By the beginning of 1943, the situation in Leningrad surrounded by German troops remained extremely difficult. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated from the rest of the forces of the Red Army. Attempts to release the blockade of Leningrad in 1942 - the Lyuban and Sinyavinsk offensive operations, did not bring success. The shortest route between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts - between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, 12-16 km), was still occupied by units of the 18th German army. In the streets and squares of the second capital of the USSR, shells and bombs continued to explode, people died, buildings collapsed. The city was under constant threat of air raids and artillery fire. The lack of land communication with the territory under the control of the Soviet troops caused great difficulties in the supply of fuel, raw materials for factories, did not allow satisfying the needs of the troops and the civilian population in food products and basic necessities. However, the situation of Leningraders in the winter of 1942-1943. it was still somewhat better than the previous winter. Electricity was supplied to the city via an underwater cable, and fuel via an underwater pipeline. The city was supplied with the necessary food and goods on the ice of the lake - the Road of Life. In addition, in addition to the road, an iron line was also built right on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
By the end of 1942, the Leningrad Front under the command of Leonid Govorov included: 67th Army - commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Dukhanov, 55th Army - Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov, 23rd Army - Major General Alexander Cherepanov, 42- I Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaev, Primorskaya Task Force and 13th Air Army - Air Colonel General Stepan Rybalchenko. The main forces of the LF - the 42nd, 55th and 67th armies, defended themselves on the Uritsk, Pushkin line, south of Kolpino, Porogi, the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga. The 67th Army operated in a 30 km strip along the right bank of the Neva from Poroga to Lake Ladoga, having a small bridgehead on the left bank of the river, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka. The 55th rifle brigade of this army defended from the south the road that passed along the ice of Lake Ladoga. The 23rd Army defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, located on the Karelian Isthmus. It should be noted that the situation on this sector of the front was stable for a long time, even a soldier's saying appeared: “There are no three (or 'there are three neutral') armies in the world - Swedish, Turkish and 23rd Soviet”. Therefore, the formations of this army were often transferred to other, more dangerous directions. The 42nd Army defended the Pulkovo line. The Primorsky Task Force (POG) was located at the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
The actions of the LF were supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Tributs, which was based at the mouth of the Neva River and in Kronstadt. He covered the coastal flanks of the front, supported the ground forces with his aviation and naval artillery fire. In addition, the fleet held a number of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, which covered the western approaches to the city. Leningrad was also supported by the Ladoga military flotilla. The air defense of Leningrad was carried out by the Leningrad Air Defense Army, which interacted with the aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the front and the fleet. The military road on the ice of the lake and the transshipment bases on its shores were covered from Luftwaffe attacks by the formations of a separate Ladoga air defense region.
By the beginning of 1943, the Volkhov Front under the command of General of the Army Kirill Meretsky included: the 2nd Shock Army, the 4th, 8th, 52nd, 54th, 59th armies and the 14th air army. But they took a direct part in the operation: 2nd Shock Army - under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Romanovsky, 54th Army - Lieutenant General Alexander Sukhomlin, 8th Army - Lieutenant General Philip Starikov, 14th Air Army - General Aviation Lieutenant Ivan Zhuravlev. They operated in a 300 km strip from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen. On the right flank from Lake Ladoga to the Kirov railway, units of the 2nd shock and 8th armies were located.
The German command, after the failure of attempts to take the city in 1942, was forced to stop the fruitless offensive and order the troops to go on the defensive. The Red Army was opposed by the 18th German Army under the command of Georg Liderman, which was part of Army Group North. It consisted of 4 army corps and up to 26 divisions. German troops were supported by the 1st Air Fleet of Colonel-General of the Air Force Alfred Keller. In addition, on the northwestern approaches to the city, opposite the 23rd Soviet Army, there were 4 Finnish divisions from the Karelian Isthmus operational group.
