When discussing the combat readiness of the Navy, the ability of the state to provide the fleet with everything it needs, and the correctness of the chosen strategy for the development of the fleet, we usually mean the need to be ready for hostilities. If the exit from the base, then through mines and with the preliminary elimination of enemy submarines in an ambush at the exit, if the landing, then a bloody assault on the enemy coast, plowing tens of square kilometers of land with artillery fire from the sea, burnt-out hulls of landing ships in shallow water and "timber floating" from human bodies along the surf line - those who were unlucky enough to slip through the shores of the shores. Hence the desire and the requirement to have minesweepers and modern anti-mine weapons, hence the need for strike aircraft on the coast to "deal" with enemy ship strike groups, and much more.
But behind this militaristic approach, it is worth remembering that in the future a big war with our traditional enemies is much less likely than the continuation of the "paramilitary" confrontation with them, full of stress, provocations, demonstrations of force, threats, false attacks, covert operations … and losses, yes, but not comparable to combat. A non-war, or a new cold war, is far more likely than a potentially unpredictable hot one.
In the 70s, the ship strike groups of the USSR Navy more than once looked at the Americans "through the sight." The latter did not hesitate to demonstrate strength, arranging hooligan flights over the masts of our ships, they could brazenly congratulate one or another officer on a new position even before information about this came to the ship via regular communication channels (and ruin such a poor fellow's career). Sometimes it was very hot: with shooting across the course, attempts to ram, but there was no war. Our people, by the way, weren't too shy either.
In the 80s, when the Reagan crusader team made a firm decision to crush the USSR and developed powerful pressure, including on the Soviet Navy, it became even hotter (these events were given a short but succinct assessment by Reagan Navy Minister John Lehman in one of his interviews).
But a real war did not happen either, the USSR surrendered without it.
The logic of operation in war and non-war is diametrically different. For example, the recent passage of an American destroyer through the Gulf of Peter the Great in a real war would have led to its drowning, most likely by an air strike from the shore. But in the logic of non-war, it was an attempt by the Americans to put pressure on us. To press, showing that they wanted to spit on how we view this or that part of the World Ocean and what rights we have on it. Showing that this is their "spit", they are ready to back up with force, if necessary.
Specifically there and then, they did not succeed, frankly, not very well. But even in this case, our Ministry of Defense had to make a special statement explaining the event, and the BOD also had to be sent to track the destroyer.
Let's play the situation "in the other direction." The upgraded cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" as an embodied readiness to launch a missile strike and a pair of BODs to provide anti-aircraft defense and air defense in the near zone will also be noted off the coast of the United States.
Will such a demonstration be of military importance? No, in a real war they would never have gotten there. And the political? Another one. Even a banal voyage of a reconnaissance ship near American territorial waters usually causes a wave of publications in the American press - but in the press, so to speak, of the "third echelon". But this is during the passage of unarmed scouts. A cruiser potentially capable of attacking dozens of targets on the shore, repelling a strong air attack and then, after that, sinking more than one surface ship is a phenomenon of a completely different order. Yes, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, he will be doomed, but firstly, the enemy will pay a very considerable price for this, secondly, he is able to inflict huge damage in this case, and thirdly, such waving the barrel in front of the nose is certainly will not leave Americans indifferent. Someone else's cruising connection for your tervod is a symbol. Now it is more interesting for Russia not to provoke the United States with such antics, trying to play a civilized peace-loving country slandered by propaganda (which, by the way, is true). But everything can change.
There are examples (in English). Frankly, given the intensity of emotions that accompanied that summit, the presence of a missile cruiser was quite appropriate.
For example, the number of ships in the PLA Navy will go into the quality of these very PLA Navy, and they will "grapple" with the Americans like our fleet during the Cold War. Then it will be possible to make very thick hints to the Americans in response to their every provocation - as soon as they send their AUGs to "contain" the same Chinese AUGs, our ships may well appear near the Hawaiian Islands, or a couple of ten miles to the south, showing the Americans that their calculations the balance of power with the enemy can be suddenly and at an extremely inappropriate moment for them, corrected - and not for the better for them. And that it is time to recognize our right to live on this planet, moreover, as we ourselves want, and not on commands from Washington. Or prepare for surprises.
To illustrate how these operations look and what they lead to, let us examine one of such operations, since this is just a textbook example.
At the beginning of the Reagan era, the Americans still suffered from a lack of a clear concept of what to do with the sprawling Soviet Navy and by what methods. However, even then their new "Naval Strategy" was adopted and refined, providing for an "offensive" on Soviet naval positions in the world in order, as John Lehman would say many years later, "to drive the Soviet naval bears back into their dens."
To mark the beginning of a new era for the Soviet Union, the Norpac FleetEx Ops'82 exercise, scheduled for the fall of 1982, was chosen.
