Combat operations near the coast require support from naval artillery fire. It is not possible to provide fire support with Tomahawk cruise missiles. We have the most serious intentions about naval artillery.
- Lieutenant General Emile R. Bedard, United States Marine Corps
First, a few facts and statistics.
A third of the world's population lives in a coastal strip 50 km wide. More than half of the world's megacities are concentrated on the coast: London, Istanbul, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Shanghai, Tokyo …
The average range of naval artillery shots during Operation Desert Storm was 35,400 meters (guns of the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin).
The explosion of an 862 kg Mk.13 high-explosive projectile created a 15-meter crater 6 meters deep. Vietnam veterans recall how a blast wave cleared a "spot" in the jungle with a radius of 180 meters, suitable for a helicopter landing.
At a distance of 20 kilometers, the 1225-kg armor-piercing "suitcase" Mk.8 APC could penetrate half a meter of steel armor or over six meters of reinforced concrete - no fortification could withstand the power of 406 mm guns.
By analyzing the video recordings, it was established that the Iowa-class battleships could fire up to 1000 rounds with the main caliber in an hour. A similar density of fire could have been created by the air wings of two aircraft carriers.
According to the US Navy, the operating costs of the battleship Iowa were 7 times lower than those of the aircraft carrier Nimitz.
“Place the Aegis cruiser in the wake of the battleship and you will go wherever you want. Add an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred miles away and you have an unbeatable combat system."
- Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy, Admiral Carlisle Trost at the reactivation ceremony of the battleship "Wisconsin", October 1988
“When we passed the Strait of Hormuz, silence reigned on the Iranian coast. The war at sea ended completely"
- Captain Larry Sequist, commander of the battleship "Iowa" on the events of the Tanker War (mid-80s).
Battleship "Wisconsin"
Third-party expert opinions.
"Of your entire fleet, only the battleship looks like a real weapon."
- Sultan Qaboos bin Said.
"We are prepared to cover the costs of maintaining the two Iowa-class battleships to ensure they are able to maintain continuous combat patrols in the Persian Gulf for nine months a year."
- Address by the Sultan of Oman to US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Fall 1991
"The battleship's fire caused civilian casualties and cattle grazing in the valley."
- Information source in the Syrian army about the events in the Bekaa Valley (1983)
American intelligence claims the opposite: 300 shells from the battleship "New Jersey" silenced eight artillery batteries, shelling the Christian neighborhoods in western Beirut. The positions of the air defense missile system in the Bekaa valley were suppressed. One of the shells hit the command post, where the commander of the Syrian contingent in Lebanon was at that moment.
And again - dry statistics.
From the moment of receipt of the request to the first shot of naval artillery, no more than 2.5 minutes should pass - this is the standard of the United States Marine Corps, 1999 (Emergency Fire Support).
During the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia (1999), difficult weather conditions and poor visibility led to the partial or complete cancellation of 50% of sorties.
“The problem with aiming through the clouds has not been fully resolved; there is no guarantee of air strikes in difficult weather conditions."
- Lieutenant General E. Bedard on the critical shortcomings of aviation when performing tasks related to direct support of the troops.
A bit of history.
Between May 1951 and March 1952, US Navy ships fired at targets in the Korean Peninsula with 414,000 artillery ammunition (90% were five-inch rounds; the rest were six, eight, and sixteen inches). The current conflict between South Korea and the DPRK will require equally intense fire support from the sea.
In the period from 1965 to 1968. American ships fired over 1.1 million shells along the coast of Vietnam. This is already serious.
The battalions ask for fire
By the end of the 20th century, the fleet had completely lost its artillery with a caliber of more than 5 inches. The overwhelming majority of modern cruisers and destroyers have no more than one universal artillery mount of 76 - 130 mm caliber. The cannon is used as an auxiliary means for warning shots, shelling unprotected objects and finishing off "wounded".
The disappearance of large-caliber artillery did not mean the disappearance of the tasks traditionally solved by the cannons of ships. Yes, in the struggle at sea, artillery gave way to rocket weapons. But a wide gap remained in the solution of tasks in the “fleet against shore” format. Suppression of enemy defenses, direct fire support of amphibious assault forces and army units fighting near the coast. Traditional areas of application of "big guns".
At first, no one paid attention to this - everyone was carried away by missile weapons and the idea of a worldwide nuclear "holocaust". Suffice it to recall the means by which the Yankees were preparing to clear the enemy coast in the 60s - a missile with a nuclear warhead RIM-8B, which was part of the Talos naval air defense system (warhead capacity - 2 kt). Finally, the geopolitical situation itself did not contribute to the development of the idea of amphibious assault - the superpowers had allies in any region of the planet, through whose territory they burst "on a visit" to the enemy (Vietnam, Iraq - all according to the same scheme).
