The collision with the latest Soviet tanks forced the Germans to radically revise their tank-building programs. As you know, the largest tank that the Wehrmacht had at the beginning of World War II was the T-IV modification F (not to be confused with the F2!) Weighing only 22.3 tons, and the Germans sincerely believed that a combat vehicle of this weight would be enough for them. enough. T-III and T-IV fit perfectly into the concept of the blitzkrieg, as the German generals understood it, and the latter did not seek more. Of course, progress did not stand still, and German designers from Daimler-Benz, Krupp and MAN worked on a new medium tank project, but its weight should not exceed 20 tons.
In principle, the military did not mind getting a heavier tank to break through the enemy's defenses, but did not feel much need for it. The latter was expressed both in the absence of any intelligible technical specifications, and in the fact that no one seriously demanded a result from the manufacturers. E. Aders - at that time one of the leading German designers of tank equipment of the "Henschel" company, worked on a 30-ton "breakthrough tank" as early as 1937, but in 1941 this tank was infinitely far from completion. In fact, there were only two prototypes that did not even have their own turret, although one of them was still equipped with a T-IV turret. The armor of the "heavy tank" did not exceed 50 mm.
The T-34 and KV, for all their shortcomings, were an extremely unpleasant surprise for the German armed forces. It was quite obvious that the excellent visibility and ergonomics still cannot fully compensate for the relatively weak armor and armament of the "triplets" and "fours". As a result, the work on the "20-ton" and "30-ton" tanks was curtailed, and new tasks were put on the agenda of the German designers - in the shortest possible time for the companies "Henschel" and "Porsche" had to create a heavy tank weighing 45 tons, and "Daimler-Benz" and MAN received an order for a medium tank weighing 35 tons. The heavy tank later became the famous "Tiger", but we will look at the history of its creation some other time. The subject of the material offered to your attention is a medium tank, the design task of which was codenamed "Panther".
Is it correct to compare the Panther with the T-34?
The fact is that the combat vehicle created according to the "Panther" project, according to the initial idea of the Wehrmacht leadership, was supposed to solve the same tasks that were assigned to the "thirty-four" in the Red Army. In other words, before the meeting with the T-34, the German generals armed their tank divisions T-III and T-IV and were quite happy with them. The German strategy was a blitzkrieg, which provided for the rapid destruction of the enemy army by cutting it and encircling large military masses, followed by forcing the latter to surrender. For this, the German army needed powerful mobile troops capable of conducting mobile warfare, and deep operations behind enemy lines. The bulk of these troops were tank divisions, and until the invasion of the USSR, their tanks, "troikas" and "fours", quite effectively solved the entire spectrum of tasks facing them.
But the appearance of a tank with a 76, 2-mm cannon and armor, which protected well from the standard 37-mm anti-tank "beater", which even 50-mm artillery systems pierced from the second time to the third, made the capabilities of the T-III and T-IV insufficient. The Germans had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the T-34 both on the battlefields and in a non-combat situation, since a considerable number of "thirty-fours" came to them either completely intact or with minimal damage. Thus, the Germans were able to perfectly study the design of the T-34, see both the strengths and weaknesses of this tank of ours. And, which is not surprising at all, they wanted to get a tank that would organically combine the advantages of Soviet and German medium armored vehicles, without having their shortcomings. More specifically, they wanted to get a medium tank with a powerful 75-mm cannon, armor not inferior to that of the T-34 (that is, anti-shell by the standards of 1941), as well as a relatively spacious and ergonomic internal device for five crew members. And with a good view, of course.
Artillery
Dear M. B. Baryatinsky in his monograph "Panther" the Panzerwaffe steel cat "points to a 75-mm artillery system ordered by the Wehrmacht from the Rheinmetall company, capable of penetrating 140 mm of armor at a distance of a kilometer, and it was precisely such a weapon that was eventually installed on" Panther ".
