With the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union, the Nazi leadership counted on the political isolation of our country, but on July 12, 1941, an agreement was signed between Great Britain and the USSR on joint actions in the war against Germany. At a conference of representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States held in Moscow on September 29 - October 1, decisions were made to provide the Soviet Union with assistance with weapons and strategic materials and our supplies to the United States and England of raw materials for military production.
The system of transfer of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, industrial equipment, oil products, raw materials, foodstuffs, information and services necessary for the conduct of war on the part of the United States on loan or lease to the countries - allies in the anti-Hitler coalition of 1941-1945, which existed during the war years. Lend-Lease from English. lend - to lend and lease - to lease was invented by the President of the United States F. Roosevelt, who sought to support the states that were attacked by the German and Japanese aggressors. The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941. It was repeatedly extended and extended not only to the war period, but also to the early post-war years. The law took effect immediately after its adoption. On June 30, 1945, lend-lease agreements were signed by the United States with 35 countries. In response to the armaments and other cargoes arriving in the USSR, the Allies received 300 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, gold, timber, etc. Russia completed settlements with the United States for goods supplied during the war only in 2006.
As soon as it became obvious that cargoes from Great Britain and the USA would soon begin to arrive in the Soviet Union, the question of the routes of their delivery immediately arose. The closest and safest route from America to the USSR in the summer and autumn of 1941 ran across the Pacific Ocean. But, firstly, of the 5 largest Soviet Pacific ports, only Vladivostok had a railway connection with the front, and secondly, cargo from Primorye was stuck for weeks on the Trans-Siberian Railway. Nevertheless, the "Pacific route" functioned throughout the war, and 47% of imported cargo was delivered to the Soviet Union via it. The Alaska-Siberia air bridge, unattainable for the enemy, operated here, along which about 8 thousand aircraft were delivered to the USSR. Another route ran through the Persian Gulf and Iran. But he was able to start functioning only in the middle of 1942. Subsequently, when all the technical and organizational problems were solved, this route took over 23.8% of all supplies from the Allies. However, this was later, and help was required already in the fall of 1941.
The most expedient was the third route - through the Norwegian and Barents Seas to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. Despite the fact that the vessels covered this route in 10-14 days, and the proximity of the northern ports to the center of the country and the front, this route had significant drawbacks. The non-freezing port of Murmansk was only a few tens of kilometers from the front line and therefore was subjected to continuous air strikes. Arkhangelsk, relatively remote from the front line, became inaccessible to ships for several months a year due to the freezing of the White Sea. The route itself from the British Isles to the Kola Peninsula passed along the occupied Norwegian coast, where the bases of the German Air Force and Navy were located, and thus along its entire length it was under the continuous influence of the forces of the enemy fleet and aviation. Nevertheless, in the decisive period for our country, 1941-1942. the northern direction turned out to be the most effective.
The organization of the convoys and the responsibility for the safety of their passage to and from our ports was entrusted to the British Admiralty. In accordance with the organization of the convoy service established in the English fleet, all issues of the formation of convoys and their transition were dealt with by the merchant shipping department of the Admiralty. Convoys formed at Loch E and Scapa Flow in England, Reykjavik and Hall. Hvalfjord in Iceland (in 1944-1945 - only Loch Yu). Arkhangelsk, Molotovsk (Severodvinsk), Murmansk were the points of arrival of the convoys and their departure back. The crossings were completed in 10-14 days. During the freeze-up period, the movement of ships in the White Sea was provided by Soviet icebreakers. The convoys included British transports loaded in various ports, American and other Allied transports arriving in England or Reykjavik from the United States. Since 1942, more than half of the ships in convoys have been American. From November 1941 to March 1943 (before the transfer of some of our ships to the Far East), Soviet transports were also included. The limitedness of our merchant fleet and the lack of ships with a speed of 8-10 knots did not allow them to be used on a wider scale.
