The one who does nothing is not mistaken
(popular wisdom)
It is not shameful not to know anything.
(D. Diderot)
A necessary foreword
This section, as well as the above epigraphs, is not the author's desire to get into the great literature, but just the need to identify some initial points that may remove (or significantly reduce) the indignation of highly respected forum participants in the event of errors of different levels of depth noticed. This work does not at all claim to be true in the last instance, but is only a weak attempt by the author to understand the heap of facts and data that are available in the literature and on the Internet, about the tactical and technical characteristics of the tanks that were in service with the Red Army and the Wehrmacht by June 22 1941, as well as an attempt at a small analysis and generalization of those. How much I managed to do this, to judge you …
Where to begin?
Before arguing, let's agree on terms.
(ancient Greek wisdom)
The question raised in the title of the chapter is not a tribute to the Russian mentality with its age-old problems. As it seems to the author, one of the stumbling blocks in comparing and evaluating the tanks of the USSR and Germany during the beginning of WWII is that at that time there was no single tank concept in the world. And, therefore, a unified classification of tanks. And only over time, when tanks became an independent type of armed forces, when the tasks and capabilities of tank formations became clear, the tactics of their use became clear, then the classification of combat vehicles began to crystallize. Moreover, in different countries (in accordance with their vision of armored vehicles), it was different. And this turned out to be the first (but far from the last and not the most difficult) problem that I had to face. So, in England and France, tanks were considered a means of reinforcing the infantry and were divided into infantry escort and cruising tanks. In the USSR, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a classification system was already formed based on the weight of the machine: light (up to 20 tons), medium (20 - 40 tons) and heavy (over 40 tons). The use of such a classification is obviously related to the values of the carrying capacity of bridges and railway platforms.
The German army also had the same classification, but it was based on the power of the weapons: tanks with machine-gun armament, tanks with light cannon armament and tanks with heavy cannon armament. Light cannon armament included cannons with a caliber from 20 mm to 50 mm, heavy cannon armament - cannons with a caliber of 75 mm and above.
In our comparative analysis, I will use the well-established Soviet classification system, and not only for reasons of historical verification by time. In my opinion, the weight of the vehicle characterizes its security, since its main share falls on the armor protection of the hull and turret (sheet thickness). Based on this criterion, we will evaluate and compare the combat vehicles of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the eve of the Second World War (Table 1):
Table 1.
Proposed classification of German and Soviet tanks by type
However, this approach, according to the author, is not complete enough: light tanks differ quite a lot in the composition and power of weapons. Apparently, this is due to the fact that historically enough time was allotted to find solutions to the configuration of a combat vehicle, and the military had to approach the formation of tank units according to the principle of “what we have” and not “what you please”.
Based on this, light tanks are also divided into two subgroups: machine-gun and machine-gun and cannon (guns up to and including 37 mm caliber). For tanks of medium and heavy weight, such a unit does not make sense: in them machine guns are clearly auxiliary weapons.
Second the remark will relate to the use of tanks on the battlefield. Of all the variety of tasks to be solved, according to the author, two are the main ones:
a) destruction of enemy manpower (infantry);
b) countering the enemy's BTT, primarily tanks.
The solution to the first problem is a rather trivial task: since the time of Ancient Egypt, mankind has found more and more effective means to destroy their own kind. In light of the use of tanks, this decision looks like this: a gun of the highest possible caliber with a powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile and machine guns, also in the maximum possible number. An indicator of the success of solving the second problem will be the armor penetration value of a tank gun.
In a purely psychological aspect, the task of comparing something or someone in human consciousness implicitly presupposes the presence of an element of competition, confrontation. This confrontation can be solved either in terms of "who shouts louder (jumps, throws, picks up, etc.), or in terms of direct one-on-one clarification" who is in charge of the house. " It seems that in the aspect of the realities of wartime, it is the second approach that will be more correct, i.e. the situation of a direct collision of tanks of two opposing sides. And, therefore, from all the performance characteristics of tank guns, we will choose only the armor penetration value. All other characteristics, if the need arises, will be considered as auxiliary.
Third: many German (and some Soviet) tanks, despite the different markings, were quite the same type, differing in insignificant technological details, or represented a continuous line of improving combat qualities. In this case, the most successful modification will be selected as the comparison machine.
Fourth a remark about the comparison of calibers: in German and Soviet practice, there was a slightly different system of reference. The first defines the caliber as the distance between opposite groove fields (A); the second - as the distance between the bottom of the opposite grooves (B). In the USSR, the first system was adopted, in Germany - the second [1]. Based on this, guns of similar calibers (especially small-bore ones) will be considered as belonging to the same group. For guns of large calibers (for example, 76 mm and more), this difference is not significant.