It makes no sense to fully describe in the article what happened there, it will be much more useful for those interested to get acquainted with the essay of Rear Admiral V. A. Kareva "Unknown Soviet Pearl Harbor". V. A. Karev was a direct participant in the events from our side. People who served in Kamchatka in those years found a number of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in his memoirs, but not fundamental ones. The essay, among other things, conveys well the spirit of that era.
It is also worth listing here briefly the sequence of the American operation:
1. Open advance of AUG "Enterprise" to Kamchatka.
2. Latent advancement of the AUG "Midway" to Kamchatka. The Americans, who “figured out” how Soviet intelligence worked, managed to “substitute” the Midway for it at night, and so that our Pacific people mistook the Midway for the Enterprise.
3. Fires in the barracks at the Soviet radio interception points on the island of Iturup and in the village of Provideniya. For those who are not “local”, it should be explained that the distance between them is thousands of kilometers. The almost simultaneous fires of the barracks at night in different, but critical for disrupting the deployment of the Americans, military units cannot be a coincidence. So the assumption of Rear Admiral Karev about the attack by SEAL special forces is most likely true. It should be understood that both in Soviet times and after them, the entire defense system of the Chukotka coast could be completely disorganized by literally a few sabotage groups, it was impossible to stop their landing, nor to stop the advance from the coastline to the attacked objects, it is impossible even now. On the Kuril Islands, apparently, it was the same. Most likely, the Americans really did it, especially since then the raids of their naval special forces on the territory of the USSR became a sad reality.
4. Formation from AUG "Enterprise" and AUG "Midway" aircraft carrier formation (ACS) in size and a layer sufficient to defeat the Soviet forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula, both naval and air.
5. Beginning of practicing air strikes on Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.
And only after that did Soviet intelligence spot the Americans.
This is how Karev himself describes it:
Thus, we remained in the dark where the AUG "Midway" was located. It was only on Sunday afternoon that a report was received from our coastal radio detachment in Kamchatka that our posts mark the work of ships at the frequencies of the intra-squadron communication of the AUG "Midway".
It was a shock. The results of the radio direction showed that the newly formed aircraft carrier strike force (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts carrier-based aircraft flights at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the Main Headquarters of the Navy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov makes a decision immediately. Urgently send the Patrol escort ship, three Project 671 RTM multipurpose nuclear submarines to monitor the AUS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, bring all the Pacific Fleet's naval missile-carrying aviation to full readiness, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, bring into full combat readiness of all parts and ships of the Pacific Fleet reconnaissance.
In response to such aggressive actions of the Americans, prepare the air division of naval missile-carrying aviation for departure in readiness, on Monday to designate an air-missile strike on the aircraft carrier formation. At the same time, multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
September 13, Monday … The Pacific Fleet reconnaissance will have to find the location of the AUS and direct the air division of the naval missile-carrying aviation. But at this time, a radio silence mode was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of the optoelectronic space reconnaissance. There is no reliable data on the whereabouts of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA aviation from Kamchatka took place. To an empty space.
Only a day later, on Tuesday September 14, we learn from data from air defense posts on the Kuril Islands that the carrier strike force is maneuvering east of Paramushir Island (Kuril Islands), conducting carrier-based aircraft flights.
Then it was possible to bring the patrol ship "Sentinel" to the aircraft carriers (TFR "Sentinel" at one time received a notoriety in the Main Command of the Navy after the well-known events in the Baltic, associated with the hijacking of the ship in 1975 under the command of political commander Sablin, who disagreed with the policy of the Kremlin. the crew was disbanded, and the ship was transferred from the Baltic to Kamchatka). Now this ship has become a ship for direct tracking of the AUS. Multipurpose submarines sent to track the American AUS did not quite cope with their tasks, since this is the most difficult task for the submarine commander. You should try to be undetected in the composition of the connection order.
Ultimately, the US aircraft carrier strike force passed east of the Kuril Islands, revealing the capabilities of the Soviet air defense to protect its borders. The apotheosis of this transition was the violation of the airspace of the USSR in the area of the Lesser Kuril ridge (islands Tanfiliev, Anchuchin, Yuri, Polonsky, Zeleny, Shikotan) by carrier-based aircraft from aircraft carriers. It turned out that our "all-weather" fighter aircraft, represented by the outdated MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters, is not capable of withstanding the American carrier-based Phantoms and Intruder attack aircraft. The weather did not allow them to be used. After this next spit in our direction, the aircraft carrier formation ("Enterprise", "Midway") entered the Sea of Japan through the Sangar Strait.
This is how it looked. Moreover, as Karev notes below, according to the scenario of the American exercises, the AUS strike on Kamchatka, to which the Americans were able to prepare covertly, was preceded by a training attack with cruise missiles from submarines, which the Navy did not even suspect.
This is such a non-war. It was precisely by such measures of psychological pressure that the United States broke the will of the Soviet political leadership. And in the end they broke. Not only at sea, of course. Those interested in the question can find and read the book "Victory" by Peter Schweitzer, everything is well described there. At the same time, no real "big" war happened.