In 1941, the situation with 75-mm anti-tank guns in Germany was as follows: in 1938-39. "Rheinmetall" and "Krupp" received a technical specification and an order for the creation of a promising 75-mm artillery system. And they were in no hurry with their creation, since in 1940 at the same "Rheinmetall" was ready only a non-firing prototype of the gun, which, by the way, was recognized as the best. However, it turned into a full-fledged artillery system only in 1942 - we are talking, of course, about the wonderful German Pak 40, but for all its merits, it certainly could not penetrate 140-mm armor at a distance of 1000 m. Even with a sub-caliber projectile. And so, in July 1941, the generals of the Wehrmacht came to the conclusion that even this promising, but not yet created weapon is no longer good enough for the newest medium tank. As a result, the tank analogue of the towed Pak 40 - KwK 40 with a barrel length of 43 and 48 calibers, received German self-propelled guns and T-IV, and for the "Panther" was made an enchanting power artillery system KwK 42.
KwK 40 L48 (that is, with a barrel length of 48 calibers) gave 6, 8 kg of the projectile an initial velocity of 790 m / s, and this was much, much more than the usual universal "three-inch": for example, the domestic F-34, which was armed with the T -34, reported 6, 3 kg. projectile only 655 m / s. But the long-barreled KwK 42 L70 sent a projectile of 6, 8 kg flying at a speed of 925 m / s! As a result, according to the tabular values, KwK 40 at a distance of a kilometer pierced 85 mm with an armor-piercing caliber and 95 mm with an APCR projectile, while KwK 42 - 111 and 149 mm, respectively! Judging by the widespread data, the KwK 42 surpassed in armor penetration even the 88-mm cannon of the Tiger tank at a distance of about 2 km, where the capabilities of their shells were approximately equal 75-mm "Panther"), in other sources you can find the figure 2,500 m.
The author has already written that for a real battle, it is not so much the tabular armor penetration that matters as the range of a direct shot. And, although the author does not have exact data on the KwK 42, it is quite obvious that in this parameter, too, it was superior to both the KwK 40 and the domestic 76, 2-mm artillery systems.
Reservation
In the last quarter of a century, if not more, the T-34's booking scheme has come under intense criticism. In the USSR, rational angles of inclination of armor plates were considered an unconditional benefit and advantage of the "thirty-four", but then many claims were revealed. Among which, for example, there were claims that such a slope of armor, of course, can provide a ricochet of enemy ammunition, but only if the caliber of this ammunition is not more than the thickness of the armor plate. From this point of view, the rational angles of 40-45 mm armor for the T-34 mod. 1940 lost their meaning already in the confrontation with 50-mm guns, not to mention the 75-mm.
Maybe, of course, it is so, but the opinion of the Germans on this issue is interesting. Having the opportunity to be convinced of the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 armor from their own experience and knowing perfectly well that the new Soviet tanks are armed with a 76, 2-mm cannon, for their promising tank they determined sufficient protection from 40 mm armor plates with rational angles of inclination.
Subsequently, during the creation of the tank, the armor protection was increased, but how? Consider the booking of the "Panther" in comparison with the T-34 mod. 1940 g.
As you can see, the Panther's forehead is much better protected. Frontal part (top) 85 mm thick and located at an angle of 55 degrees. It represented practically indestructible protection against Soviet artillery of 76, 2-mm and lower caliber at any reasonable distance. The same can be said about the lower armored part, which had the same angle of inclination, but less thickness - 65 mm. In the T-34, the angles of the upper and lower parts are approximately the same - 60 and 53 degrees, but their thickness is only 45 mm. The turret front of the Panther is 100 mm, and the cannon mask is even 110 mm, while the T-34 has only 40-45 mm.
Another advantage of the German tank is the armoring of the bottom. If for the T-34 it was 16 mm in the nose and 13 mm further, then for the "Panther" - respectively 30 and 17 mm. Obviously, this somewhat improved mine protection, although how much is difficult to say.