Initially, the British formed convoys of 6-10 ships, dispatching them at intervals of one to three weeks. From March 1942, the number of transports in convoys increased to 16–25, and the PQ-16, PQ-17 and PQ-18 had 34, 36 and 40 units, respectively. From the end of December 1942, large convoys began to be divided into two groups, each of 13-19 ships. From February 1944, convoys consisting of 30–49 transports began to be sent, and in 1945 - of 24–28 transports. The passage of the convoys was carried out along the route England (or Iceland) - about. Jan Mayen - Fr. Bear - Arkhangelsk (or Murmansk). Depending on the ice conditions in the Greenland and Barents Seas, the route was chosen north of about. Jan Mayen and Bear (possibly farther from enemy bases and airfields in Northern Norway) or south of these islands (in winter). The British used circular security of transports. It included destroyers, destroyers, corvettes, frigates, sloops, minesweepers and submarine hunters. Each ship was assigned a place in the general marching order of the convoy. When submarines were spotted, individual escort ships left the formation and began pursuit, often breaking away from the convoy. In some cases, the convoy broke up (in stormy weather, with the threat of attack by surface ships).
To protect the convoy from a possible attack by surface ships, a cover detachment was allocated. Sometimes it was divided into two groups: a cruising detachment (close cover) and a long-range (operational) cover detachment, which included battleships, cruisers, and sometimes aircraft carriers. The operational cover detachment moved parallel to the course of the convoy's movement or deployed on distant approaches to enemy bases. In the operational zone of the Northern Fleet (east of the meridian 18 °, and then 20 ° east longitude), security was reinforced by Soviet ships and aircraft. In addition, Soviet ships searched for submarines and trawled fairways on the approaches to the Kola Bay and in the throat of the White Sea - to Arkhangelsk.
Depth bombing at the entrance to the Kola Bay
The first convoy from Great Britain to the USSR left on August 21, 1941. It consisted of 6 British and 1 Danish transport guarded by 2 destroyers, 4 corvettes and 3 minesweepers. It was named after the name of the operation on its wiring - "Dervish". But later, when the convoys going to the Soviet Union were assigned the letter designation PQ, the first in the documents began to be called PQ-0. This designation arose quite by accident and was the initials of Peter Quelyn, a British officer who was in charge of the planning of convoy operations to the Soviet Union at that time in the operational management of the Admiralty. Return convoys were designated QP. From December 1942, the convoys were designated YW and RA, respectively, and the serial number, starting with the conditional number - 51.
On August 31, 1941, the Dervish convoy arrived in Arkhangelsk without loss and became a real embodiment of Anglo-Soviet military cooperation. The fact is that, along with trucks, mines, bombs, rubber, wool, 15 dismantled British Hurricane fighters were unloaded onto the berths of the Arkhangelsk port. Until the end of 1941, 10 more convoys were conducted in both directions. The situation in the external communications in 1941 did not cause concern for the fate of the external convoys. The German plan "Barbarossa" planned the defeat of the Soviet Union in a fleeting company, mainly by ground forces and aviation. Therefore, the German Navy also did not consider the Arctic as an area of possible application of its efforts. The Germans did not take any measures to disrupt external communications and there were no losses in the convoys. 1942 for the northern convoys was in many respects unlike the previous one, the increasing influence of the enemy was felt.
Since A. Hitler did not believe that the German fleet could achieve the decisive goals of the war in the West against Great Britain, he decided to use the nucleus of large surface ships, significant forces of the submarine fleet and aviation to achieve victory in the East. In order to interrupt sea communications between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as well as to prevent a possible landing in Northern Norway, in January-February 1942, the battleship Tirpitz, the heavy cruisers Admiral Scheer, were redeployed to the Trondheim region. Lyuttsov, Hipper, light cruiser Cologne, 5 destroyers and 14 submarines. To support these ships, as well as to protect their communications, the Germans concentrated here a significant number of minesweepers, patrol ships, boats and various auxiliary vessels. The strength of the 5th German Air Fleet, based in Norway and Finland, had increased to 500 aircraft by the spring of 1942. The first ship on the route of the northern convoys was lost on January 7, 1942. It turned out to be the British steamer "Vaziristan", which was sailing with the PQ-7 convoy. The first major operation of the surface forces of the Nazis against the allied convoys was carried out in March 1942 (codenamed "Shportpalas"). To intercept the QP-8 convoy, the battleship Tirpitz came out, guarded by 3 destroyers and submarines. As a result, the lumber carrier Izhora, which was lagging behind the convoy, was sunk.
