Place of Birth
It was the third year of a terrible war, both sides were preparing for one of the key battles of World War II - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge. The opponents were preparing and looking for means capable of ensuring victory and crushing the enemy.
To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 are tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 divisions of assault guns, with a total strength, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people.
German troops received a certain amount of new equipment:
134 tanks Pz. Kpfw. VI "Tiger" (14 more - command tanks)
190 Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" (11 more - evacuation and command)
90 assault guns Sd. Kfz. 184 "Ferdinand". (It is believed that these figures are underestimated).
The German command had high hopes for this new armored vehicle and, for good reason, the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, despite the abundance of childhood illnesses, were outstanding vehicles. Do not forget about 102 Pz. II, 809 Pz. III and 913 Pz. IV, 455 StuG III and 68 StuH (42-44% of all assault guns available on the Eastern Front) plus the Marder III, Hummel, Nashorn self-propelled guns, Wespe, Grille. The Pz. III and Pz. IV tanks were seriously modernized.
For the sake of new arrivals of armored vehicles, the beginning of the Citadel was repeatedly postponed - the qualitative superiority of German tanks and self-propelled guns was the cornerstone on which plans, fateful for Germany, were built. And there was every reason for this - German designers and industry did their best.
The Soviet side was also preparing for battle. Intelligence played the most important role in the upcoming battle, and on April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, "On the plan of Operation Citadel" of the German High Command, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by A. Hitler, was placed on the table of I. V. Stalin who signed it only three days later. This made it possible to accurately predict the strength and direction of the German strikes on the Kursk Bulge.
It was decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, carrying out counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, an in-depth defense was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. In total, 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. But there was one more weapon that made a colossal contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops and turned the IL-2 into a real legend of that war.
Asymmetric response
By the third year of the war, German and Soviet tankers were accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of air assault strikes.
It was quite problematic to destroy German tanks with the help of Ilov at the beginning of the war. First, the effectiveness of the 20-mm ShVAK cannons against tank armor was low (23-mm, and then 37-mm aircraft guns appeared on the Ilakh only in the second half of the Great Patriotic War).
Secondly, in order to destroy a tank with a bomb, it took a truly devilish luck. The crew did not have a navigator to provide aiming, and the pilot's bomber sight was ineffective. The Il-2 could attack either from low altitudes or from a very shallow dive, and the long nose of the aircraft simply blocked the target from the pilot.
And thirdly, the rockets - an analogue of those that the Katyusha fired - were not at all as good as the Soviet military leaders used to say about it. Even with a direct hit, the tank did not always fail, and to hit a separate target with a rocket projectile, that same diabolical luck was required.
But in the middle of 1942, the well-known developer of fuses, I. A. Larionov, proposed the design of a light anti-tank bomb of cumulative action. The command of the Air Force and personally I. V. Stalin showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work, and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942.
The action of the anti-tank bomb was as follows: when it hit the tank's armor, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetril detonator bombs, undermined the main explosive charge. The main charge had a funnel-shaped notch - a cumulative notch - on the lower side vertically. At the moment of detonation, due to the presence of a funnel, a cumulative jet with a diameter of 1-3 mm and a speed of 12-15 km / s was formed. At the point of impact of the jet with the armor, a pressure of up to 105 MPa (1000 atm) arose. To enhance the impact, a thin metal cone was inserted into the cumulative funnel.
Melting at the moment of the explosion, the metal served as a battering ram, increasing the effect on the armor. The cumulative jet burned through the armor (therefore, the first cumulative shells we called armor-piercing), hitting the crew, causing an explosion of ammunition, igniting the fuel. Shrapnel from the body of the bomb hit manpower and vulnerable equipment. The maximum armor-piercing effect is achieved provided that at the moment of the explosion the bomb charge is at a certain distance from the armor, which is called the focal distance. The explosion of the shaped charge at the focal length was provided by the corresponding dimensions of the nose of the bomb.