At the same time, oddly enough, the sides and sterns of the Panther are worse protected than those of the T-34. If we look at the diagram from top to bottom, we see that the thickness of the side of the turret of the German tank is 45 mm, the inclined hull sheet is 40 mm and the vertical hull sheet is 40 mm, while the T-34 has corresponding thicknesses of 45, 40 and 45 mm. It seems that the superiority is quite insignificant, but the slope angles of the Panther's armor are less rational - 25 degrees. for armor plates of the tower and 30 degrees. for the hull, while the T-34 has 30 and 40 degrees. respectively. In addition, in the T-34 of a later release (the same age as the Panther), the inclined armor plates of the hull side were reinforced up to 45 mm. As for the stern of the brainchild of the "gloomy Aryan genius", there the "Panther" was protected by 40 mm armor at an angle of 30 degrees, and the T-34 - 40 mm armor at an angle of 42-48 degrees.
Engine, transmission, chassis
At the stage of prototypes of the future "Panther" 2 approaches collided - "Daimler-Benz" "adopted" the Soviet scheme, according to which both the engine and the transmission were located in the rear of the tank, with the rear wheels driving. At the same time, MAN specialists proposed a traditional German layout: the engine was in the stern, and the gearbox and so on were in the nose, with the front wheels being the leading ones.
The clash of opinions led to the creation of the so-called "Panther Commission", which concluded that the traditional German scheme, although much more complex, was still better.
As for the engine, the "Daimlerians" were going to install a diesel of their own design on the tank, but the gasoline engine was much more acceptable for Germany. First of all, for the reason that most of the diesel fuel was absorbed by Kriegsmarine submarines, and therefore there was a fair deficit. As a result, the Panther received a 700-strong Maybach.
In general, driving the Panther after the eradication of inevitable childhood diseases was quite convenient and comfortable for the driver. But it cannot be said that the T-34 mod. 1943 there were some significant problems with this.
Good things come at a price
So, the German designers did a tremendous job on the mistakes and created a real masterpiece that combined the advantages of the German and Soviet schools of tank building.
At a distance of a direct shot, "Panther" hit the T-34 in any projection, while its protection in the forehead practically could not be penetrated by any Soviet 76, 2-mm gun, namely, they formed the basis of the Red Army anti-tank defense system. At the same time, the sides and rear of the "Panther" defended slightly worse than the "thirty-four". The Germans managed to combine rational angles of inclination of the armor with a spacious fighting compartment, comfortable for five crew members: of course, excellent German optics were also available. Not that here the T-34 was categorically inferior to the Panther, our sights were very good, but the German ones are still better.
But the weight of this miracle of engineering reached 44.8 tons, as a result of which it is no longer possible to speak of the Panther as a medium tank, which, in essence, is the key drawback of the Panther project. In an effort to create the perfect medium tank, German designers actually turned it into a heavy one. That, in fact, was the reason for a number of shortcomings of this "panzerwaffe cat".
The first of them is a large height, reaching 2,995 mm.
The fact is that with the German scheme, the torsion bars and the propeller shaft were placed between the bottom of the tank and the floor of the fighting compartment, which was not required for the T-34, which had both the engine and the transmission in the rear. In other words, the Germans had to, as it were, raise the fighting compartment and supplies, including fuel and ammunition above the bottom of the tank, in order to make room for the torsion bar and shaft, and this, naturally, made the German tank higher. On the one hand, it doesn't seem like such a big problem, the height of the tank. But this is if we forget that the range of a direct shot of any weapon is the greater, the higher its target.
The second drawback is the "chess" running gear, which became a real curse of the German tankers.
The Germans invented it in order to provide a heavy tank with good smoothness, and they achieved this. But such a chassis, which consisted of many rollers, was extremely heavy, much heavier than usual, and in addition, extremely inconvenient to operate, because in order to get to the rear rows of rollers, the front ones had to be removed. To be more precise, in order to remove only one roller of the inner row, it was necessary to dismantle from a third to half of the rollers of the outer row. And, of course, an example that wanders from one publication to another is a canonical example: about how the mud and snow that got clogged during the movement of the Panther between the rollers at night froze to such an extent that they blocked the rotation of the rollers, which made the tank lose its ability to move.