But there were exceptions - the Bekaa Valley or the Falklands War of 1982, when the sailors had no choice but to uncover their guns and fire a hundred volleys towards the coast. And if the Yankees were lucky in Lebanon - there was a reactivated battleship from the Second World War, then the British had a hard time. Of the naval artillery, only 114 mm "pukalki" remained, poorly suited for shelling the coast. The situation was saved only by the incompetent preparation of the enemy. If several tanks dug into the ground were on the shore, the results of the "duels" could be disastrous for Her Majesty's destroyers.
Destroyer "Cardiff" after the morning shelling of the coast
The US Marines were the first to sound the alarm. These guys had everything they needed to land from the sea: squadrons of universal amphibious ships and helicopter carriers, MLP naval transshipment terminals, high-speed transports and air-cushion landing craft. Amphibious armored vehicles, special equipment and weapons. Everything you need - except for fire support. The Pentagon offered its soldiers to "go chest-to-weight" on the machine guns of the unsuppressed enemy defense.
But how to suppress the defense? How to provide fire support to the landing forces?
Five-inch destroyer cannons?
The power of 30-kg shells is enough only to deal with unprotected manpower. Trying to use them to destroy long-term fortifications, prepared positions and infrastructure on the enemy's coast is a waste of resources and time. The firing range (20-25 km) also does not contribute to the effective use of five-inch guns: the mine threat prevents the approach to the coast, and the ship itself becomes vulnerable to enemy fire.
The use of small-caliber guns is justified during massive shelling and "cleansing" the enemy coast. But modern ships are not even capable of this: only one cannon per destroyer with 600 rounds of ammunition. There is no need to talk about any intensity of fire.
The creation of guided munitions will also not solve anything: a five-inch projectile is not capable of penetrating even a meter of reinforced concrete, and its high accuracy means little in comparison with large-caliber ammunition. The radius of destruction of 406-mm projectiles is in any case greater than the circular probable deviation of precision-guided ERGM ammunition.
Shot from a five-inch Mk. 45
For this reason, in the United States in 2008, work was curtailed to create long-range shells for sea "five-inch". The Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) program assumed the creation of a guided projectile with an estimated firing range of 110 km, but the chosen caliber was too small.
Finally, one should not neglect the psychological factor - the explosions of large-caliber shells can sow panic and lead to a mass exodus of enemy soldiers from the occupied territory. This has been proven more than once in practice.
Direct air support?
"All-weather aviation does not fly in bad weather" (Murphy's Law). In a snowstorm, fog or sandstorm, the landing is guaranteed to be left without fire support. The second important factor is reaction time: here only a combat air patrol, constantly hanging over the leading edge, can compete with the guns.
Sandstorm
American pilots felt they were the masters of the sky in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. But what happens in the event of a war with the DPRK or an amphibious landing on Iranian territory?
The Iranians may have modern air defense systems. The North Koreans have a huge number of anti-aircraft artillery barrels. This excludes flights at altitudes below 2 thousand meters, which in turn makes it difficult to use unguided weapons, makes it impossible to fly attack helicopters and exposes aviation at medium altitudes to anti-aircraft missile fire.
What is a developed air defense system, the Yankees know firsthand. Vietnam became a formidable warning from the past: according to official figures, the losses in that war amounted to 8,612 aircraft and helicopters.
American "aerocracy" is powerless against bad weather and S-300 anti-aircraft systems. Tomahawks are too expensive and few in number. Five-inch cannons do not have enough destructive power.
Only big guns can help the landing
To our displeasure, American naval commanders and engineers quickly reacted to the situation and offered several solutions to the problem at once. Among the proposals made were the following.
Fire support ship based on the landing transport "San Antonio" (LPD-17), armed with a pair of 155 mm AGS guns. A relatively cheap and angry option.
Landing transport dock type "San Antonio"
The second proposal is the missile and artillery destroyer Zamvolt. It was this option that subsequently got a start in life. It was planned that the Zamvolts would become the main type of US Navy destroyers (at least 30 units), but the exorbitant greed of the shipyard managers and the sophisticated design of the ship forced them to change plans in the direction of reducing the order. In total, no more than three Zamvolts will be built. A specific strike tool for local wars of the future.
Also among the proposals was a conservative option with the construction of an additional aircraft carrier (which was completely out of topic - the fleet needed guns). And, finally, a provocative initiative to build a missile and artillery … battleship.
German frigate "Hamburg" with a turret from the ACS Pz.2000 (caliber 155 mm)
Capital Surface Warship (CSW). Why not?
The estimated appearance of the ship is as follows.
360 missile launchers (below deck UVP Mk.41).
Several artillery towers with guns over twelve inches (305 mm or more). Modern projectiles with increased flight range and laser / GPS guidance (technologies developed under the ERGM program).
Five-inch (127 mm) caliber guns with increased storage capacity - for carrying out massive shelling of the coast and destroying unprotected targets.
Modern radars and fire control devices (similar to Aegis), complex ship automation.
