In discussing the topic of what kind of navy Russia needs, many opponents spoke from this position: Russia cannot afford a large ocean fleet capable of destroying the enemy's merchant shipping, and it does not need ships of the near sea zone, which are already being built.
In my opinion, the coastal defense theory itself is absolutely flawed and cannot be the basis for the Russian navy, especially in light of the fact that NATO, led by the United States, which has the largest and most powerful military in the world, is listed as potential adversaries. by the navy. The American fleet is not only superior in the entire Russian Navy, taken together, it can also maneuver on its own on a global scale and can create numerical and qualitative superiority in any naval theater of operations. The Russian fleet, on the other hand, is divided into four separate and independent fleets, which cannot connect and act together as a united fleet. The reasons for this are purely geographical: three out of four fleets (Baltic, Black Sea and surface forces of the Pacific Fleet), in essence, are locked in the seas, the exits from which are controlled by the enemy. This circumstance creates an opportunity for the US Navy and the fleets of its many allies to smash the Russian Navy in parts.
In such conditions, betting on the defense of the coast and on the ships of the near sea zone is an initially failed strategy, transferring the initiative to the enemy and preparing the conditions for its own defeat. If the enemy has complete superiority, then he will undoubtedly cope with coastal defense against a fleet with very limited combat capabilities.
Understanding this important circumstance should have served as the basis for a complete revision of the naval doctrine and the development of some new versions of it, at least theoretically promising, if not victory, then at least a draw in a large-scale naval war. However, as I see it, many opponents do not have such an understanding. Therefore, a more detailed explanation of why the current naval strategy of Russia is unsuitable and generally absurd in places is required.
The balance of forces
The best example of this is the Baltic Fleet. Its current composition consists of two Project 11540 patrol ships (Neustrashimy and Yaroslav Mudry), 4 Project 20380 Guarding patrol ships of the near sea zone, 7 small missile ships, 6 small anti-submarine ships, 12 boats (including 7 small missile boats), 4 large landing ships of project 775, two small amphibious assault ships on an air cushion of project 12322 and 9 landing boats. There were also three Project 877 submarines, one of which was decommissioned in 2017, the other under repair, and only one, the B-806 Dmitrov, is in service. A total of 46 surface ships and one submarine in service.
It seems to be a lot. But everything is learned by comparison. The naval forces of the European NATO member states that go out to the Baltic Sea, that is, they are likely opponents of the Baltic Fleet, have the following composition:
Germany: 6 submarines, 8 frigates, 5 corvettes, 19 minesweepers.
Poland: 5 submarines, 2 frigates, one corvette, 3 missile boats.
Denmark: 4 ocean patrol ships, 3 frigates.
Norway: 6 submarines, 4 frigates, 6 corvettes, 6 minesweepers.
Estonia: 3 minesweepers.
Latvia: 4 minesweepers, 8 patrol ships.
Lithuania: 2 minesweepers, 4 patrol ships.
In total, they include 82 surface ships and 11 submarines. So even without the involvement of ships of other NATO members (USA, Great Britain, France, Italy), the fleets of the Baltic NATO member states are 1, 7 times superior to the Baltic Fleet in surface ships and 10 times in submarines.
In addition to them, there are also neutrals unfriendly to Russia: Sweden (5 submarines, 9 corvettes, 12 patrol boats, 20 minesweepers) and Finland (6 minelayers, 8 patrol ships, 13 minesweepers). Their neutrality is relative. Finland is not a member of NATO, but it is a member of the European Union and through it is included in military activity in Europe, as a whole, controlled by the NATO command. Sweden also actively cooperates with NATO, and in particular, the Swedish contingent was part of the international forces in Afghanistan. That is, in the event of a major war in the Baltic, these countries would rather side with NATO. Even being neutral, they will still oppose the Russian fleet.
It is also worth adding to this that the Baltic Fleet has no allies in the Baltic Sea, and the main forces of the fleet are concentrated on only one base in Baltiysk, which is surrounded on three sides by NATO member states (Poland and Lithuania) and is available for air and missile strikes. and also for the offensive of ground forces.