Tests of cumulative aerial bombs were carried out from December 1942 to April 21, 1943. Field tests showed that armor penetration up to 60 mm thick was reliably ensured at an encounter angle of 30 °. The minimum height, which ensured the alignment of the bomb before meeting the armor of the tank and the reliability of its action, was 70 m. The final version was PTAB-2, 5-1, 5, i.e. anti-tank aerial bomb of cumulative action weighing 1.5 kg in dimensions of 2.5 kg aerial bomb. GKO urgently decided to adopt PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 and organize its mass production. The drug addict B. L. Vannikov It was instructed to produce by May 15, 1943, 800 thousand PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 aerial bombs with an ADA bottom fuse. The order was carried out by more than 150 enterprises of various people's commissariats and departments.
It was the tandem PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 plus IL-2 that was to become a real thunderstorm for armored vehicles.
It should be noted that only thanks to I. V. Stalin, PTAB was put into service. Stalin in this case, showed himself as an outstanding military-technical specialist, and not only as a "satrap".
Application on the Kursk Bulge
And on the morning of July 5, 1943, the German offensive began.
Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin I. V. to achieve the effect of tactical surprise, he categorically banned the use of PTAB bombs until special permission was obtained. Their existence was kept in strict confidence. But as soon as the tank battles began on the Kursk Bulge, bombs were used in massive quantities.
The first PTAB were used by the pilots of the 2nd Guards and 299th Assault Aviation Divisions of the 16th VA on July 5, 1943. Maloarkhangelsk-Yasnaya Polyana, enemy tanks and motorized infantry carried out 10 attacks during the day, being bombarded with PTAB.
According to other sources, for the first time the new PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 cumulative bombs were used by the pilots of the 61st Shad of the 291st Shad in the early morning of 5 July. In the area of Butovo "silt" st. Lieutenant Dobkevich managed to suddenly attack the enemy column for the enemy. Descending after exiting the attack, the crews clearly saw many burning tanks and vehicles. While retreating from the target, the group also fought off the advancing Messerschmitts, one of which was hit in the Sukho-Solotino area, and the pilot was taken prisoner. The command of the formation decided to develop the outlined success: after the attack aircraft of the 61st Shap, groups of the 241st and 617th regiments struck, which did not allow the enemy to turn into battle formation. According to the reports of the pilots, they managed to destroy up to 15 enemy tanks.
The massive use of PTAB had the effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the crews of enemy armored vehicles (in addition to the equipment itself). In the first days of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, that is, on the routes of movement as part of columns, in places of concentration and at their initial positions, for which they were punished - the flight path of the PTAB blocked 2-3 tanks distant from each other at a distance of 70-75 m and the effectiveness was amazing (up to 6-8 tanks from the 1st approach). As a result, the losses reached tangible proportions even in the absence of the massive use of the IL-2.
PTAB was used not only with the IL-2, but also with the Yak-9B fighter-bomber
Pilots of the 291th Air Force of Colonel A. N. Vitruk The 2nd VA, using PTAB, destroyed and disabled up to 30 German tanks during July 5. Attack aircraft of the 3rd and 9th air corps of the 17th VA reported the defeat of up to 90 units of enemy armored vehicles on the battlefield and in the area of the river crossings. Northern Donets.
On the Oboyan direction on July 7, Il-2 attack aircraft of the 1st shak of the 2nd VA, supporting the 3rd mechanized corps of the 1st TA, in the period from 4.40 to 6.40 in the morning with two groups of 46 and 33 aircraft, supported by 66 fighters, attacked accumulations of tanks in the Syrtsevo-Yakovlevo area, concentrated for an attack in the direction of Krasnaya Dubrava (300-500 tanks) and Bolshiye Mayachki (100 tanks). The strikes were crowned with success, the enemy was unable to break through the 2nd line of defense of the 1st TA. Decryption of photographs of the battlefield at 13.15 showed the presence of more than 200 damaged tanks and self-propelled guns.
Probably the largest target hit by Soviet attack aircraft from the 291st air force was a column of tanks and vehicles (no less than 400 pieces of equipment), which on July 7 moved along the Tomarovka-Cherkasskoye road. First, the eight Il-2 st. Lieutenant Baranova dropped about 1600 anti-tank bombs from a height of 200 - 300 m in two approaches, and then the attack was repeated by another eight Il-2, led by ml. Lieutenant Golubev. When leaving, our crews observed up to 20 burning tanks.