And finally fifth: all tanks will be compared according to their declared performance characteristics. Other factors, such as the quality of the manufacture of armor and ammunition, the training of the crews, the practice of using in combat conditions, etc. will not be taken into account. Likewise, the armor of all tanks is considered the same in terms of its strength characteristics and the protective property will be considered only in terms of its thickness. Also, we will not go into the nuances of determining the qualitative (initial and guaranteed) and quantitative (in the USSR they were more stringent) characteristics of the armor penetration criteria [2].
Light machine gun tanks
To begin with, let's clarify the following thesis: a direct collision of such combat vehicles is not only hypothetical, but also highly unpromising: vehicles of this class had bulletproof and anti-fragmentation armor, and its defeat with standard weapons was very problematic.
German machine-gun tanks of the beginning of the Second World War are represented by machines T - I modifications A and V … The Soviet assortment is much wider: amphibious tanks T-37, T-38, T-40, T-26 early modification (sample 1931) (Table 2). From a purely methodological point of view, the T-27 tankettes should be included in the same group, but this class of armored vehicles will not be considered by us due to the dead end of this branch of the development of the BTT. We will also not consider armored vehicles (although the Soviet cannon BAs were armed with 45-mm tank guns) due to their auxiliary nature.
Table 2.
As can be seen from the table, the German T - I was superior only to the Soviet T-38 both in armor thickness and firepower, which is not surprising: the T-38 is an amphibious tank. But at the same time, it was hopelessly behind both the newer amphibious tank T-40 (in terms of firepower) and from its peer T-26 (in terms of protection). At the same time, the amphibious T-40 could well be a deadly enemy for the T - I: its large-caliber machine gun could quite cope with the thin armor of machine-gun tanks. The Soviet tanks also outnumbered their opponents in terms of ammunition.
It is noteworthy that the Soviet FLOATING T ‒ 40 was superior to the German LINEAR T - I.
Light machine gun and cannon tanks
This group is made up of German T - I (C), T - II (A-C and F), T - III (A-G), Czech 35 (t) and 38 (t), Soviet T-26 (sample 1932) and BT-2 (sample 1932) (Table 3). It appears to be the most difficult to classify. Vehicles of this class differed not only in design (Soviet tanks were double-turreted - a clear echo of the First World War, when the main task of tanks was considered the destruction of infantry in the trenches, and the possibility of simultaneous firing in two different directions was a rather attractive quality, which single-turret tanks lacked), but also weapons. It represented a rather variegated palette: from automatic 20-mm cannons, which had a clear aviation (or anti-aviation) origin, to small-caliber artillery developed on a very different basis. Without going into the details of the genesis of the development of the weapons of these tanks, we will limit ourselves to considering their performance characteristics.
If everything is more or less clear with the tanks of the T - I and T - II series, then the "troikas" require some clarification. To begin with, the cars of the first four series (AD) were most likely prototypes, which practically did not have to fight (information on this matter is contradictory. According to one of them, all 95 cars were cut into metal and parts, according to others, some of them had a chance to take part in the Norwegian and Danish operations). The first truly massive and battle tank was the modification E and all subsequent ones. In the initial version, 37-mm KwK 36 L / 46 cannons were installed on them, which in 1940-41. were replaced by 50 mm KwK 38 L / 42 (the modernization reserve still allowed it). The same applies to tanks of the series E and G … In this part, only vehicles with 37-mm guns will be considered, since by the beginning of the Second World War, the Wehrmacht included T-III with both 37-mm and 50-mm guns, which will be discussed below. Here are their characteristics:
Table 3.
*) - hereinafter: this entry only says that the AUTHOR DOES NOT HAVE data.
It is immediately striking that tanks of this category are sharply divided into two weight groups: some have approximately the same combat weight (8-10.5 tons), while the T-III is discordant in value in the region of 20 tons. Such a sharp increase in weight does not by accident: the first modifications of the tank had a mass of 15, 5 tons (Ausf A), which gradually increased to 19.8 t (Ausf D) … These changes were made in connection with the requirement of the military to strengthen the protection of the tank, which was reflected in the increase in the thickness of the armor (and, accordingly, the weight of the tank). At the same time, all other characteristics either remained unchanged (weapons), or underwent minor changes (engine power, chassis). The "triplets" of early modifications A - D remained essentially experimental machines, and I consider it meaningless to consider them in this aspect.
As for the weapons, then it should also be dwelled on in more detail, since there is also a significant discrepancy in it.
For starters - German 20mm cannons. Cannon EW 141 - Aviation automatic weapon, adapted for installation on a tank. True, in the literature one can find the opinion that this is not a cannon, but a large-caliber machine gun. The author was unable to find any data on the range of ammunition and their capabilities.