The death of the timber carrier "Izhora"
In March 1942, German aviation began to attack the convoys at sea crossing, and in April they began massive raids on Murmansk. As a result of air attacks, convoy PQ-13, which arrived in Murmansk on March 30, lost 4 ships and a escort ship.
Burning houses in Murmansk July 1942
If until that time the Northern Fleet provided the movement of external convoys in the order of daily combat activities, then starting with the PQ-13 convoy to support two successive convoys (coming to the USSR and leaving to Great Britain), the fleet began to carry out operations in which almost all the forces of the fleet participated: destroyers and patrol ships strengthened the immediate guarding of the convoy; aviation carried out bombing strikes at airfields and bases, covered convoys when they approached at a distance of 150-200 miles to the coast, and carried out anti-aircraft defense of bases and anchorages of ships; minesweepers, patrol ships and boats kept coastal areas and raids safe from mines and submarines. All of these forces were deployed along the eastern section of the convoy route of up to 1,000 miles. But the situation was getting more complicated, and out of 75 ships in 4 convoys leaving Great Britain, Iceland and the Soviet Union, 9 were sunk in April: QP-10 - 4 ships, PQ-14 - 1 ship, PQ-15 - 3 ships.
At the end of May, convoy PQ-16 lost 6 transports from air strikes. On May 30, one of the famous pilots of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was killed in an air battle over this convoy, shooting down three Ju-88s. regiment commander Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel B. F. Safonov (on May 27, he was presented by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to be awarded the second Gold Star medal). In general, the situation around the northern convoys in the summer of 1942 can be defined as critical. The PQ-17, which became the most tragic convoy of the Second World War, became a kind of watershed, the deepest crisis of the northern convoys.
On June 27, 1942, PQ-17 left Hvalfjord in Iceland with 36 transports (including the Soviet tankers Azerbaijan and Donbass) and 3 rescue vessels. Two transports soon returned due to damage. The escort included up to 20 British ships (destroyers, corvettes, air defense ships and minesweepers). To the south of the convoy, there was a close cover detachment consisting of 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers. In the eastern part of the Norwegian Sea, a long-range cover detachment, consisting of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and the aircraft carrier "Victories" with cover of 12 destroyers, was maneuvering. By June 29, the Northern Fleet submarines K-2, K-21, K-22, Shch-403 and nine British submarines were deployed off the coast of Northern Norway.
Convoy PQ-17
At the airfields of the Kola Peninsula, 116 aircraft were prepared for action. Thus, the provision of the convoy with surface forces was sufficiently reliable in case of a meeting with an enemy squadron. To defeat the convoy, the fascist German command prepared 108 bombers, 30 dive bombers and 57 torpedo bombers. 11 submarines were to act against the convoy. Two groups of surface ships were in Trondheim (battleship Tirpitz, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, 4 destroyers), and in Narvik (heavy cruisers Admiral Scheer, Lutzov, 6 destroyers). To use large surface ships to attack convoys A. Hitler allowed only on condition that there were no British aircraft carriers nearby.