German defense
The Germans had the most powerful defense and dense grouping of troops in the most dangerous direction - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge (its depth did not exceed 15 km). Here, between the city of Mga and Lake Ladoga, 5 German divisions were stationed - the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th army corps. They included about 60 thousand people, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. Each village was turned into a strong point, prepared for a circular defense, the positions were covered with minefields, barbed wire and reinforced with pillboxes. In total there were two lines of defense: the first included the structures of the 8th SDPP, the 1st and 2nd Gorodkov and the houses of the city of Shlisselburg - from Leningrad, Lipka, Workers' villages No. 4, 8, 7, Gontovaya Lipka - from the Volkhov front, the second included workers 'settlements No. 1 and No. 5, stations Podgornaya, Sinyavino, workers' settlement No. 6, and Mikhailovsky settlement. The defensive lines were saturated with nodes of resistance, had a developed network of trenches, shelters, dugouts, and fire weapons. As a result, the entire ledge resembled one fortified area.
The situation for the attacking side was exacerbated by the wooded and swampy terrain in the area. In addition, there was a large territory of the Sinyavinsky peat excavations, which were cut by deep ditches. The territory was impassable for armored vehicles and heavy artillery, and they were needed to destroy enemy fortifications. To overcome such a defense, powerful means of suppression and destruction were required, a tremendous strain on the forces and means of the attacking side.
Plan and preparation of the operation. Strike groups of the Soviet army
Back in November 1942, the LF command submitted to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief their proposals for preparing a new offensive near Leningrad. It was planned to carry out two operations in December 1942 - February 1943. During the "Shlisselburg operation" it was proposed by the LF forces, together with the troops of the Volkhov Front, to break through the blockade of the city and build a railway along Lake Ladoga. During the "Uritskaya operation" they were going to break through the land corridor to the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The headquarters approved the first part of the operation - breaking the blockade of Leningrad (directive No. 170696 of December 2, 1942). The operation was codenamed "Iskra" and the troops were to be on full alert by January 1, 1943.
The plan of the operation was set forth in more detail in the directive No. 170703 of the Supreme Command of the Supreme Command of 8 December. The troops of the LF and VF were given the task of smashing the German grouping in the Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg area and, thus, lifting the complete blockade of Leningrad. By the end of January 1943, the Red Army was supposed to reach the line of the Moika River - Mikhailovsky - Tortolovo. The directive also announced the conduct of the "Mginsky operation" in February with the aim of defeating the German group in the Mga region and ensuring a strong railway connection between Leningrad and the country. The coordination of the actions of the fronts was entrusted to Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.
Almost a month was allotted to prepare the operation. Much attention was paid to the interaction between the troops of the two fronts. In the rear, training fields and special townships were created to practice offensive actions of formations in wooded and swampy terrain and assault the enemy's echeloned defense. The formations of the 67th Army practiced methods of crossing the Neva on the ice and guiding the crossing for tanks and artillery. In the LF, at the direction of Govorov, artillery groups were formed: long-range, special purpose, counter-mortar and a separate group of guards mortar units. By the beginning of the operation, thanks to intelligence efforts, the command was able to get a pretty good idea of the German defense. There was a thaw in December, so the ice on the Neva was weak, and the marshland was inaccessible, therefore, the Headquarters, at the suggestion of the LF commander, postponed the start of the operation to January 12, 1943. In early January, the GKO sent Georgy Zhukov to the Volkhov front to reinforce.
To carry out the operation, shock groups were formed as part of the LF and VF of the fronts, which were reinforced with armored, artillery and engineering formations, including from the Stavka reserve. On the Volkhov Front, the basis of the shock group was the Romanovsky 2nd Shock Army. In its composition, including the army reserve, there were 12 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 1 rifle and 3 ski brigades, a guards tank breakthrough regiment, 4 separate tank battalions: 165 thousand people, 2,100-2,200 guns and mortars, 225 tanks. From the air, the army was supported by about 400 aircraft. The army received the task to break through the enemy's defenses on a 12 km sector from the village of Lipki on the shores of Lake Ladoga and to Gaitolovo, to enter the line of Workers' villages No. 1 and No. 5, Sinyavino, and then develop the offensive until it was joined with the LF units. In addition, the troops of the 8th Army: 2 rifle divisions, a marine brigade, a separate tank regiment and 2 separate tank battalions, delivered an auxiliary strike in the direction of Tortolovo, the village of Mikhailovsky. The offensive of the 2nd Shock and 8th Army was supported by about 2,885 guns and mortars.