20 mm cannon KwK 30 L / 55 and KwK 38 L / 55 are essentially the same weapon, developed on the basis of a small-caliber anti-aircraft gun and differing in purely technological features. Ammunition and characteristics are the same (hereinafter - the data is given only for armor-piercing shells of all types used on these weapons) [3, 5, 7]:
Table 4.
More serious opponents were the A-3 and A-7 tank guns of captured Czech tanks 35 (t) and 38 (t).
Škoda 37 mm A3 (German version 3.7cm KwK 34 (t)) - anti-tank 37-mm gun produced by the Škoda plant, installed on Lt vz 35 tanks. The barrel length was 39 calibers (1448 mm), the initial velocity of an armor-piercing projectile weighing 0.85 kg was 675 m / s, which was enough to penetrate 40- mm armor plate at a distance of 500 m. High-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 0.825 kg had an initial speed of 687 m / s [7].
Table 5.
Škoda 37 mm A7 (in German sources it appears as 3.7 cm KwK 38 (t)) - anti-tank 37-mm gun, produced by the Czech company Škoda. Barrel length - 42 caliber (1554 mm), which provided a projectile weighing 0, 853 kg, an initial speed of 750 m / s.
For him, shells of two types were supposed: Panzergranate 39 (PzGr. 39) and Panzergranate 40 (PzGr. 40). Armor penetration table for this gun [6, 7]:
Table 6.
Both guns have fairly similar characteristics and use the same ammunition. Good ballistic performance made these tanks deadly opponents for Soviet tanks of a similar class at all ranges of aimed fire.
German 37-mm cannon KwK 35/36 L / 46, 5 firm Rheinmetall-Borsig had a barrel length of 45 calibers (1717 mm), which gave armor-piercing shells the following characteristics:
Table 7.
Soviet tank gun B-3 was developed by P. Syachentov on the basis of the German anti-tank gun of the company "Rheinmetal". Both guns had the same ballistics and device, with the exception of the bolt: like all the other designs of Syachentov, it had 1/4 automatic. The armor penetration of the B-3 was as follows: [8]
Table 8.
Of all the tanks in this category, only the Soviet T-26 and BT-2 on the one hand and the captured Czech 35 (t) and 38 (t) on the other can be considered worthy opponents. All the rest simply do not stand up to criticism and can only be considered full-fledged combat vehicles for 1941 as an unrestrained optimist.
Light cannon tanks
The appearance and existence in the armies of a number of countries of the aforementioned tanks with such strange hybrid weapons, according to the author, is explained solely by the level of technical equipment of the armies of that time. Let's not forget that all the aforementioned cars appeared at approximately the same time: at the beginning - the first half of the 30s. The low power of the engines that existed then, the insufficient hardness of the armor, the large mass-dimensional characteristics of large-caliber guns - all this made it impossible to install powerful guns in tanks.
But, as you know, progress never stands still. If there is demand, then supply will inevitably appear. And the military sphere is a source of inexhaustible demand. And the designers gradually developed more and more acceptable samples of tank gun armament. So, since the mid-30s, a model of a light tank that has become a classic has appeared: weight 15 - 20 tons, anti-bullet and anti-fragmentation armor, high mobility. The gun was installed as a compromise between weight and size characteristics and the maximum possible power. With the characteristics of a light tank, these were mainly anti-tank guns.
On the Soviet side, such tanks were the T - 26 model of 1933 with subsequent modifications (1937 - a conical tower and inclined plates of the turret platform, 1939 - increased armor), BT - 5 and BT - 7.
Modifications from a series of T - III tanks deserve consideration. E and F … If the first of them was the result of design developments, then the second was a response to the cruel realities of wartime. In particular, the booking had to be increased. But further modifications of the "triplets" (T - III (H) and T - III (J)), based on the principles outlined above, should be classified as average.
Consideration in this category of tanks of the series will be somewhat unconventional. T - IV, which almost all researchers attribute to heavy German tanks, although they make a reservation that we are talking about the classification by the caliber of the gun. But, just as true to the adherence to one classification declared above, the author will attribute them to this class. As for the tool, it will definitely be discussed further.
Thus, this niche is filled by German tanks of the series T - IV modifications A, B, C, D and E … The rest of the "four" modifications can rightfully be attributed to medium tanks.
A few words about the differences between these modifications. As usual, the first two were actually the same machines, the differences were of a technological nature. Modification WITH already had a more or less massive character, but its main difference from version B was in a more powerful engine and armoring of the machine gun barrel. Machine series D got more powerful armor and a different cannon mask. As for the tanks of the series E, then they became the brainchild of the Polish campaign and were distinguished by enhanced armor in the form of additional armor plates on the frontal (30 mm) and side (20 mm) armor. Since the main modifications with which Germany entered World War II were D and E, we will restrict ourselves to their consideration (with a formal increase in the weight of the tank E up to 21 t).