It must be said that the Soviet and American tanks of comparable weight - the IS-2 (46 tons) and the M26 Pershing were deprived of such an innovation and, nevertheless, coped quite well with their tasks. Yes, the movement of the "Panther" was probably smoother than those of these tanks, but what advantages in battle could this give? Now, if the German designers were able to ensure such a smoothness at which it would be possible to conduct aimed fire on the move - then yes, in this case, of course, one could say that "the game is worth the candle." However, nothing of the kind happened - like the tanks of the anti-Hitler coalition, the "Panther" could shoot accurately (that is, not only shoot, but also hit) only from the spot. In general, the smoothness of the movement of the German tanks, both "Panther" and "Tiger", was bought at an excessively high price - it was clearly not worth it. And the post-war experience of tank building confirmed this with all the evidence - despite the fact that the chassis of German tanks were very well studied, the "checkerboard" scheme did not gain further distribution.
The third drawback of the tank was the low maintainability of the transmission in the field. As mentioned above, the Germans deliberately went for the complication of the design in favor of quality, and the Panther's transmission was good - while it worked. But as soon as she was out of order, due to combat damage, or because of internal breakdowns, the tank needed factory repair. Trying to fix the Panther in the field was possible … but extremely difficult.
But, of course, the main drawback of the "Panther" was that during the design process it turned from a medium to a heavy tank."Why is this drawback so critical?" - the reader may ask: "Modern main battle tanks have a mass of over 40 and 50 tons, but the same domestic T-90 weighs 46.5 tons and feels great!"
This is so, but the problem is that the current level of technology and economies is slightly different from that which existed during the Second World War. And the first answer to the question why a heavy tank of the Great Patriotic War period cannot become the main one lies in the limitedness of its technical resource.
On the one hand, it seems to be somehow unfair to reproach the "Panther" with a capricious transmission, because in principle it was quite good: some "Panthers", according to the testimony of German tankers, managed to overcome up to 1,800 km on their own, without requiring major repairs … But this was still an exception, which only confirmed the rule that both the engine and the transmission of the tank suffered from numerous "childhood diseases", the elimination of which took the Germans about a year. And the combination of a structure difficult to repair with its well-known capriciousness obviously led to the fact that the Panther, in fact, turned out to be not a very suitable tank for mobile warfare, for deep tank raids.
The second fundamental drawback of a heavy tank, which they are trying to force to play in an unusual "weight category", is that a heavy tank, being much larger, more complex and more expensive than the average, a priori in those years could not be produced in quantities necessary to saturate tank divisions with them. … This is true for absolutely all countries, including, of course, Germany.
I must say that the "Panther" was conceived precisely as the main battle tank, which was supposed to replace the T-III and T-IV in the tank units of the Wehrmacht. But the complexity and high cost led to the fact that, despite the fact that the production of "Panthers" were engaged in factories of as many as 4 companies (MAN, Daimler-Benz, MNH and Henschel), it was impossible to provide a sufficient number of them. And Heinz Guderian, who at that time served as the chief inspector of the Wehrmacht's tank forces, after consulting with the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, had to moderate his appetites: only one battalion of each tank regiment was to be equipped with Panthers. Of course, these plans have also been revised.
In total, from February 1943 to February 1945 inclusive, the Germans, under the data of Müller-Hillebrand, produced 5,629 Panthers, not counting various equipment based on it. I must say that these data are not absolutely accurate, but nevertheless. But the T-IV over the same period was produced 7,471 units. "Triplets", the release of which was curtailed - 714 units. Thus, in the specified period, a total of 13 814 "Panthers" and "three rubles" with "fours" were produced, which in theory it should have replaced, and it turns out that "Panthers" were produced only slightly more than 40% of the total output of these three cars since the beginning of production of "Panther".
During the same period, the total production of T-34-76 and T-34-85 amounted to 31,804 vehicles.
Thus, "Panthers", on the one hand, could not become a full-fledged medium tank in any way - they simply could not be produced in the quantities required for this. But as a heavy tank, they also had significant disadvantages.