From the side of the LF, the main role was to be played by Dukhanov's 67th army. It consisted of 7 rifle divisions (one guards), 6 rifle, 3 tank and 2 ski brigades, 2 separate tank battalions. The offensive was supported by the artillery of the army, the front, the Baltic Fleet (88 guns with a caliber of 130-406 mm) - about 1900 barrels, the 13th Air Force and naval aviation - about 450 aircraft and about 200 tanks. Parts of the 67th Army were supposed to cross the Neva on a 12 km section between Nevsky Pyatachk and Shlisselburg, concentrating their main efforts in the direction of Maryino, Sinyavino. The LF troops, having broken through the German defenses in the Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg sector, were to join up with the VF formations at the turn of Workers' settlements No. 2, 5 and 6, and then develop an offensive to the southeast and reach the line on the Moika River.
Both strike groups numbered about 300 thousand people, about 4,900 guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and more than 800 aircraft.
The beginning of the Offensive. January 12, 1943
On the morning of January 12, 1943, the troops of the two fronts simultaneously launched an offensive. Previously, at night, aviation struck a powerful blow at the positions of the Wehrmacht in the breakthrough zone, as well as at airfields, command posts, communications and railway junctions in the enemy rear. Tons of metal fell on the Germans, destroying their manpower, destroying defenses and suppressing morale. At 9:30 am the artillery of the two fronts began artillery preparation: in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army, it lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes, and in the sector of the 67th Army - 2 hours and 20 minutes. 40 minutes before the start of the movement of infantry and armored vehicles, an attack on previously reconnoitered artillery and mortar positions, strongholds and communication centers was struck by ground attack aircraft, in groups of 6-8 aircraft.
At 11:50 am, under the cover of the "rampart of fire" and the fire of the 16th fortified area, divisions of the first echelon of the 67th army went on the attack. Each of the four divisions - the 45th Guards, 268th, 136th, 86th Infantry Divisions, were reinforced with several artillery and mortar regiments, an anti-tank artillery regiment and one or two engineering battalions. In addition, the offensive was supported by 147 light tanks and armored cars, the weight of which could withstand the ice. The particular complexity of the operation was that the defensive positions of the Wehrmacht went along the steep, icy left river bank, which was higher than the right one. The Germans' fire weapons were arranged in tiers and covered all approaches to the coast with multi-layered fire. To break through to the other side, it was necessary to reliably suppress the firing points of the Germans, especially in the first line. At the same time, it was necessary to take care not to damage the ice near the left bank.
Assault groups were the first to break through to the other bank of the Neva. Their fighters selflessly made passes through the barriers. Rifle and tank units crossed the river behind them. After a fierce battle, the enemy's defenses were hacked in the area north of the 2nd Gorodok (268th rifle division and 86th separate tank battalion) and in the Maryino area (136th division and formations of the 61st tank brigade). By the end of the day, Soviet troops broke the resistance of the 170th German Infantry Division between the 2nd Gorodok and Shlisselburg. The 67th Army captured the bridgehead between the 2nd Gorodok and Shlisselburg, the construction of a crossing for medium and heavy tanks and heavy artillery began (completed on January 14). On the flanks, the situation was more difficult: on the right wing, the 45th Guards Rifle Division in the "Nevsky Piglet" area was able to capture only the first line of German fortifications; on the left wing, the 86th Rifle Division was unable to cross the Neva at Shlisselburg (it was transferred to a bridgehead in the Maryino area in order to strike at Shlisselburg from a southern direction).