Soviet BT - 5 and BT - 7 were representatives of the same row and the "seven" was the result of further modification and improvement of the line of high-speed tanks. However, she continued to improve even after being adopted. So, in 1937, the tank received a conical turret and increased ammunition, in 1938 the track was replaced (with a small link), the suspension was strengthened, rubber tires were eliminated (the tanks were wheeled-tracked), and the fuel supply increased. In addition, in 1939, a modification of the BT-7M was produced, in which a V-2 diesel was installed. Otherwise, its characteristics have remained unchanged. Of the BT series, the most massive was the BT - 7 and BT - 7M tanks (in total about 6000 units), the characteristics of which we will consider.
Table 9.
German 50 mm gun KwK 38 L / 42 was also developed by the designers of the Rheinmetall-Borsig company. It had a barrel length of 42 calibers (2100 mm), rate of fire - 15 rounds per minute. Shots were used for shooting: [3, 7]
Table 10.
The next modification is 50 mm gun KwK 39 L / 60 - was a modified long-barreled version of the KwK 38 L / 42 gun. The main difference was the greater length of the charging chamber, associated with the increase in the length of the sleeve from 288 mm to 420 mm. The same shots were used for shooting: [3, 7]
Table 11.
Already at first glance it is clear that this variant was distinguished by significantly higher power and, accordingly, represented a great danger to tanks.
All T-IV tanks of early modifications had the same gun: a short-barreled 75-mm cannon KwK 37 L / 24 with a barrel length of 24 caliber (1765, 3 mm). It was intended to combat defensive fortifications (this explains the relatively short barrel), but the presence of an armor-piercing projectile in its ammunition set allowed the tank to successfully fight against armored vehicles protected by bulletproof or light anti-cannon armor. Its ammunition included shots:
Table 12.
Unfortunately, the data on the characteristics of the projectiles of this gun are not very widespread, so the author will operate only with those at his disposal, bearing in mind that the armor-piercing effect of a cumulative projectile is much greater than a conventional armor-piercing projectile and does not depend on the distance.
Soviet 45 mm tank gun 20K was adapted to fire both armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation shells. The armor penetration was as follows [4]:
Table 13.
A brief acquaintance with the performance characteristics of German guns and the Soviet 20KT suggests that in a direct collision of Soviet and German tanks of this class, tank guns of the "troikas" hit Soviet T - 26 of all modifications from all angles at an effective range of fire. Soviet tanks were dangerous for the T - III only from a distance of less than 1500 m, which made them practically defenseless when meeting them in a head-on collision.
Although less adapted for the purposes of anti-tank warfare, the "four" were also dangerous for Soviet light tanks from a distance of 3000 m, while they could confidently fight their counterparts only from distances not exceeding the same 1500 m.
To help our tanks overcome this dangerous zone of unanswered fire without tangible losses, according to the plan of our military theorists, there should have been great mobility (the specific power of the BT was 30-35 hp / t with an average ground pressure of 0.75 kg / cm2 and a speed 40 km / h versus similar T - IV indicators at 14-15 hp / t, 0.77 kg / cm2 and 20 km / h). In addition, the high rate of fire of the semi-automatic 20KT compared to the KwK 37 and the larger ammunition gave the chances of success.
As for the tanks of the first two groups, all cannon tanks were practically invulnerable for them, while remaining dangerous for them at all ranges of aimed fire.
Medium tanks
This category of tanks includes only three German vehicles: T - III (H, J) and T - IV (F)with a second marking F1.
Modification of the T-III series machines went mainly in the direction of increasing the thickness of the armor. The armament remained the same - the 50 mm KwK 38 L / 42 cannon. The weight of the tank increased to 21.5 - 21.8 tons, which only worsened the kinetic parameters of the tank. The modernization of the T - IV tank developed in the same direction: strengthening the armor and, as a forced measure (the weight of the tank reached 22, 3 tons), the use of wider tracks. The armament also remained unchanged: the 75 mm KwK 37 L / 24 cannon.
Soviet medium tanks were presented with a three-turret T - 28 and legendary T-34 … Having become the hallmark of Victory, the T - 34 was put into service at the end of 1939 and met the war practically unchanged (only technological changes were made to improve maintainability and improve manufacturability in production). The most significant changes include the installation of a more powerful 85 mm cannon in the new turret and an increase in the number of people in the crew from four to five. As for the T - 28, it was an ambiguous design. Built in 1932 as an infantry support tank (a sad relic of the "Tukhachevsky era"), it turned out to be a very good machine for its time and for solving the tasks assigned to it, which remained in the army and underwent several minor reconstructions (replacing the KT-28 cannon with L-10, installation of a stern machine gun in the turret, replacement of a cylindrical turret with a conical one, installation of screens), which did not significantly change its combat properties.