What was the intention of the American political leadership conducting such provocative exercises? The idea is that the USSR understands that if the Americans hit first, they will not be stopped. It was a commonplace fear-mongering among the enemy. Of course, in a real war that is already going on, it would not have been possible to do this. But before it began, in preparation for the strike, everything worked out quite well - it really worked out. Then there were a lot of such exercises, and not only in the Pacific Ocean, but in the mid-eighties, the USSR began to curtail its presence in the World Ocean. This was what the Americans wanted.
The conclusion from all this is this: the fleet, in principle, is able to force the enemy to perform certain actions without war, but for this the threat it creates must be clear and realistic. It must be realizable. And then the enemy can flinch. Although he may become embittered, and then it will only get worse. But this is already the task of politicians - to choose the right moment for the demonstration of force.
Here are a couple more examples.
In the 70s, the USSR Navy practiced, and successfully, its own set of measures to put pressure on the Americans. These measures consisted of deploying cruise missile submarines at a strike distance from the American naval formations, ready to strike, and monitoring the American formations by surface ships. The ship provided target designation, the submarines "delivered" a blow. A submarine strike could, and, if possible, should have been accompanied by attacks by the Naval Missile Aviation. This tactic, with all its drawbacks, for the time being, was a very effective tool of non-strategic deterrence, and guaranteed that at the beginning of the war, the US Navy would suffer simply monstrous losses in ships and people - right away. The downside was that this was what sparked the American response in the eighties. But it could have turned out differently, and with the correct management of the course of events, it should have been.
How can such measures work today? Well, for example, as soon as NATO began its Trident Juncture exercises, it was necessary not only to "rude" GPS, as it was done, and to spy on them from the Tu-142M, but also, for example, to form a KUG from ships of the Baltic Fleet, frigates of the Black Sea Fleet, and an amphibious detachment from the Black Sea and Baltic large landing ships with the marines (and this is about ten ships, that is, about two battalions with equipment), after which, with the forces of this detachment, "loom" off Gibraltar. Together with planes from Khmeimim. Subtly hinting, so to speak. This was followed by a series of real strikes against pro-British bandit groups somewhere in Syria, with their demonstrative destruction. Yes, it would not have much military significance, but it would have a political one - the Britons would be shown that they could not be pressed down exactly where they are ready for it. Not necessarily in Gibraltar, anywhere.
Such naval operations are in fact no less important than preparations for an apocalyptic war with the United States and NATO. Although preparation must take place, otherwise such raids will be a pure and easily recognizable bluff, but the fact of the matter is that it is impossible to focus on one preparation for a "real" war, and even with one scenario (we were attacked). What if the enemy does not attack? And investments in the fleet should pay off.
In the article “Offensive or Defense? There will be enough resources for one thing.” and Oceanic zones not only without money for ships, but also without people. Now the time has come to complicate the situation even more and to sound another water one - the creation of a fleet that can effectively put pressure on the enemy using the methods described above, and the creation of a fleet that can inflict maximum losses on the enemy in a real war, these are similar tasks, but these are different tasks. They differ from each other, like a multiple-shot pistol taken out of its holster in the hands, and a smaller and less ammunition pistol with a silencer hidden under clothes. Similar, but not the same.
For example, in order to "put pressure" on the enemy, a destroyer or, better, an URO cruiser with cruise missiles is suitable for us. It is well suited for hitting a weak enemy, and for demonstrating strength, and for demonstrating the flag. But for the conduct of hostilities near their shores, the Su-30SM regiment, armed with anti-ship missiles of various types and pilots with special naval training, will be much more useful. Different things.
In order to ensure the deployment of SSBNs in a threatened period, some ships are needed. In order to cover the bases of terrorists in Africa or cause hysteria in the Times - other ships. Sometimes the roles will be combined. But it will often be the other way around. For example, minesweepers are vital during a war, but of little use during "force pressure" operations.
One of the tasks of future naval development will be to determine the balance between ships that are more suitable for force pressure on the opponent, and those that will be needed to kill his military in the course of a real, large, escalating spiral of war. Where there are no weapons tracking and counter-tracking, where the commanders do not test each other's nerves, but immediately sink the discovered "opponent" ship, or at least try. Of course, the ships needed more for force pressure will be able to fight in a full-scale war, and ships built in strict accordance with the requirements of such a war can also be used in peacetime operations, they just will be very “suboptimal” when solving “not their own »Tasks. Therefore, it will be necessary to identify this balance, and adhere to it, because on the one hand, the best battle is the one that did not take place, and on the other, the state is the embodied readiness for war. Both of these statements are true, and both will have to be met, somehow resolving the existing contradiction in the requirements for the number and types of ships.
Indeed, in the final analysis, the purpose of the existence of the armed forces is to achieve the country's political goals by force. And force can not only be used, but also demonstrated, and this, too, must be able to do the right thing, at least out of philanthropy.
There is simply no other choice.