On July 1, enemy aerial reconnaissance spotted convoy PQ-17 in the Norwegian Sea. During the first 4 days, the convoy successfully repelled attacks from aircraft and submarines, although 3 transports were sunk. At about the same time, a detachment of enemy ships, when deploying from Narvik to the Alten Fjord, ran into stones, as a result of which the heavy cruiser "Luttsov" and 3 destroyers were damaged. On the morning of July 4, the allied command became aware of the upcoming deployment of a surface grouping of enemy forces, including the battleship Tirpitz. The first sea lord, Admiral D. Pound, decided to disperse the convoy. At 2230 hours on 4 July, by order of the British Admiralty, the direct escort destroyers and close cover ships retreated to the west to join the long-range cover detachment. The transports were ordered to disperse and proceed independently to Soviet ports.
On July 5, at about 11 o'clock, the German squadron headed by the battleship Tirpitz (12 ships) went to sea. Soon, in the area north of Hammerfest, the submarine K-21 (Captain 2nd Rank N. A. Lunin) discovered it, attacked the battleship with torpedoes and reported it to the command. On the same day, the squadron was discovered by an aircraft and a British submarine, who also reported its appearance. Having intercepted these radio messages, the German command ordered the squadron to return to Altenfjord. Ships left without cover in the polar day became easy prey for enemy aircraft and submarines. From 5 to 10 July, 20 transports and a rescue vessel were sunk in the northeastern part of the Barents Sea. Mainly those ships that took refuge in the bays and bays of Novaya Zemlya and whose crews showed heroism in the struggle for the survivability of their ships escaped from the convoy.
On the part of the Northern Fleet, energetic and extensive measures were required to search for and provide assistance to transports. On July 28, the last transport of the PQ-17 convoy, the Winston Salem, arrived in Arkhangelsk. Of the 36 transports of the PQ-17 convoy, two ships returned to Iceland, 11 reached Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, 23 were sunk. 153 people died. Soviet ships and vessels rescued about 300 British and Soviet sailors. Together with the transports, 3350 vehicles, 430 tanks, 210 aircraft and about 100 thousand tons of cargo were lost.
After the disaster with the PQ-17 convoy, the British government refused to send convoys to the Soviet Union. Only under pressure from the Soviet government in early September convoy PQ-18 left Iceland for the Soviet Union. It consisted of 40 ships. The convoy was supported by more than 50 escort ships. For the first time, a convoy aircraft carrier with 15 aircraft on board was included in the escort, which caused significant damage to the enemy during an enemy air raid. The conditions for the passage of the convoy PQ-18 were in many respects similar to the previous one, but this time the escort ships and all the support forces of the allies took up the battle. The convoy was attacked by 17 submarines and over 330 aircraft. In total, from the PQ-18 convoy, German aviation managed to sink 10 transports, submarines - 3 transports. Only 1 transport was sunk in the Northern Fleet zone. The German fleet and aviation received a proper rebuff - 4 boats were sunk and 41 aircraft were shot down.
British EM "Eskimo" guarded by PQ-18
During the passage of convoys PQ-18 and QP-14, losses on both sides were great, but it became clear that with strong security and sufficient security measures, the Germans would not be able to interrupt the communication routes between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the North. However, the Allies again refused to send convoys until the onset of the polar night. In October - November 1942, at the suggestion of the Soviet command, the system of movement of single transports (“drop by drop”) was tested. The Allies considered the sailing of single ships ineffective, and later abandoned it.
With the onset of the polar night, winter stormy weather, the movement of convoys to the Soviet Union resumed. The first convoy in mid-December passed unnoticed by the enemy. The second was attacked by two heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers. They did not make their way to the transports. Both sides lost a destroyer, and there were no losses in transports. This failure was one of the reasons that A. Hitler made the decision to replace the commander of the German fleet, Gross Admiral E. Raeder, and the admiral K. Doenitz, who gave priority to the submarine forces, replaced the adherent of the actions of large surface forces. In January and February 1943, several heavily escorted convoys marched in the North. From February to November 1943, not a single convoy arrived at the Soviet ports - the PQ-17 syndrome was still too great. Despite the fact that for the whole winter the convoys going to the Soviet Union did not lose a single transport. True, the return convoys lost 6 ships sunk by German submarines. But this is 6 out of 83 transports.