Table 14.
Since the armament of German tanks was considered above, we will only get acquainted with the characteristics of Soviet tank guns.
76-mm gun L-10. All that was found: an armor-piercing projectile at an initial speed of 555 m / s at a distance of 500 m pierced armor with a thickness of 61 mm, at 1000 m - 51 mm (at an angle of meeting 60 degrees).
76 mm cannon F-34 - tank gun of the Gorky plant number 92, which, starting from 1941, was serially equipped with T-34 tanks. The design of the gun began in 1939, the gun was an extended version of the F-32 tank gun and was originally intended to arm the T-28 and T-35 tanks. The design of the gun was completed on March 15, 1939, the first tests of the gun mounted on the T-28 tank took place on October 19, 1939 at the Gorokhovets training ground. However, it was decided to abandon the rearmament of the T - 28 and T - 35 tanks, and the gun was reassigned to the new T - 34 tank, on which the first firing from the F-34 cannon was fired in November 1940. In addition, tests were carried out on the BT - 7A tank.
The armor penetration of shells from the F-34 cannon was as follows (guaranteed penetration):
Table 15.
The firing range of armor-piercing projectiles was 4000 m, high-explosive fragmentation - from 9000 to 13000 m, fragmentation (shrapnel) - 6000 - 8000 m, depending on the type of ammunition used. The calculation carried out according to the methodology below makes it possible to estimate the armor penetration at a distance of 2000 in 51 mm at an angle of meeting of 90 degrees and 36 mm at 60 degrees. The practical rate of fire was 3 - 5 rounds per minute.
Heavy tanks
In this category of combat vehicles, no comparison is expected due to the complete absence of such in the German army. Soviet vehicles are represented by the most propagandistic tank T - 35 and the most powerful tank for 1941 KV - 1.
I'll make a reservation right away: the KV - 2 tank will not be considered in this context. His 152-mm howitzer was intended for completely different purposes, namely, to break through the front edge of a heavily fortified enemy defense zone, destroy powerful bunkers and assault URs. By the nature of the tasks being solved, this machine could be safely attributed to an ACS, but a number of features: the presence of a rotating turret, powerful booking, the ability to solve independent tasks - quite sharply distinguish it from self-propelled artillery. In my purely subjective opinion, the KV - 2 should be attributed to a non-existent type of BTT, namely to assault tanks, i.e. machines that are capable of solving both tank and artillery missions.
Table 16.
Tank T - 35 was developed in 1932 as a heavy breakthrough tank and fully corresponded to the realities of combined arms combat of that time, namely: the presence of large masses of infantry and cavalry; defense in depth, saturated with a large number of barbed wire; almost complete absence of anti-tank artillery. Therefore, the main purpose of such a tank was to combat precisely these dangers. Infantry and cavalry were supposed to be destroyed by massive machine gun fire (6 pieces of 7, 62-mm DT machine guns installed in three of its five towers completely blocked all directions of possible attack), artillery and closed firing points were suppressed by 76-mm guns CT-28 (later - L-10), and to defeat the tanks then available in the armies of the potential enemy, two 45-mm 20K guns were installed, which also provided shelling in all sectors. The characteristics of all these weapons have already been discussed earlier.
In 1939, all the T - 35 tanks available in the Red Army were modernized: the armor of the frontal part of the hull was increased to 70 mm, the sides and turret - to 25 mm, and the gun was replaced. The armor protection of the stern and roof remained unchanged: 20 and 14 mm, respectively.
Heavy tank KV - 1 was developed in the winter of 1940 and was a generalized experience in the design and production of heavy tanks in the USSR, taking into account also the new tasks facing the troops. Among the requirements for this vehicle were the following: powerful anti-cannon armor, capable of withstanding new anti-tank guns; a universal weapon capable of not only destroying enemy firing points and fortifications, but also confidently hitting all types of enemy tanks that existed at that time.
A cannon was used as such a weapon. F-32 designs by V. G. Grabin. In modern literature, an opinion is often expressed about the insufficient armament of the KV-1 tank, and at the same time they argue that the 76-mm F-22 is the best that we then had for tanks. This statement, as the author sees it, is rather sly. An 85-mm tank gun based on the 52K anti-aircraft gun was in development and could well have been created by that time, and the spacious Voroshilov turret made it possible to install it without problems with space. The problem was different: paradoxically, there were no missions in the tank for such a powerful weapon. The armor of all enemy tanks was so thin that BB shells pierced through both sides and flew without destroying it. In addition, there is also an economic component: the larger the caliber, the more expensive each shot costs the country. Therefore, the 76 mm F-32 gun was recognized as fully appropriate for its purpose. It remains only unclear why the F-34 gun, which appeared a little later, was not installed on it. Probably, our old Russian approach “is good as it is, and the best is the enemy of the good”. Who knows….