In the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock (went on the offensive at 11:15) and the 8th armies (at 11:30), the offensive developed with great difficulty. Aviation and artillery were unable to suppress the main firing points of the enemy, and the swamps were impassable even in winter. The fiercest battles were fought for the points of Lipka, Rabochiy Settlement No. 8 and Gontovaya Lipka, these strongholds were on the flanks of the breakthrough forces and, even in complete encirclement, continued the battle. On the right flank and in the center, the 128th, 372nd and 256th Infantry Divisions were able to break through the defenses of the 227th Infantry Division by the end of the day and advance 2-3 km. Strongpoints Lipka and Workers' settlement No. 8 could not be taken that day. On the left flank, only the 327th Rifle Division, which occupied most of the fortification in the Kruglaya grove, was able to achieve some success. The attacks of the 376th Division and the forces of the 8th Army were unsuccessful.
The German command, already on the first day of the battle, was forced to bring operational reserves into battle: the formations of the 96th Infantry Division and the 5th Mountain Rifle Division were sent to the aid of the 170th Division, two regiments of the 61st Infantry Division ( the group of Major General Hüner”) Were introduced into the center of the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge.
Battles 13 - 17 January
On the morning of January 13, the offensive continued. The Soviet command, in order to finally turn the situation in their favor, began to introduce the second echelon of the advancing armies into battle. However, the Germans, relying on strong points and a developed defense system, put up stubborn resistance, the battles took on a protracted and fierce character.
In the 67th Army's offensive zone on the left flank, the 86th Infantry Division and a battalion of armored vehicles, supported from the north by the 34th Ski Brigade and the 55th Infantry Brigade (on the ice of the lake), stormed the approaches to Shlisselburg for several days. By the evening of the 15th, the Red Army reached the outskirts of the city, the German troops in Shlisselburg were in a critical situation, but continued to fight stubbornly.
In the center, the 136th Rifle Division and the 61st Tank Brigade were developing an offensive in the direction of Workers 'Village No. 5. To provide the left flank of the division, the 123rd Rifle Brigade was brought into battle, it was supposed to advance in the direction of Workers' Village No. 3. Then, to ensure the right flank, the 123rd Infantry Division and a tank brigade were brought into battle, they advanced in the direction of Rabochiy Settlement No. 6, Sinyavino. After several days of fighting, the 123rd Rifle Brigade captured Workers 'Village No. 3 and reached the outskirts of villages No. 1 and 2. The 136th Division fought its way to Workers' Village No. 5, but was unable to take it right away.
On the right wing of the 67th Army, the attacks of the 45th Guards and 268th Rifle Divisions were still unsuccessful. The Air Force and artillery were unable to eliminate the firing points in the 1st, 2nd Gorodki and 8th GRES. In addition, the German troops received reinforcements - formations of the 96th Infantry and 5th Mountain Rifle Divisions. The Germans even launched fierce counterattacks, using the 502nd heavy tank battalion, which was armed with heavy tanks "Tiger I". The Soviet troops, despite the introduction of the troops of the second echelon - the 13th rifle division, the 102nd and 142nd rifle brigades, into battle, could not turn the situation in this sector in their favor.
In the zone of the 2nd Shock Army, the offensive continued to develop more slowly than that of the 67th Army. German troops, relying on strong points - Workers' villages No. 7 and No. 8, Lipke, continued to offer stubborn resistance. On January 13, despite the introduction of part of the forces of the second echelon into battle, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army did not achieve serious success in any direction. In the following days, the army command tried to widen the breakthrough in the southern sector from the Kruglaya grove to Gaitolovo, but without significant results. The 256th Rifle Division was able to achieve the greatest successes in this direction, on January 14 it occupied the Workers' Settlement No. 7, the Podgornaya station and reached the approaches to Sinyavino. On the right wing, the 12th ski brigade was sent to the aid of the 128th division, it was supposed to go to the rear of the Lipka stronghold on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
On January 15, in the center of the offensive zone, the 372nd Infantry Division was finally able to take the Workers' villages No. 8 and No. 4, and on the 17th it left the village No. 1. By this day, the 18th Infantry Division and the 98th Tank Brigade of the 2nd UA had already been several days fought a stubborn battle on the outskirts of Workers' Village No. 5. It was also attacked from the west by units of the 67th Army. The moment of joining the two armies was close …