All the presented splendor is chained in decimeter armor and enclosed in a hull with a total displacement of 57,000 tons.
The neolinkor concept was proposed by the Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in 2007.
Despite the seeming implausibility of such a ship, the CSW idea found wide support among sailors. Neolinkor has a simple and obvious solution for a number of important tasks: fire support (cheap, reliable and effective), peacetime demonstration of force (it is easy to imagine how fierce CSW will be). Due to its armament and the highest combat stability, the battleship will be the most important figure in the theater of operations. An invulnerable and immortal warrior who, by his very presence, inspires awe on the enemy and diverts significant resources to attempts to destroy such a ship.
On duty, I had to deal with many programs to improve the survivability of ships. It is my personal conviction that there is no more tenacious ship than a battleship.
- James O'Brien, Director of the Center for Fire Testing and Combat Damage Evaluation, US Department of Defense.
The conning tower of the battleship Massachusetts
But is it possible to combine the traditional elements of the dreadnought era with the technology of our time? On the technical side, the answer is overwhelmingly yes. The weight and size characteristics of modern weapons and mechanisms have decreased radically: on the CSW, each electric light, generator or switchboard will be several times lighter than similar devices on the battleship Iowa (1943). The released load reserve will not be wasted. The modern battleship will have even more impressive security and enhanced armament.
What is the main problem on the way of implementing the CSW idea?
Of course, the money needed to cover the costs of designing and building such an extraordinary ship. But how justified are the fears and doubts of skeptics?
Of course, CSW will not come cheap. Like its ancestors - battleships and battle cruisers - the capital ship will become an attribute of the fleets of the leading powers. The rest will quietly envy on the sidelines, avoiding situations where this power can turn against them.
Neolinkor is much smaller than a supercarrier (57 thousand versus 100 thousand tons) and, therefore, cannot be more expensive than an atomic giant with a superradar, electromagnetic catapults and a plasma garbage disposal system. The cost of the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, excluding the cost of its air wing, exceeds $ 13 billion. However, the colossal figure does not bother the military at all - the Fords are planned to be built in a series of 10-11 units at a rate of one ship in 4-5 years.
The aircraft carrier "Karl Vinson" passes the dock of the battleship "Missouri", Pearl Harbor
CSW proponents estimate that the development and construction of a neolinkor would cost close to $ 10 billion. At the same time:
The cost of operating a neolinkor is much closer to the cost of operating the missile cruiser Ticonderoga than to the cost of maintaining an aircraft carrier and its wing.
That being said, do not forget that the battleship will carry as many weapons as ten Ticonderogs and Orly Berks combined. In addition, it will have the highest combat resistance and a sinister reputation.
One of the prerequisites for the popularity of the CSW project was problems associated with the construction of the Zamvolt destroyer.
Two six-inch cannons firing at a range of 160 km. 80 vertical rocket launchers.
Alas, the remarkable concept of the missile and artillery ship was ruined by the monstrous level of technical performance. An attempt to make the 14,500-ton destroyer invisible, coupled with numerous innovations (a DBR radar with six AFARs, a water-jet propulsion unit, peripheral air defense units of a special design) - all this led to a natural result. The cost of Zamvolt, taking into account all R&D and construction of a prototype super destroyer on a scale of 1: 4, exceeded $ 7 billion.
USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
The top management of the US Navy is concerned about the exorbitant complexity and abnormally high cost of the destroyer. Doubts about the combat value of this ship, which, in line with its duty, will have to approach the enemy's coast by less than 100 miles, are growing louder. Nevertheless, the huge expensive ship is practically devoid of constructive protection (peripheral armored UVPs are no more than a Thai boxer's "shell"). Worse, the Zamvolt is largely devoid of active defense means: there are no long-range anti-aircraft missiles in the ammunition load, the ship does not carry any Phalanxes and RIM-116.
The Zamvolt is designed to remain invisible to the enemy. But there are situations when a fight is inevitable.
It is not hard to guess what will happen to the 7 billion Zamvolt in this case. It is not clear whether 150 sailors (such are the results of the total automation of the destroyer) will have enough strength to extinguish the fires and quickly repair the holes in the 180-meter hull.
Exceptionally high cost, questionable combat stability, small ammunition load (only 80 UVP and 920 shells in both packages).
The Yankees themselves are asking the obvious question: maybe it was worth stopping work on the deliberately hopeless project of an invisible destroyer. And instead of "white elephants" to build a pair of truly combat-ready ships capable of operating safely near the enemy coast and demolishing everything in their path from their huge cannons.
Capital warships CSW, best suited to the challenges of the new millennium.
“Battleships are designed to project their strength and survive in battle. They are capable of withstanding any form of aggression - like no other ship in our Navy. They are well armed and dominate the sea."
- Statement by Admiral Train in connection with the start of the program to reactivate old battleships
Chinese "battleship"
