th Air Army with 414 aircraft.
The shock grouping of the Volkhov Front was made up of the 2nd Shock Army, part of the forces of the 8th Army. The first echelon of the 2nd Shock Army consisted of the 128th, 372nd, 256th, 327th, 314th, 376th Infantry Divisions, 122nd Tank Brigade, 32nd Guards Tank Breakthrough Regiment, 4 separate tank battalions. The second echelon consisted of the 18th, 191st, 71st, 11th, 239th rifle divisions, 16th, 98th and 185th tank brigades. The army's reserve consisted of the 147th rifle division, the 22nd rifle, the 11th, 12th and 13th ski brigades. On the left flank of the offensive, part of the forces of the 8th Army acted: the 80th, 364th rifle divisions, the 73rd marine brigade, the 25th separate tank regiment and two separate tank battalions. The offensive was supported by artillery from the front and two armies with about 2,885 guns and mortars and the 14th Air Army with 395 aircraft.
In preparation for the operation, the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, at the expense of their reserves and the regrouping of formations from other directions, significantly strengthened the 67th and 2nd shock armies, decisively concentrating their forces on the breakthrough sectors. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy here in infantry by 4, 5 times, in artillery by 6-7, in tanks by 10 and in aircraft by 2 times. In the 67th Army, 1909 guns and mortars of 76-mm and more caliber were concentrated in the 13-kilometer section of the breakthrough, which made it possible to bring the artillery density to 146 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. 1st rifle division (width 1.5 km), the density of guns and mortars per 1 km of the front was 365 units, in the breakthrough sector of the 376th rifle division (width 2 km) - 183, and in the auxiliary direction - 101 guns and mortars per 1 km front.
Artillery preparation for the attack was planned for 2 hours and 20 minutes, support for the attack - by the method of a barrage of fire to a depth of 1 km, and then by the method of sequential concentration of fire. In addition, it was envisaged with the exit of the attacking troops on the ice to put a barrage of fire 200-250 m from the first position of the enemy. All tank units (on the LF - 222 tanks and 37 armored vehicles, on the VF - 217 tanks) were planned to be used for direct support of the infantry. For the air defense of the strike groups, the following were involved: in the VF - three anti-aircraft artillery divisions, six separate anti-aircraft battalions and two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries; in the LF - an anti-aircraft artillery division, an air defense regiment, six separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions, two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries, as well as four anti-aircraft artillery and four fighter aviation regiments from the Leningrad Air Defense Army.
The peculiarity of the operation was that almost a month was allocated for preparation. Throughout December, the troops of the 2nd Shock and 67th Armies were intensively preparing for the upcoming operation. All formations were supplemented with personnel, military equipment and weapons. The troops accumulated from 2 to 5 ammunition sets, depending on the systems of guns and mortars. The most labor-intensive work was the preparation of the starting areas for the front strike groupings. It was required to increase the number of trenches and communication passages, shelters for personnel, to open and equip firing positions for artillery, mortars, tanks, and to arrange ammunition depots. The total volume of earthworks on each front was estimated at hundreds of thousands of cubic meters. All work was carried out only by hand, in the dark, without disrupting the normal behavior of the troops occupying the defense, in compliance with camouflage measures. At the same time, sappers built roads and column tracks, gatis and stubs through the swamps, which abounded in the original areas, cleared minefields, and prepared passages in obstacles. So, engineering units built 20 km of column tracks in the military rear, strengthened bridges and built new ones, made passages in minefields (one per company).
In addition, the LF also required the manufacture of means to overcome the high bank of the Neva and areas of damaged ice cover. For this purpose, hundreds of boards were made of boards, assault ladders, hooks, ropes with hooks and "crampons". After considering a number of options (including creating a canal in the ice of the Neva with the subsequent construction of a pontoon bridge, or reinforcing the ice by freezing ropes into it), it was decided to transport tanks and heavy artillery across the Neva along wooden "rails" laid on sleepers.
Particular attention was paid to the training of troops, commanders and staffs. Under the leadership of the commanders of the armies, training sessions of the command staff and command-staff games were held. For each division in the rear, a terrain was selected, similar to the one where it was necessary to break through the defenses. There were equipped training fields and towns like enemy strongpoints, where subunits and units learned to storm fortified positions and conduct an offensive battle in the forest. So, the Leningraders at the Toksovsky training ground created a defense zone similar to the one that was to be broken through. Here regimental exercises with live firing were held, the infantry was trained to follow the barrage at a distance of 100 meters. On the sections of the Neva within the city limits, they practiced methods of overcoming damaged areas of ice, storming a steep, icy, fortified with bunkers coast. Troops underwent similar training on the Volkhov front. In conclusion, a live-fire exercise was held. The maps were carefully refined using aerial photography. Photo schemes and corrected maps were received by all commanders, including companies and batteries. In the subunits and units allocated for the breakthrough, assault detachments and barrage groups were created to make passages and destroy the most durable defensive structures. At the VF, 83 assault detachments were formed, including sappers, machine gunners, machine gunners, flamethrowers, artillery crews and escort tanks. Particular attention was paid to practicing the methods of storming wood and earth barriers, peat, snow and ice shafts.
Operational camouflage was of great importance. The regrouping of troops was carried out exclusively at night or in non-flying weather. For reconnaissance in force and night searches, only those subunits and units that were in direct contact with the enemy were involved. In order to hide the preparations for a breakthrough from him, reconnaissance operations were intensified along the entire front, up to Novgorod. North of Novgorod, they imitated violent activity, indicating the concentration of a large mass of troops and equipment. A limited number of people participated in the development of the operation plan. All these measures have played a role. The enemy managed to establish only shortly before the start of the operation that Soviet troops were preparing for an offensive, but he could not determine the time and force of the strike. The commander of the 26th Army Corps, General Leiser, taking this into account, suggested to the commander of the 18th Army, General Lindemann, to withdraw the troops from Shlisselburg. But this proposal was not accepted.
Soviet soldiers in the attack near Leningrad, during the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad. Photo source:
The command of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts on December 27, 1942 asked Stalin to postpone the start of the offensive to January 10-12. They explained this proposal by extremely unfavorable meteorological conditions, which led to a prolonged thaw and, in connection with this, to insufficient stability of the ice cover on the Neva and poor passability of bogs.
In early January 1943, a joint meeting of the military councils of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts took place. It clarified the issues of interaction of the front troops in the operation, the simultaneous occupation of the initial position, the beginning of artillery and aviation training, the time of the attack of infantry and tanks, the conditional line of meeting of the front troops - Workers' villages No. 2 and 6, etc. It was also agreed that if the troops One of the fronts, having reached the intended line, will not meet the troops of the other front, then they will continue the offensive until the actual meeting.
Before the start of the operation, on January 10, 1943, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov to see on the spot whether everything has been done for the success of the operation. Zhukov got acquainted with the state of affairs in the 2nd shock and 8th armies. On his instructions, some shortcomings were eliminated. On the night of January 11, the troops took up their starting position.
B. V. Kotik, N. M. Kutuzov, V. I. Seleznev, L. V. Kabachek, Yu. A. Garikov, K. G. Molteninov, F. V. Savostyanov. Diorama of the Museum-Reserve "Breaking the Siege of Leningrad", dedicated to the turning point in the history of the defense of Leningrad - Operation Iskra (Kirovsk, Kirovsky District, Leningrad Region)