After the sinking of the battleship Scharnhorst in the Barents Sea by British ships in December 1943, the German command refused to use large surface ships to fight the convoys. The activity of the German fleet in the North Atlantic dropped sharply. The main opponents of the convoys in the North were submarines, the number of which increased.
In February 1944, the British Admiralty returned to the formation of large convoys for the USSR with 1-3 escort aircraft carriers in escort. In the defense of convoys, the proportion of ships that conducted preliminary searches increased. In the anti-submarine defense system, the role of naval aviation has significantly increased. During 1944, as a result of lend-lease deliveries, the Northern Fleet received 21 large hunters, 44 torpedo boats, 31 patrol boats, 34 minesweepers from the United States equipped with acoustic and electromagnetic trawls, hydroacoustic stations and Hedgehog rocket launchers, which qualitatively changed the sweeping forces of the fleet. In addition, in accordance with the decisions of the Tehran Conference regarding the future division of the Italian fleet, in August 1944 Soviet crews brought the battleship Arkhangelsk (Royal Sovereign), 9 destroyers of the Zharkiy type (Richmond type) to the North, 4 submarines of the "Ursula" ("B") type - from Great Britain, the cruiser "Murmansk" ("Milwaukee") - from the USA. The enemy repeatedly tried to influence the external communications of the allies, but did not have much success. Until May 5, 8 convoys of 275 transports passed in both directions, having lost only 4 transports and two destroyers. For the whole year 1944the Germans managed to sink 6 transports and 3 escort ships, losing 13 submarines.
Outer convoys continued to move between British and Soviet ports until May 28, 1945. The final phase of the campaign is characterized by an increased activity of enemy submarines. They began to operate in areas where it was almost impossible to avoid them - on the approaches to the Kola Bay and adjacent areas. During the passage of allied convoys, the number of enemy submarines in these areas increased to 10–12. All of them underwent modernization and were equipped with the "Snorkhel" device, which ensures the operation of diesel engines and charging batteries at periscope depth, had more advanced radar and hydroacoustic stations and received homing acoustic torpedoes. All this forced the command of the Northern Fleet to allocate additional anti-submarine forces along the route of the convoys. In total, to ensure the safety of external convoys, the ships of the fleet in 1945 went to sea 108 times, anti-submarine aviation made 607 sorties. When escorting external convoys, the Allies lost 5 transports and 5 escort ships. The Northern Fleet lost the destroyer Deyatenyy, torpedoed on January 16 by an enemy submarine. In 1945, 5 convoys of 136 transports arrived from England to the northern ports of the USSR, and the same number of convoys returned - 141 transports.
Convoy escorts have preserved many examples of mutual assistance and mutual assistance of British and Soviet sailors and pilots. A number of them were awarded orders of the USSR and Great Britain. Allied Arctic convoys became one of the brightest examples of combat interaction of allied fleets in World War II. Thus, the heroic feat was performed by the crew of the Soviet timber carrier "Old Bolshevik", which was part of the PQ-16 convoy. The ship, loaded with military equipment, ammunition and gasoline, was attacked and set on fire by fascist aircraft. Soviet sailors rejected the offer of the British command to switch to other transports. The convoy left, leaving a burning timber truck. For eight hours, the crew of the ship that had lost its course fought off attacks from enemy aircraft, fought with water, fire and emerged victorious. Having eliminated the damage, the Soviet sailors delivered the cargo necessary for the front to Murmansk. For their courage, many crew members were awarded orders and medals, and the captain of the ship I. I. Afanasyev and steering B. I. Akazenok were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
"Old Bolshevik"
Many heroic pages have been written in the history of the northern convoys. The most obvious of these is the PQ-17 tragedy. A small Canadian paramilitary trawler "Ayrshire" under the command of Lieutenant L. Gradwell, after the order to disperse, took under its protection 3 transports and led them into the ice. Having camouflaged the ships under icebergs, uncovered and alerted the guns of the tanks being transported, the group arrived without loss to Novaya Zemlya, and from there to Arkhangelsk. The captain of the tanker "Azerbaijan" V. N. Izotov refused to switch from the burning ship to the rescue ships that approached, the tanker's crew, consisting mainly of women, managed not only to localize the fire, but soon put it out. The fuel was delivered to its destination. Part of the crew of the Soviet steamer Kiev, which was killed in April 1942 (convoy QР-10), was returning home on the British transport Empire Byron. When the ship was torpedoed by a German submarine, the British and Soviet sailors found themselves in the same boat. Skillful actions of the British chief officer V. Pras and the Soviet ship doctor A. I. Leskin slept their lives.