Recalling the events of July 7, S. I. Chernyshev, in those days the commander of the 183rd Rifle Division, which was part of the second echelon of the Voronezh Front, noted: “The column of tanks, led by the Tigers, was slowly moving in our direction, firing from the cannons. Shells roared through the air with a howl. My heart became alarmed: there were too many tanks. Involuntarily the question arose: will we hold the line? But then our planes appeared in the air. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. On low level flight, the attack aircraft rushed swiftly into the attack. Five head tanks immediately caught fire. The planes continued to hit the target over and over again. The entire field in front of us was covered with clouds of black smoke. For the first time, at such a close distance, I had to observe the remarkable skill of our pilots."
The command of the Voronezh Front also gave a positive assessment of the use of PTAB. In his evening report to Stalin, General Vatutin noted: "Eight" silts "bombed the accumulations of enemy tanks, using new bombs. The effectiveness of the bombing is good: 12 enemy tanks immediately caught fire."
An equally positive assessment of cumulative bombs is noted in the documents of the 2nd Air Army, which testify: “The flight personnel of the assault aviation, accustomed to operating on tanks with previously known bombs, speaks with admiration about the PTABs, each flight of attack aircraft with PTABs is highly effective, and the enemy lost several destroyed and burned tanks.
According to the operational reports of the 2nd VA, during July 7, the pilots of the 291st Air Force alone dropped 10,272 PTABs on enemy vehicles, and another 9,727 such bombs were dropped a day later. They began to use anti-tank bombs and aviators of the 1st shak, which, unlike their colleagues, delivered strikes in large groups of 40 or more attack aircraft. According to the report of the ground forces, on July 7, 80 "silts" of V. G. Ryazanov on the Yakovlevo-Syrtsevo area helped repel the attack of four enemy tank divisions, trying to develop an offensive on Krasnaya Dubrovka, Bolshiye Mayachki.
It is necessary, however, to note that the German tankers in a few days moved exclusively to dispersed marching and battle formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the control of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated combat interaction. The effectiveness of Il-2 strikes with the use of PTAB decreased by about 4-4.5 times, remaining on average 2-3 times higher than with the use of high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.
In total, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were used up in the operations of the Russian aviation on the Kursk Bulge …
Effectiveness of PTAB
Enemy tanks continued to be the main target of the Il-2 throughout the entire defensive operation. Not surprisingly, on July 8, the headquarters of the 2nd Air Army decided to test the effectiveness of the new cumulative bombs. The inspection was carried out by officers of the army headquarters, who monitored the actions of the Il-2 unit from the 617th Shap, led by the commander of the regiment, Major Lomovtsev. As a result of the first attack, six attack aircraft from an altitude of 800-600 m dropped PTABs on a cluster of German tanks, during the second, a volley of RSs was fired, followed by a decrease to 200-150 m and firing at the target with machine-gun and cannon fire. In total, our officers noted four powerful explosions and up to 15 burning enemy tanks.
The bomb charge of the Il-2 attack aircraft included up to 192 PTAB in 4 cassettes for small bombs or up to 220 in bulk in 4 bomb compartments. When the PTAB was dropped from a height of 200 m at a flight speed of 340-360 km / h, one bomb hit an average area of 15 square meters, while, depending on the bomb load, the total strip was 15x (190-210) square meters … This was enough for a guaranteed defeat (mostly irrevocably) of any Wehrmacht tank, which had the misfortune of being in the gap. the area occupied by one tank is 20-22 sq.m.
Weighing 2.5 kilograms, the PTAB cumulative bomb penetrated 70 mm of armor. For comparison: the thickness of the roof "Tiger" - 28 mm, "Panther" - 16 mm.
A large number of bombs dropped from each attack aircraft almost simultaneously made it possible to most effectively hit armored targets at refueling points, at the initial lines of attack, at crossings, when moving in columns, in general in places of concentration.