What will happen in case of war?
Now let's imagine the worst possible scenario imaginable. The NATO command started a large-scale war with Russia and, within its framework, set out to end the Baltic Fleet. For NATO, the Baltic Sea is an important and beneficial route for operations against Russia to supply ground forces by sea transport through the ports of the Baltic countries. Therefore, NATO will undoubtedly require that there are no more foreign fleets in the Baltic and no more threats to supply shipments.
The fact that the Baltic Fleet is basically huddled together at one base in Baltiysk already shows the most profitable option for its destruction: a missile salvo and a massive air raid to destroy ships in the base, as well as a dash of the ground group for the final capture of the base. NATO fleets are deploying at sea in a veil to intercept and destroy ships that may leave the base. For this, significant forces will undoubtedly be allocated, since the NATO command will strive to sink the Baltic fleet in the first hours of the war, and then transfer air forces to other tasks, in particular, to the battle over the Baltic states and for air supremacy.
And what can the Baltic Fleet do in such a situation? Essentially, nothing. He can either go to sea and take a fight in an attempt to sell his life at a higher price, or try to make his way into the Gulf of Finland - with very dubious chances of success. In a massive attack, the fleet will be destroyed in any case, perhaps before its death it will be able to inflict some damage to the enemy, which has almost no effect on the general course of hostilities.
In fact, it will be a battle in a trough, surrounded on all sides by superior enemy forces, without the possibility of dispersal and maneuver, and without much chance of survival.
You say coastal protection? Which one? It is pointless to defend the coast of the Kaliningrad region in the event of a major war, since the seizure of this territory for NATO is more profitable for a ground force. Protecting the coast of the Gulf of Finland? Well, the Baltic Fleet has yet to reach it and, most likely, it will not succeed. Even, let's say, some ships miraculously and luck broke through, but this will be achieved at the cost of losing the main naval base of the Baltic Fleet. Further, the enemy will block the exit from the Gulf of Finland with minefields and, having seized air supremacy over the Baltic states, will arrange something like a bombing range for ships.
That is why the concept of coastal defense in conditions of clear superiority of the enemy is absurd and can lead to nothing but defeat. Yes, such conclusions may be unpleasant to draw, but for whom is it easy? Even if some of your opponents are almost twice your strength and reinforcements may still approach them, then you cannot count on victory, and no hurray-patriotic slogans will cancel this and will not close it.
Absurdity needs to be abandoned as soon as possible
In general, I do not see such combat missions that the current Russian Baltic Fleet can perform in the event of war and with normal enemy opposition, even with ghostly chances of success.
The Soviet Baltic Fleet still had better conditions: the basing points from Leningrad to the mouth of the Elbe, the composition of forces three times larger than now, that is, there was the possibility of dispersal and maneuver. The fleet had clear tasks and had to ensure the offensive of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany deep into the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany north of the Central German Canal, supply it, prevent the NATO fleets from breaking through to the Baltic, and covered, in addition to its own aviation, also with the aviation of the 16th Air army stationed on the territory of the GDR. The Soviet Baltic Fleet also had allies: the fleets of the GDR and Poland. They write about him that in Soviet times the Baltic Fleet was not so good, but still, according to general conditions, it could contribute to the course of a big war.
It follows from this that this absurd concept of coastal defense must be quickly abandoned and the entire concept of the Baltic Fleet must be radically revised. I would suggest several points for such a revision.
First, the surface fleet in the Baltic needs to be reduced to a size that is determined by the tasks of the current coast guard. Surplus ships (especially landing ships) need to be transferred to other fleets, where they can find better use (Black Sea and Pacific).
Secondly, the Baltic Fleet should become predominantly an air fleet, since under the current conditions aviation is better suited both for combating enemy navies and for combating merchant shipping. It will be useful both for the general fight for air supremacy over the Baltic states, and for naval operations.
Thirdly, the actual naval forces need to be built up at the expense of all sorts of combat robots: boats, submarines, self-propelled mines and the like. This is a completely new field of naval weapons, in which there is still work to be done.