In total, during the war years, 40 convoys of 811 ships passed through the Arctic waters to the Soviet Union. Of these, 58 transports were destroyed by the enemy during the crossing and 33 returned to the ports of departure. In the opposite direction, 715 ships left the Soviet Union for the ports of Great Britain and Iceland in 35 convoys, of which 29 were sunk during the crossing, and 8 returned. Thus, in both directions during the war years, 1,398 ships passed the entire route in northern convoys, the losses amounted to 87 ships, 69 of which fell on the most tragic 1942.
The northern route played an extremely important role in the delivery of strategic cargo for the USSR at the first stage of the war. The risk was justified by the speed of delivery of weapons to the Soviet front during the most difficult period for the country. Until July 1942, 964 thousand tons of weapons, materials and food were sent with northern convoys - 61% of all cargo brought into the USSR from abroad. 2314 tanks, 1550 tankettes, 1903 aircraft, etc. were delivered by the northern route. From July 1942 to the end of 1943, a noticeable decline in the role of the northern route began, the total share of supplies to the USSR fell from 61% to 16%. Although still almost half of all weapons imported into the country (tanks, aircraft, etc.) were delivered by northern convoys. At the final stage of the war, due to the gradual closure of the "Iranian corridor", its role again increased. In 1944-1945. over 2, 2 million tons, or 22% of all cargo, were brought into the country via it. In total, during the war years, the northern route delivered 36% of all military cargo.
Loading tanks "Matilda" in the English port and American
attack aircraft "Mustang" on board the transport
List of allied Arctic convoys
1941
To the USSR From the USSR
Dervish - PQ-0 from Iceland 21 August
to Arkhangelsk on August 31 QP-1 from Arkhangelsk on September 28
in Scapa Flow 10 October
PQ-1 from Iceland on September 29
to Arkhangelsk on October 11 QP-2 from Arkhangelsk on November 3
to Orkney Islands 17 November
PQ-2 from Liverpool October 13
to Arkhangelsk October 30 QP-3 from Arkhangelsk November 27
scattered along the way, arrived December 3
PQ-3 from Iceland on November 9
to Arkhangelsk on November 22 QP-4 from Arkhangelsk on December 29
scattered en route, arrived January 9, 1942
PQ-4 from Iceland 17 November
to Arkhangelsk on November 28
PQ-5 from Iceland on November 27
to Arkhangelsk on December 13
PQ-6 from Iceland December 8
to Murmansk on December 20
1942
PQ-7A from Iceland on December 26, 1941
to Murmansk on January 12 QP-5 from Murmansk on January 13
scattered on the way, arrived on January 19
PQ-7B from Iceland December 31
to Murmansk on January 11 QP-6 from Murmansk on January 24
scattered along the way, arrived on January 28
PQ-8 from Iceland January 8
to Arkhangelsk on January 17 QP-7 from Murmansk on February 12
scattered along the way, arrived on February 15
Combined
PQ-9 and PQ-10 from Iceland 1 February
to Murmansk on February 10 QP-8 from Murmansk on March 1
to Reykjavik on 11 March
PQ-11 from Scotland February 14
to Murmansk on February 22 QP-9 from Kola Bay on March 21
to Reykjavik on 3 April
PQ-12 from Reykjavik March 1st