According to German data, having undergone several massive assault strikes within one day, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Dead's Head" in the area of Bolshoi Mayachki lost a total of 270 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers. The density of PTAB coverage was such that over 2000 direct hits of PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 were recorded.
A captured German tank lieutenant testified during interrogation: “On July 6, at 5 o'clock in the morning, in the Belgorod region, Russian attack aircraft attacked our group of tanks - there were at least a hundred of them. The effect of their actions was unprecedented. During the first attack, one group of attack aircraft knocked out and burned 20 tanks. At the same time, another group attacked a motorized rifle battalion resting on vehicles. Small-caliber bombs and shells rained down on our heads. 90 vehicles were burned and 120 people were killed. During the entire time of the war on the Eastern Front, I have not seen such a result of the actions of the Russian aviation. There are not enough words to express the full power of this raid."
According to German statistics, in the Battle of Kursk, about 80 percent of the T-VI Tiger tanks were hit by cumulative shells - actually artillery or aerial bombs. The same goes for the T-V "Panther" tank. The bulk of the "Panthers" were out of action due to fires, and not from artillery fire. On the very first day of battles, according to various sources, from 128 to 160 "Panthers" out of 240 burned down (according to other sources, about 440 units were concentrated). Five days later, only 41 Panthers remained in service with the Germans.
German tank Pz. V "Panther", destroyed by attack aircraft 10 km from Butovo. The PTAB hit caused the ammunition to detonate. Belgorod direction, July 1943
A study of the effectiveness of the PTAB action against tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed by our attack aircraft and abandoned by the enemy during his retreat shows that as a result of a direct hit on a tank (self-propelled gun), the latter is destroyed or disabled. A bomb hitting a turret or hull causes the tank to ignite or its ammunition explodes, usually leading to the complete destruction of the tank. At the same time, PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 destroys light and heavy tanks with equal success.
Anti-tank SU "Marder III" destroyed by attack aircraft
SS "Marder III", PTAB hit the compartment, the upper part was blown up, the crew was destroyed
True, it is necessary to note one significant nuance: the main problem of destruction by cumulative ammunition was the fire in the tank that arises after breaking through the armor. But if this fire broke out right on the battlefield, then the surviving crew members had no choice but to jump out of the tank and escape, otherwise our infantry would kill them. But if this fire broke out after an air raid on the march or in their rear, then the surviving tankers were obliged to extinguish the fire, in the event of a fire, the mechanic was obliged to close the shutters of the power department, and the entire crew, having jumped out, slammed the hatches and fill the cracks with foam. which air could enter the tank. The fire was dying out. And in the "Panthers" in the power department there was an automatic fire extinguishing system, which, when the temperature rose above 120 °, filled carburetors and fuel pumps with foam - places from which gasoline could flow.
But the tank after such a fire needed repair of the engine and electrical wiring, but its undercarriage was intact and the tank could be easily towed to the collection points for damaged equipment, since in the Battle of Kursk the Germans created special engineering units for this purpose, moving behind the tank units. collecting and repairing damaged equipment. Therefore, strictly speaking, tanks knocked out by PTABs were to be received by our troops as trophies in exceptional cases, like the case in the First Ponyri.
Thus, a special commission examining military equipment in the area north of 1 Ponyri and height 238, 1 established that “out of 44 tanks destroyed and destroyed [by Soviet air strikes], only five became victims of bombers (the result of a direct hit by FAB-100 or FAB-250) and the rest are attack aircraft. When examining enemy tanks and assault guns, it was possible to determine that PTAB inflicted damage on the tank, after which it could not be restored. As a result of the fire, all equipment is destroyed, the armor gets burned and loses its protective properties, and the explosion of ammunition completes the destruction of the tank …"
In the same place, on the battlefield in the Ponyri region, a German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" was discovered, destroyed by PTAB. The bomb hit the armored cover of the left gas tank, burned through the 20-mm armor, destroyed the gas tank with a blast wave and ignited the gasoline. The fire destroyed all equipment and detonated ammunition.