The first is, of course, booking. In 1942-43. the Germans launched the serial construction of a heavy tank with anti-cannon armor - we are, of course, talking about the "Tiger", which, thanks to the 80-100 mm armor that protects the front and sides of the tank, was hardly vulnerable to anti-tank and field artillery shells. The "Tiger" could very successfully push through the enemy's defense: it could be stopped, disabled, interrupting, say, a caterpillar, but it is extremely difficult to inflict really heavy damage on it. That is why, according to some sources, on the Kursk Bulge, each "Tiger" was knocked out on average 1, 9 times - but after that, having received field repairs, it returned to service.
But "Panther" could not boast of such a thing - the protection of its sides corresponded to the requirements of a medium tank, in 1943 it, of course, could not be considered anti-cannon-proof. And during the breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which was built with a "focal" anti-tank defense system capable of conducting crossfire at the advancing tanks from several positions, she could not, of course, turn towards all of them with her almost invulnerable frontal projection. In other words, all other things being equal, the "Panthers" in breaking through the enemy defense would have suffered significantly greater losses than the "Tigers".
Secondly, this is the caliber of the gun - although the 75-mm KwK 42 was quite enough for anti-tank battles, it was no longer necessary to defeat the entire range of targets that a heavy tank had to deal with. And about the armor penetration of the Germans, it seems, were tormented by vague doubts.
That is why, as a further direction of the Panther's development, already at the beginning of 1943, they saw the increase in the thickness of the side armor to 60 mm and the installation of an even more powerful 88-mm gun KwK43 L / 71 (Panther II project) than on the Tiger.
In general, the following can be said about the "Panther" - the German military design thought produced a very strange tank. Too big and complex to become the main combat vehicle of tank divisions, too capricious for "deep operations", not armored enough to break into enemy defenses, while until the very end of the war it was capable of effectively destroying any armored vehicles of the USSR and allies.
And here, in the opinion of the author of this article, lies the secret of the effectiveness of "Panthers". If we take the analysis of the use of these tanks, made by our specialists during the war years, we will see that:
"The tactics of using tanks" Panther "has the following features:
a) tanks are used in battle mainly on roads or in the area of roads;
b) tanks "Panther" are not used separately, but as a rule they are escorted by groups of medium tanks T-III and T-IV;
c) tanks "Panther" open fire from long distances, using their advantage in artillery armament, trying to prevent our tanks from approaching;
d) during the attack, the "panthers" move in one direction, without changing course, trying to use their advantage in frontal defense;
e) during the defense, the "Panther" tanks operate from ambushes;
f) when the "Panthers" retreat to the nearest shelter in reverse, trying not to expose the sides to artillery fire."
In other words, the Germans, in fact, used the Panthers in the offensive not as tanks, but as self-propelled artillery installations, the actions of which were supported by the usual "troikas" and "fours". And on the defensive, the Panthers were an excellent anti-tank self-propelled gun: realizing the direction of the main attack, the Germans could always prepare and meet ours at pre-prepared positions, “head-on”, shooting them from afar, preventing them from flanking for an attack.
In other words, the "Panthers", for a number of the above reasons, did not meet the requirements of the modern at that time mobile warfare, strategy and tactics of deep operations. But at the moment when the Wehrmacht began to receive them in some large quantities, there was no longer any talk about any deep operations - after the Kursk Bulge, where the Panthers debuted, the Wehrmacht finally and irrevocably lost its strategic initiative and could only defend itself. only snapping back with counterattacks. Germany had the issue of mobile defense on the agenda, and for her, the Panther turned out to be almost an ideal tank. Expensive and complex, but still not as much as the "Tiger", which means that it was produced in noticeably large quantities, with noticeably better mobility than the "Tiger", with an excellently protected frontal projection, with excellent armor penetration characteristics of the 75-mm cannon, "Panther" in its performance characteristics remarkably suited the role of anti-tank self-propelled guns - a mobile reserve for the defending troops.
In other words, the Panther was almost an ideal tank … for an army losing the war.