to Murmansk on March 12 QP-10 from Kola Bay on April 10
to Reykjavik on April 21
PQ-13
from Scotland 20 March
to Murmansk on March 31
QP-11 from Murmansk on April 28
to Reykjavik on 7 May
PQ-14 from Scotland March 26
to Murmansk on April 19 QP-12 from Kola Bay on May 21
to Reykjavik on May 29
PQ-15 from Scotland April 10
to Murmansk May 5 QP-13 from Arkhangelsk June 26
to Reykjavik on 7 July
PQ-16 from Reykjavik on May 21
to Murmansk on May 30 QP-14 from Arkhangelsk on September 13
to Scotland 26 September
PQ-17 from Reykjavik on June 27
scattered along the way, arrived on 11 July QP-15 from Kola Bay on 17 November
to Scotland 30 November
PQ-18 from Scotland September 2
to Arkhangelsk on September 21
JW-51A from Liverpool December 15
to the Kola Bay December 25 RA-51 from the Kola Bay December 30
to Scotland 11 January 1943
JW-51B from Liverpool December 22
to the Kola Bay on January 4, 1943
FB independent vessels without escort "drop by drop"
1943
JW-52 from Liverpool January 17
to the Kola Bay on January 27 RA-52 from the Kola Bay on January 29
to Scotland 9 February
JW-53 from Liverpool 15 February
to Kola Bay February 27 RA-53 from Kola Bay March 1
to Scotland 14 March
JW-54A from Liverpool 15 November
to Kola Bay November 24 RA-54A from Kola Bay November 1
to Scotland 14 November
JW-54B from Liverpool November 22
to Arkhangelsk December 3 RA-54B from Arkhangelsk November 26
to Scotland on December 9
JW-55A from Liverpool December 12
to Arkhangelsk December 22 RA-55A from Kola Bay December 22
to Scotland 1 January 1944
JW-55B from Liverpool December 20
to Arkhangelsk December 30 RA-55B from Kola Bay December 31
to Scotland 8 January 1944
1944
JW-56A from Liverpool January 12
to Arkhangelsk on January 28 RA-56 from the Kola Bay on February 3
to Scotland 11 February
JW-56B from Liverpool January 22
to Kola Bay February 1 RA-57 from Kola Bay March 2
to Scotland 10 March
JW-57 from Liverpool on February 20
to Kola Bay February 28 RA-58 from Kola Bay April 7
to Scotland April 14
JW-58 from Liverpool March 27
to Kola Bay April 4 RA-59 from Kola Bay April 28
to Scotland 6 May
JW-59 from Liverpool August 15
to the Kola Bay on August 25 RA-59A from the Kola Bay on August 28
to Scotland 5 September
JW-60 from Liverpool 15 September
to the Kola Bay September 23 RA-60 from the Kola Bay September 28
to Scotland 5 October
JW-61 from Liverpool October 20
to Kola Bay October 28 RA-61 from Kola Bay November 2
to Scotland on November 9
JW-61A from Liverpool October 31
to Murmansk on November 6 RA-61A from Kola Bay on November 11
to Scotland 17 November
JW-62 from Scotland on November 29
to the Kola Bay on November 7 RA-62 from the Kola Bay on December 10
to Scotland December 19
1945
JW-63
from Scotland December 30
to the Kola Bay January 8, 1945 RA-63 from the Kola Bay January 11
to Scotland January 21
JW-64 from Scotland February 3
to Kola Bay February 15 RA-64 from Kola Bay February 17
to Scotland 28 February
JW-65 from Scotland 11 March
to Kola Bay March 21 RA-65 from Kola Bay March 23
to Scotland 1 April
JW-66 from Scotland April 16
to Kola Bay April 25 RA-66 from Kola Bay April 29
to Scotland 8 May
JW-67 from Scotland May 12
to Kola Bay May 20 RA-67 from Kola Bay May 23
to Scotland May 30