The high efficiency of the PTAB's action against armored vehicles received a completely unexpected confirmation. In the offensive zone of the 380th rifle division of the Bryansk Front near the village of Podmaslovo, our tank company by mistake came under attack from its Il-2 attack aircraft. As a result, one T-34 tank was completely destroyed from a direct hit by PTAB: it was broken "into several parts." A special commission working on the spot recorded "around the tank … seven funnels, as well as … locking forks from PTAB-2, 5-1, 5.
All that remains of the T-34 tank, destroyed by an explosion of ammunition after being hit by a PTAB. Area of the village of Podmaslovo, Bryansk front, 1943
In general, the combat experience of using PTAB showed that the loss of tanks, on average, up to 15% of the total number subjected to the strike, was achieved in those cases when for every 10-20 tanks a detachment of forces was allocated about 3-5 groups of IL-2 (six machines in each group), which acted sequentially one after the other or two at a time.
Well, if we talk about efficiency, then it is necessary to note the cheapness and simplicity of the production of the PTAB itself, in comparison with the complexity and cost of its destroyed armored vehicles. The price of one Pz. Kpfw V "Panther" tank without weapons was 117,000 Reichsmarks, the PzIII cost 96,163, and the Tiger - 250,800 marks. I could not find the exact cost of PTAB-2, 5-1, 5, but, unlike shells of the same weight, it cost ten times cheaper. And we must remember that, Guderian taught that a tactical novelty must be applied en masse, and they did so with PTAB.
Unfortunately, PTAB itself and the use of PTAB had disadvantages that reduce its effectiveness.
So, the PTAB fuse turned out to be very sensitive and triggered when it hit the tops and branches of trees and other light obstacles. At the same time, the armored vehicles standing under them were not amazed, which actually began to be used by German tankers in the future, placing their tanks in a dense forest or under awnings. Already in August, the documents of units and formations began to note cases of the enemy using a conventional metal mesh stretched over the tank to protect their tanks. When it hit the grid, the PTAB was undermined, and the cumulative jet was formed at a great distance from the armor, without inflicting any damage on it.
The drawbacks of the cassettes of small bombs of Il-2 aircraft were revealed: there were cases of PTAB hanging in the compartments, followed by their falling out during landing and an explosion under the fuselage, which led to serious consequences. In addition, when 78 bombs are loaded into each cassette, according to the operating instructions, "the ends of the flaps, looking towards the tail of the aircraft, sag from the uneven arrangement of the load on them … with a bad airfield … individual bombs may fall out."
The accepted laying of bombs horizontally, forward with the stabilizer led to the fact that up to 20% of the bombs did not explode. Cases of bomb collisions in the air, premature explosions due to deformation of stabilizers, non-coagulation of windmills and other design defects were noted. There were also shortcomings of a tactical nature, which also "reduced the effectiveness of aviation when operating against tanks."
The detachment of aircraft forces with PTAB to strike at the accumulation of tanks established by reconnaissance was not always sufficient to reliably defeat the target. This led to the need for repeated blows. But the tanks had time to disperse by this time - "hence the large expenditure of funds with minimal efficiency."
Conclusion
This was the debut of the formidable tandem, it is no coincidence that after the first days of the fighting, the German command ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate all its efforts on destroying our attack aircraft, not paying attention to other targets. If we assume that the tank forces of Germany were the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, it turns out that the contribution of the assault aviation to the victory at the Kursk Bulge is difficult to overestimate.
And around this period of the war, the IL-2 got its nickname - "Schwarzer Tod (Black Death)".
But the real "finest hour" for Soviet aviation, including the IL-2, came during Operation Bagration, when aviation was working with almost impunity.
In general, remembering the famous dialogue “Unfortunately, we seem to teach you how to fight! “And we will wean you!”, We can say that our grandfathers turned out to be good students and first learned to fight, and then weaned the Germans to fight, hopefully, forever.
The photo shows the German Ministry of Defense. On the ground floor there is a carpet on the floor. On a carpet, aerial footage of Berlin in May 1945