In any case, not wanting to waste time discussing the questions "why and how", the author will limit himself to considering what happened.
The semi-automatic 76-mm tank gun L-11 designed by the Leningrad Kirov plant with a mechanical type semi-automatic had a barrel length of 30.5 calibers (2324 mm), which made it possible to fire 6 - 7 rounds / min. The initial velocity of the HE shell was 635 m / s, the BB - 612 m / s with the following armor penetration values:
Table 17.
* - calculated by the method below
In terms of its characteristics, it largely coincided with the F-32 cannon of its competitor Grabin, somewhat inferior to it in reliability. And although the history of adopting these guns is replete with interesting and sometimes very intriguing moments, we note only the moment that the presence of a well-functioning production was the reason for a compromise option: the L-11 cannon was adopted for the tanks produced by the Kirov plant, which, obviously, was quite logical …
76 mm cannon F-32 - semiautomatic with semiautomatic copying type, which made it possible to make 5 - 6 rounds / min. The barrel with a length of 31.5 (2400 mm) gave the HE shell an initial velocity of 638 m / s, BB - 613 m / s, which provided the following values of armor penetration:
Table 18.
* - calculated by the method below
V. G. Grabin mentions that the F-32 was, at the request of the customer and against the will of the designers, noticeably shortened with a tangible loss of combat qualities for the sake of the then prevailing fear that the tank could catch the ground with the gun barrel. This did not allow the F-32 to realize all the capabilities originally incorporated in its design.
So, all the tanks of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht that existed on June 22, 1941 were systematized (with what degree of adequacy, judge dear readers), now it's time to decide what to do with it. Let us consider how the available performance characteristics made it possible to solve the above problems.
Machine-gun tanks were well suited for destroying enemy manpower in open combat, but poorly suited for attacking defense lines. Even a simple trench significantly increased the survivability of the infantry, while the tank itself remained open to defeat with all available means of dealing with it. The cannon armament of machine-gun and cannon tanks was also not very suitable for these purposes: the power of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile of 37- or 45 mm caliber is clearly insufficient both to create a "cloud of fragments" and to destroy enemy bunkers.
The guns of medium and heavy tanks were much better adapted for solving the first of the tasks noted, especially the 75/76 mm caliber, which is quite understandable - guns of this caliber were created for this in due time.
But the question of what will be the result of the collision of these machines in collision with each other requires more detailed consideration.
A bit of math
Being a chemist by training, i.e. "Creeping empiricist", the author could not help but try to find some mathematical generalization of the data on the armor penetration of German and Soviet tank guns. Since the curves of armor penetration have a form close to exponential, they were approximated by a curve of the form
where Br is armor penetration, b (0) and b (1) are coefficients, the meaning of which can be defined as follows: b (0) is the maximum possible thickness of penetrated armor, b (1) is an indicator of the rate of fall of the projectile's effectiveness (figuratively speaking, “length hands "of a tank gun) and flatness of the trajectory (slightly erring against the rigor and scientific terminology, we will call this value" ballistic characteristic ").
The data of calculations and performance characteristics of guns are presented in the table:
Table 19.
* - values are calculated by two points
According to the calculation data, one can immediately see a fairly obvious correlation: the value of b (0) is directly proportional to the magnitude of the kinetic energy of the projectile (muzzle energy). As for the value of b (1), its expression is not so obviously related to the parameters of the gun and projectile.
This mathematical model allows you to calculate a table of target destruction at different distances and build armor penetration curves. For German guns, they look like this:
Defeat table
Penetration curves
for the Soviet - like this:
Defeat table
Penetration curves
The calculated values are highlighted in bold, which agree well (I would say - excellent) with the tabular data.
Based on the exponential dependence of armor penetration on distance, it is possible to calculate the maximum distance of penetration of armor using the formula
where Tbr is the thickness of the armor, X is the distance at which it breaks through.
Below are tables of calculated distances for the considered tanks, based on the assumption that they meet "head-to-head":
Table 22.
The shaded cells show negative values, which in themselves have no physical meaning, but are a good illustration, so to speak, of the "uselessness" of these weapons against these tanks, and the value of the value shows the degree of this "uselessness". In practical terms, this may be a certain characteristic of the possibility of modernizing the weapon, i.e. the answer to the question: could THIS gun, in principle, penetrate the armor of THIS tank?
Even a simple comparison of the data shows that the characteristics of the B-3 gun are practically no different from those for the Czech-made A3 and A7 guns, closer to the latter. The 20K cannon, having an average caliber between the German A7 and 50 Kwk, is inferior to them in muzzle energy, but superior in flatness. The 50 mm KwK 39 L / 60 looks especially great in this class, surpassing all its predecessors up to distances of 1700 - 1800 m. For the initial period of the Second World War, such a "long arm" was simply an excellent indicator and this system obviously demonstrates the maximum possible characteristics for guns of such calibers.
Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the 75-mm KwK 37 L / 24 gun installed on all tanks of the Pz IV modification is unnecessary - a short barrel with a large caliber, although it could report a sufficient supply of kinetic energy, but with an impulse of 385 (kg m / s) it could not provide a great flatness of the trajectory. In other words, it was an anti-infantry vehicle that could more or less effectively fight tanks at close ranges (at large, hinged aimed fire at a maneuvering target was difficult).
As for the Soviet "heavyweights", then everything is just simple and understandable: the guns had enormous potential, which allowed them to more than effectively solve both anti-tank and anti-personnel missions. Despite the fact that the barrels of these guns were cut in comparison with their field counterparts, at a high initial velocity of the projectile, they retained high (and for some purposes, excessive) armor penetration, just as effectively solving anti-personnel tasks (defeat of manpower, destruction of bunkers, suppression of battery fire), which were solved by a wide range of shells (this information is not given in this article, but is widely presented on the Internet).
Now about the possible development of the situation when meeting opponents in a variety of combinations.
To do this, first, let's group the tanks into groups by armor thickness (criterion 1), ordering them within the groups according to the guns installed on them (criterion 2). In the Wehrmacht it will look like this:
Table 23.
A similar table for Soviet tanks gives the following distribution:
Table 24.
What could await them when they met on the battlefield "head-on-forehead"?
The 20-mm guns of German light tanks posed a relative danger only for the light tanks T - 26 of the 1931 model and BT-2, and even then only from a distance of no more than 500 m, while they confidently hit the T - II (A) starting from 2500 m. More serious opponents were the heavily armored T - I (C), whose armor penetrated only from 850 m and even more "thick-fronted" T - II (F), which were taken only from 500 m. For the rest of the Soviet tanks, they did not pose any danger.
It makes no sense to consider single combat with other Soviet tanks: only a relatively weakly armored T - 28 could be hit by the "Czechs" from a distance of no more than 900 m, while they themselves could be guaranteed to be destroyed by him from a distance of 4 km. The same applies to the T - I (C), whose 30 mm armor penetrated the Soviet L-10 from 3.5 km.
With this phrase, we smoothly moved from the first group of German tanks to the second. More powerful weapons made them deadly opponents for our T - 26 and BT of all modifications, shooting from at distances from 2.5 to 3.5 km, while they could only bring them damage from a distance of 1000 - 1300 m, which was clearly not enough in a tank duel. The only salvation was in the successful concentration of fire and maneuver, as well as the use of support forces (artillery, infantry, aviation). And only the old T - 28 was still quite confidently able to keep opponents at a distance of 3 km or more.
A hypothetical meeting of tanks of the second group could well look the most dramatic. The 50 KwK 38 artillery system, not the most convincing for this, was supported by more solid armor, and the 75 KwK 37 already had sufficient penetration, as the Germans believed.
Soviet counterparts could oppose not only quite solid armor protection, but also powerful 76-mm guns. When these vehicles met, the Germans had an advantage only over the T - 28, which they acquired at a rather high price - the thick armor led to the almost complete exhaustion of the reserve for the modernization of the "troikas". As for the "fours", the approximate parity with the T - 28 could have put German designers in a difficult dilemma: increase the thickness of the armor or increase the power of the gun. If it were not for the legendary "thirty-four" on the battlefield, then perhaps they would have followed the standard path: increasing the thickness of the armor plate is always easier than developing a new artillery system. But the almost complete impossibility of penetrating the frontal armor of the T - 34 with tank guns solved the problem unambiguously - to create a weapon that can hit Soviet tanks from a distance of more than 2000 m in order to keep them at a safe distance. The T - 34 itself could deal with any of its opponents from any distance, while remaining invulnerable from any range of aimed fire.
There is no need to talk about the KV-1 fights with the Germans: the Wehrmacht could only deal with them with the help of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and corps artillery.
With such an abundance of used tank guns both in the Wehrmacht and in the Red Army, the question becomes quite natural: which gun was better? As you know, the most difficult answers have to be found for the simplest questions. This one is no exception. I'll try to answer it from my bell tower.
Digressing from the specific requirements that the military put before the designers, the author will allow himself to define as the criteria high muzzle energy (b0) and the ability to maintain a destructive ability for a long time (b1). According to the first parameter, of the 37-mile meters, the Soviet B-3 seems to be the most acceptable, according to the second - the Czech A3. In the aggregate of both, practically none of them has an overwhelming superiority and the choice in favor of either one lies in completely different planes.
The second group of guns demonstrates the clear superiority of the German gunsmiths, especially the 50 Kwk39 / L60 gun, which surpasses the only Soviet 20K in terms of muzzle energy. The high ballistic characteristics of these guns made it possible to put up with their rather rapid fall (which is understandable: no one has canceled the air resistance).
But in the third group of guns there was no analogue to Soviet guns: high muzzle energy, impulse values of about 4000 kg m / s, combined with a large projectile mass, made it possible to maintain high armor penetration at long distances.
Summary
So, whose tanks were better? The answer is obvious. Already the abundance of modifications of the Wehrmacht's combat vehicles alone suggests that unfinished models were put on the stream, the shortcomings of which were eliminated during combat operation. Purely machine-gun tanks and tanks with small-caliber cannons of aviation origin at the beginning of the forties - this cannot even be called technical stupidity. Such a machine could only pose a danger to tanks of the "Tukhachevsky era", but not to the creations of Koshkin and Kotin. Even the somewhat archaic looking T - 28s were clearly too tough for them, to say nothing of more powerful or more modern machines. Even Soviet armored cars, armed with the same 20K cannons, were dangerous for these "armored monsters of the Wehrmacht" at distances where they were really "pitiful little fluffs" *. Increasing armor is the easiest way to increase a tank's survivability in battle, but it is also the most hopeless. An increase in weight, a decrease in mobility, the need to increase engine power - all these tricks quickly eat up the resource of modernization and sooner or later put designers in front of the need to develop a new machine. The failure of the Polish tank forces and the headlessness and carelessness in the use of tank forces in France played a cruel joke with the Germans: they never met a really serious enemy. The episodic use of the English Matildas in France also did not force us to draw conclusions: the monstrosity of the tank, combined with a scanty number of them, made it possible to solve this problem by other, non-tank means. The German anti-tank artillery was not in the best condition either. Having in general more powerful systems, they have remained at the level of the tasks of the beginning, at best, the mid-thirties.
Soviet tanks did not suffer from pettiness, although they were also not devoid of drawbacks. This is the low reliability of the engines, and the low quality of optics, and the lack of a sufficient number of radio stations, the low level of comfort and work overload on the crew - all this is not a complete list of the problems of our combat vehicles. Add to this the low professionalism of specialists (mechanics were taken from collective farm tractor drivers, commanders were generally taught at accelerated courses), and a large percentage of rejects in the production of ammunition (this is where it is necessary to look for the reason for the low REAL efficiency of the "magpies", and not in their innate depravity), and much more, but the combat vehicles themselves were quite modern and fully meeting the challenges not only of the present, but also of some future. Early production tanks were more or less specialized, the T - 34 and KV - 1 were universal tanks. There were no cars of this class in any other country in the world. As for the Wehrmacht, only the luck of the first year of the war gave German designers a head start for developing effective objections to Soviet realities. Only in the summer of 1942 did the Panzervafe receive a vehicle that remotely corresponded to the T - 34 developments of 1940, and only in the summer of 1943 did the Panthers, somewhat superior to their prototype, and the Tigers, significantly superior to the KV - 1 developments of the same already forgotten 1940. And this despite the fact that the Soviet response to this menagerie followed after half a year and a year, respectively. Comments, as they say, are superfluous …
_
*) This quote is taken from some publications of Russian "historians" who clearly tried to hide the truth …
Conclusion
I don't need a friend who nods his head in agreement at every word I say. My shadow does it much better.
(Socrates)
The number of copies broken in discussions on this issue certainly exceeds the number of copies broken in the real battles of human history. Adding one more twigs to this heap, the author did not aim to simply clutter up the space. As Moliere said, “all genres have a right to exist, except the boring one,” and if so, then this point of view on this problem, as it seems to the author, also has a right to exist. In presenting this review to the public, the author hopes for constructive criticism. Also, the author will be grateful if respected opponents point out errors in calculations and facts. These remarks can be voiced both on the forum and in personal communication.
Literature
In this section, I would also like to make a reservation. Gathering information took more than one year and did not have the character of a target. It's just that the author himself wanted to understand the existing situation. That is why a large amount of data was already stored in the form of numerical characteristics, not marked with links. Therefore, the author apologizes for the incomplete list of information sources below:
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Wikipedia article "Skoda 37 mm A7"
[7]
[8] Wikipedia, article "37-mm tank gun model 1930 (5-K)"
And:
M. Svirin. Artillery armament of Soviet tanks 1940-1945. Armada-Vertical, no. 4
M. Baryatinsky. Light tanks of the Second World War. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2007.
M. Baryatinsky. Tanks of the Second World War. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2009.
Tanks of the world. / Compiled by R. Ismagilov. - Smolensk, Rusich. 2002.
